The Tor Browser: comparison ipc/chromium/src/base/process_util

--1:000000000000
+:7ea539765a1e
+//* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+// Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits>
+#include <set>
+#include "base/basictypes.h"
+#include "base/eintr_wrapper.h"
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "base/platform_thread.h"
+#include "base/process_util.h"
+#include "base/scoped_ptr.h"
+#include "base/sys_info.h"
+#include "base/time.h"
+#include "base/waitable_event.h"
+#include "base/dir_reader_posix.h"
+const int kMicrosecondsPerSecond = 1000000;
+namespace base {
+ProcessId GetCurrentProcId() {
+return getpid();
+}
+ProcessHandle GetCurrentProcessHandle() {
+return GetCurrentProcId();
+}
+bool OpenProcessHandle(ProcessId pid, ProcessHandle* handle) {
+// On Posix platforms, process handles are the same as PIDs, so we
+// don't need to do anything.
+*handle = pid;
+return true;
+}
+bool OpenPrivilegedProcessHandle(ProcessId pid, ProcessHandle* handle) {
+// On POSIX permissions are checked for each operation on process,
+// not when opening a "handle".
+return OpenProcessHandle(pid, handle);
+}
+void CloseProcessHandle(ProcessHandle process) {
+// See OpenProcessHandle, nothing to do.
+return;
+}
+ProcessId GetProcId(ProcessHandle process) {
+return process;
+}
+// Attempts to kill the process identified by the given process
+// entry structure.  Ignores specified exit_code; posix can't force that.
+// Returns true if this is successful, false otherwise.
+bool KillProcess(ProcessHandle process_id, int exit_code, bool wait) {
+bool result = kill(process_id, SIGTERM) == 0;
+if (result && wait) {
+int tries = 60;
+// The process may not end immediately due to pending I/O
+while (tries-- > 0) {
+int pid = HANDLE_EINTR(waitpid(process_id, NULL, WNOHANG));
+if (pid == process_id)
+break;
+sleep(1);
+}
+result = kill(process_id, SIGKILL) == 0;
+}
+if (!result)
+DLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to terminate process.";
+return result;
+}
+#ifdef ANDROID
+typedef unsigned long int rlim_t;
+#endif
+// A class to handle auto-closing of DIR*'s.
+class ScopedDIRClose {
+public:
+inline void operator()(DIR* x) const {
+if (x) {
+closedir(x);
+}
+}
+};
+typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<DIR, ScopedDIRClose> ScopedDIR;
+void CloseSuperfluousFds(const base::InjectiveMultimap& saved_mapping) {
+// DANGER: no calls to malloc are allowed from now on:
+// http://crbug.com/36678
+#if defined(ANDROID)
+static const rlim_t kSystemDefaultMaxFds = 1024;
+static const char kFDDir[] = "/proc/self/fd";
+#elif defined(OS_LINUX)
+static const rlim_t kSystemDefaultMaxFds = 8192;
+static const char kFDDir[] = "/proc/self/fd";
+#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
+static const rlim_t kSystemDefaultMaxFds = 256;
+static const char kFDDir[] = "/dev/fd";
+#elif defined(OS_BSD)
+// the getrlimit below should never fail, so whatever ..
+static const rlim_t kSystemDefaultMaxFds = 1024;
+// at least /dev/fd will exist
+static const char kFDDir[] = "/dev/fd";
+#endif
+// Get the maximum number of FDs possible.
+struct rlimit nofile;
+rlim_t max_fds;
+if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &nofile)) {
+// getrlimit failed. Take a best guess.
+max_fds = kSystemDefaultMaxFds;
+DLOG(ERROR) << "getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE) failed: " << errno;
+} else {
+max_fds = nofile.rlim_cur;
+}
+if (max_fds > INT_MAX)
+max_fds = INT_MAX;
+DirReaderPosix fd_dir(kFDDir);
+if (!fd_dir.IsValid()) {
+// Fallback case: Try every possible fd.
+for (rlim_t i = 0; i < max_fds; ++i) {
+const int fd = static_cast<int>(i);
+if (fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO || fd == STDERR_FILENO)
+continue;
+InjectiveMultimap::const_iterator j;
+for (j = saved_mapping.begin(); j != saved_mapping.end(); j++) {
+if (fd == j->dest)
+break;
+}
+if (j != saved_mapping.end())
+continue;
+// Since we're just trying to close anything we can find,
+// ignore any error return values of close().
+HANDLE_EINTR(close(fd));
+}
+return;
+}
+const int dir_fd = fd_dir.fd();
+for ( ; fd_dir.Next(); ) {
+// Skip . and .. entries.
+if (fd_dir.name()[0] == '.')
+continue;
+char *endptr;
+errno = 0;
+const long int fd = strtol(fd_dir.name(), &endptr, 10);
+if (fd_dir.name()[0] == 0 || *endptr || fd < 0 || errno)
+continue;
+if (fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO || fd == STDERR_FILENO)
+continue;
+InjectiveMultimap::const_iterator i;
