michael@0: /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
michael@0:  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
michael@0:  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
michael@0: /* 
michael@0:  *  The following code handles the storage of PKCS 11 modules used by the
michael@0:  * NSS. For the rest of NSS, only one kind of database handle exists:
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  *     SFTKDBHandle
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  * There is one SFTKDBHandle for the each key database and one for each cert 
michael@0:  * database. These databases are opened as associated pairs, one pair per
michael@0:  * slot. SFTKDBHandles are reference counted objects.
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  * Each SFTKDBHandle points to a low level database handle (SDB). This handle
michael@0:  * represents the underlying physical database. These objects are not 
michael@0:  * reference counted, an are 'owned' by their respective SFTKDBHandles.
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  *  
michael@0:  */
michael@0: #include "sftkdb.h"
michael@0: #include "sftkdbti.h"
michael@0: #include "pkcs11t.h"
michael@0: #include "pkcs11i.h"
michael@0: #include "sdb.h"
michael@0: #include "prprf.h" 
michael@0: #include "secasn1.h"
michael@0: #include "pratom.h"
michael@0: #include "blapi.h"
michael@0: #include "secoid.h"
michael@0: #include "lowpbe.h"
michael@0: #include "secdert.h"
michael@0: #include "prsystem.h"
michael@0: #include "lgglue.h"
michael@0: #include "secerr.h"
michael@0: #include "softoken.h"
michael@0:   
michael@0: /******************************************************************
michael@0:  * 
michael@0:  * Key DB password handling functions
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  * These functions manage the key db password (set, reset, initialize, use).
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  * The key is managed on 'this side' of the database. All private data is
michael@0:  * encrypted before it is sent to the database itself. Besides PBE's, the
michael@0:  * database management code can also mix in various fixed keys so the data
michael@0:  * in the database is no longer considered 'plain text'.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: /* take string password and turn it into a key. The key is dependent
michael@0:  * on a global salt entry acquired from the database. This salted
michael@0:  * value will be based to a pkcs5 pbe function before it is used
michael@0:  * in an actual encryption */
michael@0: static SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_passwordToKey(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, SECItem *salt,
michael@0: 			const char *pw, SECItem *key)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SHA1Context *cx = NULL;
michael@0:     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     key->data = PORT_Alloc(SHA1_LENGTH);
michael@0:     if (key->data == NULL) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     key->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     cx = SHA1_NewContext();
michael@0:     if ( cx == NULL) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     SHA1_Begin(cx);
michael@0:     if (salt  && salt->data ) {
michael@0: 	SHA1_Update(cx, salt->data, salt->len);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     SHA1_Update(cx, (unsigned char *)pw, PORT_Strlen(pw));
michael@0:     SHA1_End(cx, key->data, &key->len, key->len);
michael@0:     rv = SECSuccess;
michael@0:     
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (cx) {
michael@0: 	SHA1_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	if (key->data != NULL) {
michael@0: 	    PORT_ZFree(key->data,key->len);
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	key->data = NULL;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * Cipher text stored in the database contains 3 elements:
michael@0:  * 1) an identifier describing the encryption algorithm.
michael@0:  * 2) an entry specific salt value.
michael@0:  * 3) the encrypted value.
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  * The following data structure represents the encrypted data in a decoded
michael@0:  * (but still encrypted) form.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: typedef struct sftkCipherValueStr sftkCipherValue;
michael@0: struct sftkCipherValueStr {
michael@0:     PLArenaPool *arena;
michael@0:     SECOidTag  alg;
michael@0:     NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param;
michael@0:     SECItem    salt;
michael@0:     SECItem    value;
michael@0: };
michael@0: 
michael@0: #define SFTK_CIPHERTEXT_VERSION 3
michael@0: 
michael@0: struct SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfoStr {
michael@0:     SECAlgorithmID algorithm;
michael@0:     SECItem encryptedData;
michael@0: };
michael@0: typedef struct SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfoStr SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo;
michael@0: 
michael@0: SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
michael@0: 
michael@0: const SEC_ASN1Template sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate[] = {
michael@0:     { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
michael@0:         0, NULL, sizeof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo) },
michael@0:     { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN ,
michael@0:         offsetof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo,algorithm),
michael@0:         SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
michael@0:     { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
michael@0:         offsetof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo,encryptedData) },
michael@0:     { 0 }
michael@0: };
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * This parses the cipherText into cipher value. NOTE: cipherValue will point
michael@0:  * to data in cipherText, if cipherText is freed, cipherValue will be invalid.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: static SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_decodeCipherText(SECItem *cipherText, sftkCipherValue *cipherValue)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
michael@0:     SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo edi;
michael@0:     SECStatus rv;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
michael@0:     if (arena == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     cipherValue->arena = NULL;
michael@0:     cipherValue->param = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &edi, sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate,
