michael@0: /* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
michael@0: /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
michael@0:  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
michael@0:  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
michael@0: 
michael@0: #include "nsISupports.idl"
michael@0: 
michael@0: interface nsIURI;
michael@0: interface nsIChannel;
michael@0: 
michael@0: /**
michael@0:  * nsIProtocolHandler
michael@0:  */
michael@0: [scriptable, uuid(f5753fec-a051-4ddc-8891-11f1f1575072)]
michael@0: interface nsIProtocolHandler : nsISupports
michael@0: {
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * The scheme of this protocol (e.g., "file").
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     readonly attribute ACString scheme;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /** 
michael@0:      * The default port is the port that this protocol normally uses.
michael@0:      * If a port does not make sense for the protocol (e.g., "about:")
michael@0:      * then -1 will be returned.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     readonly attribute long defaultPort;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Returns the protocol specific flags (see flag definitions below).  
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     readonly attribute unsigned long protocolFlags;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Makes a URI object that is suitable for loading by this protocol,
michael@0:      * where the URI string is given as an UTF-8 string.  The caller may
michael@0:      * provide the charset from which the URI string originated, so that
michael@0:      * the URI string can be translated back to that charset (if necessary)
michael@0:      * before communicating with, for example, the origin server of the URI
michael@0:      * string.  (Many servers do not support UTF-8 IRIs at the present time,
michael@0:      * so we must be careful about tracking the native charset of the origin
michael@0:      * server.)
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * @param aSpec          - the URI string in UTF-8 encoding. depending
michael@0:      *                         on the protocol implementation, unicode character
michael@0:      *                         sequences may or may not be %xx escaped.
michael@0:      * @param aOriginCharset - the charset of the document from which this URI
michael@0:      *                         string originated.  this corresponds to the
michael@0:      *                         charset that should be used when communicating
michael@0:      *                         this URI to an origin server, for example.  if
michael@0:      *                         null, then UTF-8 encoding is assumed (i.e.,
michael@0:      *                         no charset transformation from aSpec).
michael@0:      * @param aBaseURI       - if null, aSpec must specify an absolute URI.
michael@0:      *                         otherwise, aSpec may be resolved relative
michael@0:      *                         to aBaseURI, depending on the protocol. 
michael@0:      *                         If the protocol has no concept of relative 
michael@0:      *                         URI aBaseURI will simply be ignored.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     nsIURI newURI(in AUTF8String aSpec,
michael@0:                   in string aOriginCharset,
michael@0:                   in nsIURI aBaseURI);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler. 
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     nsIChannel newChannel(in nsIURI aURI);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Allows a protocol to override blacklisted ports.
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * This method will be called when there is an attempt to connect to a port 
michael@0:      * that is blacklisted.  For example, for most protocols, port 25 (Simple Mail
michael@0:      * Transfer) is banned.  When a URI containing this "known-to-do-bad-things" 
michael@0:      * port number is encountered, this function will be called to ask if the 
michael@0:      * protocol handler wants to override the ban.  
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     boolean allowPort(in long port, in string scheme);
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**************************************************************************
michael@0:      * Constants for the protocol flags (the first is the default mask, the
michael@0:      * others are deviations):
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * NOTE: Implementation must ignore any flags they do not understand.
michael@0:      */
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * standard full URI with authority component and concept of relative
michael@0:      * URIs (http, ftp, ...)
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_STD = 0;
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * no concept of relative URIs (about, javascript, finger, ...)
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_NORELATIVE = (1<<0);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * no authority component (file, ...)
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_NOAUTH = (1<<1);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * This protocol handler can be proxied via a proxy (socks or http)
michael@0:      * (e.g., irc, smtp, http, etc.).  If the protocol supports transparent
michael@0:      * proxying, the handler should implement nsIProxiedProtocolHandler.
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * If it supports only HTTP proxying, then it need not support
michael@0:      * nsIProxiedProtocolHandler, but should instead set the ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP
michael@0:      * flag (see below).
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * @see nsIProxiedProtocolHandler
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY = (1<<2);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * This protocol handler can be proxied using a http proxy (e.g., http,
michael@0:      * ftp, etc.).  nsIIOService::newChannelFromURI will feed URIs from this
michael@0:      * protocol handler to the HTTP protocol handler instead.  This flag is
michael@0:      * ignored if ALLOWS_PROXY is not set.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP = (1<<3);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * The URIs for this protocol have no inherent security context, so
michael@0:      * documents loaded via this protocol should inherit the security context
michael@0:      * from the document that loads them.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT = (1<<4);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * "Automatic" loads that would replace the document (e.g. <meta> refresh,
michael@0:      * certain types of XLinks, possibly other loads that the application
michael@0:      * decides are not user triggered) are not allowed if the originating (NOT
michael@0:      * the target) URI has this protocol flag.  Note that the decision as to
michael@0:      * what constitutes an "automatic" load is made externally, by the caller
michael@0:      * of nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.  See documentation for that
michael@0:      * method for more information.
