The Tor Browser: netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c@ac0c01689b40 (annotated)

netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c@ac0c01689b40 (annotated)

netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c

Thu, 15 Jan 2015 15:59:08 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 15:59:08 +0100
branch: TOR_BUG_9701
changeset 10: ac0c01689b40
permissions: -rwxr-xr-x

Implement a real Private Browsing Mode condition by changing the API/ABI;
This solves Tor bug #9701, complying with disk avoidance documented in
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#disk-avoidance.

 /*-
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2008, by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Randall Stewart. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Michael Tuexen. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
  *
  * a) Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
  *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * b) Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
  * c) Neither the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its
  *    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
  *    from this software without specific prior written permission.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
  * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
  * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
  * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
  * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
  * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
  * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
  * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
  * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #ifdef __FreeBSD__
 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD: head/sys/netinet/sctp_auth.c 257804 2013-11-07 18:50:11Z tuexen $");
 #endif
 #include <netinet/sctp_os.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp_header.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp_pcb.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp_var.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp_sysctl.h>
 #include <netinet/sctputil.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp_indata.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp_output.h>
 #include <netinet/sctp_auth.h>
 #ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
 #define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG		(SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1)
 #define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG2	(SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2)
 #endif /* SCTP_DEBUG */
 void
 sctp_clear_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist)
 {
 	bzero(chklist, sizeof(*chklist));
 	/* chklist->num_chunks = 0; */
 }
 sctp_auth_chklist_t *
 sctp_alloc_chunklist(void)
 {
 	sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist;
 	SCTP_MALLOC(chklist, sctp_auth_chklist_t *, sizeof(*chklist),
 		    SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
 	if (chklist == NULL) {
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "sctp_alloc_chunklist: failed to get memory!\n");
 	} else {
 		sctp_clear_chunklist(chklist);
 	}
 	return (chklist);
 }
 void
 sctp_free_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
 {
 	if (list != NULL)
 		SCTP_FREE(list, SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
 }
 sctp_auth_chklist_t *
 sctp_copy_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
 {
 	sctp_auth_chklist_t *new_list;
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 	/* get a new list */
 	new_list = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
 	if (new_list == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 	/* copy it */
 	bcopy(list, new_list, sizeof(*new_list));
 	return (new_list);
 }
 /*
  * add a chunk to the required chunks list
  */
 int
 sctp_auth_add_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
 {
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* is chunk restricted? */
 	if ((chunk == SCTP_INITIATION) ||
 	    (chunk == SCTP_INITIATION_ACK) ||
 	    (chunk == SCTP_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) ||
 	    (chunk == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION)) {
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	if (list->chunks[chunk] == 0) {
 		list->chunks[chunk] = 1;
 		list->num_chunks++;
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP: added chunk %u (0x%02x) to Auth list\n",
 			chunk, chunk);
 	}
 	return (0);
 }
 /*
  * delete a chunk from the required chunks list
  */
 int
 sctp_auth_delete_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
 {
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* is chunk restricted? */
 	if ((chunk == SCTP_ASCONF) ||
 	    (chunk == SCTP_ASCONF_ACK)) {
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	if (list->chunks[chunk] == 1) {
 		list->chunks[chunk] = 0;
 		list->num_chunks--;
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP: deleted chunk %u (0x%02x) from Auth list\n",
 			chunk, chunk);
 	}
 	return (0);
 }
 size_t
 sctp_auth_get_chklist_size(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
 {
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (0);
 	else
 		return (list->num_chunks);
 }
 /*
  * set the default list of chunks requiring AUTH
  */
 void
 sctp_auth_set_default_chunks(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
 {
 	(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(SCTP_ASCONF, list);
 	(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(SCTP_ASCONF_ACK, list);
 }
 /*
  * return the current number and list of required chunks caller must
  * guarantee ptr has space for up to 256 bytes
  */
 int
 sctp_serialize_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
 {
 	int i, count = 0;
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (0);
 	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
 		if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
 			*ptr++ = i;
 			count++;
 		}
 	}
 	return (count);
 }
 int
 sctp_pack_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
 {
 	int i, size = 0;
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (0);
 	if (list->num_chunks <= 32) {
 		/* just list them, one byte each */
 		for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
 			if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
 				*ptr++ = i;
 				size++;
 			}
 		}
 	} else {
 		int index, offset;
 		/* pack into a 32 byte bitfield */
 		for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
 			if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
 				index = i / 8;
 				offset = i % 8;
 				ptr[index] |= (1 << offset);
 			}
 		}
 		size = 32;
 	}
 	return (size);
 }
 int
 sctp_unpack_auth_chunks(const uint8_t *ptr, uint8_t num_chunks,
     sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
 {
 	int i;
 	int size;
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (0);
 	if (num_chunks <= 32) {
 		/* just pull them, one byte each */
 		for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
 			(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(*ptr++, list);
 		}
 		size = num_chunks;
 	} else {
 		int index, offset;
 		/* unpack from a 32 byte bitfield */
 		for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
 			for (offset = 0; offset < 8; offset++) {
 				if (ptr[index] & (1 << offset)) {
 					(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk((index * 8) + offset, list);
 				}
 			}
 		}
 		size = 32;
 	}
 	return (size);
 }
 /*
  * allocate structure space for a key of length keylen
  */
 sctp_key_t *
 sctp_alloc_key(uint32_t keylen)
 {
 	sctp_key_t *new_key;
 	SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_key_t *, sizeof(*new_key) + keylen,
 		    SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
 	if (new_key == NULL) {
 		/* out of memory */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	new_key->keylen = keylen;
 	return (new_key);
 }
 void
 sctp_free_key(sctp_key_t *key)
 {
 	if (key != NULL)
 		SCTP_FREE(key,SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
 }
 void
 sctp_print_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
 {
 	uint32_t i;
 	if (key == NULL) {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
 		return;
 	}
 	SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
 	if (key->keylen) {
 		for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
 			SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
 	} else {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
 	}
 }
 void
