toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/xpinstall/browser_signed_tampered.js

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100

author
Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date
Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
changeset 0
6474c204b198
permissions
-rw-r--r--

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

     1 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
     2 // Tests installing a signed add-on that has been tampered with after signing.
     3 function test() {
     4   Harness.installConfirmCallback = confirm_install;
     5   Harness.downloadFailedCallback = download_failed;
     6   Harness.installsCompletedCallback = finish_test;
     7   Harness.setup();
     9   var pm = Services.perms;
    10   pm.add(makeURI("http://example.com/"), "install", pm.ALLOW_ACTION);
    12   var triggers = encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify({
    13     "Tampered Signed XPI": TESTROOT + "signed-tampered.xpi"
    14   }));
    15   gBrowser.selectedTab = gBrowser.addTab();
    16   gBrowser.loadURI(TESTROOT + "installtrigger.html?" + triggers);
    17 }
    19 function confirm_install(window) {
    20   ok(false, "Should not offer to install");
    21 }
    23 function download_failed(install) {
    24   is(install.error, AddonManager.ERROR_CORRUPT_FILE, "Install should fail");
    25 }
    27 function finish_test(count) {
    28   is(count, 0, "No add-ons should have been installed");
    29   Services.perms.remove("example.com", "install");
    31   gBrowser.removeCurrentTab();
    32   Harness.finish();
    33 }

mercurial