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * A typical protocol that might want to set this flag is a protocol that
michael@0:      * shows highly untrusted content in a viewing area that the user expects
michael@0:      * to have a lot of control over, such as an e-mail reader.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = (1<<5);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
michael@0:      * |                                                                   |
michael@0:      * |  ALL PROTOCOL HANDLERS MUST SET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE FLAGS.  |
michael@0:      * |                                                                   |
michael@0:      * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * These flags are used to determine who is allowed to load URIs for this
michael@0:      * protocol.  Note that if a URI is nested, only the flags for the
michael@0:      * innermost URI matter.  See nsINestedURI.
michael@0:      *
michael@0:      * If none of these five flags are set, the URI must be treated as if it
michael@0:      * had the URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE flag set, for compatibility with protocol
michael@0:      * handlers written against Gecko 1.8 or earlier.  In this case, there may
michael@0:      * be run-time warning messages indicating that a "default insecure"
michael@0:      * assumption is being made.  At some point in the futures (Mozilla 2.0,
michael@0:      * most likely), these warnings will become errors.
michael@0:      */
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by anyone.  For example, any
michael@0:      * website should be allowed to trigger a load of a URI for this protocol.
michael@0:      * Web-safe protocols like "http" should set this flag.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1<<6);
michael@0:     
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * The URIs for this protocol are UNSAFE if loaded by untrusted (web)
michael@0:      * content and may only be loaded by privileged code (for example, code
michael@0:      * which has the system principal).  Various internal protocols should set
michael@0:      * this flag.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD = (1<<7);
michael@0:     
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * The URIs for this protocol point to resources that are part of the
michael@0:      * application's user interface.  There are cases when such resources may
michael@0:      * be made accessible to untrusted content such as web pages, so this is
michael@0:      * less restrictive than URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD but more restrictive than
michael@0:      * URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE.  See the documentation for
michael@0:      * nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE = (1<<8);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Loading of URIs for this protocol from other origins should only be
michael@0:      * allowed if those origins should have access to the local filesystem.
michael@0:      * It's up to the application to decide what origins should have such
michael@0:      * access.  Protocols like "file" that point to local data should set this
michael@0:      * flag.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE = (1<<9);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded only by callers with a
michael@0:      * principal that subsumes this uri. For example, privileged code and
michael@0:      * websites that are same origin as this uri.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS = (1<<10);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Channels using this protocol never call OnDataAvailable
michael@0:      * on the listener passed to AsyncOpen and they therefore
michael@0:      * do not return any data that we can use.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA = (1<<11);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * URIs for this protocol are considered to be local resources.  This could
michael@0:      * be a local file (URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE), a UI resource (URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE),
michael@0:      * or something else that would not hit the network.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE = (1<<12);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * URIs for this protocol execute script when they are opened.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_OPENING_EXECUTES_SCRIPT = (1<<13);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Loading channels from this protocol has side-effects that make
michael@0:      * it unsuitable for saving to a local file.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_NON_PERSISTABLE = (1<<14);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * This protocol handler forbids accessing cookies e.g. for mail related
michael@0:      * protocols.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_COOKIE_ACCESS = (1<<15);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * URIs for this protocol require the webapps permission on the principal
michael@0:      * when opening URIs for a different domain. See bug#773886
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_CROSS_ORIGIN_NEEDS_WEBAPPS_PERM = (1<<16);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * Channels for this protocol don't need to spin the event loop to handle
michael@0:      * Open() and reads on the resulting stream.
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_SYNC_LOAD_IS_OK = (1<<17);
michael@0: 
michael@0:     /**
michael@0:      * URI is secure to load in an https page and should not be blocked
michael@0:      * by nsMixedContentBlocker
michael@0:      */
michael@0:     const unsigned long URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT = (1<<18);
michael@0: 
michael@0: 
michael@0: };
michael@0: 
michael@0: %{C++
michael@0: /**
michael@0:  * Protocol handlers are registered with XPCOM under the following CONTRACTID prefix:
michael@0:  */
michael@0: #define NS_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_CONTRACTID_PREFIX "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name="
michael@0: /**
michael@0:  * For example, "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=http"
michael@0:  */
michael@0: %}