 sctp_show_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
 {
 	uint32_t i;
 	if (key == NULL) {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
 		return;
 	}
 	SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
 	if (key->keylen) {
 		for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
 			SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
 	} else {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
 	}
 }
 static uint32_t
 sctp_get_keylen(sctp_key_t *key)
 {
 	if (key != NULL)
 		return (key->keylen);
 	else
 		return (0);
 }
 /*
  * generate a new random key of length 'keylen'
  */
 sctp_key_t *
 sctp_generate_random_key(uint32_t keylen)
 {
 	sctp_key_t *new_key;
 	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
 	if (new_key == NULL) {
 		/* out of memory */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, keylen);
 	new_key->keylen = keylen;
 	return (new_key);
 }
 sctp_key_t *
 sctp_set_key(uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen)
 {
 	sctp_key_t *new_key;
 	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
 	if (new_key == NULL) {
 		/* out of memory */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	bcopy(key, new_key->key, keylen);
 	return (new_key);
 }
 /*-
  * given two keys of variable size, compute which key is "larger/smaller"
  * returns:  1 if key1 > key2
  *          -1 if key1 < key2
  *           0 if key1 = key2
  */
 static int
 sctp_compare_key(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2)
 {
 	uint32_t maxlen;
 	uint32_t i;
 	uint32_t key1len, key2len;
 	uint8_t *key_1, *key_2;
 	uint8_t val1, val2;
 	/* sanity/length check */
 	key1len = sctp_get_keylen(key1);
 	key2len = sctp_get_keylen(key2);
 	if ((key1len == 0) && (key2len == 0))
 		return (0);
 	else if (key1len == 0)
 		return (-1);
 	else if (key2len == 0)
 		return (1);
 	if (key1len < key2len) {
 		maxlen = key2len;
 	} else {
 		maxlen = key1len;
 	}
 	key_1 = key1->key;
 	key_2 = key2->key;
 	/* check for numeric equality */
 	for (i = 0; i < maxlen; i++) {
 		/* left-pad with zeros */
 		val1 = (i < (maxlen - key1len)) ? 0 : *(key_1++);
 		val2 = (i < (maxlen - key2len)) ? 0 : *(key_2++);
 		if (val1 > val2) {
  			return (1);
 		} else if (val1 < val2) {
  			return (-1);
 		}
 	}
 	/* keys are equal value, so check lengths */
 	if (key1len == key2len)
 		return (0);
 	else if (key1len < key2len)
 		return (-1);
 	else
 		return (1);
 }
 /*
  * generate the concatenated keying material based on the two keys and the
  * shared key (if available). draft-ietf-tsvwg-auth specifies the specific
  * order for concatenation
  */
 sctp_key_t *
 sctp_compute_hashkey(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2, sctp_key_t *shared)
 {
 	uint32_t keylen;
 	sctp_key_t *new_key;
 	uint8_t *key_ptr;
 	keylen = sctp_get_keylen(key1) + sctp_get_keylen(key2) +
 	    sctp_get_keylen(shared);
 	if (keylen > 0) {
 		/* get space for the new key */
 		new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
 		if (new_key == NULL) {
 			/* out of memory */
 			return (NULL);
 		}
 		new_key->keylen = keylen;
 		key_ptr = new_key->key;
 	} else {
 		/* all keys empty/null?! */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	/* concatenate the keys */
 	if (sctp_compare_key(key1, key2) <= 0) {
 		/* key is shared + key1 + key2 */
 		if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
 			bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen);
 			key_ptr += shared->keylen;
 		}
 		if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
 			bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen);
 			key_ptr += key1->keylen;
 		}
 		if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
 			bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen);
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* key is shared + key2 + key1 */
 		if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
 			bcopy(shared->key, key_ptr, shared->keylen);
 			key_ptr += shared->keylen;
 		}
 		if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
 			bcopy(key2->key, key_ptr, key2->keylen);
 			key_ptr += key2->keylen;
 		}
 		if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
 			bcopy(key1->key, key_ptr, key1->keylen);
 		}
 	}
 	return (new_key);
 }
 sctp_sharedkey_t *
 sctp_alloc_sharedkey(void)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *new_key;
 	SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_sharedkey_t *, sizeof(*new_key),
 		    SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
 	if (new_key == NULL) {
 		/* out of memory */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	new_key->keyid = 0;
 	new_key->key = NULL;
 	new_key->refcount = 1;
 	new_key->deactivated = 0;
 	return (new_key);
 }
 void
 sctp_free_sharedkey(sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
 {
 	if (skey == NULL)
 		return;
 	if (SCTP_DECREMENT_AND_CHECK_REFCOUNT(&skey->refcount)) {
 		if (skey->key != NULL)
 			sctp_free_key(skey->key);
 		SCTP_FREE(skey, SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
 	}
 }
 sctp_sharedkey_t *
 sctp_find_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys, uint16_t key_id)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
 		if (skey->keyid == key_id)
 			return (skey);
 	}
 	return (NULL);
 }
 int
 sctp_insert_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys,
 		      sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	if ((shared_keys == NULL) || (new_skey == NULL))
 		return (EINVAL);
 	/* insert into an empty list? */
 	if (LIST_EMPTY(shared_keys)) {
 		LIST_INSERT_HEAD(shared_keys, new_skey, next);
 		return (0);
 	}
 	/* insert into the existing list, ordered by key id */
 	LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
 		if (new_skey->keyid < skey->keyid) {
 			/* insert it before here */
 			LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
 			return (0);
 		} else if (new_skey->keyid == skey->keyid) {
 			/* replace the existing key */
 			/* verify this key *can* be replaced */
 			if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
 				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 					"can't replace shared key id %u\n",
 					new_skey->keyid);
 				return (EBUSY);
 			}
 			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 				"replacing shared key id %u\n",
 				new_skey->keyid);
 			LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
 			LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
 			sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
 			return (0);
 		}
 		if (LIST_NEXT(skey, next) == NULL) {
 			/* belongs at the end of the list */
 			LIST_INSERT_AFTER(skey, new_skey, next);
 			return (0);
 		}
 	}
 	/* shouldn't reach here */
 	return (0);
 }
 void
 sctp_auth_key_acquire(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	/* find the shared key */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
 	/* bump the ref count */
 	if (skey) {
 		atomic_add_int(&skey->refcount, 1);
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
 			"%s: stcb %p key %u refcount acquire to %d\n",
 			__FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
 	}
 }
 void
 sctp_auth_key_release(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id, int so_locked
 #if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING)
 	SCTP_UNUSED
 #endif
 )
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	/* find the shared key */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
 	/* decrement the ref count */
 	if (skey) {
 		sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
 			"%s: stcb %p key %u refcount release to %d\n",
 			__FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
 		/* see if a notification should be generated */
 		if ((skey->refcount <= 1) && (skey->deactivated)) {
 			/* notify ULP that key is no longer used */
 			sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb,
 					key_id, 0, so_locked);
 			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
 				"%s: stcb %p key %u no longer used, %d\n",
 				__FUNCTION__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
 		}
 	}
 }
 static sctp_sharedkey_t *
 sctp_copy_sharedkey(const sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey;
 	if (skey == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 	new_skey = sctp_alloc_sharedkey();
 	if (new_skey == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 	if (skey->key != NULL)
 		new_skey->key = sctp_set_key(skey->key->key, skey->key->keylen);
 	else
 		new_skey->key = NULL;
 	new_skey->keyid = skey->keyid;
 	return (new_skey);
 }
 int