michael@0:                             cipherText);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     cipherValue->alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&edi.algorithm);
michael@0:     cipherValue->param = nsspkcs5_AlgidToParam(&edi.algorithm);
michael@0:     if (cipherValue->param == NULL) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     cipherValue->value = edi.encryptedData;
michael@0:     cipherValue->arena = arena;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     return SECSuccess;
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (cipherValue->param) {
michael@0: 	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(cipherValue->param);
michael@0: 	cipherValue->param = NULL;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (arena) {
michael@0: 	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return SECFailure;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: /* 
michael@0:  * unlike decode, Encode actually allocates a SECItem the caller must free
michael@0:  * The caller can pass an optional arena to to indicate where to place
michael@0:  * the resultant cipherText.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: static SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_encodeCipherText(PLArenaPool *arena, sftkCipherValue *cipherValue, 
michael@0:                         SECItem **cipherText)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo edi;
michael@0:     SECAlgorithmID *algid;
michael@0:     SECStatus rv;
michael@0:     PLArenaPool *localArena = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0:     localArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
michael@0:     if (localArena == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     algid = nsspkcs5_CreateAlgorithmID(localArena, cipherValue->alg, 
michael@0: 					cipherValue->param);
michael@0:     if (algid == NULL) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(localArena, &edi.algorithm, algid);
michael@0:     SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(algid, PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     edi.encryptedData = cipherValue->value;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     *cipherText = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL, &edi, 
michael@0: 				    sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate);
michael@0:     if (*cipherText == NULL) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (localArena) {
michael@0: 	PORT_FreeArena(localArena,PR_FALSE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * Use our key to decode a cipherText block from the database.
michael@0:  *
michael@0:  * plain text is allocated by nsspkcs5_CipherData and must be freed
michael@0:  * with SECITEM_FreeItem by the caller.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(SECItem *passKey, SECItem *cipherText, SECItem **plain) 
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECStatus rv;
michael@0:     sftkCipherValue cipherValue;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* First get the cipher type */
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_decodeCipherText(cipherText, &cipherValue);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     *plain = nsspkcs5_CipherData(cipherValue.param, passKey, &cipherValue.value, 
michael@0: 				    PR_FALSE, NULL);
michael@0:     if (*plain == NULL) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     } 
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (cipherValue.param) {
michael@0: 	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(cipherValue.param);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (cipherValue.arena) {
michael@0: 	PORT_FreeArena(cipherValue.arena,PR_FALSE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * encrypt a block. This function returned the encrypted ciphertext which
michael@0:  * the caller must free. If the caller provides an arena, cipherText will
michael@0:  * be allocated out of that arena. This also generated the per entry
michael@0:  * salt automatically.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *passKey, 
michael@0: 		SECItem *plainText, SECItem **cipherText) 
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECStatus rv;
michael@0:     sftkCipherValue cipherValue;
michael@0:     SECItem *cipher = NULL;
michael@0:     NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param = NULL;
michael@0:     unsigned char saltData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
michael@0: 
michael@0:     cipherValue.alg = SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_TRIPLE_DES_CBC;
michael@0:     cipherValue.salt.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
michael@0:     cipherValue.salt.data = saltData;
michael@0:     RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(saltData,cipherValue.salt.len);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     param = nsspkcs5_NewParam(cipherValue.alg, &cipherValue.salt, 1);
michael@0:     if (param == NULL) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     cipher = nsspkcs5_CipherData(param, passKey, plainText, PR_TRUE, NULL);
michael@0:     if (cipher == NULL) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     } 
michael@0:     cipherValue.value = *cipher;
michael@0:     cipherValue.param = param;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_encodeCipherText(arena, &cipherValue, cipherText);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (cipher) {
michael@0: 	SECITEM_FreeItem(cipher, PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (param) {
michael@0: 	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(param);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * use the password and the pbe parameters to generate an HMAC for the
michael@0:  * given plain text data. This is used by sftkdb_VerifyAttribute and
michael@0:  * sftkdb_SignAttribute. Signature is returned in signData. The caller
michael@0:  * must preallocate the space in the secitem.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: static SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_pbehash(SECOidTag sigOid, SECItem *passKey, 
michael@0: 	       NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param,
michael@0: 	       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType,
michael@0: 	       SECItem *plainText, SECItem *signData)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
michael@0:     SECItem *key = NULL;
michael@0:     HMACContext *hashCx = NULL;
michael@0:     HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgNULL;
michael@0:     const SECHashObject *hashObj;
michael@0:     unsigned char addressData[SDB_ULONG_SIZE];
michael@0: 
michael@0:     hashType = HASH_FromHMACOid(param->encAlg);
