The Tor Browser: netwerk/base/public/nsIProtocolHandler.idl@6474c204b198 (annotated)

netwerk/base/public/nsIProtocolHandler.idl@6474c204b198 (annotated)

netwerk/base/public/nsIProtocolHandler.idl

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
changeset 0: 6474c204b198
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

 /* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 #include "nsISupports.idl"
 interface nsIURI;
 interface nsIChannel;
 /**
  * nsIProtocolHandler
  */
 [scriptable, uuid(f5753fec-a051-4ddc-8891-11f1f1575072)]
 interface nsIProtocolHandler : nsISupports
 {
     /**
      * The scheme of this protocol (e.g., "file").
      */
     readonly attribute ACString scheme;
     /**
      * The default port is the port that this protocol normally uses.
      * If a port does not make sense for the protocol (e.g., "about:")
      * then -1 will be returned.
      */
     readonly attribute long defaultPort;
     /**
      * Returns the protocol specific flags (see flag definitions below).
      */
     readonly attribute unsigned long protocolFlags;
     /**
      * Makes a URI object that is suitable for loading by this protocol,
      * where the URI string is given as an UTF-8 string.  The caller may
      * provide the charset from which the URI string originated, so that
      * the URI string can be translated back to that charset (if necessary)
      * before communicating with, for example, the origin server of the URI
      * string.  (Many servers do not support UTF-8 IRIs at the present time,
      * so we must be careful about tracking the native charset of the origin
      * server.)
      *
      * @param aSpec          - the URI string in UTF-8 encoding. depending
      *                         on the protocol implementation, unicode character
      *                         sequences may or may not be %xx escaped.
      * @param aOriginCharset - the charset of the document from which this URI
      *                         string originated.  this corresponds to the
      *                         charset that should be used when communicating
      *                         this URI to an origin server, for example.  if
      *                         null, then UTF-8 encoding is assumed (i.e.,
      *                         no charset transformation from aSpec).
      * @param aBaseURI       - if null, aSpec must specify an absolute URI.
      *                         otherwise, aSpec may be resolved relative
      *                         to aBaseURI, depending on the protocol.
      *                         If the protocol has no concept of relative
      *                         URI aBaseURI will simply be ignored.
      */
     nsIURI newURI(in AUTF8String aSpec,
                   in string aOriginCharset,
                   in nsIURI aBaseURI);
     /**
      * Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler.
      */
     nsIChannel newChannel(in nsIURI aURI);
     /**
      * Allows a protocol to override blacklisted ports.
      *
      * This method will be called when there is an attempt to connect to a port
      * that is blacklisted.  For example, for most protocols, port 25 (Simple Mail
      * Transfer) is banned.  When a URI containing this "known-to-do-bad-things"
      * port number is encountered, this function will be called to ask if the
      * protocol handler wants to override the ban.
      */
     boolean allowPort(in long port, in string scheme);
     /**************************************************************************
      * Constants for the protocol flags (the first is the default mask, the
      * others are deviations):
      *
      * NOTE: Implementation must ignore any flags they do not understand.
      */
     /**
      * standard full URI with authority component and concept of relative
      * URIs (http, ftp, ...)
      */
     const unsigned long URI_STD = 0;
     /**
      * no concept of relative URIs (about, javascript, finger, ...)
      */
     const unsigned long URI_NORELATIVE = (1<<0);
     /**
      * no authority component (file, ...)
      */
     const unsigned long URI_NOAUTH = (1<<1);
     /**
      * This protocol handler can be proxied via a proxy (socks or http)
      * (e.g., irc, smtp, http, etc.).  If the protocol supports transparent
      * proxying, the handler should implement nsIProxiedProtocolHandler.
      *
      * If it supports only HTTP proxying, then it need not support
      * nsIProxiedProtocolHandler, but should instead set the ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP
      * flag (see below).
      *
      * @see nsIProxiedProtocolHandler
      */
     const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY = (1<<2);
     /**
      * This protocol handler can be proxied using a http proxy (e.g., http,
      * ftp, etc.).  nsIIOService::newChannelFromURI will feed URIs from this
      * protocol handler to the HTTP protocol handler instead.  This flag is
      * ignored if ALLOWS_PROXY is not set.
      */
     const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP = (1<<3);
     /**
      * The URIs for this protocol have no inherent security context, so
      * documents loaded via this protocol should inherit the security context
      * from the document that loads them.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT = (1<<4);
     /**
      * "Automatic" loads that would replace the document (e.g. <meta> refresh,
      * certain types of XLinks, possibly other loads that the application
      * decides are not user triggered) are not allowed if the originating (NOT
      * the target) URI has this protocol flag.  Note that the decision as to