 sctp_copy_skeylist(const struct sctp_keyhead *src, struct sctp_keyhead *dest)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey, *new_skey;
 	int count = 0;
 	if ((src == NULL) || (dest == NULL))
 		return (0);
 	LIST_FOREACH(skey, src, next) {
 		new_skey = sctp_copy_sharedkey(skey);
 		if (new_skey != NULL) {
 			(void)sctp_insert_sharedkey(dest, new_skey);
 			count++;
 		}
 	}
 	return (count);
 }
 sctp_hmaclist_t *
 sctp_alloc_hmaclist(uint8_t num_hmacs)
 {
 	sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
 	int alloc_size;
 	alloc_size = sizeof(*new_list) + num_hmacs * sizeof(new_list->hmac[0]);
 	SCTP_MALLOC(new_list, sctp_hmaclist_t *, alloc_size,
 		    SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
 	if (new_list == NULL) {
 		/* out of memory */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	new_list->max_algo = num_hmacs;
 	new_list->num_algo = 0;
 	return (new_list);
 }
 void
 sctp_free_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
 {
 	if (list != NULL) {
 		SCTP_FREE(list,SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
 		list = NULL;
 	}
 }
 int
 sctp_auth_add_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t hmac_id)
 {
 	int i;
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	if (list->num_algo == list->max_algo) {
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP: HMAC id list full, ignoring add %u\n", hmac_id);
 		return (-1);
 	}
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	if ((hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) &&
 	    (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256)) {
 #else
 	if (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
 #endif
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	/* Now is it already in the list */
 	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
 		if (list->hmac[i] == hmac_id) {
 			/* already in list */
 			return (-1);
 		}
 	}
 	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "SCTP: add HMAC id %u to list\n", hmac_id);
 	list->hmac[list->num_algo++] = hmac_id;
 	return (0);
 }
 sctp_hmaclist_t *
 sctp_copy_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
 {
 	sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
 	int i;
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 	/* get a new list */
 	new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(list->max_algo);
 	if (new_list == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 	/* copy it */
 	new_list->max_algo = list->max_algo;
 	new_list->num_algo = list->num_algo;
 	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
 		new_list->hmac[i] = list->hmac[i];
 	return (new_list);
 }
 sctp_hmaclist_t *
 sctp_default_supported_hmaclist(void)
 {
 	sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(2);
 #else
 	new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(1);
 #endif
 	if (new_list == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	/* We prefer SHA256, so list it first */
 	(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256);
 #endif
 	(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1);
 	return (new_list);
 }
 /*-
  * HMAC algos are listed in priority/preference order
  * find the best HMAC id to use for the peer based on local support
  */
 uint16_t
 sctp_negotiate_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *peer, sctp_hmaclist_t *local)
 {
 	int i, j;
 	if ((local == NULL) || (peer == NULL))
 		return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
 	for (i = 0; i < peer->num_algo; i++) {
 		for (j = 0; j < local->num_algo; j++) {
 			if (peer->hmac[i] == local->hmac[j]) {
 				/* found the "best" one */
 				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 					"SCTP: negotiated peer HMAC id %u\n",
 					peer->hmac[i]);
 				return (peer->hmac[i]);
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	/* didn't find one! */
 	return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
 }
 /*-
  * serialize the HMAC algo list and return space used
  * caller must guarantee ptr has appropriate space
  */
 int
 sctp_serialize_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
 {
 	int i;
 	uint16_t hmac_id;
 	if (list == NULL)
 		return (0);
 	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
 		hmac_id = htons(list->hmac[i]);
 		bcopy(&hmac_id, ptr, sizeof(hmac_id));
 		ptr += sizeof(hmac_id);
 	}
 	return (list->num_algo * sizeof(hmac_id));
 }
 int
 sctp_verify_hmac_param (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs, uint32_t num_hmacs)
 {
 	uint32_t i;
 	for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
 		if (ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]) == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
 	 		return (0);
 		}
 	}
 	return (-1);
 }
 sctp_authinfo_t *
 sctp_alloc_authinfo(void)
 {
 	sctp_authinfo_t *new_authinfo;
 	SCTP_MALLOC(new_authinfo, sctp_authinfo_t *, sizeof(*new_authinfo),
 		    SCTP_M_AUTH_IF);
 	if (new_authinfo == NULL) {
 		/* out of memory */
 		return (NULL);
 	}
 	bzero(new_authinfo, sizeof(*new_authinfo));
 	return (new_authinfo);
 }
 void
 sctp_free_authinfo(sctp_authinfo_t *authinfo)
 {
 	if (authinfo == NULL)
 		return;
 	if (authinfo->random != NULL)
 		sctp_free_key(authinfo->random);
 	if (authinfo->peer_random != NULL)
 		sctp_free_key(authinfo->peer_random);
 	if (authinfo->assoc_key != NULL)
 		sctp_free_key(authinfo->assoc_key);
 	if (authinfo->recv_key != NULL)
 		sctp_free_key(authinfo->recv_key);
 	/* We are NOT dynamically allocating authinfo's right now... */
 	/* SCTP_FREE(authinfo, SCTP_M_AUTH_??); */
 }
 uint32_t
 sctp_get_auth_chunk_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
 {
 	int size;
 	size = sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk) + sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
 	return (SCTP_SIZE32(size));
 }
 uint32_t
 sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
 {
 	switch (hmac_algo) {
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
 		return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA1);
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
 		return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256);
 #endif
 	default:
 		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
 		return (0);
 	} /* end switch */
 }
 static inline int
 sctp_get_hmac_block_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
 {
 	switch (hmac_algo) {
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
 		return (64);
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
 		return (64);
 #endif
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
 	default:
 		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
 		return (0);
 	} /* end switch */
 }
 #if defined(__Userspace__)
 /* __Userspace__ SHA1_Init is defined in libcrypto.a (libssl-dev on Ubuntu) */
 #endif
 static void
 sctp_hmac_init(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx)
 {
 	switch (hmac_algo) {
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
 		SCTP_SHA1_INIT(&ctx->sha1);
 		break;
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
 		SCTP_SHA256_INIT(&ctx->sha256);
 		break;
 #endif
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
 	default:
 		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
 		return;
 	} /* end switch */
 }
 static void
 sctp_hmac_update(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
     uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen)
 {
 	switch (hmac_algo) {
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
 		SCTP_SHA1_UPDATE(&ctx->sha1, text, textlen);
 		break;
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
 		SCTP_SHA256_UPDATE(&ctx->sha256, text, textlen);
 		break;
 #endif
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
 	default:
 		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
 		return;
 	} /* end switch */
 }
 static void
 sctp_hmac_final(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
     uint8_t *digest)
 {
 	switch (hmac_algo) {
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
 		SCTP_SHA1_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha1);
 		break;
 #if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
 		SCTP_SHA256_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha256);
 		break;
 #endif
 	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
 	default:
 		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
 		return;
 	} /* end switch */
 }
 /*-
  * Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication: FIPS 198 (RFC 2104)
  *
  * Compute the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
  * algorithm.  Resulting digest is placed in 'digest' and digest length
  * is returned, if the HMAC was performed.