michael@0:     if (hashType == HASH_AlgNULL) {
michael@0: 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
michael@0:     if (hashObj == NULL) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(param, passKey, NULL, PR_FALSE);
michael@0:     if (!key) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     hashCx = HMAC_Create(hashObj, key->data, key->len, PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     if (!hashCx) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     HMAC_Begin(hashCx);
michael@0:     /* Tie this value to a particular object. This is most important for
michael@0:      * the trust attributes, where and attacker could copy a value for
michael@0:      * 'validCA' from another cert in the database */
michael@0:     sftk_ULong2SDBULong(addressData, objectID);
michael@0:     HMAC_Update(hashCx, addressData, SDB_ULONG_SIZE);
michael@0:     sftk_ULong2SDBULong(addressData, attrType);
michael@0:     HMAC_Update(hashCx, addressData, SDB_ULONG_SIZE);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     HMAC_Update(hashCx, plainText->data, plainText->len);
michael@0:     rv = HMAC_Finish(hashCx, signData->data, &signData->len, signData->len);
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (hashCx) {
michael@0: 	HMAC_Destroy(hashCx, PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (key) {
michael@0: 	SECITEM_FreeItem(key,PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * Use our key to verify a signText block from the database matches
michael@0:  * the plainText from the database. The signText is a PKCS 5 v2 pbe.
michael@0:  * plainText is the plainText of the attribute.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(SECItem *passKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, 
michael@0: 	     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType, 
michael@0: 	     SECItem *plainText, SECItem *signText) 
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECStatus rv;
michael@0:     sftkCipherValue signValue;
michael@0:     SECItem signature;
michael@0:     unsigned char signData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
michael@0:     
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* First get the cipher type */
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_decodeCipherText(signText, &signValue);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     signature.data = signData;
michael@0:     signature.len = sizeof(signData);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_pbehash(signValue.alg, passKey, signValue.param, 
michael@0: 			objectID, attrType, plainText, &signature);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&signValue.value,&signature) != 0) {
michael@0: 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (signValue.param) {
michael@0: 	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(signValue.param);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (signValue.arena) {
michael@0: 	PORT_FreeArena(signValue.arena,PR_FALSE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * Use our key to create a signText block the plain text of an
michael@0:  * attribute. The signText is a PKCS 5 v2 pbe.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_SignAttribute(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *passKey, 
michael@0: 	 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType, 
michael@0: 	 SECItem *plainText, SECItem **signature) 
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECStatus rv;
michael@0:     sftkCipherValue signValue;
michael@0:     NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param = NULL;
michael@0:     unsigned char saltData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
michael@0:     unsigned char signData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
michael@0:     SECOidTag hmacAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256; /* hash for authentication */
michael@0:     SECOidTag prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;  /* hash for pb key generation */
michael@0:     HASH_HashType prfType;
michael@0:     unsigned int hmacLength;
michael@0:     unsigned int prfLength;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* this code allows us to fetch the lengths and hashes on the fly
michael@0:      * by simply changing the OID above */
michael@0:     prfType = HASH_FromHMACOid(prfAlg);
michael@0:     PORT_Assert(prfType != HASH_AlgNULL);
michael@0:     prfLength = HASH_GetRawHashObject(prfType)->length;
michael@0:     PORT_Assert(prfLength <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     hmacLength = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_FromHMACOid(hmacAlg))->length;
michael@0:     PORT_Assert(hmacLength <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* initialize our CipherValue structure */
michael@0:     signValue.alg = SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1;
michael@0:     signValue.salt.len = prfLength;
michael@0:     signValue.salt.data = saltData;
michael@0:     signValue.value.data = signData;
michael@0:     signValue.value.len = hmacLength;
michael@0:     RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(saltData,prfLength);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* initialize our pkcs5 parameter */
michael@0:     param = nsspkcs5_NewParam(signValue.alg, &signValue.salt, 1);
michael@0:     if (param == NULL) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     param->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
michael@0:     /* set the PKCS 5 v2 parameters, not extractable from the
michael@0:      * data passed into nsspkcs5_NewParam */
michael@0:     param->encAlg = hmacAlg;
michael@0:     param->hashType = prfType;
michael@0:     param->keyLen = hmacLength;
michael@0:     rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(param->poolp, &param->prfAlg, prfAlg, NULL);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* calculate the mac */
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_pbehash(signValue.alg, passKey, param, objectID, attrType,
michael@0: 			plainText, &signValue.value);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     signValue.param = param;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* write it out */
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_encodeCipherText(arena, &signValue, signature);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (param) {
michael@0: 	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(param);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * safely swith the passed in key for the one caches in the keydb handle
michael@0:  * 
michael@0:  * A key attached to the handle tells us the the token is logged in.
