The Tor Browser: security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp@7e26c7da4463 (annotated)

security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp@7e26c7da4463 (annotated)

security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:55:50 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:55:50 +0100
changeset 2: 7e26c7da4463
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Added tag UPSTREAM_283F7C6 for changeset ca08bd8f51b2

 /* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
 /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 #include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include "ExtendedValidation.h"
 #include "OCSPRequestor.h"
 #include "certdb.h"
 #include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
 #include "nss.h"
 #include "ocsp.h"
 #include "pk11pub.h"
 #include "pkix/pkix.h"
 #include "prerror.h"
 #include "prmem.h"
 #include "prprf.h"
 #include "secerr.h"
 #include "secmod.h"
 using namespace mozilla::pkix;
 #ifdef PR_LOGGING
 extern PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog;
 #endif
 namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
 const char BUILTIN_ROOTS_MODULE_DEFAULT_NAME[] = "Builtin Roots Module";
 void PORT_Free_string(char* str) { PORT_Free(str); }
 namespace {
 typedef ScopedPtr<SECMODModule, SECMOD_DestroyModule> ScopedSECMODModule;
 } // unnamed namespace
 NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(SECTrustType certDBTrustType,
                                            OCSPFetching ocspFetching,
                                            OCSPCache& ocspCache,
                                            void* pinArg,
                                            CERTChainVerifyCallback* checkChainCallback)
   : mCertDBTrustType(certDBTrustType)
   , mOCSPFetching(ocspFetching)
   , mOCSPCache(ocspCache)
   , mPinArg(pinArg)
   , mCheckChainCallback(checkChainCallback)
 {
 }
 SECStatus
 NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FindPotentialIssuers(
   const SECItem* encodedIssuerName, PRTime time,
   /*out*/ mozilla::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList& results)
 {
   // TODO: normalize encodedIssuerName
   // TODO: NSS seems to be ambiguous between "no potential issuers found" and
   // "there was an error trying to retrieve the potential issuers."
   results = CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
                                        encodedIssuerName, time, true);
   return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
                                    SECOidTag policy,
                                    const CERTCertificate* candidateCert,
                                    /*out*/ TrustLevel* trustLevel)
 {
   PR_ASSERT(candidateCert);
   PR_ASSERT(trustLevel);
   if (!candidateCert || !trustLevel) {
     PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
 #ifdef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
   if (policy != SEC_OID_X509_ANY_POLICY) {
     PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
 #endif
   // XXX: CERT_GetCertTrust seems to be abusing SECStatus as a boolean, where
   // SECSuccess means that there is a trust record and SECFailure means there
   // is not a trust record. I looked at NSS's internal uses of
   // CERT_GetCertTrust, and all that code uses the result as a boolean meaning
   // "We have a trust record."
   CERTCertTrust trust;
   if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert, &trust) == SECSuccess) {
     PRUint32 flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, mCertDBTrustType);
     // For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
     // because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
     // CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
     // relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
     // distrusted.
     PRUint32 relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == MustBeCA ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
                                                           : CERTDB_TRUSTED;
     if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit|CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
             == CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
       *trustLevel = ActivelyDistrusted;
       return SECSuccess;
     }
     // For TRUST, we only use the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit, because Gecko hasn't
     // needed to consider end-entity certs to be their own trust anchors since
     // Gecko implemented nsICertOverrideService.
     if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA) {
       if (policy == SEC_OID_X509_ANY_POLICY) {
         *trustLevel = TrustAnchor;
         return SECSuccess;
       }
 #ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
       if (CertIsAuthoritativeForEVPolicy(candidateCert, policy)) {
         *trustLevel = TrustAnchor;
         return SECSuccess;
       }
 #endif
     }
   }
   *trustLevel = InheritsTrust;
   return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifySignedData(const CERTSignedData* signedData,
                                        const CERTCertificate* cert)
 {
   return ::mozilla::pkix::VerifySignedData(signedData, cert, mPinArg);
 }
 static PRIntervalTime
 OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching ocspFetching)
 {
   switch (ocspFetching) {
     case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail:
       return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
     case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV:
     case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail:
       return PR_SecondsToInterval(10);
     // The rest of these are error cases. Assert in debug builds, but return
     // the default value corresponding to 2 seconds in release builds.