  *
  * WARNING: it is up to the caller to supply sufficient space to hold the
  * resultant digest.
  */
 uint32_t
 sctp_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
     uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
 {
 	uint32_t digestlen;
 	uint32_t blocklen;
 	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
 	uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128];	/* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
 	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	uint32_t i;
 	/* sanity check the material and length */
 	if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (text == NULL) ||
 	    (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
 		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
 		return (0);
 	}
 	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
 	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (digestlen == 0)
 		return (0);
 	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
 	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (keylen > blocklen) {
 		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
 		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
 		/* set the hashed key as the key */
 		keylen = digestlen;
 		key = temp;
 	}
 	/* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
 	bzero(ipad, blocklen);
 	bzero(opad, blocklen);
 	bcopy(key, ipad, keylen);
 	bcopy(key, opad, keylen);
 	/* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
 	for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
 		ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
 		opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
 	}
 	/* perform inner hash */
 	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, text, textlen);
 	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
 	/* perform outer hash */
 	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
 	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
 	return (digestlen);
 }
 /* mbuf version */
 uint32_t
 sctp_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
     struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest, uint32_t trailer)
 {
 	uint32_t digestlen;
 	uint32_t blocklen;
 	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
 	uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128];	/* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
 	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	uint32_t i;
 	struct mbuf *m_tmp;
 	/* sanity check the material and length */
 	if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
 		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
 		return (0);
 	}
 	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
 	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (digestlen == 0)
 		return (0);
 	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
 	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (keylen > blocklen) {
 		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
 		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
 		/* set the hashed key as the key */
 		keylen = digestlen;
 		key = temp;
 	}
 	/* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
 	bzero(ipad, blocklen);
 	bzero(opad, blocklen);
 	bcopy(key, ipad, keylen);
 	bcopy(key, opad, keylen);
 	/* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
 	for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
 		ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
 		opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
 	}
 	/* perform inner hash */
 	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
 	/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start of text) */
 	m_tmp = m;
 	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
 		m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
 		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 	/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain for the text */
 	while (m_tmp != NULL) {
 		if ((SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp) == NULL) && trailer) {
 			sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
 					 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - (trailer+m_offset));
 		} else {
 			sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
 					 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
 		}
 		/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
 		m_offset = 0;
 		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
 	/* perform outer hash */
 	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
 	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
 	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
 	return (digestlen);
 }
 /*-
  * verify the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
  * algorithm.
  * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success.
  */
 int
 sctp_verify_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
     uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen,
     uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen)
 {
 	uint32_t len;
 	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	/* sanity check the material and length */
 	if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) ||
 	    (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
 		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest */
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	len = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
 	if ((len == 0) || (digestlen != len))
 		return (-1);
 	/* compute the expected hash */
 	if (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key, keylen, text, textlen, temp) != len)
 		return (-1);
 	if (memcmp(digest, temp, digestlen) != 0)
 		return (-1);
 	else
 		return (0);
 }
 /*
  * computes the requested HMAC using a key struct (which may be modified if
  * the keylen exceeds the HMAC block len).
  */
 uint32_t
 sctp_compute_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, uint8_t *text,
     uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
 {
 	uint32_t digestlen;
 	uint32_t blocklen;
 	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
 	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	/* sanity check */
 	if ((key == NULL) || (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) ||
 	    (digest == NULL)) {
 		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
 		return (0);
 	}
 	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
 	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (digestlen == 0)
 		return (0);
 	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
 	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
 		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
 		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
 		/* save the hashed key as the new key */
 		key->keylen = digestlen;
 		bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen);
 	}
 	return (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, text, textlen,
 	    digest));
 }
 /* mbuf version */
 uint32_t
 sctp_compute_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, struct mbuf *m,
     uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest)
 {
 	uint32_t digestlen;
 	uint32_t blocklen;
 	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
 	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	/* sanity check */
 	if ((key == NULL) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
 		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
 		return (0);
 	}
 	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
 	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (digestlen == 0)
 		return (0);
 	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
 	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
 	if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
 		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
 		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
 		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
 		/* save the hashed key as the new key */
 		key->keylen = digestlen;
 		bcopy(temp, key->key, key->keylen);
 	}
 	return (sctp_hmac_m(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, m, m_offset, digest, 0));
 }
 int
 sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t id)
 {
 	int i;
 	if ((list == NULL) || (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD))
 		return (0);
 	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
 		if (list->hmac[i] == id)
 			return (1);
 	/* not in the list */
 	return (0);
 }
 /*-
  * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id on an association.
  * the cached key(s) will be recomputed and re-cached at next use.
  * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
  */
 void
 sctp_clear_cachedkeys(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	if (stcb == NULL)
 		return;
 	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) {
 		sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
 		stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key = NULL;
 	}
 	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid) {
 		sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
 		stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key = NULL;
 	}
 }
 /*-
  * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id for all assocs on
  * an endpoint.
  * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
  */
 void
 sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	struct sctp_tcb *stcb;
 	if (inp == NULL)
 		return;
 	/* clear the cached keys on all assocs on this instance */
 	LIST_FOREACH(stcb, &inp->sctp_asoc_list, sctp_tcblist) {
 		SCTP_TCB_LOCK(stcb);
 		sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
 		SCTP_TCB_UNLOCK(stcb);
 	}
 }
 /*-
  * delete a shared key from an association
  * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
  */
 int
 sctp_delete_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	if (stcb == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
 	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
 		return (-1);
 	/* does the key exist? */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
 	if (skey == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
 	if (skey->refcount > 1)
 		return (-1);
 	/* remove it */
 	LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
 	sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */
 	/* clear any cached keys */
 	sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
 	return (0);
 }
 /*-
  * deletes a shared key from the endpoint
  * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
  */
 int
 sctp_delete_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	if (inp == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
 	if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
 		return (-1);
 	/* does the key exist? */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
 	if (skey == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
 	/* remove it */
 	LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
 	sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */
 	/* clear any cached keys */
 	sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(inp, keyid);
 	return (0);
 }
 /*-
  * set the active key on an association
  * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
  */
 int
 sctp_auth_setactivekey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey = NULL;
 	/* find the key on the assoc */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
 	if (skey == NULL) {
 		/* that key doesn't exist */
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
 		/* can't reactivate a deactivated key with other refcounts */
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	/* set the (new) active key */
 	stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = keyid;
 	/* reset the deactivated flag */
 	skey->deactivated = 0;
 	return (0);
 }
 /*-
  * set the active key on an endpoint
  * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
  */
 int
 sctp_auth_setactivekey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	/* find the key */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
 	if (skey == NULL) {
 		/* that key doesn't exist */
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid = keyid;
 	return (0);
 }
 /*-
  * deactivates a shared key from the association
  * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
  */
 int
 sctp_deact_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	if (stcb == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
 	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
 		return (-1);
 	/* does the key exist? */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
 	if (skey == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
 	if (skey->refcount == 1) {
 		/* no other users, send a notification for this key */
 		sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb, keyid, 0,
 				SCTP_SO_LOCKED);
 	}
 	/* mark the key as deactivated */
 	skey->deactivated = 1;
 	return (0);
 }
 /*-
  * deactivates a shared key from the endpoint
  * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
  */
 int
 sctp_deact_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	if (inp == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
 	if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
 		return (-1);
 	/* does the key exist? */
 	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
 	if (skey == NULL)
 		return (-1);
 	/* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
 	/* remove it */
 	LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
 	sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */
 	return (0);
 }
 /*
  * get local authentication parameters from cookie (from INIT-ACK)
  */
 void
 sctp_auth_get_cookie_params(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *m,
     uint32_t offset, uint32_t length)
 {
 	struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, tmp_param;
 	uint16_t plen, ptype;
 	uint8_t random_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
 	struct sctp_auth_random *p_random = NULL;
 	uint16_t random_len = 0;
 	uint8_t hmacs_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
 	struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs = NULL;
 	uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
 	uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
 	struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
 	uint16_t num_chunks = 0;
 	sctp_key_t *new_key;
 	uint32_t keylen;
 	/* convert to upper bound */
 	length += offset;
 	phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset,
 	    sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
 	while (phdr != NULL) {
 		ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
 		plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
 		if ((plen == 0) || (offset + plen > length))
 			break;
 		if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
 			if (plen > sizeof(random_store))
 				break;
 			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
 			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)random_store, min(plen, sizeof(random_store)));
 			if (phdr == NULL)
 				return;
 			/* save the random and length for the key */
 			p_random = (struct sctp_auth_random *)phdr;
 			random_len = plen - sizeof(*p_random);
 		} else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
 			int num_hmacs;
 			int i;
 			if (plen > sizeof(hmacs_store))
 				break;
 			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
 			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)hmacs_store, min(plen,sizeof(hmacs_store)));
 			if (phdr == NULL)
 				return;
 			/* save the hmacs list and num for the key */
 			hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
 			hmacs_len = plen - sizeof(*hmacs);
 			num_hmacs = hmacs_len / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
 			if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL)
 				sctp_free_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
 			stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(num_hmacs);
 			if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
 				for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
 					(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
 					    ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]));
 				}
 			}
 		} else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
 			int i;
 			if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store))
 				break;
 			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
 			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store, min(plen,sizeof(chunks_store)));
 			if (phdr == NULL)
 				return;
 			chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
 			num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
 			/* save chunks list and num for the key */
 			if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL)
 				sctp_clear_chunklist(stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
 			else
 				stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
 			for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
 				(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(chunks->chunk_types[i],
 				    stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
 			}
 		}
 		/* get next parameter */
 		offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
 		if (offset + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) > length)
 			break;
 		phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr),
 		    (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
 	}
 	/* concatenate the full random key */
 	keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len + sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len;
 	if (chunks != NULL) {
 		keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
 	}
 	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
 	if (new_key != NULL) {
 	    /* copy in the RANDOM */
 	    if (p_random != NULL) {
 		keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len;
 		bcopy(p_random, new_key->key, keylen);
 	    }
 	    /* append in the AUTH chunks */
 	    if (chunks != NULL) {
 		bcopy(chunks, new_key->key + keylen,
 		      sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks);
 		keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
 	    }
 	    /* append in the HMACs */
 	    if (hmacs != NULL) {
 		bcopy(hmacs, new_key->key + keylen,
 		      sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len);
 	    }
 	}
 	if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
 	    sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
 	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
 	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
 	sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
 	sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
 	/* negotiate what HMAC to use for the peer */
 	stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id = sctp_negotiate_hmacid(stcb->asoc.peer_hmacs,
 	    stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
 	/* copy defaults from the endpoint */
 	/* FIX ME: put in cookie? */
 	stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
 	/* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
 	(void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
 				 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
 }
 /*
