Mon, 20 Apr 2009 19:22:00 +0200
Change unfortunate but partly useful overreaching security tradeoff.
The principle of allocating each running process an individual system
user and group can have security benefits, however maintining a plethora
of users, groups, processes, file modes, file permissions, and even
nonportable file ACLs on a host serving from a hundred processes has
some security disadvantages. This tradeoff is even worse for systems
like OpenPKG which benefit from administration transparency through the
use of minimal system intrusion and only three usage privilege levels.
michael@13 | 1 | ## |
michael@13 | 2 | ## @l_prefix@/etc/rc.conf -- Run-Command Configuration for OpenPKG Hierarchy |
michael@13 | 3 | ## |
michael@13 | 4 | ## This Bourne-Shell script is sourced from @l_prefix@/etc/rc after |
michael@13 | 5 | ## reading the %config sections from the @l_prefix@/etc/rc.d/rc.<name> |
michael@13 | 6 | ## script and before executing its %<cmd> section when |
michael@13 | 7 | ## "@l_prefix@/etc/rc <name> <cmd>" is run. You can use this to |
michael@13 | 8 | ## override all configuration variables which are listed in the output |
michael@13 | 9 | ## of the "@l_prefix@/etc/rc --config" command. By default this |
michael@13 | 10 | ## script obviously is empty. |
michael@13 | 11 | ## |
michael@13 | 12 |