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1 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
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2 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
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3 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
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4 |
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5 #include "nsContentBlocker.h" |
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6 #include "nsIContent.h" |
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7 #include "nsIURI.h" |
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8 #include "nsIServiceManager.h" |
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9 #include "nsIDocShellTreeItem.h" |
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10 #include "nsIPrefService.h" |
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11 #include "nsIPrefBranch.h" |
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12 #include "nsIDocShell.h" |
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13 #include "nsString.h" |
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14 #include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" |
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15 #include "nsIObjectLoadingContent.h" |
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16 #include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h" |
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17 |
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18 // Possible behavior pref values |
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19 // Those map to the nsIPermissionManager values where possible |
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20 #define BEHAVIOR_ACCEPT nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION |
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21 #define BEHAVIOR_REJECT nsIPermissionManager::DENY_ACTION |
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22 #define BEHAVIOR_NOFOREIGN 3 |
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23 |
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24 // From nsIContentPolicy |
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25 static const char *kTypeString[] = {"other", |
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26 "script", |
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27 "image", |
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28 "stylesheet", |
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29 "object", |
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30 "document", |
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31 "subdocument", |
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32 "refresh", |
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33 "xbl", |
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34 "ping", |
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35 "xmlhttprequest", |
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36 "objectsubrequest", |
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37 "dtd", |
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38 "font", |
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39 "media", |
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40 "websocket", |
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41 "csp_report", |
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42 "xslt"}; |
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43 |
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44 #define NUMBER_OF_TYPES MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(kTypeString) |
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45 uint8_t nsContentBlocker::mBehaviorPref[NUMBER_OF_TYPES]; |
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46 |
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47 NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentBlocker, |
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48 nsIContentPolicy, |
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49 nsIObserver, |
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50 nsISupportsWeakReference) |
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51 |
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52 nsContentBlocker::nsContentBlocker() |
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53 { |
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54 memset(mBehaviorPref, BEHAVIOR_ACCEPT, NUMBER_OF_TYPES); |
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55 } |
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56 |
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57 nsresult |
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58 nsContentBlocker::Init() |
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59 { |
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60 nsresult rv; |
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61 mPermissionManager = do_GetService(NS_PERMISSIONMANAGER_CONTRACTID, &rv); |
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62 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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63 |
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64 nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefService = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); |
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65 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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66 |
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67 nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch; |
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68 rv = prefService->GetBranch("permissions.default.", getter_AddRefs(prefBranch)); |
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69 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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70 |
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71 // Migrate old image blocker pref |
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72 nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> oldPrefBranch; |
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73 oldPrefBranch = do_QueryInterface(prefService); |
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74 int32_t oldPref; |
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75 rv = oldPrefBranch->GetIntPref("network.image.imageBehavior", &oldPref); |
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76 if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && oldPref) { |
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77 int32_t newPref; |
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78 switch (oldPref) { |
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79 default: |
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80 newPref = BEHAVIOR_ACCEPT; |
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81 break; |
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82 case 1: |
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83 newPref = BEHAVIOR_NOFOREIGN; |
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84 break; |
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85 case 2: |
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86 newPref = BEHAVIOR_REJECT; |
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87 break; |
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88 } |
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89 prefBranch->SetIntPref("image", newPref); |
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90 oldPrefBranch->ClearUserPref("network.image.imageBehavior"); |
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91 } |
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92 |
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93 |
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94 // The branch is not a copy of the prefservice, but a new object, because |
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95 // it is a non-default branch. Adding obeservers to it will only work if |
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96 // we make sure that the object doesn't die. So, keep a reference to it. |
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97 mPrefBranchInternal = do_QueryInterface(prefBranch, &rv); |
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98 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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99 |
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100 rv = mPrefBranchInternal->AddObserver("", this, true); |
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101 PrefChanged(prefBranch, nullptr); |
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102 |
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103 return rv; |
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104 } |
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105 |
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106 #undef LIMIT |
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107 #define LIMIT(x, low, high, default) ((x) >= (low) && (x) <= (high) ? (x) : (default)) |
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108 |
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109 void |
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110 nsContentBlocker::PrefChanged(nsIPrefBranch *aPrefBranch, |
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111 const char *aPref) |
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112 { |
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113 int32_t val; |
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114 |
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115 #define PREF_CHANGED(_P) (!aPref || !strcmp(aPref, _P)) |
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116 |
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117 for(uint32_t i = 0; i < NUMBER_OF_TYPES; ++i) { |
