toolkit/components/passwordmgr/InsecurePasswordUtils.jsm

Sat, 03 Jan 2015 20:18:00 +0100

author
Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date
Sat, 03 Jan 2015 20:18:00 +0100
branch
TOR_BUG_3246
changeset 7
129ffea94266
permissions
-rw-r--r--

Conditionally enable double key logic according to:
private browsing mode or privacy.thirdparty.isolate preference and
implement in GetCookieStringCommon and FindCookie where it counts...
With some reservations of how to convince FindCookie users to test
condition and pass a nullptr when disabling double key logic.

michael@0 1 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
michael@0 2 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
michael@0 3 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
michael@0 4
michael@0 5 this.EXPORTED_SYMBOLS = [ "InsecurePasswordUtils" ];
michael@0 6
michael@0 7 const Ci = Components.interfaces;
michael@0 8 const Cu = Components.utils;
michael@0 9 const Cc = Components.classes;
michael@0 10
michael@0 11 Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm");
michael@0 12 Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm");
michael@0 13
michael@0 14 XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetter(this, "devtools",
michael@0 15 "resource://gre/modules/devtools/Loader.jsm");
michael@0 16
michael@0 17 Object.defineProperty(this, "WebConsoleUtils", {
michael@0 18 get: function() {
michael@0 19 return devtools.require("devtools/toolkit/webconsole/utils").Utils;
michael@0 20 },
michael@0 21 configurable: true,
michael@0 22 enumerable: true
michael@0 23 });
michael@0 24
michael@0 25 const STRINGS_URI = "chrome://global/locale/security/security.properties";
michael@0 26 let l10n = new WebConsoleUtils.l10n(STRINGS_URI);
michael@0 27
michael@0 28 this.InsecurePasswordUtils = {
michael@0 29
michael@0 30 _sendWebConsoleMessage : function (messageTag, domDoc) {
michael@0 31 /*
michael@0 32 * All web console messages are warnings for now so I decided to set the
michael@0 33 * flag here and save a bit of the flag creation in the callers.
michael@0 34 * It's easy to expose this later if needed
michael@0 35 */
michael@0 36
michael@0 37 let windowId = WebConsoleUtils.getInnerWindowId(domDoc.defaultView);
michael@0 38 let category = "Insecure Password Field";
michael@0 39 let flag = Ci.nsIScriptError.warningFlag;
michael@0 40 let message = l10n.getStr(messageTag);
michael@0 41 let consoleMsg = Cc["@mozilla.org/scripterror;1"]
michael@0 42 .createInstance(Ci.nsIScriptError);
michael@0 43
michael@0 44 consoleMsg.initWithWindowID(
michael@0 45 message, "", 0, 0, 0, flag, category, windowId);
michael@0 46
michael@0 47 Services.console.logMessage(consoleMsg);
michael@0 48 },
michael@0 49
michael@0 50 /*
michael@0 51 * Checks whether the passed uri is secure
michael@0 52 * Check Protocol Flags to determine if scheme is secure:
michael@0 53 * URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA - e.g.
michael@0 54 * "mailto"
michael@0 55 * URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE - e.g.
michael@0 56 * "data",
michael@0 57 * "resource",
michael@0 58 * "moz-icon"
michael@0 59 * URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT - e.g.
michael@0 60 * "javascript"
michael@0 61 * URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT - e.g.
michael@0 62 * "https",
michael@0 63 * "moz-safe-about"
michael@0 64 *
michael@0 65 * The use of this logic comes directly from nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
michael@0 66 * At the time it was decided to include these protocols since a secure
michael@0 67 * uri for mixed content blocker means that the resource can't be
michael@0 68 * easily tampered with because 1) it is sent over an encrypted channel or
michael@0 69 * 2) it is a local resource that never hits the network
michael@0 70 * or 3) it is a request sent without any response that could alter
michael@0 71 * the behavior of the page. It was decided to include the same logic
michael@0 72 * here both to be consistent with MCB and to make sure we cover all
michael@0 73 * "safe" protocols. Eventually, the code here and the code in MCB
michael@0 74 * will be moved to a common location that will be referenced from
michael@0 75 * both places. Look at
michael@0 76 * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=899099 for more info.
michael@0 77 */
michael@0 78 _checkIfURIisSecure : function(uri) {
michael@0 79 let isSafe = false;
michael@0 80 let netutil = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/util;1"].getService(Ci.nsINetUtil);
michael@0 81 let ph = Ci.nsIProtocolHandler;
michael@0 82
michael@0 83 if (netutil.URIChainHasFlags(uri, ph.URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE) ||
michael@0 84 netutil.URIChainHasFlags(uri, ph.URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA) ||
michael@0 85 netutil.URIChainHasFlags(uri, ph.URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT) ||
michael@0 86 netutil.URIChainHasFlags(uri, ph.URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT)) {
michael@0 87
michael@0 88 isSafe = true;
michael@0 89 }
michael@0 90
michael@0 91 return isSafe;
michael@0 92 },
michael@0 93
michael@0 94 /*
michael@0 95 * Checks whether the passed nested document is insecure
michael@0 96 * or is inside an insecure parent document.
michael@0 97 *
michael@0 98 * We check the chain of frame ancestors all the way until the top document
michael@0 99 * because MITM attackers could replace https:// iframes if they are nested inside
michael@0 100 * http:// documents with their own content, thus creating a security risk
michael@0 101 * and potentially stealing user data. Under such scenario, a user might not
michael@0 102 * get a Mixed Content Blocker message, if the main document is served over HTTP
michael@0 103 * and framing an HTTPS page as it would under the reverse scenario (http
michael@0 104 * inside https).
michael@0 105 */
michael@0 106 _checkForInsecureNestedDocuments : function(domDoc) {
michael@0 107 let uri = domDoc.documentURIObject;
michael@0 108 if (domDoc.defaultView == domDoc.defaultView.parent) {
michael@0 109 // We are at the top, nothing to check here
michael@0 110 return false;
michael@0 111 }
michael@0 112 if (!this._checkIfURIisSecure(uri)) {
michael@0 113 // We are insecure
michael@0 114 return true;
michael@0 115 }
michael@0 116 // I am secure, but check my parent
michael@0 117 return this._checkForInsecureNestedDocuments(domDoc.defaultView.parent.document);
michael@0 118 },
michael@0 119
michael@0 120
michael@0 121 /*
michael@0 122 * Checks if there are insecure password fields present on the form's document
michael@0 123 * i.e. passwords inside forms with http action, inside iframes with http src,
michael@0 124 * or on insecure web pages. If insecure password fields are present,
michael@0 125 * a log message is sent to the web console to warn developers.
michael@0 126 */
michael@0 127 checkForInsecurePasswords : function (aForm) {
michael@0 128 var domDoc = aForm.ownerDocument;
michael@0 129 let pageURI = domDoc.defaultView.top.document.documentURIObject;
michael@0 130 let isSafePage = this._checkIfURIisSecure(pageURI);
michael@0 131
michael@0 132 if (!isSafePage) {
michael@0 133 this._sendWebConsoleMessage("InsecurePasswordsPresentOnPage", domDoc);
michael@0 134 }
michael@0 135
michael@0 136 // Check if we are on an iframe with insecure src, or inside another
michael@0 137 // insecure iframe or document.
michael@0 138 if (this._checkForInsecureNestedDocuments(domDoc)) {
michael@0 139 this._sendWebConsoleMessage("InsecurePasswordsPresentOnIframe", domDoc);
michael@0 140 }
michael@0 141
michael@0 142 if (aForm.action.match(/^http:\/\//)) {
michael@0 143 this._sendWebConsoleMessage("InsecureFormActionPasswordsPresent", domDoc);
michael@0 144 }
michael@0 145 },
michael@0 146 };

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