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comparison: security/nss/lib/ssl/sslenum.c

security/nss/lib/ssl/sslenum.c

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TOR_BUG_9701
changeset 15
b8a032363ba2
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-1:000000000000 0:562f329d0243
1 /*
2 * Table enumerating all implemented cipher suites
3 * Part of public API.
4 *
5 * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
6 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
7 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
8
9 #include "ssl.h"
10 #include "sslproto.h"
11
12 /*
13 * The ordering of cipher suites in this table must match the ordering in
14 * the cipherSuites table in ssl3con.c.
15 *
16 * If new ECC cipher suites are added, also update the ssl3CipherSuite arrays
17 * in ssl3ecc.c.
18 *
19 * Finally, update the ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED macro in sslimpl.h.
20 *
21 * The ordering is as follows:
22 * * No-encryption cipher suites last
23 * * Export/weak/obsolete cipher suites before no-encryption cipher suites
24 * * Order by key exchange algorithm: ECDHE, then DHE, then ECDH, RSA.
25 * * Within key agreement sections, order by symmetric encryption algorithm:
26 * AES-128, then Camellia-128, then AES-256, then Camellia-256, then SEED,
27 * then FIPS-3DES, then 3DES, then RC4. AES is commonly accepted as a
28 * strong cipher internationally, and is often hardware-accelerated.
29 * Camellia also has wide international support across standards
30 * organizations. SEED is only recommended by the Korean government. 3DES
31 * only provides 112 bits of security. RC4 is now deprecated or forbidden
32 * by many standards organizations.
33 * * Within symmetric algorithm sections, order by message authentication
34 * algorithm: GCM, then HMAC-SHA1, then HMAC-SHA256, then HMAC-MD5.
35 * * Within message authentication algorithm sections, order by asymmetric
36 * signature algorithm: ECDSA, then RSA, then DSS.
37 *
38 * Exception: Because some servers ignore the high-order byte of the cipher
39 * suite ID, we must be careful about adding cipher suites with IDs larger
40 * than 0x00ff; see bug 946147. For these broken servers, the first four cipher
41 * suites, with the MSB zeroed, look like:
42 * TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 { 0x00,0x2B }
43 * TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x2F }
44 * TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x0A }
45 * TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x09 }
46 * The broken server only supports the third and fourth ones and will select
47 * the third one.
48 */
49 const PRUint16 SSL_ImplementedCiphers[] = {
50 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
51 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
52 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
53 /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA must appear before
54 * TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA to work around bug 946147.
55 */
56 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
57 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
58 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
59 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
60 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
61 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
62 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
63 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
64 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
65 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
66 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
67
68 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
69 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
70 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
71 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
72 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
73 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
74 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
75 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
76 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
77 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
78 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
79 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
80 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
81 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
82
83 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
84 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
85 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
86 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
87 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
88 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
89 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
90 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
91 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
92 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
93
94 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
95 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
96 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
97 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
98 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
99 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
100 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
101 TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
102 SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
103 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
104 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
105 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
106
107 /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */
108 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
109 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
110 SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
111 TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
112
113 /* export ciphersuites with 1024-bit public key exchange keys */
114 TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
115 TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
116
117 /* export ciphersuites with 512-bit public key exchange keys */
118 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
119 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
120
121 /* ciphersuites with no encryption */
122 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
123 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
124 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
125 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
126 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
127 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
128 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
129 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
130 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,
131
132 /* SSL2 cipher suites. */
133 SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5,
134 SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
135 SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5, /* actually 112, not 192 */
136 SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5,
137 SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
138 SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
139
140 0
141
142 };
143
144 const PRUint16 SSL_NumImplementedCiphers =
145 (sizeof SSL_ImplementedCiphers) / (sizeof SSL_ImplementedCiphers[0]) - 1;
146
147 const PRUint16 *
148 SSL_GetImplementedCiphers(void)
149 {
150 return SSL_ImplementedCiphers;
151 }
152
153 PRUint16
154 SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(void)
155 {
156 return SSL_NumImplementedCiphers;
157 }

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