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118 if (PREF_CHANGED(kTypeString[i]) && |
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119 NS_SUCCEEDED(aPrefBranch->GetIntPref(kTypeString[i], &val))) |
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120 mBehaviorPref[i] = LIMIT(val, 1, 3, 1); |
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121 } |
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122 |
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123 } |
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124 |
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125 // nsIContentPolicy Implementation |
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126 NS_IMETHODIMP |
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127 nsContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType, |
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128 nsIURI *aContentLocation, |
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129 nsIURI *aRequestingLocation, |
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130 nsISupports *aRequestingContext, |
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131 const nsACString &aMimeGuess, |
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132 nsISupports *aExtra, |
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133 nsIPrincipal *aRequestPrincipal, |
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134 int16_t *aDecision) |
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135 { |
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136 *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; |
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137 nsresult rv; |
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138 |
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139 // Ony support NUMBER_OF_TYPES content types. that all there is at the |
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140 // moment, but you never know... |
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141 if (aContentType > NUMBER_OF_TYPES) |
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142 return NS_OK; |
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143 |
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144 // we can't do anything without this |
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145 if (!aContentLocation) |
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146 return NS_OK; |
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147 |
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148 // The final type of an object tag may mutate before it reaches |
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149 // shouldProcess, so we cannot make any sane blocking decisions here |
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150 if (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) |
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151 return NS_OK; |
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152 |
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153 // we only want to check http, https, ftp |
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154 // for chrome:// and resources and others, no need to check. |
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155 nsAutoCString scheme; |
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156 aContentLocation->GetScheme(scheme); |
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157 if (!scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("ftp") && |
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158 !scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("http") && |
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159 !scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("https")) |
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160 return NS_OK; |
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161 |
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162 bool shouldLoad, fromPrefs; |
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163 rv = TestPermission(aContentLocation, aRequestingLocation, aContentType, |
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164 &shouldLoad, &fromPrefs); |
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165 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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166 if (!shouldLoad) { |
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167 if (fromPrefs) { |
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168 *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE; |
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169 } else { |
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170 *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER; |
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171 } |
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172 } |
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173 |
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174 return NS_OK; |
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175 } |
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176 |
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177 NS_IMETHODIMP |
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178 nsContentBlocker::ShouldProcess(uint32_t aContentType, |
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179 nsIURI *aContentLocation, |
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180 nsIURI *aRequestingLocation, |
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181 nsISupports *aRequestingContext, |
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182 const nsACString &aMimeGuess, |
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183 nsISupports *aExtra, |
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184 nsIPrincipal *aRequestPrincipal, |
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185 int16_t *aDecision) |
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186 { |
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187 // For loads where aRequestingContext is chrome, we should just |
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188 // accept. Those are most likely toplevel loads in windows, and |
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189 // chrome generally knows what it's doing anyway. |
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190 nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> item = |
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191 do_QueryInterface(NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext)); |
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192 |
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193 if (item && item->ItemType() == nsIDocShellTreeItem::typeChrome) { |
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194 *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; |
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195 return NS_OK; |
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196 } |
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197 |
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198 // For objects, we only check policy in shouldProcess, as the final type isn't |
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199 // determined until the channel is open -- We don't want to block images in |
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200 // object tags because plugins are disallowed. |
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201 // NOTE that this bypasses the aContentLocation checks in ShouldLoad - this is |
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202 // intentional, as aContentLocation may be null for plugins that load by type |
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203 // (e.g. java) |
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204 if (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) { |
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205 *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; |
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206 |
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207 bool shouldLoad, fromPrefs; |
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208 nsresult rv = TestPermission(aContentLocation, aRequestingLocation, |
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209 aContentType, &shouldLoad, &fromPrefs); |
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210 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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211 if (!shouldLoad) { |
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212 if (fromPrefs) { |
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213 *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE; |
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214 } else { |
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215 *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER; |
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216 } |
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217 } |
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218 return NS_OK; |
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219 } |
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220 |
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221 // This isn't a load from chrome or an object tag - Just do a ShouldLoad() |
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222 // check -- we want the same answer here |
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223 return ShouldLoad(aContentType, aContentLocation, aRequestingLocation, |
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224 aRequestingContext, aMimeGuess, aExtra, aRequestPrincipal, |
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225 aDecision); |
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226 } |
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227 |
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228 nsresult |
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229 nsContentBlocker::TestPermission(nsIURI *aCurrentURI, |