  * compute and fill in the HMAC digest for a packet
  */
 void
 sctp_fill_hmac_digest_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t auth_offset,
     struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth, struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
 {
 	uint32_t digestlen;
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	sctp_key_t *key;
 	if ((stcb == NULL) || (auth == NULL))
 		return;
 	/* zero the digest + chunk padding */
 	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id);
 	bzero(auth->hmac, SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
 	/* is the desired key cached? */
 	if ((keyid != stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) ||
 	    (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key == NULL)) {
 		if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key != NULL) {
 			/* free the old cached key */
 			sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
 		}
 		skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
 		/* the only way skey is NULL is if null key id 0 is used */
 		if (skey != NULL)
 			key = skey->key;
 		else
 			key = NULL;
 		/* compute a new assoc key and cache it */
 		stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key =
 		    sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
 					 stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, key);
 		stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid = keyid;
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "caching key id %u\n",
 			stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
 #ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
 		if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
 			sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
 				       "Assoc Key");
 #endif
 	}
 	/* set in the active key id */
 	auth->shared_key_id = htons(keyid);
 	/* compute and fill in the digest */
 	(void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
 				  m, auth_offset, auth->hmac);
 }
 static void
 sctp_bzero_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint32_t size)
 {
 	struct mbuf *m_tmp;
 	uint8_t *data;
 	/* sanity check */
 	if (m == NULL)
 		return;
 	/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start position) */
 	m_tmp = m;
 	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
 		m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
 		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 	/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain */
 	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (size > 0)) {
 		data = mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset;
 		if (size > (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp)) {
 			bzero(data, SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp));
 			size -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
 		} else {
 			bzero(data, size);
 			size = 0;
 		}
 		/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
 		m_offset = 0;
 		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
 	}
 }
 /*-
  * process the incoming Authentication chunk
  * return codes:
  *   -1 on any authentication error
  *    0 on authentication verification
  */
 int
 sctp_handle_auth(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
     struct mbuf *m, uint32_t offset)
 {
 	uint16_t chunklen;
 	uint16_t shared_key_id;
 	uint16_t hmac_id;
 	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
 	uint32_t digestlen;
 	uint8_t digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	/* auth is checked for NULL by caller */
 	chunklen = ntohs(auth->ch.chunk_length);
 	if (chunklen < sizeof(*auth)) {
 		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauth);
 	/* get the auth params */
 	shared_key_id = ntohs(auth->shared_key_id);
 	hmac_id = ntohs(auth->hmac_id);
 	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 		"SCTP AUTH Chunk: shared key %u, HMAC id %u\n",
 		shared_key_id, hmac_id);
 	/* is the indicated HMAC supported? */
 	if (!sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, hmac_id)) {
 		struct mbuf *m_err;
 		struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *err;
 		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalhmacid);
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP Auth: unsupported HMAC id %u\n",
 			hmac_id);
 		/*
 		 * report this in an Error Chunk: Unsupported HMAC
 		 * Identifier
 		 */
 		m_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(*err), 0, M_NOWAIT,
 , MT_HEADER);
 		if (m_err != NULL) {
 			/* pre-reserve some space */
 			SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(m_err, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
 			/* fill in the error */
 			err = mtod(m_err, struct sctp_auth_invalid_hmac *);
 			bzero(err, sizeof(*err));
 			err->ph.param_type = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_UNSUPPORTED_HMACID);
 			err->ph.param_length = htons(sizeof(*err));
 			err->hmac_id = ntohs(hmac_id);
 			SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_err) = sizeof(*err);
 			/* queue it */
 			sctp_queue_op_err(stcb, m_err);
 		}
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	/* get the indicated shared key, if available */
 	if ((stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key == NULL) ||
 	    (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)) {
 		/* find the shared key on the assoc first */
 		skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys,
 					   shared_key_id);
 		/* if the shared key isn't found, discard the chunk */
 		if (skey == NULL) {
 			SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalkeyid);
 			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 				"SCTP Auth: unknown key id %u\n",
 				shared_key_id);
 			return (-1);
 		}
 		/* generate a notification if this is a new key id */
 		if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)
 			/*
 			 * sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_NEW_KEY, stcb,
 			 * shared_key_id, (void
 			 * *)stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
 			 */
 			sctp_notify_authentication(stcb, SCTP_AUTH_NEW_KEY,
 			    shared_key_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid,
 			    SCTP_SO_NOT_LOCKED);
 		/* compute a new recv assoc key and cache it */
 		if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key != NULL)
 			sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
 		stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key =
 		    sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
 		    stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, skey->key);
 		stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid = shared_key_id;
 #ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
 		if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
 			sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key, "Recv Key");
 #endif
 	}
 	/* validate the digest length */
 	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_id);
 	if (chunklen < (sizeof(*auth) + digestlen)) {
 		/* invalid digest length */
 		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP Auth: chunk too short for HMAC\n");
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	/* save a copy of the digest, zero the pseudo header, and validate */
 	bcopy(auth->hmac, digest, digestlen);
 	sctp_bzero_m(m, offset + sizeof(*auth), SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
 	(void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key,
 	    m, offset, computed_digest);
 	/* compare the computed digest with the one in the AUTH chunk */
 	if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
 		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP Auth: HMAC digest check failed\n");
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	return (0);
 }
 /*
  * Generate NOTIFICATION
  */
 void
 sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
 			   uint16_t keyid, uint16_t alt_keyid, int so_locked
 #if !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(SCTP_SO_LOCK_TESTING)
 	SCTP_UNUSED
 #endif
 )
 {
 	struct mbuf *m_notify;
 	struct sctp_authkey_event *auth;
 	struct sctp_queued_to_read *control;
 	if ((stcb == NULL) ||
 	   (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_GONE) ||
 	   (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_ALLGONE) ||
 	   (stcb->asoc.state & SCTP_STATE_CLOSED_SOCKET)
 		) {
 		/* If the socket is gone we are out of here */
 		return;
 	}
 	if (sctp_stcb_is_feature_off(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_AUTHEVNT))
 		/* event not enabled */
 		return;
 	m_notify = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event),
 , M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
 	if (m_notify == NULL)
 		/* no space left */
 		return;
 	SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = 0;
 	auth = mtod(m_notify, struct sctp_authkey_event *);
 	auth->auth_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
 	auth->auth_flags = 0;
 	auth->auth_length = sizeof(*auth);
 	auth->auth_keynumber = keyid;
 	auth->auth_altkeynumber = alt_keyid;
 	auth->auth_indication = indication;
 	auth->auth_assoc_id = sctp_get_associd(stcb);
 	SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = sizeof(*auth);
 	SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_notify) = NULL;
 	/* append to socket */
 	control = sctp_build_readq_entry(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination,
 , 0, stcb->asoc.context, 0, 0, 0, m_notify);
 	if (control == NULL) {
 		/* no memory */
 		sctp_m_freem(m_notify);
 		return;
 	}
 	control->spec_flags = M_NOTIFICATION;
 	control->length = SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify);
 	/* not that we need this */
 	control->tail_mbuf = m_notify;
 	sctp_add_to_readq(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, control,
 	    &stcb->sctp_socket->so_rcv, 1, SCTP_READ_LOCK_NOT_HELD, so_locked);
 }
 /*-
  * validates the AUTHentication related parameters in an INIT/INIT-ACK
  * Note: currently only used for INIT as INIT-ACK is handled inline
  * with sctp_load_addresses_from_init()