     case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP:
     case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV:
       PR_NOT_REACHED("we should never see this OCSPFetching type here");
     default:
       PR_NOT_REACHED("we're not handling every OCSPFetching type");
   }
   return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
 }
 SECStatus
 NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(
   mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
   const CERTCertificate* cert,
   /*const*/ CERTCertificate* issuerCert,
   PRTime time,
   /*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse)
 {
   // Actively distrusted certificates will have already been blocked by
   // GetCertTrust.
   // TODO: need to verify that IsRevoked isn't called for trust anchors AND
   // that that fact is documented in mozillapkix.
   PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
          ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of CheckRevocation\n"));
   PORT_Assert(cert);
   PORT_Assert(issuerCert);
   if (!cert || !issuerCert) {
     PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   // Bug 991815: The BR allow OCSP for intermediates to be up to one year old.
   // Since this affects EV there is no reason why DV should be more strict
   // so all intermediatates are allowed to have OCSP responses up to one year
   // old.
   uint16_t maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 10;
   if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) {
     maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 365;
   }
   // If we have a stapled OCSP response then the verification of that response
   // determines the result unless the OCSP response is expired. We make an
   // exception for expired responses because some servers, nginx in particular,
   // are known to serve expired responses due to bugs.
   // We keep track of the result of verifying the stapled response but don't
   // immediately return failure if the response has expired.
   PRErrorCode stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode = 0;
   if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
     PR_ASSERT(endEntityOrCA == MustBeEndEntity);
     bool expired;
     SECStatus rv = VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(cert, issuerCert,
                                                           time,
                                                           maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
                                                           stapledOCSPResponse,
                                                           ResponseWasStapled,
                                                           expired);
     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
       // stapled OCSP response present and good
       Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 1);
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: good"));
       return rv;
     }
     stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode = PR_GetError();
     if (stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE ||
         expired) {
       // stapled OCSP response present but expired
       Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 3);
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: expired stapled OCSP response"));
     } else {
       // stapled OCSP response present but invalid for some reason
       Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 4);
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: failure"));
       return rv;
     }
   } else {
     // no stapled OCSP response
     Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, 2);
     PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
            ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no stapled OCSP response"));
   }
   PRErrorCode cachedResponseErrorCode = 0;
   PRTime cachedResponseValidThrough = 0;
   bool cachedResponsePresent = mOCSPCache.Get(cert, issuerCert,
                                               cachedResponseErrorCode,
                                               cachedResponseValidThrough);
   if (cachedResponsePresent) {
     if (cachedResponseErrorCode == 0 && cachedResponseValidThrough >= time) {
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: good"));
       return SECSuccess;
     }
     // If we have a cached revoked response, use it.
     if (cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: revoked"));
       PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     // The cached response may indicate an unknown certificate or it may be
     // expired. Don't return with either of these statuses yet - we may be
     // able to fetch a more recent one.
     PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
            ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: error %ld valid "
            "until %lld", cachedResponseErrorCode, cachedResponseValidThrough));
     // When a good cached response has expired, it is more convenient
     // to convert that to an error code and just deal with
     // cachedResponseErrorCode from here on out.
     if (cachedResponseErrorCode == 0 && cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
       cachedResponseErrorCode = SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
     }
     // We may have a cached indication of server failure. Ignore it if
     // it has expired.
     if (cachedResponseErrorCode != 0 &&
         cachedResponseErrorCode != SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT &&
         cachedResponseErrorCode != SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE &&
         cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
       cachedResponseErrorCode = 0;
       cachedResponsePresent = false;
     }
   } else {
     PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
            ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no cached OCSP response"));
   }
   // At this point, if and only if cachedErrorResponseCode is 0, there was no
   // cached response.