      * what constitutes an "automatic" load is made externally, by the caller
      * of nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.  See documentation for that
      * method for more information.
      *
      * A typical protocol that might want to set this flag is a protocol that
      * shows highly untrusted content in a viewing area that the user expects
      * to have a lot of control over, such as an e-mail reader.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = (1<<5);
     /**
      * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
      * |                                                                   |
      * |  ALL PROTOCOL HANDLERS MUST SET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE FLAGS.  |
      * |                                                                   |
      * +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
      *
      * These flags are used to determine who is allowed to load URIs for this
      * protocol.  Note that if a URI is nested, only the flags for the
      * innermost URI matter.  See nsINestedURI.
      *
      * If none of these five flags are set, the URI must be treated as if it
      * had the URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE flag set, for compatibility with protocol
      * handlers written against Gecko 1.8 or earlier.  In this case, there may
      * be run-time warning messages indicating that a "default insecure"
      * assumption is being made.  At some point in the futures (Mozilla 2.0,
      * most likely), these warnings will become errors.
      */
     /**
      * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by anyone.  For example, any
      * website should be allowed to trigger a load of a URI for this protocol.
      * Web-safe protocols like "http" should set this flag.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1<<6);
     /**
      * The URIs for this protocol are UNSAFE if loaded by untrusted (web)
      * content and may only be loaded by privileged code (for example, code
      * which has the system principal).  Various internal protocols should set
      * this flag.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD = (1<<7);
     /**
      * The URIs for this protocol point to resources that are part of the
      * application's user interface.  There are cases when such resources may
      * be made accessible to untrusted content such as web pages, so this is
      * less restrictive than URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD but more restrictive than
      * URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE.  See the documentation for
      * nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE = (1<<8);
     /**
      * Loading of URIs for this protocol from other origins should only be
      * allowed if those origins should have access to the local filesystem.
      * It's up to the application to decide what origins should have such
      * access.  Protocols like "file" that point to local data should set this
      * flag.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE = (1<<9);
     /**
      * The URIs for this protocol can be loaded only by callers with a
      * principal that subsumes this uri. For example, privileged code and
      * websites that are same origin as this uri.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS = (1<<10);
     /**
      * Channels using this protocol never call OnDataAvailable
      * on the listener passed to AsyncOpen and they therefore
      * do not return any data that we can use.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA = (1<<11);
     /**
      * URIs for this protocol are considered to be local resources.  This could
      * be a local file (URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE), a UI resource (URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE),
      * or something else that would not hit the network.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE = (1<<12);
     /**
      * URIs for this protocol execute script when they are opened.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_OPENING_EXECUTES_SCRIPT = (1<<13);
     /**
      * Loading channels from this protocol has side-effects that make
      * it unsuitable for saving to a local file.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_NON_PERSISTABLE = (1<<14);
     /**
      * This protocol handler forbids accessing cookies e.g. for mail related
      * protocols.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_COOKIE_ACCESS = (1<<15);
     /**
      * URIs for this protocol require the webapps permission on the principal
      * when opening URIs for a different domain. See bug#773886
      */
     const unsigned long URI_CROSS_ORIGIN_NEEDS_WEBAPPS_PERM = (1<<16);
     /**
      * Channels for this protocol don't need to spin the event loop to handle
      * Open() and reads on the resulting stream.
      */
     const unsigned long URI_SYNC_LOAD_IS_OK = (1<<17);
     /**
      * URI is secure to load in an https page and should not be blocked
      * by nsMixedContentBlocker
      */
     const unsigned long URI_SAFE_TO_LOAD_IN_SECURE_CONTEXT = (1<<18);
 };
 %{C++
 /**
  * Protocol handlers are registered with XPCOM under the following CONTRACTID prefix:
  */
 #define NS_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_CONTRACTID_PREFIX "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name="
 /**
  * For example, "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=http"
  */
 %}

The Tor Browser / annotate

netwerk/base/public/nsIProtocolHandler.idl@6474c204b198 (annotated)

netwerk/base/public/nsIProtocolHandler.idl