michael@0:  * We can used the key attached to the handle in sftkdb_EncryptAttribute 
michael@0:  *  and sftkdb_DecryptAttribute calls.
michael@0:  */  
michael@0: static void 
michael@0: sftkdb_switchKeys(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, SECItem *passKey)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     unsigned char *data;
michael@0:     int len;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (keydb->passwordLock == NULL) {
michael@0: 	PORT_Assert(keydb->type != SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE);
michael@0: 	return;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* an atomic pointer set would be nice */
michael@0:     SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_Lock(keydb->passwordLock));
michael@0:     data = keydb->passwordKey.data;
michael@0:     len = keydb->passwordKey.len;
michael@0:     keydb->passwordKey.data = passKey->data;
michael@0:     keydb->passwordKey.len = passKey->len;
michael@0:     passKey->data = data;
michael@0:     passKey->len = len;
michael@0:     SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock));
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * returns true if we are in a middle of a merge style update.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: PRBool
michael@0: sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     return keydb->updateID ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * returns true if we are looking for the password for the user's old source
michael@0:  * database as part of a merge style update.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: PRBool
michael@0: sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     if (!sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(keydb)) {
michael@0: 	return PR_FALSE;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (keydb->updateDBIsInit && !keydb->updatePasswordKey) {
michael@0: 	return PR_TRUE;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return PR_FALSE;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * fetch an update password key from a handle.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECItem *
michael@0: sftkdb_GetUpdatePasswordKey(SFTKDBHandle *handle)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECItem *key = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* if we're a cert db, fetch it from our peer key db */
michael@0:     if (handle->type == SFTK_CERTDB_TYPE) {
michael@0: 	handle = handle->peerDB;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* don't have one */
michael@0:     if (!handle) {
michael@0: 	return NULL;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     PZ_Lock(handle->passwordLock);
michael@0:     if (handle->updatePasswordKey) {
michael@0: 	key = SECITEM_DupItem(handle->updatePasswordKey);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     PZ_Unlock(handle->passwordLock);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     return key;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * free the update password key from a handle.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: void
michael@0: sftkdb_FreeUpdatePasswordKey(SFTKDBHandle *handle)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECItem *key = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* don't have one */
michael@0:     if (!handle) {
michael@0: 	return;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* if we're a cert db, we don't have one */
michael@0:     if (handle->type == SFTK_CERTDB_TYPE) {
michael@0: 	return;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     PZ_Lock(handle->passwordLock);
michael@0:     if (handle->updatePasswordKey) {
michael@0: 	key = handle->updatePasswordKey;
michael@0: 	handle->updatePasswordKey = NULL;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     PZ_Unlock(handle->passwordLock);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (key) {
michael@0: 	SECITEM_ZfreeItem(key, PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     return;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * what password db we use depends heavily on the update state machine
michael@0:  * 
michael@0:  *  1) no update db, return the normal database.
michael@0:  *  2) update db and no merge return the update db.
michael@0:  *  3) update db and in merge: 
michael@0:  *      return the update db if we need the update db's password, 
michael@0:  *      otherwise return our normal datbase.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: static SDB *
michael@0: sftk_getPWSDB(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     if (!keydb->update) {
michael@0: 	return keydb->db;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (!sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(keydb)) {
michael@0: 	return keydb->update;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(keydb)) {
michael@0: 	return keydb->update;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return keydb->db;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * return success if we have a valid password entry.