+for (i = saved_mapping.begin(); i != saved_mapping.end(); i++) {
+if (fd == i->dest)
+break;
+}
+if (i != saved_mapping.end())
+continue;
+if (fd == dir_fd)
+continue;
+// When running under Valgrind, Valgrind opens several FDs for its
+// own use and will complain if we try to close them.  All of
+// these FDs are >= |max_fds|, so we can check against that here
+// before closing.  See https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191758
+if (fd < static_cast<int>(max_fds)) {
+int ret = HANDLE_EINTR(close(fd));
+if (ret != 0) {
+DLOG(ERROR) << "Problem closing fd";
+}
+}
+}
+}
+// Sets all file descriptors to close on exec except for stdin, stdout
+// and stderr.
+// TODO(agl): Remove this function. It's fundamentally broken for multithreaded
+// apps.
+void SetAllFDsToCloseOnExec() {
+#if defined(OS_LINUX)
+const char fd_dir[] = "/proc/self/fd";
+#elif defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_BSD)
+const char fd_dir[] = "/dev/fd";
+#endif
+ScopedDIR dir_closer(opendir(fd_dir));
+DIR *dir = dir_closer.get();
+if (NULL == dir) {
+DLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to open " << fd_dir;
+return;
+}
+struct dirent *ent;
+while ((ent = readdir(dir))) {
+// Skip . and .. entries.
+if (ent->d_name[0] == '.')
+continue;
+int i = atoi(ent->d_name);
+// We don't close stdin, stdout or stderr.
+if (i <= STDERR_FILENO)
+continue;
+int flags = fcntl(i, F_GETFD);
+if ((flags == -1) || (fcntl(i, F_SETFD, flags | FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) {
+DLOG(ERROR) << "fcntl failure.";
+}
+}
+}
+ProcessMetrics::ProcessMetrics(ProcessHandle process) : process_(process),
+last_time_(0),
+last_system_time_(0) {
+processor_count_ = base::SysInfo::NumberOfProcessors();
+}
+// static
+ProcessMetrics* ProcessMetrics::CreateProcessMetrics(ProcessHandle process) {
+return new ProcessMetrics(process);
+}
+ProcessMetrics::~ProcessMetrics() { }
+bool DidProcessCrash(bool* child_exited, ProcessHandle handle) {
+int status;
+const int result = HANDLE_EINTR(waitpid(handle, &status, WNOHANG));
+if (result == -1) {
+// This shouldn't happen, but sometimes it does.  The error is
+// probably ECHILD and the reason is probably that a pid was
+// waited on again after a previous wait reclaimed its zombie.
+// (It could also occur if the process isn't a direct child, but
+// don't do that.)  This is bad, because it risks interfering with
+// an unrelated child process if the pid is reused.
+//
+// So, lacking reliable information, we indicate that the process
+// is dead, in the hope that the caller will give up and stop
+// calling us.  See also bug 943174 and bug 933680.
+CHROMIUM_LOG(ERROR) << "waitpid failed pid:" << handle << " errno:" << errno;
+if (child_exited)
+*child_exited = true;
+return false;
+} else if (result == 0) {
+// the child hasn't exited yet.
+if (child_exited)
+*child_exited = false;
+return false;
+}
+if (child_exited)
+*child_exited = true;
+if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+switch(WTERMSIG(status)) {
+case SIGSYS:
+case SIGSEGV:
+case SIGILL:
+case SIGABRT:
+case SIGFPE:
+return true;
+default:
+return false;
+}
+}
+if (WIFEXITED(status))
+return WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0;
+return false;
+}
+namespace {
+int64_t TimeValToMicroseconds(const struct timeval& tv) {
+return tv.tv_sec * kMicrosecondsPerSecond + tv.tv_usec;
+}
+}
+int ProcessMetrics::GetCPUUsage() {
+struct timeval now;
+struct rusage usage;
+int retval = gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+if (retval)
+return 0;
+retval = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &usage);
+if (retval)
+return 0;
+int64_t system_time = (TimeValToMicroseconds(usage.ru_stime) +
+TimeValToMicroseconds(usage.ru_utime)) /
+processor_count_;
+int64_t time = TimeValToMicroseconds(now);
+if ((last_system_time_ == 0) || (last_time_ == 0)) {
+// First call, just set the last values.
+last_system_time_ = system_time;
+last_time_ = time;
+return 0;
+}
+int64_t system_time_delta = system_time - last_system_time_;
+int64_t time_delta = time - last_time_;
+DCHECK(time_delta != 0);
+if (time_delta == 0)
+return 0;
+// We add time_delta / 2 so the result is rounded.
+int cpu = static_cast<int>((system_time_delta * 100 + time_delta / 2) /
+time_delta);
+last_system_time_ = system_time;
+last_time_ = time;
+return cpu;
+}
+}  // namespace base

The Tor Browser / file comparison

comparison: ipc/chromium/src/base/process_util_posix.cc

ipc/chromium/src/base/process_util_posix.cc