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230 nsIURI *aFirstURI, |
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231 int32_t aContentType, |
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232 bool *aPermission, |
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233 bool *aFromPrefs) |
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234 { |
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235 *aFromPrefs = false; |
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236 // This default will also get used if there is an unknown value in the |
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237 // permission list, or if the permission manager returns unknown values. |
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238 *aPermission = true; |
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239 |
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240 // check the permission list first; if we find an entry, it overrides |
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241 // default prefs. |
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242 // Don't forget the aContentType ranges from 1..8, while the |
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243 // array is indexed 0..7 |
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244 uint32_t permission; |
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245 nsresult rv = mPermissionManager->TestPermission(aCurrentURI, |
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246 kTypeString[aContentType - 1], |
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247 &permission); |
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248 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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249 |
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250 // If there is nothing on the list, use the default. |
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251 if (!permission) { |
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252 permission = mBehaviorPref[aContentType - 1]; |
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253 *aFromPrefs = true; |
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254 } |
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255 |
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256 // Use the fact that the nsIPermissionManager values map to |
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257 // the BEHAVIOR_* values above. |
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258 switch (permission) { |
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259 case BEHAVIOR_ACCEPT: |
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260 *aPermission = true; |
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261 break; |
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262 case BEHAVIOR_REJECT: |
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263 *aPermission = false; |
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264 break; |
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265 |
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266 case BEHAVIOR_NOFOREIGN: |
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267 // Third party checking |
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268 |
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269 // Need a requesting uri for third party checks to work. |
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270 if (!aFirstURI) |
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271 return NS_OK; |
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272 |
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273 bool trustedSource = false; |
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274 rv = aFirstURI->SchemeIs("chrome", &trustedSource); |
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275 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv,rv); |
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276 if (!trustedSource) { |
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277 rv = aFirstURI->SchemeIs("resource", &trustedSource); |
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278 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv,rv); |
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279 } |
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280 if (trustedSource) |
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281 return NS_OK; |
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282 |
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283 // compare tails of names checking to see if they have a common domain |
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284 // we do this by comparing the tails of both names where each tail |
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285 // includes at least one dot |
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286 |
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287 // A more generic method somewhere would be nice |
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288 |
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289 nsAutoCString currentHost; |
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290 rv = aCurrentURI->GetAsciiHost(currentHost); |
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291 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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292 |
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293 // Search for two dots, starting at the end. |
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294 // If there are no two dots found, ++dot will turn to zero, |
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295 // that will return the entire string. |
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296 int32_t dot = currentHost.RFindChar('.'); |
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297 dot = currentHost.RFindChar('.', dot-1); |
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298 ++dot; |
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299 |
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300 // Get the domain, ie the last part of the host (www.domain.com -> domain.com) |
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301 // This will break on co.uk |
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302 const nsCSubstring &tail = |
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303 Substring(currentHost, dot, currentHost.Length() - dot); |
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304 |
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305 nsAutoCString firstHost; |
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306 rv = aFirstURI->GetAsciiHost(firstHost); |
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307 NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); |
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308 |
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309 // If the tail is longer then the whole firstHost, it will never match |
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310 if (firstHost.Length() < tail.Length()) { |
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311 *aPermission = false; |
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312 return NS_OK; |
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313 } |
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314 |
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315 // Get the last part of the firstUri with the same length as |tail| |
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316 const nsCSubstring &firstTail = |
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317 Substring(firstHost, firstHost.Length() - tail.Length(), tail.Length()); |
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318 |
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319 // Check that both tails are the same, and that just before the tail in |
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320 // |firstUri| there is a dot. That means both url are in the same domain |
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321 if ((firstHost.Length() > tail.Length() && |
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322 firstHost.CharAt(firstHost.Length() - tail.Length() - 1) != '.') || |
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323 !tail.Equals(firstTail)) { |
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324 *aPermission = false; |
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325 } |
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326 break; |
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327 } |
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328 |
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329 return NS_OK; |
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330 } |
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331 |
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332 NS_IMETHODIMP |
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333 nsContentBlocker::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, |
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334 const char *aTopic, |
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335 const char16_t *aData) |
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336 { |
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337 NS_ASSERTION(!strcmp(NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID, aTopic), |
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338 "unexpected topic - we only deal with pref changes!"); |
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339 |
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340 if (mPrefBranchInternal) |
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341 PrefChanged(mPrefBranchInternal, NS_LossyConvertUTF16toASCII(aData).get()); |
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342 return NS_OK; |
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343 } |