  */
 int
 sctp_validate_init_auth_params(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int limit)
 {
 	struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, parm_buf;
 	uint16_t ptype, plen;
 	int peer_supports_asconf = 0;
 	int peer_supports_auth = 0;
 	int got_random = 0, got_hmacs = 0, got_chklist = 0;
 	uint8_t saw_asconf = 0;
 	uint8_t saw_asconf_ack = 0;
 	/* go through each of the params. */
 	phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf, sizeof(parm_buf));
 	while (phdr) {
 		ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
 		plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
 		if (offset + plen > limit) {
 			break;
 		}
 		if (plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
 			break;
 		}
 		if (ptype == SCTP_SUPPORTED_CHUNK_EXT) {
 			/* A supported extension chunk */
 			struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *pr_supported;
 			uint8_t local_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
 			int num_ent, i;
 			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
 			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)&local_store, min(plen,sizeof(local_store)));
 			if (phdr == NULL) {
 				return (-1);
 			}
 			pr_supported = (struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *)phdr;
 			num_ent = plen - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
 			for (i = 0; i < num_ent; i++) {
 				switch (pr_supported->chunk_types[i]) {
 				case SCTP_ASCONF:
 				case SCTP_ASCONF_ACK:
 					peer_supports_asconf = 1;
 					break;
 				default:
 					/* one we don't care about */
 					break;
 				}
 			}
 		} else if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
 			got_random = 1;
 			/* enforce the random length */
 			if (plen != (sizeof(struct sctp_auth_random) +
 				     SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_REQUIRED)) {
 				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 					"SCTP: invalid RANDOM len\n");
 				return (-1);
 			}
 		} else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
 			uint8_t store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
 			struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs;
 			int num_hmacs;
 			if (plen > sizeof(store))
 				break;
 			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
 			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)store, min(plen,sizeof(store)));
 			if (phdr == NULL)
 				return (-1);
 			hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
 			num_hmacs = (plen - sizeof(*hmacs)) /
 			    sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
 			/* validate the hmac list */
 			if (sctp_verify_hmac_param(hmacs, num_hmacs)) {
 				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 					"SCTP: invalid HMAC param\n");
 				return (-1);
 			}
 			got_hmacs = 1;
 		} else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
 			int i, num_chunks;
 			uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE];
 			/* did the peer send a non-empty chunk list? */
 			struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
 			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
 						   (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store,
 						   min(plen,sizeof(chunks_store)));
 			if (phdr == NULL)
 				return (-1);
 			/*-
 			 * Flip through the list and mark that the
 			 * peer supports asconf/asconf_ack.
 			 */
 			chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
 			num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
 			for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
 				/* record asconf/asconf-ack if listed */
 				if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF)
 					saw_asconf = 1;
 				if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF_ACK)
 					saw_asconf_ack = 1;
 			}
 			if (num_chunks)
 				got_chklist = 1;
 		}
 		offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
 		if (offset >= limit) {
 			break;
 		}
 		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &parm_buf,
 		    sizeof(parm_buf));
 	}
 	/* validate authentication required parameters */
 	if (got_random && got_hmacs) {
 		peer_supports_auth = 1;
 	} else {
 		peer_supports_auth = 0;
 	}
 	if (!peer_supports_auth && got_chklist) {
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP: peer sent chunk list w/o AUTH\n");
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	if (!SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_asconf_auth_nochk) && peer_supports_asconf &&
 	    !peer_supports_auth) {
 		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
 			"SCTP: peer supports ASCONF but not AUTH\n");
 		return (-1);
 	} else if ((peer_supports_asconf) && (peer_supports_auth) &&
 		   ((saw_asconf == 0) || (saw_asconf_ack == 0))) {
 		return (-2);
 	}
 	return (0);
 }
 void
 sctp_initialize_auth_params(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sctp_tcb *stcb)
 {
 	uint16_t chunks_len = 0;
 	uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
 	uint16_t random_len = SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_DEFAULT;
 	sctp_key_t *new_key;
 	uint16_t keylen;
 	/* initialize hmac list from endpoint */
 	stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_copy_hmaclist(inp->sctp_ep.local_hmacs);
 	if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
 		hmacs_len = stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->num_algo *
 		    sizeof(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->hmac[0]);
 	}
 	/* initialize auth chunks list from endpoint */
 	stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks =
 	    sctp_copy_chunklist(inp->sctp_ep.local_auth_chunks);
 	if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL) {
 		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
 			if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
 				chunks_len++;
 		}
 	}
 	/* copy defaults from the endpoint */
 	stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
 	/* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
 	(void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
 				 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
 	/* now set the concatenated key (random + chunks + hmacs) */
 	/* key includes parameter headers */
 	keylen = (3 * sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + random_len + chunks_len +
 	    hmacs_len;
 	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
 	if (new_key != NULL) {
 		struct sctp_paramhdr *ph;
 		int plen;
 		/* generate and copy in the RANDOM */
 		ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)new_key->key;
 		ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_RANDOM);
 		plen = sizeof(*ph) + random_len;
 		ph->param_length = htons(plen);
 		SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key + sizeof(*ph), random_len);
 		keylen = plen;
 		/* append in the AUTH chunks */
 		/* NOTE: currently we always have chunks to list */
 		ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
 		ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_CHUNK_LIST);
 		plen = sizeof(*ph) + chunks_len;
 		ph->param_length = htons(plen);
 		keylen += sizeof(*ph);
 		if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks) {
 			int i;
 			for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
 				if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
 					new_key->key[keylen++] = i;
 			}
 		}
 		/* append in the HMACs */
 		ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
 		ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_HMAC_LIST);
 		plen = sizeof(*ph) + hmacs_len;
 		ph->param_length = htons(plen);
 		keylen += sizeof(*ph);
 		(void)sctp_serialize_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
 					new_key->key + keylen);
 	}
 	if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
 	    sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
 	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
 	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
 }
 #ifdef SCTP_HMAC_TEST
 /*
  * HMAC and key concatenation tests
  */
 static void
 sctp_print_digest(uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen, const char *str)
 {
 	uint32_t i;
 	SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s: 0x", str);
 	if (digest == NULL)
 		return;
 	for (i = 0; i < digestlen; i++)
 		SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", digest[i]);
 }
 static int
 sctp_test_hmac(const char *str, uint16_t hmac_id, uint8_t *key,
     uint32_t keylen, uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen,
     uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen)
 {
 	uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
 	SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s:", str);
 	sctp_hmac(hmac_id, key, keylen, text, textlen, computed_digest);
 	sctp_print_digest(digest, digestlen, "Expected digest");
 	sctp_print_digest(computed_digest, digestlen, "Computed digest");
 	if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
 		return (-1);
 	} else {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
 		return (0);
 	}
 }
 /*
  * RFC 2202: HMAC-SHA1 test cases
  */
 void
 sctp_test_hmac_sha1(void)
 {
 	uint8_t *digest;
 	uint8_t key[128];
 	uint32_t keylen;
 	uint8_t text[128];
 	uint32_t textlen;
 	uint32_t digestlen = 20;
 	int failed = 0;
 	/*-
 	 * test_case =     1
 	 * key =           0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
 	 * key_len =       20
 	 * data =          "Hi There"
 	 * data_len =      8
 	 * digest =        0xb617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00
 	 */
 	keylen = 20;
 	memset(key, 0x0b, keylen);
 	textlen = 8;
 	strcpy(text, "Hi There");
 	digest = "\xb6\x17\x31\x86\x55\x05\x72\x64\xe2\x8b\xc0\xb6\xfb\x37\x8c\x8e\xf1\x46\xbe\x00";
 	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 1", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
 	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/*-
 	 * test_case =     2
 	 * key =           "Jefe"
 	 * key_len =       4
 	 * data =          "what do ya want for nothing?"
