michael@0: // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
michael@0: // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
michael@0: // found in the LICENSE file.
michael@0: 
michael@0: #ifndef SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_
michael@0: #define SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_
michael@0: 
michael@0: #include <string>
michael@0: 
michael@0: #include "base/basictypes.h"
michael@0: #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_types.h"
michael@0: #include "sandbox/win/src/security_level.h"
michael@0: 
michael@0: namespace sandbox {
michael@0: 
michael@0: class TargetPolicy {
michael@0:  public:
michael@0:   // Windows subsystems that can have specific rules.
michael@0:   // Note: The process subsystem(SUBSY_PROCESS) does not evaluate the request
michael@0:   // exactly like the CreateProcess API does. See the comment at the top of
michael@0:   // process_thread_dispatcher.cc for more details.
michael@0:   enum SubSystem {
michael@0:     SUBSYS_FILES,             // Creation and opening of files and pipes.
michael@0:     SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,       // Creation of named pipes.
michael@0:     SUBSYS_PROCESS,           // Creation of child processes.
michael@0:     SUBSYS_REGISTRY,          // Creation and opening of registry keys.
michael@0:     SUBSYS_SYNC,              // Creation of named sync objects.
michael@0:     SUBSYS_HANDLES            // Duplication of handles to other processes.
michael@0:   };
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Allowable semantics when a rule is matched.
michael@0:   enum Semantics {
michael@0:     FILES_ALLOW_ANY,       // Allows open or create for any kind of access that
michael@0:                            // the file system supports.
michael@0:     FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,  // Allows open or create with read access only.
michael@0:     FILES_ALLOW_QUERY,     // Allows access to query the attributes of a file.
michael@0:     FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY,   // Allows open or create with directory semantics
michael@0:                            // only.
michael@0:     HANDLES_DUP_ANY,       // Allows duplicating handles opened with any
michael@0:                            // access permissions.
michael@0:     HANDLES_DUP_BROKER,    // Allows duplicating handles to the broker process.
michael@0:     NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,  // Allows creation of a named pipe.
michael@0:     PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,      // Allows to create a process with minimal rights
michael@0:                            // over the resulting process and thread handles.
michael@0:                            // No other parameters besides the command line are
michael@0:                            // passed to the child process.
michael@0:     PROCESS_ALL_EXEC,      // Allows the creation of a process and return fill
michael@0:                            // access on the returned handles.
michael@0:                            // This flag can be used only when the main token of
michael@0:                            // the sandboxed application is at least INTERACTIVE.
michael@0:     EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY,      // Allows the creation of an event with full access.
michael@0:     EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows opening an even with synchronize access.
michael@0:     REG_ALLOW_READONLY,    // Allows readonly access to a registry key.
michael@0:     REG_ALLOW_ANY          // Allows read and write access to a registry key.
michael@0:   };
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Increments the reference count of this object. The reference count must
michael@0:   // be incremented if this interface is given to another component.
michael@0:   virtual void AddRef() = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Decrements the reference count of this object. When the reference count
michael@0:   // is zero the object is automatically destroyed.
michael@0:   // Indicates that the caller is done with this interface. After calling
michael@0:   // release no other method should be called.
michael@0:   virtual void Release() = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets the security level for the target process' two tokens.
michael@0:   // This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target process is
michael@0:   // spawned.
michael@0:   // initial: the security level for the initial token. This is the token that
michael@0:   //   is used by the process from the creation of the process until the moment
michael@0:   //   the process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls
michael@0:   //   win32's ReverToSelf(). Once this happens the initial token is no longer
michael@0:   //   available and the lockdown token is in effect. Using an initial token is
michael@0:   //   not compatible with AppContainer, see SetAppContainer.
michael@0:   // lockdown: the security level for the token that comes into force after the
michael@0:   //   process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls
michael@0:   //   ReverToSelf(). See the explanation of each level in the TokenLevel
michael@0:   //   definition.
michael@0:   // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise.
michael@0:   //   Returns false if the lockdown value is more permissive than the initial
michael@0:   //   value.
michael@0:   //
michael@0:   // Important: most of the sandbox-provided security relies on this single
michael@0:   // setting. The caller should strive to set the lockdown level as restricted
michael@0:   // as possible.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetTokenLevel(TokenLevel initial, TokenLevel lockdown) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets the security level of the Job Object to which the target process will
michael@0:   // belong. This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target
michael@0:   // process is spawned. The job controls the global security settings which
michael@0:   // can not be specified in the token security profile.
michael@0:   // job_level: the security level for the job. See the explanation of each
michael@0:   //   level in the JobLevel definition.
michael@0:   // ui_exceptions: specify what specific rights that are disabled in the
michael@0:   //   chosen job_level that need to be granted. Use this parameter to avoid
michael@0:   //   selecting the next permissive job level unless you need all the rights
michael@0:   //   that are granted in such level.
michael@0:   //   The exceptions can be specified as a combination of the following
michael@0:   //   constants:
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES : grant access to all user-mode handles. These
michael@0:   //   include windows, icons, menus and various GDI objects. In addition the
michael@0:   //   target process can set hooks, and broadcast messages to other processes
michael@0:   //   that belong to the same desktop.
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD : grant read-only access to the clipboard.
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_WRITECLIPBOARD : grant write access to the clipboard.
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS : allow changes to the system-wide
michael@0:   //   parameters as defined by the Win32 call SystemParametersInfo().