michael@0:  * This is will show up outside of PKCS #11 as CKF_USER_PIN_INIT
michael@0:  * in the token flags.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus 
michael@0: sftkdb_HasPasswordSet(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECItem salt, value;
michael@0:     unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
michael@0:     unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
michael@0:     CK_RV crv;
michael@0:     SDB *db;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (keydb == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     db = sftk_getPWSDB(keydb);
michael@0:     if (db == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     salt.data = saltData;
michael@0:     salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
michael@0:     value.data = valueData;
michael@0:     value.len = sizeof(valueData);
michael@0:     crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* If no password is set, we can update right away */
michael@0:     if (((keydb->db->sdb_flags & SDB_RDONLY) == 0) && keydb->update 
michael@0: 	&& crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	/* update the peer certdb if it exists */
michael@0: 	if (keydb->peerDB) {
michael@0: 	    sftkdb_Update(keydb->peerDB, NULL);
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	sftkdb_Update(keydb, NULL);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return (crv == CKR_OK) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: #define SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING "password-check"
michael@0: #define SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN 14
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * check if the supplied password is valid
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus  
michael@0: sftkdb_CheckPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, const char *pw, PRBool *tokenRemoved)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECStatus rv;
michael@0:     SECItem salt, value;
michael@0:     unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
michael@0:     unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
michael@0:     SECItem key;
michael@0:     SECItem *result = NULL;
michael@0:     SDB *db;
michael@0:     CK_RV crv;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (keydb == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     db = sftk_getPWSDB(keydb);
michael@0:     if (db == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     key.data = NULL;
michael@0:     key.len = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (pw == NULL) pw="";
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* get the entry from the database */
michael@0:     salt.data = saltData;
michael@0:     salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
michael@0:     value.data = valueData;
michael@0:     value.len = sizeof(valueData);
michael@0:     crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto done;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* get our intermediate key based on the entry salt value */
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_passwordToKey(keydb, &salt, pw, &key);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto done;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* decrypt the entry value */
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(&key, &value, &result);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto done;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* if it's what we expect, update our key in the database handle and
michael@0:      * return Success */
michael@0:     if ((result->len == SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN) &&
michael@0:       PORT_Memcmp(result->data, SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING, SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN) == 0){
michael@0: 	/*
michael@0: 	 * We have a password, now lets handle any potential update cases..
michael@0: 	 * 
michael@0: 	 * First, the normal case: no update. In this case we only need the
michael@0: 	 *  the password for our only DB, which we now have, we switch 
michael@0: 	 *  the keys and fall through.
michael@0: 	 * Second regular (non-merge) update: The target DB does not yet have
michael@0: 	 *  a password initialized, we now have the password for the source DB,
michael@0: 	 *  so we can switch the keys and simply update the target database.
michael@0: 	 * Merge update case: This one is trickier.
michael@0: 	 *   1) If we need the source DB password, then we just got it here.
michael@0: 	 *       We need to save that password,
michael@0: 	 *       then we need to check to see if we need or have the target 
michael@0: 	 *         database password.
michael@0: 	 *       If we have it (it's the same as the source), or don't need 
michael@0: 	 *         it (it's not set or is ""), we can start the update now.
michael@0: 	 *       If we don't have it, we need the application to get it from 
michael@0: 	 *         the user. Clear our sessions out to simulate a token 
michael@0: 	 *         removal. C_GetTokenInfo will change the token description 
michael@0: 	 *         and the token will still appear to be logged out.
michael@0: 	 *   2) If we already have the source DB  password, this password is 
michael@0: 	 *         for the target database. We can now move forward with the 
michael@0: 	 *         update, as we now have both required passwords.
michael@0: 	 *
michael@0: 	 */
michael@0:         PZ_Lock(keydb->passwordLock);
michael@0: 	if (sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(keydb)) {
michael@0: 	    /* Squirrel this special key away.
michael@0: 	     * This has the side effect of turning sftkdb_NeedLegacyPW off,
michael@0: 	     * as well as changing which database is returned from 
michael@0: 	     * SFTK_GET_PW_DB (thus effecting both sftkdb_CheckPassword()
michael@0: 	     * and sftkdb_HasPasswordSet()) */
michael@0: 	    keydb->updatePasswordKey = SECITEM_DupItem(&key);
michael@0: 	    PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock);
michael@0: 	    if (keydb->updatePasswordKey == NULL) {
michael@0: 		/* PORT_Error set by SECITEM_DupItem */
michael@0: 		rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 		goto done;
michael@0: 	    }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 	    /* Simulate a token removal -- we need to do this any
michael@0:              * any case at this point so the token name is correct. */
michael@0: 	    *tokenRemoved = PR_TRUE;
michael@0: 
michael@0: 	    /* 
michael@0: 	     * OK, we got the update DB password, see if we need a password
michael@0: 	     * for the target...
michael@0: 	     */
michael@0: 	    if (sftkdb_HasPasswordSet(keydb) == SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 		/* We have a password, do we know what the password is?
michael@0: 		 *  check 1) for the password the user supplied for the 
michael@0: 		 *           update DB,
michael@0: 		 *    and 2) for the null password.
michael@0: 		 *
michael@0: 		 * RECURSION NOTE: we are calling ourselves here. This means
michael@0: 		 *  any updates, switchKeys, etc will have been completed
michael@0: 		 *  if these functions return successfully, in those cases
michael@0: 		 *  just exit returning Success. We don't recurse infinitely
michael@0: 		 *  because we are making this call from a NeedUpdateDBPassword
michael@0: 		 *  block and we've already set that update password at this
michael@0: 		 *  point.  */
michael@0: 		rv = sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, pw, tokenRemoved);
michael@0: 		if (rv == SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 		    /* source and target databases have the same password, we 
michael@0: 		     * are good to go */
michael@0: 		    goto done;
michael@0: 		}
michael@0: 		sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, "", tokenRemoved);
michael@0: 
michael@0: 		/*
michael@0: 		 * Important 'NULL' code here. At this point either we 
michael@0: 		 * succeeded in logging in with "" or we didn't.
