The Tor Browser: media/libvpx/vp9/common/vp9_seg

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

     1 /*

     2  *  Copyright (c) 2010 The WebM project authors. All Rights Reserved.

     3  *

     4  *  Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license

     5  *  that can be found in the LICENSE file in the root of the source

     6  *  tree. An additional intellectual property rights grant can be found

     7  *  in the file PATENTS.  All contributing project authors may

     8  *  be found in the AUTHORS file in the root of the source tree.

     9  */

    11 #include <assert.h>

    13 #include "vp9/common/vp9_blockd.h"

    14 #include "vp9/common/vp9_loopfilter.h"

    15 #include "vp9/common/vp9_seg_common.h"

    16 #include "vp9/common/vp9_quant_common.h"

    18 static const int seg_feature_data_signed[SEG_LVL_MAX] = { 1, 1, 0, 0 };

    20 static const int seg_feature_data_max[SEG_LVL_MAX] = {

    21   MAXQ, MAX_LOOP_FILTER, 3, 0 };

    23 // These functions provide access to new segment level features.

    24 // Eventually these function may be "optimized out" but for the moment,

    25 // the coding mechanism is still subject to change so these provide a

    26 // convenient single point of change.

    28 int vp9_segfeature_active(const struct segmentation *seg, int segment_id,

    29                           SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id) {

    30   return seg->enabled &&

    31          (seg->feature_mask[segment_id] & (1 << feature_id));

    32 }

    34 void vp9_clearall_segfeatures(struct segmentation *seg) {

    35   vp9_zero(seg->feature_data);

    36   vp9_zero(seg->feature_mask);

    37 }

    39 void vp9_enable_segfeature(struct segmentation *seg, int segment_id,

    40                            SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id) {

    41   seg->feature_mask[segment_id] |= 1 << feature_id;

    42 }

    44 void vp9_disable_segfeature(struct segmentation *seg, int segment_id,

    45                             SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id) {

    46   seg->feature_mask[segment_id] &= ~(1 << feature_id);

    47 }

    49 int vp9_seg_feature_data_max(SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id) {

    50   return seg_feature_data_max[feature_id];

    51 }

    53 int vp9_is_segfeature_signed(SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id) {

    54   return seg_feature_data_signed[feature_id];

    55 }

    57 void vp9_clear_segdata(struct segmentation *seg, int segment_id,

    58                        SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id) {

    59   seg->feature_data[segment_id][feature_id] = 0;

    60 }

    62 void vp9_set_segdata(struct segmentation *seg, int segment_id,

    63                      SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id, int seg_data) {

    64   assert(seg_data <= seg_feature_data_max[feature_id]);

    65   if (seg_data < 0) {

    66     assert(seg_feature_data_signed[feature_id]);

    67     assert(-seg_data <= seg_feature_data_max[feature_id]);

    68   }

    70   seg->feature_data[segment_id][feature_id] = seg_data;

    71 }

    73 int vp9_get_segdata(const struct segmentation *seg, int segment_id,

    74                     SEG_LVL_FEATURES feature_id) {

    75   return seg->feature_data[segment_id][feature_id];

    76 }

    79 const vp9_tree_index vp9_segment_tree[TREE_SIZE(MAX_SEGMENTS)] = {

    80   2,  4,  6,  8, 10, 12,

    81   0, -1, -2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7

    82 };

    85 // TBD? Functions to read and write segment data with range / validity checking

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