 	 * data_len =      28
 	 * digest =        0xeffcdf6ae5eb2fa2d27416d5f184df9c259a7c79
 	 */
 	keylen = 4;
 	strcpy(key, "Jefe");
 	textlen = 28;
 	strcpy(text, "what do ya want for nothing?");
 	digest = "\xef\xfc\xdf\x6a\xe5\xeb\x2f\xa2\xd2\x74\x16\xd5\xf1\x84\xdf\x9c\x25\x9a\x7c\x79";
 	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 2", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
 	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/*-
 	 * test_case =     3
 	 * key =           0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
 	 * key_len =       20
 	 * data =          0xdd repeated 50 times
 	 * data_len =      50
 	 * digest =        0x125d7342b9ac11cd91a39af48aa17b4f63f175d3
 	 */
 	keylen = 20;
 	memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
 	textlen = 50;
 	memset(text, 0xdd, textlen);
 	digest = "\x12\x5d\x73\x42\xb9\xac\x11\xcd\x91\xa3\x9a\xf4\x8a\xa1\x7b\x4f\x63\xf1\x75\xd3";
 	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 3", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
 	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/*-
 	 * test_case =     4
 	 * key =           0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819
 	 * key_len =       25
 	 * data =          0xcd repeated 50 times
 	 * data_len =      50
 	 * digest =        0x4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235da
 	 */
 	keylen = 25;
 	memcpy(key, "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", keylen);
 	textlen = 50;
 	memset(text, 0xcd, textlen);
 	digest = "\x4c\x90\x07\xf4\x02\x62\x50\xc6\xbc\x84\x14\xf9\xbf\x50\xc8\x6c\x2d\x72\x35\xda";
 	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 4", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
 	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/*-
 	 * test_case =     5
 	 * key =           0x0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
 	 * key_len =       20
 	 * data =          "Test With Truncation"
 	 * data_len =      20
 	 * digest =        0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04
 	 * digest-96 =     0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1
 	 */
 	keylen = 20;
 	memset(key, 0x0c, keylen);
 	textlen = 20;
 	strcpy(text, "Test With Truncation");
 	digest = "\x4c\x1a\x03\x42\x4b\x55\xe0\x7f\xe7\xf2\x7b\xe1\xd5\x8b\xb9\x32\x4a\x9a\x5a\x04";
 	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 5", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
 	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/*-
 	 * test_case =     6
 	 * key =           0xaa repeated 80 times
 	 * key_len =       80
 	 * data =          "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
 	 * data_len =      54
 	 * digest =        0xaa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112
 	 */
 	keylen = 80;
 	memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
 	textlen = 54;
 	strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First");
 	digest = "\xaa\x4a\xe5\xe1\x52\x72\xd0\x0e\x95\x70\x56\x37\xce\x8a\x3b\x55\xed\x40\x21\x12";
 	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 6", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
 	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/*-
 	 * test_case =     7
 	 * key =           0xaa repeated 80 times
 	 * key_len =       80
 	 * data =          "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"
 	 * data_len =      73
 	 * digest =        0xe8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91
 	 */
 	keylen = 80;
 	memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
 	textlen = 73;
 	strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data");
 	digest = "\xe8\xe9\x9d\x0f\x45\x23\x7d\x78\x6d\x6b\xba\xa7\x96\x5c\x78\x08\xbb\xff\x1a\x91";
 	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 7", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
 	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* done with all tests */
 	if (failed)
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: %d cases failed", failed);
 	else
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: all test cases passed");
 }
 /*
  * test assoc key concatenation
  */
 static int
 sctp_test_key_concatenation(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2,
     sctp_key_t *expected_key)
 {
 	sctp_key_t *key;
 	int ret_val;
 	sctp_show_key(key1, "\nkey1");
 	sctp_show_key(key2, "\nkey2");
 	key = sctp_compute_hashkey(key1, key2, NULL);
 	sctp_show_key(expected_key, "\nExpected");
 	sctp_show_key(key, "\nComputed");
 	if (memcmp(key, expected_key, expected_key->keylen) != 0) {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
 		ret_val = -1;
 	} else {
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
 		ret_val = 0;
 	}
 	sctp_free_key(key1);
 	sctp_free_key(key2);
 	sctp_free_key(expected_key);
 	sctp_free_key(key);
 	return (ret_val);
 }
 void
 sctp_test_authkey(void)
 {
 	sctp_key_t *key1, *key2, *expected_key;
 	int failed = 0;
 	/* test case 1 */
 	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01", 4);
 	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x02\x03\x04", 4);
 	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x02\x03\x04", 8);
 	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* test case 2 */
 	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
 	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x02", 1);
 	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02", 5);
 	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* test case 3 */
 	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
 	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x02", 4);
 	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x02", 5);
 	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* test case 4 */
 	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
 	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
 	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
 	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* test case 5 */
 	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
 	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
 	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
 	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* test case 6 */
 	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
 	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
 	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
 	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* test case 7 */
 	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
 	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
 	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
 	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
 		failed++;
 	/* done with all tests */
 	if (failed)
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: %d cases failed", failed);
 	else
 		SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: all test cases passed");
 }
 #if defined(STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST)
 int
 main(void)
 {
 	sctp_test_hmac_sha1();
 	sctp_test_authkey();
 }
 #endif /* STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST */
 #endif /* SCTP_HMAC_TEST */

The Tor Browser / annotate

netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c@ac0c01689b40 (annotated)

netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c