michael@0: // Copyright (c) 2006-2008 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
michael@0: // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
michael@0: // found in the LICENSE file.
michael@0: 
michael@0: #ifndef SANDBOX_SRC_SECURITY_LEVEL_H_
michael@0: #define SANDBOX_SRC_SECURITY_LEVEL_H_
michael@0: 
michael@0: #include "base/basictypes.h"
michael@0: 
michael@0: namespace sandbox {
michael@0: 
michael@0: // List of all the integrity levels supported in the sandbox. This is used
michael@0: // only on Windows Vista. You can't set the integrity level of the process
michael@0: // in the sandbox to a level higher than yours.
michael@0: enum IntegrityLevel {
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_SYSTEM,
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_HIGH,
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM,
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM_LOW,
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW,
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_BELOW_LOW,
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED,
michael@0:   INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST
michael@0: };
michael@0: 
michael@0: // The Token level specifies a set of  security profiles designed to
michael@0: // provide the bulk of the security of sandbox.
michael@0: //
michael@0: //  TokenLevel                 |Restricting   |Deny Only       |Privileges|
michael@0: //                             |Sids          |Sids            |          |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: // USER_LOCKDOWN               | Null Sid     | All            | None     |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: // USER_RESTRICTED             | RESTRICTED   | All            | Traverse |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: // USER_LIMITED                | Users        | All except:    | Traverse |
michael@0: //                             | Everyone     | Users          |          |
michael@0: //                             | RESTRICTED   | Everyone       |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | Interactive    |          |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: // USER_INTERACTIVE            | Users        | All except:    | Traverse |
michael@0: //                             | Everyone     | Users          |          |
michael@0: //                             | RESTRICTED   | Everyone       |          |
michael@0: //                             | Owner        | Interactive    |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | Local          |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | Authent-users  |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | User           |          |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: // USER_NON_ADMIN              | None         | All except:    | Traverse |
michael@0: //                             |              | Users          |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | Everyone       |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | Interactive    |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | Local          |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | Authent-users  |          |
michael@0: //                             |              | User           |          |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: // USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS | All          | None           | All      |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: // USER_UNPROTECTED            | None         | None           | All      |
michael@0: // ----------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------|
michael@0: //
michael@0: // The above restrictions are actually a transformation that is applied to
michael@0: // the existing broker process token. The resulting token that will be
michael@0: // applied to the target process depends both on the token level selected
michael@0: // and on the broker token itself.
michael@0: //
michael@0: //  The LOCKDOWN and RESTRICTED are designed to allow access to almost
michael@0: //  nothing that has security associated with and they are the recommended
michael@0: //  levels to run sandboxed code specially if there is a chance that the
michael@0: //  broker is process might be started by a user that belongs to the Admins
michael@0: //  or power users groups.
michael@0: enum TokenLevel {
michael@0:    USER_LOCKDOWN = 0,
michael@0:    USER_RESTRICTED,
michael@0:    USER_LIMITED,
michael@0:    USER_INTERACTIVE,
michael@0:    USER_NON_ADMIN,
michael@0:    USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
michael@0:    USER_UNPROTECTED
michael@0: };
michael@0: 
michael@0: // The Job level specifies a set of decreasing security profiles for the
michael@0: // Job object that the target process will be placed into.
michael@0: // This table summarizes the security associated with each level:
michael@0: //
michael@0: //  JobLevel        |General                            |Quota               |
michael@0: //                  |restrictions                       |restrictions        |
michael@0: // -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------|
michael@0: // JOB_NONE         | No job is assigned to the         | None               |
michael@0: //                  | sandboxed process.                |                    |
michael@0: // -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------|
michael@0: // JOB_UNPROTECTED  | None                              | *Kill on Job close.|
michael@0: // -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------|
michael@0: // JOB_INTERACTIVE  | *Forbid system-wide changes using |                    |
michael@0: //                  |  SystemParametersInfo().          | *Kill on Job close.|
michael@0: //                  | *Forbid the creation/switch of    |                    |
michael@0: //                  |  Desktops.                        |                    |
michael@0: //                  | *Forbids calls to ExitWindows().  |                    |
michael@0: // -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------|
michael@0: // JOB_LIMITED_USER | Same as INTERACTIVE_USER plus:    | *One active process|
michael@0: //                  | *Forbid changes to the display    |  limit.            |
michael@0: //                  |  settings.                        | *Kill on Job close.|
michael@0: // -----------------|---------------------------------- |--------------------|
michael@0: // JOB_RESTRICTED   | Same as LIMITED_USER plus:        | *One active process|
michael@0: //                  | * No read/write to the clipboard. |  limit.            |
michael@0: //                  | * No access to User Handles that  | *Kill on Job close.|
michael@0: //                  |   belong to other processes.      |                    |
michael@0: //                  | * Forbid message broadcasts.      |                    |
michael@0: //                  | * Forbid setting global hooks.    |                    |
michael@0: //                  | * No access to the global atoms   |                    |
michael@0: //                  |   table.                          |                    |
michael@0: // -----------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
michael@0: // JOB_LOCKDOWN     | Same as RESTRICTED                | *One active process|
michael@0: //                  |                                   |  limit.            |
michael@0: //                  |                                   | *Kill on Job close.|
michael@0: //                  |                                   | *Kill on unhandled |
michael@0: //                  |                                   |  exception.        |
michael@0: //                  |                                   |                    |
michael@0: // In the context of the above table, 'user handles' refers to the handles of
michael@0: // windows, bitmaps, menus, etc. Files, treads and registry handles are kernel
michael@0: // handles and are not affected by the job level settings.