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS : allow programmatic changes to the
michael@0:   //  display settings.
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_GLOBALATOMS : allow access to the global atoms table.
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP : allow the creation of new desktops.
michael@0:   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS : allow the call to ExitWindows().
michael@0:   //
michael@0:   // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise.
michael@0:   //
michael@0:   // Note: JOB_OBJECT_XXXX constants are defined in winnt.h and documented at
michael@0:   // length in:
michael@0:   //   http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684152.aspx
michael@0:   //
michael@0:   // Note: the recommended level is JOB_RESTRICTED or JOB_LOCKDOWN.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetJobLevel(JobLevel job_level, uint32 ui_exceptions) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Specifies the desktop on which the application is going to run. If the
michael@0:   // desktop does not exist, it will be created. If alternate_winstation is
michael@0:   // set to true, the desktop will be created on an alternate window station.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Returns the name of the alternate desktop used. If an alternate window
michael@0:   // station is specified, the name is prepended by the window station name,
michael@0:   // followed by a backslash.
michael@0:   virtual std::wstring GetAlternateDesktop() const = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Precreates the desktop and window station, if any.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode CreateAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Destroys the desktop and windows station.
michael@0:   virtual void DestroyAlternateDesktop() = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. Both the initial
michael@0:   // token and the main token will be affected by this. If the integrity level
michael@0:   // is set to a level higher than the current level, the sandbox will fail
michael@0:   // to start.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. The integrity level
michael@0:   // will not take effect before you call LowerToken. User Interface Privilege
michael@0:   // Isolation is not affected by this setting and will remain off for the
michael@0:   // process in the sandbox. If the integrity level is set to a level higher
michael@0:   // than the current level, the sandbox will fail to start.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets the AppContainer to be used for the sandboxed process. Any capability
michael@0:   // to be enabled for the process should be added before this method is invoked
michael@0:   // (by calling SetCapability() as many times as needed).
michael@0:   // The desired AppContainer must be already installed on the system, otherwise
michael@0:   // launching the sandboxed process will fail. See BrokerServices for details
michael@0:   // about installing an AppContainer.
michael@0:   // Note that currently Windows restricts the use of impersonation within
michael@0:   // AppContainers, so this function is incompatible with the use of an initial
michael@0:   // token.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetAppContainer(const wchar_t* sid) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets a capability to be enabled for the sandboxed process' AppContainer.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetCapability(const wchar_t* sid) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets the mitigations enabled when the process is created. Most of these
michael@0:   // are implemented as attributes passed via STARTUPINFOEX. So they take
michael@0:   // effect before any thread in the target executes. The declaration of
michael@0:   // MitigationFlags is followed by a detailed description of each flag.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetProcessMitigations(MitigationFlags flags) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Returns the currently set mitigation flags.
michael@0:   virtual MitigationFlags GetProcessMitigations() = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets process mitigation flags that don't take effect before the call to
michael@0:   // LowerToken().
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetDelayedProcessMitigations(MitigationFlags flags) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Returns the currently set delayed mitigation flags.
michael@0:   virtual MitigationFlags GetDelayedProcessMitigations() = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Sets the interceptions to operate in strict mode. By default, interceptions
michael@0:   // are performed in "relaxed" mode, where if something inside NTDLL.DLL is
michael@0:   // already patched we attempt to intercept it anyway. Setting interceptions
michael@0:   // to strict mode means that when we detect that the function is patched we'll
michael@0:   // refuse to perform the interception.
michael@0:   virtual void SetStrictInterceptions() = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Set the handles the target process should inherit for stdout and
michael@0:   // stderr.  The handles the caller passes must remain valid for the
michael@0:   // lifetime of the policy object.  This only has an effect on
michael@0:   // Windows Vista and later versions.  These methods accept pipe and
michael@0:   // file handles, but not console handles.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetStdoutHandle(HANDLE handle) = 0;
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode SetStderrHandle(HANDLE handle) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Adds a policy rule effective for processes spawned using this policy.
michael@0:   // subsystem: One of the above enumerated windows subsystems.
michael@0:   // semantics: One of the above enumerated FileSemantics.
michael@0:   // pattern: A specific full path or a full path with wildcard patterns.
michael@0:   //   The valid wildcards are:
michael@0:   //   '*' : Matches zero or more character. Only one in series allowed.
michael@0:   //   '?' : Matches a single character. One or more in series are allowed.
michael@0:   // Examples:
michael@0:   //   "c:\\documents and settings\\vince\\*.dmp"
michael@0:   //   "c:\\documents and settings\\*\\crashdumps\\*.dmp"
michael@0:   //   "c:\\temp\\app_log_?????_chrome.txt"
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode AddRule(SubSystem subsystem, Semantics semantics,
michael@0:                              const wchar_t* pattern) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Adds a dll that will be unloaded in the target process before it gets
michael@0:   // a chance to initialize itself. Typically, dlls that cause the target
michael@0:   // to crash go here.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode AddDllToUnload(const wchar_t* dll_name) = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:   // Adds a handle that will be closed in the target process after lockdown.
michael@0:   // A NULL value for handle_name indicates all handles of the specified type.
michael@0:   // An empty string for handle_name indicates the handle is unnamed.
michael@0:   virtual ResultCode AddKernelObjectToClose(const wchar_t* handle_type,
michael@0:                                             const wchar_t* handle_name) = 0;
michael@0: };
michael@0: 
michael@0: }  // namespace sandbox
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: #endif  // SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_