Mon, 20 Apr 2009 19:22:00 +0200
Change unfortunate but partly useful overreaching security tradeoff.
The principle of allocating each running process an individual system
user and group can have security benefits, however maintining a plethora
of users, groups, processes, file modes, file permissions, and even
nonportable file ACLs on a host serving from a hundred processes has
some security disadvantages. This tradeoff is even worse for systems
like OpenPKG which benefit from administration transparency through the
use of minimal system intrusion and only three usage privilege levels.
1 Index: glob/glob.c
2 --- glob/glob.c.orig 2006-03-10 03:20:45 +0100
3 +++ glob/glob.c 2006-04-01 19:09:18 +0200
4 @@ -216,13 +216,13 @@
5 # ifdef HAVE_ALLOCA_H
6 # include <alloca.h>
7 # else /* Not HAVE_ALLOCA_H. */
8 -# ifndef _AIX
9 +# if !defined (_AIX) && !defined (__FreeBSD__)
10 # ifdef WINDOWS32
11 # include <malloc.h>
12 # else
13 extern char *alloca ();
14 # endif /* WINDOWS32 */
15 -# endif /* Not _AIX. */
16 +# endif /* Not _AIX && not __FreeBSD__. */
17 # endif /* sparc or HAVE_ALLOCA_H. */
18 # endif /* GCC. */
20 Index: make.h
21 --- make.h.orig 2006-02-16 00:54:43 +0100
22 +++ make.h 2006-04-01 19:09:18 +0200
23 @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
24 # ifdef _AIX
25 #pragma alloca
26 # else
27 -# ifndef alloca /* predefined by HP cc +Olibcalls */
28 +# if !defined (alloca) && !defined (__FreeBSD__) /* predefined by HP cc +Olibcalls, part of stdlib.h on FreeBSD */
29 char *alloca ();
30 # endif
31 # endif