The Tor Browser: security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp@b8a032363ba2 (annotated)

security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp@b8a032363ba2 (annotated)

security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp

Thu, 22 Jan 2015 13:21:57 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 13:21:57 +0100
branch: TOR_BUG_9701
changeset 15: b8a032363ba2
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Incorporate requested changes from Mozilla in review:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1123480#c6

 /* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
 /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 #ifdef MOZ_LOGGING
 #define FORCE_PR_LOG 1
 #endif
 #include "AppTrustDomain.h"
 #include "certdb.h"
 #include "pkix/pkix.h"
 #include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
 #include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
 #include "prerror.h"
 #include "secerr.h"
 // Generated in Makefile.in
 #include "marketplace-prod-public.inc"
 #include "marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc"
 #include "marketplace-dev-public.inc"
 #include "marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc"
 #include "xpcshell.inc"
 using namespace mozilla::pkix;
 #ifdef PR_LOGGING
 extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
 #endif
 namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
 AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(void* pinArg)
   : mPinArg(pinArg)
 {
 }
 SECStatus
 AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot)
 {
   SECItem trustedDER;
   // Load the trusted certificate into the in-memory NSS database so that
   // CERT_CreateSubjectCertList can find it.
   switch (trustedRoot)
   {
     case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdPublicRoot:
       trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
       trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
       break;
     case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdReviewersRoot:
       trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
       trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
       break;
     case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevPublicRoot:
       trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
       trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
       break;
     case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevReviewersRoot:
       trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
       trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
       break;
     case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
       trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(xpcshellRoot);
       trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(xpcshellRoot);
       break;
     default:
       PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
       return SECFailure;
   }
   mTrustedRoot = CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
                                          &trustedDER, nullptr, false, true);
   if (!mTrustedRoot) {
     return SECFailure;
   }
   return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 AppTrustDomain::FindPotentialIssuers(const SECItem* encodedIssuerName,
                                      PRTime time,
                              /*out*/ mozilla::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList& results)
 {
   MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
   if (!mTrustedRoot) {
     PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   results = CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
                                        encodedIssuerName, time, true);
   return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
                              SECOidTag policy,
                              const CERTCertificate* candidateCert,
                      /*out*/ TrustLevel* trustLevel)
 {
   MOZ_ASSERT(policy == SEC_OID_X509_ANY_POLICY);
   MOZ_ASSERT(candidateCert);
   MOZ_ASSERT(trustLevel);
   MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
   if (!candidateCert || !trustLevel || policy != SEC_OID_X509_ANY_POLICY) {
     PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   if (!mTrustedRoot) {
     PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
     return SECFailure;
   }
   // Handle active distrust of the certificate.
   CERTCertTrust trust;
   if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert, &trust) == SECSuccess) {
     PRUint32 flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, trustObjectSigning);
     // For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
     // because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
     // CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
     // relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
     // distrusted.
     PRUint32 relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == MustBeCA
                               ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
                               : CERTDB_TRUSTED;
     if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
             == CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
       *trustLevel = ActivelyDistrusted;
       return SECSuccess;
     }
 #ifdef MOZ_B2G_CERTDATA
     // XXX(Bug 972201): We have to allow the old way of supporting additional
     // roots until we fix bug 889744. Remove this along with the rest of the
     // MOZ_B2G_CERTDATA stuff.
     // For TRUST, we only use the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit, because Gecko hasn't
     // needed to consider end-entity certs to be their own trust anchors since
     // Gecko implemented nsICertOverrideService.
     if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA) {
       *trustLevel = TrustAnchor;
       return SECSuccess;
     }
 #endif
   }
   // mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
   if (CERT_CompareCerts(mTrustedRoot.get(), candidateCert)) {
     *trustLevel = TrustAnchor;
     return SECSuccess;
   }
   *trustLevel = InheritsTrust;
   return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 AppTrustDomain::VerifySignedData(const CERTSignedData* signedData,
                                   const CERTCertificate* cert)
 {
   return ::mozilla::pkix::VerifySignedData(signedData, cert, mPinArg);
 }
 SECStatus
 AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA,
                                 const CERTCertificate*,
                                 /*const*/ CERTCertificate*,
                                 PRTime time,
                                 /*optional*/ const SECItem*)
 {
   // We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
   // certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
   return SECSuccess;
 }
 } }

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security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp@b8a032363ba2 (annotated)

security/apps/AppTrustDomain.cpp