mailman/mailman-sendmail.m4@0ba300bdf30a (annotated)
mailman/mailman-sendmail.m4
Mon, 20 Apr 2009 19:22:00 +0200
- author
- Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
- date
- Mon, 20 Apr 2009 19:22:00 +0200
- changeset 178
- 0ba300bdf30a
- permissions
- -rw-r--r--
Change unfortunate but partly useful overreaching security tradeoff.
The principle of allocating each running process an individual system
user and group can have security benefits, however maintining a plethora
of users, groups, processes, file modes, file permissions, and even
nonportable file ACLs on a host serving from a hundred processes has
some security disadvantages. This tradeoff is even worse for systems
like OpenPKG which benefit from administration transparency through the
use of minimal system intrusion and only three usage privilege levels.
| michael@7 | 1 | dnl |
| michael@7 | 2 | dnl mailman.m4: Mailman specific local mailer |
| michael@7 | 3 | dnl |
| michael@7 | 4 | |
| michael@7 | 5 | MAILER_DEFINITIONS |
| michael@7 | 6 | |
| michael@7 | 7 | ## Special flags! See: |
| michael@7 | 8 | ## http://www.sendmail.org/~ca/email/doc8.10/op-sh-5.html#sh-5.4 Note |
| michael@7 | 9 | ## especially the absence of the "m" and "n" flags. THIS IS IMPORTANT: |
| michael@7 | 10 | ## mailman handler assumes this behavior to avoid having to know too |
| michael@7 | 11 | ## much about address parsing and other RFC-2822 mail details. |
| michael@7 | 12 | |
| michael@7 | 13 | Mmailman, P=@l_prefix@/libexec/mailman/mail/mailman-sendmail, F=rDFMhlqSu, U=@l_nusr@:@l_ngrp@, |
| michael@7 | 14 | S=EnvFromL, R=EnvToL/HdrToL, |
| michael@7 | 15 | A=mailman-sendmail $h $u |
| michael@7 | 16 |