   PR_ASSERT((!cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseErrorCode == 0) ||
             (cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseErrorCode != 0));
   // TODO: We still need to handle the fallback for expired responses. But,
   // if/when we disable OCSP fetching by default, it would be ambiguous whether
   // security.OCSP.enable==0 means "I want the default" or "I really never want
   // you to ever fetch OCSP."
   if ((mOCSPFetching == NeverFetchOCSP) ||
       (endEntityOrCA == MustBeCA && (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail ||
                                      mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail))) {
     // We're not going to be doing any fetching, so if there was a cached
     // "unknown" response, say so.
     if (cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
       PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     // If we're doing hard-fail, we want to know if we have a cached response
     // that has expired.
     if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail &&
         cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
       PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
   }
   if (mOCSPFetching == LocalOnlyOCSPForEV) {
     PR_SetError(cachedResponseErrorCode != 0 ? cachedResponseErrorCode
                                              : SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   ScopedPtr<char, PORT_Free_string>
     url(CERT_GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(cert));
   if (!url) {
     if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForEV ||
         cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
       PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     if (cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
       PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     if (stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode != 0) {
       PR_SetError(stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     // Nothing to do if we don't have an OCSP responder URI for the cert; just
     // assume it is good. Note that this is the confusing, but intended,
     // interpretation of "strict" revocation checking in the face of a
     // certificate that lacks an OCSP responder URI.
     return SECSuccess;
   }
   ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
   if (!arena) {
     return SECFailure;
   }
   // Only request a response if we didn't have a cached indication of failure
   // (don't keep requesting responses from a failing server).
   const SECItem* response = nullptr;
   if (cachedResponseErrorCode == 0 ||
       cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
       cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
     const SECItem* request(CreateEncodedOCSPRequest(arena.get(), cert,
                                                     issuerCert));
     if (!request) {
       return SECFailure;
     }
     response = DoOCSPRequest(arena.get(), url.get(), request,
                              OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(mOCSPFetching));
   }
   if (!response) {
     PRErrorCode error = PR_GetError();
     if (error == 0) {
       error = cachedResponseErrorCode;
     }
     PRTime timeout = time + ServerFailureDelay;
     if (mOCSPCache.Put(cert, issuerCert, error, time, timeout) != SECSuccess) {
       return SECFailure;
     }
     PR_SetError(error, 0);
     if (mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure after "
               "OCSP request failure"));
       return SECFailure;
     }
     if (cachedResponseErrorCode == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from cached "
               "response after OCSP request failure"));
       PR_SetError(cachedResponseErrorCode, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     if (stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode != 0) {
       PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
              ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired "
               "stapled response after OCSP request failure"));
       PR_SetError(stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode, 0);
       return SECFailure;
     }
     PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
            ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECSuccess after "
             "OCSP request failure"));
     return SECSuccess; // Soft fail -> success :(
   }
   // If the response from the network has expired but indicates a revoked
   // or unknown certificate, PR_GetError() will return the appropriate error.
   // We actually ignore expired here.
   bool expired;
   SECStatus rv = VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(cert, issuerCert, time,
                                                         maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
                                                         response,
                                                         ResponseIsFromNetwork,
                                                         expired);
   if (rv == SECSuccess || mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
     PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
       ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning after VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse"));
     return rv;
   }
   PRErrorCode error = PR_GetError();
   if (error == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
       error == SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
     return rv;
   }
   if (stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode != 0) {
     PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
            ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired stapled "
             "response after OCSP request verification failure"));
     PR_SetError(stapledOCSPResponseErrorCode, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
          ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: end of CheckRevocation"));
   return SECSuccess; // Soft fail -> success :(
 }
 SECStatus
 NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(
   const CERTCertificate* cert, CERTCertificate* issuerCert, PRTime time,
   uint16_t maxLifetimeInDays, const SECItem* encodedResponse,
   EncodedResponseSource responseSource, /*out*/ bool& expired)
 {
   PRTime thisUpdate = 0;
   PRTime validThrough = 0;
   SECStatus rv = VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse(*this, cert, issuerCert, time,
                                            maxLifetimeInDays, encodedResponse,
                                            expired, &thisUpdate, &validThrough);
   PRErrorCode error = (rv == SECSuccess ? 0 : PR_GetError());
   // If a response was stapled and expired, we don't want to cache it. Return
   // early to simplify the logic here.
   if (responseSource == ResponseWasStapled && expired) {
     PR_ASSERT(rv != SECSuccess);
     return rv;
   }
   // validThrough is only trustworthy if the response successfully verifies
   // or it indicates a revoked or unknown certificate.