michael@0: enum JobLevel {
michael@0:   JOB_LOCKDOWN = 0,
michael@0:   JOB_RESTRICTED,
michael@0:   JOB_LIMITED_USER,
michael@0:   JOB_INTERACTIVE,
michael@0:   JOB_UNPROTECTED,
michael@0:   JOB_NONE
michael@0: };
michael@0: 
michael@0: // These flags correspond to various process-level mitigations (eg. ASLR and
michael@0: // DEP). Most are implemented via UpdateProcThreadAttribute() plus flags for
michael@0: // the PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_MITIGATION_POLICY attribute argument; documented
michael@0: // here: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880
michael@0: // Some mitigations are implemented directly by the sandbox or emulated to
michael@0: // the greatest extent possible when not directly supported by the OS.
michael@0: // Flags that are unsupported for the target OS will be silently ignored.
michael@0: // Flags that are invalid for their application (pre or post startup) will
michael@0: // return SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS.
michael@0: typedef uint64 MitigationFlags;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Permanently enables DEP for the target process. Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_DEP_ENABLE.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_DEP                              = 0x00000001;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Permanently Disables ATL thunk emulation when DEP is enabled. Valid
michael@0: // only when MITIGATION_DEP is passed. Corresponds to not passing
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_DEP_ATL_THUNK_ENABLE.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK                 = 0x00000002;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Enables Structured exception handling override prevention. Must be
michael@0: // enabled prior to process start. Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_SEHOP_ENABLE.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_SEHOP                            = 0x00000004;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Forces ASLR on all images in the child process. Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_FORCE_RELOCATE_IMAGES_ALWAYS_ON .
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_RELOCATE_IMAGE                   = 0x00000008;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Refuses to load DLLs that cannot support ASLR. Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_FORCE_RELOCATE_IMAGES_ALWAYS_ON_REQ_RELOCS.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_RELOCATE_IMAGE_REQUIRED          = 0x00000010;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Terminates the process on Windows heap corruption. Coresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_HEAP_TERMINATE_ALWAYS_ON.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE                   = 0x00000020;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Sets a random lower bound as the minimum user address. Must be
michael@0: // enabled prior to process start. On 32-bit processes this is
michael@0: // emulated to a much smaller degree. Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR_ALWAYS_ON.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR                   = 0x00000040;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Increases the randomness range of bottom-up ASLR to up to 1TB. Must be
michael@0: // enabled prior to process start and with MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR.
michael@0: // Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_HIGH_ENTROPY_ASLR_ALWAYS_ON
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_HIGH_ENTROPY_ASLR                = 0x00000080;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Immediately raises an exception on a bad handle reference. Must be
michael@0: // enabled after startup. Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS_ALWAYS_ON.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS             = 0x00000100;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Prevents the process from making Win32k calls. Must be enabled after
michael@0: // startup. Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_WIN32K_SYSTEM_CALL_DISABLE_ALWAYS_ON.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE                   = 0x00000200;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Disables common DLL injection methods (e.g. window hooks and
michael@0: // App_InitDLLs). Corresponds to
michael@0: // PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE_ALWAYS_ON.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_EXTENSION_DLL_DISABLE            = 0x00000400;
michael@0: 
michael@0: // Sets the DLL search order to LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_DEFAULT_DIRS. Additional
michael@0: // directories can be added via the Windows AddDllDirectory() function.
michael@0: // http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh310515
michael@0: // Must be enabled after startup.
michael@0: const MitigationFlags MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER        = 0x00000001ULL << 32;
michael@0: 
michael@0: }  // namespace sandbox
michael@0: 
michael@0: #endif  // SANDBOX_SRC_SECURITY_LEVEL_H_