michael@0:                  *
michael@0:                  *  If we did succeed at login, our machine state will be set
michael@0: 		 * to logged in appropriately. The application will find that 
michael@0: 		 * it's logged in as soon as it opens a new session. We have 
michael@0: 		 * also completed the update. Life is good.
michael@0: 		 * 
michael@0: 		 *  If we did not succeed, well the user still successfully
michael@0: 		 * logged into the update database, since we faked the token 
michael@0: 		 * removal it's just like the user logged into his smart card 
michael@0: 		 * then removed it. the actual login work, so we report that 
michael@0: 		 * success back to the user, but we won't actually be
michael@0: 		 * logged in. The application will find this out when it
michael@0: 		 * checks it's login state, thus triggering another password
michael@0: 		 * prompt so we can get the real target DB password.
michael@0: 		 *
michael@0: 		 * summary, we exit from here with SECSuccess no matter what.
michael@0: 		 */
michael@0: 		rv = SECSuccess;
michael@0: 		goto done;
michael@0: 	    } else {
michael@0: 		/* there is no password, just fall through to update.
michael@0: 		 * update will write the source DB's password record
michael@0: 		 * into the target DB just like it would in a non-merge
michael@0: 		 * update case. */
michael@0: 	    }
michael@0: 	} else {
michael@0: 	    PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock);
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	/* load the keys, so the keydb can parse it's key set */
michael@0: 	sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &key);
michael@0: 
michael@0: 	/* we need to update, do it now */
michael@0: 	if (((keydb->db->sdb_flags & SDB_RDONLY) == 0) && keydb->update) {
michael@0: 	    /* update the peer certdb if it exists */
michael@0: 	    if (keydb->peerDB) {
michael@0: 		sftkdb_Update(keydb->peerDB, &key);
michael@0: 	    }
michael@0: 	    sftkdb_Update(keydb, &key);
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     } else {
michael@0:         rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	/*PORT_SetError( bad password); */
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: done:
michael@0:     if (key.data) {
michael@0: 	PORT_ZFree(key.data,key.len);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (result) {
michael@0: 	SECITEM_FreeItem(result,PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * return Success if the there is a cached password key.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_PWCached(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     return keydb->passwordKey.data ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: static CK_RV
michael@0: sftk_updateMacs(PLArenaPool *arena, SFTKDBHandle *handle,
michael@0: 		       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
michael@0:     CK_RV crv2;
michael@0:     CK_ATTRIBUTE authAttrs[] = {
michael@0: 	{CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS, NULL, 0},
michael@0:     };
michael@0:     CK_ULONG authAttrCount = sizeof(authAttrs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
michael@0:     int i, count;
michael@0:     SFTKDBHandle *keyHandle = handle;
michael@0:     SDB *keyTarget = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     id &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (handle->type != SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE) {
michael@0: 	keyHandle = handle->peerDB;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (keyHandle == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return CKR_OK;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* old DB's don't have meta data, finished with MACs */
michael@0:     keyTarget = SFTK_GET_SDB(keyHandle);
michael@0:     if ((keyTarget->sdb_flags &SDB_HAS_META) == 0) {
michael@0: 	return CKR_OK;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /*
michael@0:      * STEP 1: find the MACed attributes of this object 
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     crv2 = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(handle, id, authAttrs, authAttrCount);
michael@0:     count = 0;
michael@0:     /* allocate space for the attributes */
michael@0:     for (i=0; i < authAttrCount; i++) {
michael@0: 	if ((authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)){
michael@0: 	    continue;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	count++;
michael@0:         authAttrs[i].pValue = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,authAttrs[i].ulValueLen);
michael@0: 	if (authAttrs[i].pValue == NULL) {
michael@0: 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
michael@0: 	    break;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* if count was zero, none were found, finished with MACs */
michael@0:     if (count == 0) {
michael@0: 	return CKR_OK;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(handle, id, authAttrs, authAttrCount);
michael@0:     /* ignore error code, we expect some possible errors */
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* GetAttributeValue just verified the old macs, safe to write
michael@0:      * them out then... */
michael@0:     for (i=0; i < authAttrCount; i++) {
michael@0: 	SECItem *signText;
michael@0: 	SECItem plainText;
michael@0: 	SECStatus rv;
michael@0: 
michael@0: 	if ((authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)){
michael@0: 	    continue;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 
michael@0: 	plainText.data = authAttrs[i].pValue;
michael@0: 	plainText.len = authAttrs[i].ulValueLen;
michael@0: 	rv = sftkdb_SignAttribute(arena, newKey, id, 
michael@0: 			authAttrs[i].type, &plainText, &signText);
michael@0: 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	rv = sftkdb_PutAttributeSignature(handle, keyTarget, id, 
michael@0: 				authAttrs[i].type, signText);
michael@0: 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     return CKR_OK;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 	
michael@0: static CK_RV
michael@0: sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena, SFTKDBHandle *keydb,
michael@0: 		       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
michael@0:     CK_RV crv2;
michael@0:     CK_ATTRIBUTE *first, *last;
michael@0:     CK_ATTRIBUTE privAttrs[] = {
michael@0: 	{CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_PRIME_1, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_PRIME_2, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_EXPONENT_1, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_EXPONENT_2, NULL, 0},
michael@0: 	{CKA_COEFFICIENT, NULL, 0} };
michael@0:     CK_ULONG privAttrCount = sizeof(privAttrs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
michael@0:     int i, count;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /*
michael@0:      * STEP 1. Read the old attributes in the clear.