   // If this isn't the case, store an indication of failure (to prevent
   // repeatedly requesting a response from a failing server).
   if (rv != SECSuccess && error != SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
       error != SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
     validThrough = time + ServerFailureDelay;
   }
   if (responseSource == ResponseIsFromNetwork ||
       rv == SECSuccess ||
       error == SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE ||
       error == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
     PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
            ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: caching OCSP response"));
     if (mOCSPCache.Put(cert, issuerCert, error, thisUpdate, validThrough)
           != SECSuccess) {
       return SECFailure;
     }
   }
   // If the verification failed, re-set to that original error
   // (the call to Put may have un-set it).
   if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     PR_SetError(error, 0);
   }
   return rv;
 }
 SECStatus
 NSSCertDBTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const CERTCertList* certChain) {
   SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
   PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
       ("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of IsChainValid mCheckCallback=%p",
        mCheckChainCallback));
   if (!mCheckChainCallback) {
     return SECSuccess;
   }
   if (!mCheckChainCallback->isChainValid) {
     PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   PRBool chainOK;
   rv = (mCheckChainCallback->isChainValid)(mCheckChainCallback->isChainValidArg,
                                            certChain, &chainOK);
   if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     return rv;
   }
   // rv = SECSuccess only implies successful call, now is time
   // to check the chain check status
   // we should only return success if the chain is valid
   if (chainOK) {
     return SECSuccess;
   }
   PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_APPLICATION_CALLBACK_ERROR, 0);
   return SECFailure;
 }
 namespace {
 static char*
 nss_addEscape(const char* string, char quote)
 {
   char* newString = 0;
   int escapes = 0, size = 0;
   const char* src;
   char* dest;
   for (src = string; *src; src++) {
   if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
     escapes++;
   }
   size++;
   }
   newString = (char*) PORT_ZAlloc(escapes + size + 1);
   if (!newString) {
     return nullptr;
   }
   for (src = string, dest = newString; *src; src++, dest++) {
     if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
       *dest++ = '\\';
     }
     *dest = *src;
   }
   return newString;
 }
 } // unnamed namespace
 SECStatus
 InitializeNSS(const char* dir, bool readOnly)
 {
   // The NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT flag turns off the loading of the root certs
   // module by NSS_Initialize because we will load it in InstallLoadableRoots
   // later.  It also allows us to work around a bug in the system NSS in
   // Ubuntu 8.04, which loads any nonexistent "<configdir>/libnssckbi.so" as
   // "/usr/lib/nss/libnssckbi.so".
   uint32_t flags = NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE;
   if (readOnly) {
     flags |= NSS_INIT_READONLY;
   }
   return ::NSS_Initialize(dir, "", "", SECMOD_DB, flags);
 }
 void
 DisableMD5()
 {
   NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_MD5,
 , NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
   NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
 , NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
   NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC,
 , NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
 }
 SECStatus
 LoadLoadableRoots(/*optional*/ const char* dir, const char* modNameUTF8)
 {
   PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
   if (!modNameUTF8) {
     PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   ScopedPtr<char, PR_FreeLibraryName> fullLibraryPath(
     PR_GetLibraryName(dir, "nssckbi"));
   if (!fullLibraryPath) {
     return SECFailure;
   }
   ScopedPtr<char, PORT_Free_string> escaped_fullLibraryPath(
     nss_addEscape(fullLibraryPath.get(), '\"'));
   if (!escaped_fullLibraryPath) {
     return SECFailure;
   }
   // If a module exists with the same name, delete it.
