Mon, 20 Apr 2009 19:22:00 +0200
Change unfortunate but partly useful overreaching security tradeoff.
The principle of allocating each running process an individual system
user and group can have security benefits, however maintining a plethora
of users, groups, processes, file modes, file permissions, and even
nonportable file ACLs on a host serving from a hundred processes has
some security disadvantages. This tradeoff is even worse for systems
like OpenPKG which benefit from administration transparency through the
use of minimal system intrusion and only three usage privilege levels.
1 ##
2 ## @l_prefix@/.bash_login -- Local Bash Login Script
3 ##
5 # provide user and host information in default prompt
6 PS1="\u@\h\$ "
8 # environment permissions
9 umask 022
10 ulimit -c 16384
12 # history functionality
13 shopt -s histappend
14 HISTSIZE=100
15 HISTFILESIZE=100
17 # various additional variables
18 export TMPDIR=/tmp
19 export BLOCKSIZE=1024
21 # activate the bootstrapping Bourne-Shell
22 # environment of the OpenPKG hierarchy
23 eval `@l_prefix@/bin/openpkg rc --eval openpkg env`
25 # make sure some non-standard but usually
26 # important executable directories are active
27 test -d /usr/ccs/bin && PATH="$PATH:/usr/ccs/bin"
28 test -d /usr/local/bin && PATH="$PATH:/usr/local/bin"
30 # initially adjust $PWD to symbolic path
31 cd $HOME
33 # path to bash environment init script
34 BASH_ENV=$HOME/.bashrc
36 # source the standard environment script
37 . $BASH_ENV