michael@0:      */
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* Get the attribute sizes.
michael@0:      *  ignore the error code, we will have unknown attributes here */
michael@0:     crv2 = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, privAttrs, privAttrCount);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /*
michael@0:      * find the valid block of attributes and fill allocate space for
michael@0:      * their data */
michael@0:     first = last = NULL;
michael@0:     for (i=0; i < privAttrCount; i++) {
michael@0:          /* find the block of attributes that are appropriate for this 
michael@0:           * objects. There should only be once contiguous block, if not 
michael@0:           * there's an error.
michael@0:           *
michael@0:           * find the first and last good entry.
michael@0:           */
michael@0: 	if ((privAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (privAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)){
michael@0: 	    if (!first) continue;
michael@0: 	    if (!last) {
michael@0: 		/* previous entry was last good entry */
michael@0: 		last= &privAttrs[i-1];
michael@0: 	    }
michael@0: 	    continue;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	if (!first) {
michael@0: 	    first = &privAttrs[i];
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	if (last) {
michael@0: 	   /* OOPS, we've found another good entry beyond the end of the
michael@0: 	    * last good entry, we need to fail here. */
michael@0: 	   crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
michael@0: 	   break;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:         privAttrs[i].pValue = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,privAttrs[i].ulValueLen);
michael@0: 	if (privAttrs[i].pValue == NULL) {
michael@0: 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
michael@0: 	    break;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (first == NULL) {
michael@0: 	/* no valid entries found, return error based on crv2 */
michael@0: 	return crv2;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (last == NULL) {
michael@0: 	last = &privAttrs[privAttrCount-1];
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	return crv;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     /* read the attributes */
michael@0:     count = (last-first)+1;
michael@0:     crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, first, count);
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	return crv;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /*
michael@0:      * STEP 2: read the encrypt the attributes with the new key.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     for (i=0; i < count; i++) {
michael@0: 	SECItem plainText;
michael@0: 	SECItem *result;
michael@0: 	SECStatus rv;
michael@0: 
michael@0: 	plainText.data = first[i].pValue;
michael@0: 	plainText.len = first[i].ulValueLen;
michael@0:     	rv = sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(arena, newKey, &plainText, &result);
michael@0: 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	   return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	first[i].pValue = result->data;
michael@0: 	first[i].ulValueLen = result->len;
michael@0: 	/* clear our sensitive data out */
michael@0: 	PORT_Memset(plainText.data, 0, plainText.len);
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /*
michael@0:      * STEP 3: write the newly encrypted attributes out directly
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     id &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
michael@0:     keydb->newKey = newKey;
michael@0:     crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_SetAttributeValue)(keydb->db, id, first, count);
michael@0:     keydb->newKey = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     return crv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 	
michael@0: static CK_RV
michael@0: sftk_convertAttributes(SFTKDBHandle *handle, 
michael@0: 			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
michael@0:     PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* get a new arena to simplify cleanup */
michael@0:     arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
michael@0:     if (!arena) {
michael@0: 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /*
michael@0:      * first handle the MACS
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     crv = sftk_updateMacs(arena, handle, id, newKey);
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (handle->type == SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE) {
michael@0: 	crv = sftk_updateEncrypted(arena, handle, id, newKey);
michael@0: 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	    goto loser;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* free up our mess */
michael@0:     /* NOTE: at this point we know we've cleared out any unencrypted data */
michael@0:     PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
michael@0:     return CKR_OK;
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     /* there may be unencrypted data, clear it out down */
michael@0:     PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
michael@0:     return crv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * must be called with the old key active.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: CK_RV
michael@0: sftkdb_convertObjects(SFTKDBHandle *handle, CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, 
michael@0: 			CK_ULONG count, SECItem *newKey)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SDBFind *find = NULL;
michael@0:     CK_ULONG idCount = SFTK_MAX_IDS;
michael@0:     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ids[SFTK_MAX_IDS];
michael@0:     CK_RV crv, crv2;
michael@0:     int i;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     crv = sftkdb_FindObjectsInit(handle, template, count, &find);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	return crv;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     while ((crv == CKR_OK) && (idCount == SFTK_MAX_IDS)) {
michael@0: 	crv = sftkdb_FindObjects(handle, find, ids, SFTK_MAX_IDS, &idCount);
michael@0: 	for (i=0; (crv == CKR_OK) && (i < idCount); i++) {
michael@0: 	    crv = sftk_convertAttributes(handle, ids[i], newKey);
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     crv2 = sftkdb_FindObjectsFinal(handle, find);
michael@0:     if (crv == CKR_OK) crv = crv2;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     return crv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * change the database password.