   int modType;
   SECMOD_DeleteModule(modNameUTF8, &modType);
   ScopedPtr<char, PR_smprintf_free> pkcs11ModuleSpec(
     PR_smprintf("name=\"%s\" library=\"%s\"", modNameUTF8,
                 escaped_fullLibraryPath.get()));
   if (!pkcs11ModuleSpec) {
     return SECFailure;
   }
   ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_LoadUserModule(pkcs11ModuleSpec.get(),
                                                        nullptr, false));
   if (!rootsModule) {
     return SECFailure;
   }
   if (!rootsModule->loaded) {
     PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   return SECSuccess;
 }
 void
 UnloadLoadableRoots(const char* modNameUTF8)
 {
   PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
   ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_FindModule(modNameUTF8));
   if (rootsModule) {
     SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(rootsModule.get());
   }
 }
 void
 SetClassicOCSPBehavior(CertVerifier::ocsp_download_config enabled,
                        CertVerifier::ocsp_strict_config strict,
                        CertVerifier::ocsp_get_config get)
 {
   CERT_DisableOCSPDefaultResponder(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());
   if (enabled == CertVerifier::ocsp_off) {
     CERT_DisableOCSPChecking(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());
   } else {
     CERT_EnableOCSPChecking(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());
   }
   SEC_OcspFailureMode failureMode = strict == CertVerifier::ocsp_strict
                                   ? ocspMode_FailureIsVerificationFailure
                                   : ocspMode_FailureIsNotAVerificationFailure;
   (void) CERT_SetOCSPFailureMode(failureMode);
   CERT_ForcePostMethodForOCSP(get != CertVerifier::ocsp_get_enabled);
   int OCSPTimeoutSeconds = 3;
   if (strict == CertVerifier::ocsp_strict) {
     OCSPTimeoutSeconds = 10;
   }
   CERT_SetOCSPTimeout(OCSPTimeoutSeconds);
 }
 char*
 DefaultServerNicknameForCert(CERTCertificate* cert)
 {
   char* nickname = nullptr;
   int count;
   bool conflict;
   char* servername = nullptr;
   servername = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
   if (!servername) {
     // Certs without common names are strange, but they do exist...
     // Let's try to use another string for the nickname
     servername = CERT_GetOrgUnitName(&cert->subject);
     if (!servername) {
       servername = CERT_GetOrgName(&cert->subject);
       if (!servername) {
         servername = CERT_GetLocalityName(&cert->subject);
         if (!servername) {
           servername = CERT_GetStateName(&cert->subject);
           if (!servername) {
             servername = CERT_GetCountryName(&cert->subject);
             if (!servername) {
               // We tried hard, there is nothing more we can do.
               // A cert without any names doesn't really make sense.
               return nullptr;
             }
           }
         }
       }
     }
   }
   count = 1;
   while (1) {
     if (count == 1) {
       nickname = PR_smprintf("%s", servername);
     }
     else {
       nickname = PR_smprintf("%s #%d", servername, count);
     }
     if (!nickname) {
       break;
     }
     conflict = SEC_CertNicknameConflict(nickname, &cert->derSubject,
                                         cert->dbhandle);
     if (!conflict) {
       break;
     }
     PR_Free(nickname);
     count++;
   }
   PR_FREEIF(servername);
   return nickname;
 }
 void
 SaveIntermediateCerts(const ScopedCERTCertList& certList)
 {
   if (!certList) {
     return;
   }
   bool isEndEntity = true;
   for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
         !CERT_LIST_END(node, certList);
         node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
     if (isEndEntity) {
       // Skip the end-entity; we only want to store intermediates
       isEndEntity = false;
       continue;
     }
     if (node->cert->slot) {
       // This cert was found on a token, no need to remember it in the temp db.
       continue;
     }
     if (node->cert->isperm) {
       // We don't need to remember certs already stored in perm db.
       continue;
     }
     // We have found a signer cert that we want to remember.
     char* nickname = DefaultServerNicknameForCert(node->cert);
     if (nickname && *nickname) {
       ScopedPtr<PK11SlotInfo, PK11_FreeSlot> slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
       if (slot) {
         PK11_ImportCert(slot.get(), node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
                         nickname, false);
       }
     }
     PR_FREEIF(nickname);
   }
 }
 } } // namespace mozilla::psm

The Tor Browser / annotate

security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp@7e26c7da4463 (annotated)

security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp