Mon, 20 Apr 2009 19:22:00 +0200
Change unfortunate but partly useful overreaching security tradeoff.
The principle of allocating each running process an individual system
user and group can have security benefits, however maintining a plethora
of users, groups, processes, file modes, file permissions, and even
nonportable file ACLs on a host serving from a hundred processes has
some security disadvantages. This tradeoff is even worse for systems
like OpenPKG which benefit from administration transparency through the
use of minimal system intrusion and only three usage privilege levels.
1 Index: lib/timevar.c
2 --- lib/timevar.c.orig 2008-07-14 10:56:12 +0200
3 +++ lib/timevar.c 2008-11-03 19:16:04 +0100
4 @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
5 # include <sys/times.h>
6 #endif
7 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H
8 +#include <sys/time.h>
9 #include <sys/resource.h>
10 #endif
12 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Security Fix:
15 http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20080708155228&mode=flat&count=13
17 Index: data/yacc.c
18 --- data/yacc.c.orig 2008-11-02 19:09:10 +0100
19 +++ data/yacc.c 2008-11-03 19:16:04 +0100
20 @@ -1444,7 +1444,10 @@
21 users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
22 unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
23 GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
24 +if (yylen)
25 yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
26 +else
27 + memset(&yyval, 0, sizeof(yyval));
29 ]b4_locations_if(
30 [[ /* Default location. */