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_ChangePassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, 
michael@0:                       char *oldPin, char *newPin, PRBool *tokenRemoved)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
michael@0:     SECItem plainText;
michael@0:     SECItem newKey;
michael@0:     SECItem *result = NULL;
michael@0:     SECItem salt, value;
michael@0:     SFTKDBHandle *certdb;
michael@0:     unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
michael@0:     unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
michael@0:     CK_RV crv;
michael@0:     SDB *db;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     if (keydb == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     db = SFTK_GET_SDB(keydb);
michael@0:     if (db == NULL) {
michael@0: 	return SECFailure;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     newKey.data = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /* make sure we have a valid old pin */
michael@0:     crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_Begin)(keydb->db);
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     salt.data = saltData;
michael@0:     salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
michael@0:     value.data = valueData;
michael@0:     value.len = sizeof(valueData);
michael@0:     crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
michael@0:     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	rv = sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, oldPin, tokenRemoved);
michael@0: 	if (rv == SECFailure) {
michael@0: 	    goto loser;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     } else {
michael@0: 	salt.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
michael@0:     	RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(salt.data,salt.len);
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_passwordToKey(keydb, &salt, newPin, &newKey);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /*
michael@0:      * convert encrypted entries here.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(keydb, NULL, 0, &newKey);
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     /* fix up certdb macs */
michael@0:     certdb = keydb->peerDB;
michael@0:     if (certdb) {
michael@0: 	CK_ATTRIBUTE objectType = { CKA_CLASS, 0, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS) };
michael@0: 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS myClass = CKO_NETSCAPE_TRUST;
michael@0: 
michael@0: 	objectType.pValue = &myClass;
michael@0: 	crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(certdb, &objectType, 1, &newKey);
michael@0: 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	    rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	    goto loser;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0: 	myClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
michael@0: 	crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(certdb, &objectType, 1, &newKey);
michael@0: 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	    rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	    goto loser;
michael@0: 	}
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0:     plainText.data = (unsigned char *)SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING;
michael@0:     plainText.len = SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     rv = sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(NULL, &newKey, &plainText, &result);
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     value.data = result->data;
michael@0:     value.len = result->len;
michael@0:     crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_PutMetaData)(keydb->db, "password", &salt, &value);
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_Commit)(keydb->db);
michael@0:     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
michael@0: 	rv = SECFailure;
michael@0: 	goto loser;
michael@0:     }
michael@0: 
michael@0:     keydb->newKey = NULL;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &newKey);
michael@0: 
michael@0: loser:
michael@0:     if (newKey.data) {
michael@0: 	PORT_ZFree(newKey.data,newKey.len);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (result) {
michael@0: 	SECITEM_FreeItem(result, PR_FALSE);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
michael@0:         (*keydb->db->sdb_Abort)(keydb->db);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     
michael@0:     return rv;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: /*
michael@0:  * lose our cached password
michael@0:  */
michael@0: SECStatus
michael@0: sftkdb_ClearPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
michael@0: {
michael@0:     SECItem oldKey;
michael@0:     oldKey.data = NULL;
michael@0:     oldKey.len = 0;
michael@0:     sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &oldKey);
michael@0:     if (oldKey.data) {
michael@0: 	PORT_ZFree(oldKey.data, oldKey.len);
michael@0:     }
michael@0:     return SECSuccess;
michael@0: }
michael@0: 
michael@0: