The Tor Browser: security/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
changeset 0: 6474c204b198
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 #ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
 #include "stubs.h"
 #endif
 #include "prerror.h"
 #include "secerr.h"
 #include "prtypes.h"
 #include "prinit.h"
 #include "blapi.h"
 #include "blapii.h"
 #include "nssilock.h"
 #include "secitem.h"
 #include "sha_fast.h"
 #include "sha256.h"
 #include "secrng.h"	/* for RNG_SystemRNG() */
 #include "secmpi.h"
 /* PRNG_SEEDLEN defined in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1
  * for SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 it's 440 bits.
  * for SHA-384 and SHA-512 it's 888 bits */
 #define PRNG_SEEDLEN      (440/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE)
 static const PRInt64 PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES = LL_INIT(0x1, 0x0);
 						/* 2^35 bits or 2^32 bytes */
 #define PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 0x10000		/* 2^19 bits or 2^16 bytes */
 #define PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE (8*1024) /* must be less than
 						 *  PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES
 						 */
 /* RESEED_COUNT is how many calls to the prng before we need to reseed
  * under normal NIST rules, you must return an error. In the NSS case, we
  * self-reseed with RNG_SystemRNG(). Count can be a large number. For code
  * simplicity, we specify count with 2 components: RESEED_BYTE (which is
  * the same as LOG256(RESEED_COUNT)) and RESEED_VALUE (which is the same as
  * RESEED_COUNT / (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE)). Another way to look at this is
  * RESEED_COUNT = RESEED_VALUE * (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE). For Hash based DRBG
  * we use the maximum count value, 2^48, or RESEED_BYTE=6 and RESEED_VALUE=1
  */
 #define RESEED_BYTE 6
 #define RESEED_VALUE 1
 #define PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) \
 	PORT_Memset((rng)->reseed_counter, 0, sizeof (rng)->reseed_counter); \
 	(rng)->reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE] = 1;
 /*
  * The actual values of this enum are specified in SP 800-90, 10.1.1.*
  * The spec does not name the types, it only uses bare values
  */
 typedef enum {
    prngCGenerateType = 0,   	/* used when creating a new 'C' */
    prngReseedType = 1,	    	/* used in reseeding */
    prngAdditionalDataType = 2,  /* used in mixing additional data */
    prngGenerateByteType = 3	/* used when mixing internal state while
 				 * generating bytes */
 } prngVTypes;
 /*
  * Global RNG context
  */
 struct RNGContextStr {
     PZLock   *lock;        /* Lock to serialize access to global rng */
     /*
      * NOTE, a number of steps in the drbg algorithm need to hash
      * V_type || V. The code, therefore, depends on the V array following
      * immediately after V_type to avoid extra copies. To accomplish this
      * in a way that compiliers can't perturb, we declare V_type and V
      * as a V_Data array and reference them by macros */
     PRUint8  V_Data[PRNG_SEEDLEN+1]; /* internal state variables */
 #define  V_type  V_Data[0]
 #define  V(rng)       (((rng)->V_Data)+1)
 #define  VSize(rng)   ((sizeof (rng)->V_Data) -1)
     PRUint8  C[PRNG_SEEDLEN];        /* internal state variables */
     PRUint8  oldV[PRNG_SEEDLEN];     /* for continuous rng checking */
     /* If we get calls for the PRNG to return less than the length of our
      * hash, we extend the request for a full hash (since we'll be doing
      * the full hash anyway). Future requests for random numbers are fulfilled
      * from the remainder of the bytes we generated. Requests for bytes longer
      * than the hash size are fulfilled directly from the HashGen function
      * of the random number generator. */
     PRUint8  reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE+1]; /* number of requests since the
 					     * last reseed. Need only be
 					     * big enough to hold the whole
 					     * reseed count */
     PRUint8  data[SHA256_LENGTH];	/* when we request less than a block
 					 * save the rest of the rng output for
 					 * another partial block */
     PRUint8  dataAvail;            /* # bytes of output available in our cache,
 	                            * [0...SHA256_LENGTH] */
     /* store additional data that has been shovelled off to us by
      * RNG_RandomUpdate. */
     PRUint8  additionalDataCache[PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE];
     PRUint32 additionalAvail;
     PRBool   isValid;          /* false if RNG reaches an invalid state */
 };
 typedef struct RNGContextStr RNGContext;
 static RNGContext *globalrng = NULL;
 static RNGContext theGlobalRng;
 /*
  * The next several functions are derived from the NIST SP 800-90
  * spec. In these functions, an attempt was made to use names consistent
  * with the names in the spec, even if they differ from normal NSS usage.
  */
 /*
  * Hash Derive function defined in NISP SP 800-90 Section 10.4.1.
  * This function is used in the Instantiate and Reseed functions.
  *
  * NOTE: requested_bytes cannot overlap with input_string_1 or input_string_2.
  * input_string_1 and input_string_2 are logically concatentated.
  * input_string_1 must be supplied.
  * if input_string_2 is not supplied, NULL should be passed for this parameter.
  */
 static SECStatus
 prng_Hash_df(PRUint8 *requested_bytes, unsigned int no_of_bytes_to_return,
 	const PRUint8 *input_string_1, unsigned int input_string_1_len,
 	const PRUint8 *input_string_2, unsigned int input_string_2_len)
 {
     SHA256Context ctx;
     PRUint32 tmp;
     PRUint8 counter;
     tmp=SHA_HTONL(no_of_bytes_to_return*8);
     for (counter = 1 ; no_of_bytes_to_return > 0; counter++) {
 	unsigned int hash_return_len;
  	SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
  	SHA256_Update(&ctx, &counter, 1);
  	SHA256_Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)&tmp, sizeof tmp);
  	SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_1, input_string_1_len);
 	if (input_string_2) {
  	    SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_2, input_string_2_len);
 	}
 	SHA256_End(&ctx, requested_bytes, &hash_return_len,
 		no_of_bytes_to_return);
 	requested_bytes += hash_return_len;
 	no_of_bytes_to_return -= hash_return_len;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * Hash_DRBG Instantiate NIST SP 800-80 10.1.1.2
  *
  * NOTE: bytes & len are entropy || nonce || personalization_string. In
  * normal operation, NSS calculates them all together in a single call.
  */
 static SECStatus
 prng_instantiate(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int len)
 {
     if (len < PRNG_SEEDLEN) {
 	/* if the seedlen is to small, it's probably because we failed to get
 	 * enough random data */
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), bytes, len, NULL, 0);
     rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType;
     prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0);
     PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng)
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * Update the global random number generator with more seeding
  * material. Use the Hash_DRBG reseed algorithm from NIST SP-800-90
  * section 10.1.1.3
  *
  * If entropy is NULL, it is fetched from the noise generator.
  */
 static SECStatus
 prng_reseed(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
 	const PRUint8 *additional_input, unsigned int additional_input_len)
 {
     PRUint8 noiseData[(sizeof rng->V_Data)+PRNG_SEEDLEN];
     PRUint8 *noise = &noiseData[0];
     /* if entropy wasn't supplied, fetch it. (normal operation case) */
     if (entropy == NULL) {
     	entropy_len = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG(
 			&noiseData[sizeof rng->V_Data], PRNG_SEEDLEN);
     } else {
 	/* NOTE: this code is only available for testing, not to applications */
 	/* if entropy was too big for the stack variable, get it from malloc */
 	if (entropy_len > PRNG_SEEDLEN) {
 	    noise = PORT_Alloc(entropy_len + (sizeof rng->V_Data));
 	    if (noise == NULL) {
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	}
 	PORT_Memcpy(&noise[sizeof rng->V_Data],entropy, entropy_len);
     }
     if (entropy_len < 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) {
 	/* noise == &noiseData[0] at this point, so nothing to free */
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     rng->V_type = prngReseedType;
     PORT_Memcpy(noise, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
     prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), noise, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len,
 		additional_input, additional_input_len);
     /* clear potential CSP */
     PORT_Memset(noise, 0, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len);
     rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType;
     prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0);
     PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng)
     if (noise != &noiseData[0]) {
 	PORT_Free(noise);
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * SP 800-90 requires we rerun our health tests on reseed
  */
 static SECStatus
 prng_reseed_test(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy,
 	unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *additional_input,
 	unsigned int additional_input_len)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     /* do health checks in FIPS mode */
     rv = PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests();
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	/* error set by PRNGTEST_RunHealTests() */
 	rng->isValid = PR_FALSE;
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     return prng_reseed(rng, entropy, entropy_len,
 				additional_input, additional_input_len);
 }
 /*
  * build some fast inline functions for adding.
  */
 #define PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, start, cy) \
    carry = cy; \
    for (k1=start; carry && k1 >=0 ; k1--) { \
 	carry = !(++dest[k1]); \
    }
 /*
  * NOTE: dest must be an array for the following to work.
  */
 #define PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
     carry = 0; \
     for (k1=dest_len -1, k2=len-1; k2 >= 0; --k1, --k2) { \
 	carry += dest[k1]+ add[k2]; \
 	dest[k1] = (PRUint8) carry; \
 	carry >>= 8; \
     }
 #define PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
     PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
     PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, k1, carry)
 /*
  * This function expands the internal state of the prng to fulfill any number
  * of bytes we need for this request. We only use this call if we need more
  * than can be supplied by a single call to SHA256_HashBuf.
  *
  * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4, Hashgen
  */
 static void
 prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes,
 	     unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes)
 {
     PRUint8 data[VSize(rng)];
     PORT_Memcpy(data, V(rng), VSize(rng));
     while (no_of_returned_bytes) {
 	SHA256Context ctx;
 	unsigned int len;
 	unsigned int carry;
 	int k1;
  	SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
  	SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, sizeof data);
 	SHA256_End(&ctx, returned_bytes, &len, no_of_returned_bytes);
 	returned_bytes += len;
 	no_of_returned_bytes -= len;
 	/* The carry parameter is a bool (increment or not).
 	 * This increments data if no_of_returned_bytes is not zero */
 	PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data)- 1, no_of_returned_bytes);
     }
     PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
 }
 /*
  * Generates new random bytes and advances the internal prng state.
  * additional bytes are only used in algorithm testing.
  *
  * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4
  */
 static SECStatus
 prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
 		PRUint8 *returned_bytes, unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes,
 		const PRUint8 *additional_input,
 		unsigned int additional_input_len)
 {
     PRUint8 H[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* both H and w since they
 			       * aren't used concurrently */
     unsigned int carry;
     int k1, k2;
     if (!rng->isValid) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* This code only triggers during tests, normal
      * prng operation does not use additional_input */
     if (additional_input){
 	SHA256Context ctx;
 	/* NIST SP 800-90 defines two temporaries in their calculations,
 	 * w and H. These temporaries are the same lengths, and used
 	 * at different times, so we use the following macro to collapse
 	 * them to the same variable, but keeping their unique names for
 	 * easy comparison to the spec */
 #define w H
 	rng->V_type = prngAdditionalDataType;
  	SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
  	SHA256_Update(&ctx, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
  	SHA256_Update(&ctx, additional_input, additional_input_len);
 	SHA256_End(&ctx, w, NULL, sizeof w);
 	PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), w, sizeof w)
 	PORT_Memset(w, 0, sizeof w);
 #undef w
     }
     if (no_of_returned_bytes == SHA256_LENGTH) {
 	/* short_cut to hashbuf and save a copy and a clear */
 	SHA256_HashBuf(returned_bytes, V(rng), VSize(rng) );
     } else {
     	prng_Hashgen(rng, returned_bytes, no_of_returned_bytes);
     }
     /* advance our internal state... */
     rng->V_type = prngGenerateByteType;
     SHA256_HashBuf(H, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
     PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), H, sizeof H)
     PRNG_ADD_BITS(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->C, sizeof rng->C);
     PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->reseed_counter,
 					sizeof rng->reseed_counter)
     PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter,(sizeof rng->reseed_counter)-1, 1);
     /* continuous rng check */
     if (memcmp(V(rng), rng->oldV, sizeof rng->oldV) == 0) {
 	rng->isValid = PR_FALSE;
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     PORT_Memcpy(rng->oldV, V(rng), sizeof rng->oldV);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Use NSPR to prevent RNG_RNGInit from being called from separate
  * threads, creating a race condition.
  */
 static const PRCallOnceType pristineCallOnce;
 static PRCallOnceType coRNGInit;
 static PRStatus rng_init(void)
 {
     PRUint8 bytes[PRNG_SEEDLEN*2]; /* entropy + nonce */
     unsigned int numBytes;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     if (globalrng == NULL) {
 	/* bytes needs to have enough space to hold
 	 * a SHA256 hash value. Blow up at compile time if this isn't true */
 	PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(bytes) >= SHA256_LENGTH);
 	/* create a new global RNG context */
 	globalrng = &theGlobalRng;
         PORT_Assert(NULL == globalrng->lock);
 	/* create a lock for it */
 	globalrng->lock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
 	if (globalrng->lock == NULL) {
 	    globalrng = NULL;
 	    PORT_SetError(PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR);
 	    return PR_FAILURE;
 	}
 	/* Try to get some seed data for the RNG */
 	numBytes = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG(bytes, sizeof bytes);
 	PORT_Assert(numBytes == 0 || numBytes == sizeof bytes);
 	if (numBytes != 0) {
 	    /* if this is our first call,  instantiate, otherwise reseed
 	     * prng_instantiate gets a new clean state, we want to mix
 	     * any previous entropy we may have collected */
 	    if (V(globalrng)[0] == 0) {
 		rv = prng_instantiate(globalrng, bytes, numBytes);
 	    } else {
 		rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, bytes, numBytes, NULL, 0);
 	    }
 	    memset(bytes, 0, numBytes);
 	} else {
 	    PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock);
 	    globalrng->lock = NULL;
 	    globalrng = NULL;
 	    return PR_FAILURE;
 	}
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return PR_FAILURE;
 	}
 	/* the RNG is in a valid state */
 	globalrng->isValid = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fetch one random value so that we can populate rng->oldV for our
 	 * continous random number test. */
 	prng_generateNewBytes(globalrng, bytes, SHA256_LENGTH, NULL, 0);
 	/* Fetch more entropy into the PRNG */
 	RNG_SystemInfoForRNG();
     }
     return PR_SUCCESS;
 }
 /*
  * Clean up the global RNG context
  */
 static void
 prng_freeRNGContext(RNGContext *rng)
 {
     PRUint8 inputhash[VSize(rng) + (sizeof rng->C)];
     /* destroy context lock */
     SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock));
     /* zero global RNG context except for C & V to preserve entropy */
     prng_Hash_df(inputhash, sizeof rng->C, rng->C, sizeof rng->C, NULL, 0);
     prng_Hash_df(&inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng), V(rng), VSize(rng),
 								  NULL, 0);
     memset(rng, 0, sizeof *rng);
     memcpy(rng->C, inputhash, sizeof rng->C);
     memcpy(V(rng), &inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng));
     memset(inputhash, 0, sizeof inputhash);
 }
 /*
  * Public functions
  */
 /*
  * Initialize the global RNG context and give it some seed input taken
  * from the system.  This function is thread-safe and will only allow
  * the global context to be initialized once.  The seed input is likely
  * small, so it is imperative that RNG_RandomUpdate() be called with
  * additional seed data before the generator is used.  A good way to
  * provide the generator with additional entropy is to call
  * RNG_SystemInfoForRNG().  Note that C_Initialize() does exactly that.
  */
 SECStatus
 RNG_RNGInit(void)
 {
     /* Allow only one call to initialize the context */
     PR_CallOnce(&coRNGInit, rng_init);
     /* Make sure there is a context */
     return (globalrng != NULL) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
 }
 /*
 ** Update the global random number generator with more seeding
 ** material.
 */
 SECStatus
 RNG_RandomUpdate(const void *data, size_t bytes)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     /* Make sure our assumption that size_t is unsigned is true */
     PR_STATIC_ASSERT(((size_t)-1) > (size_t)1);
 #if defined(NS_PTR_GT_32) || (defined(NSS_USE_64) && !defined(NS_PTR_LE_32))
     /*
      * NIST 800-90 requires us to verify our inputs. This value can
      * come from the application, so we need to make sure it's within the
      * spec. The spec says it must be less than 2^32 bytes (2^35 bits).
      * This can only happen if size_t is greater than 32 bits (i.e. on
      * most 64 bit platforms). The 90% case (perhaps 100% case), size_t
      * is less than or equal to 32 bits if the platform is not 64 bits, and
      * greater than 32 bits if it is a 64 bit platform. The corner
      * cases are handled with explicit defines NS_PTR_GT_32 and NS_PTR_LE_32.
      *
      * In general, neither NS_PTR_GT_32 nor NS_PTR_LE_32 will need to be
      * defined. If you trip over the next two size ASSERTS at compile time,
      * you will need to define them for your platform.
      *
      * if 'sizeof(size_t) > 4' is triggered it means that we were expecting
      *   sizeof(size_t) to be greater than 4, but it wasn't. Setting
      *   NS_PTR_LE_32 will correct that mistake.
      *
      * if 'sizeof(size_t) <= 4' is triggered, it means that we were expecting
      *   sizeof(size_t) to be less than or equal to 4, but it wasn't. Setting
      *   NS_PTR_GT_32 will correct that mistake.
      */
     PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) > 4);
     if (bytes > PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES) {
 	bytes = PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES;
     }
 #else
     PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) <= 4);
 #endif
     PZ_Lock(globalrng->lock);
     /* if we're passed more than our additionalDataCache, simply
      * call reseed with that data */
     if (bytes > sizeof (globalrng->additionalDataCache)) {
 	rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0, data, (unsigned int) bytes);
     /* if we aren't going to fill or overflow the buffer, just cache it */
     } else if (bytes < ((sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache)
 				- globalrng->additionalAvail)) {
 	PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache+globalrng->additionalAvail,
 		    data, bytes);
 	globalrng->additionalAvail += (PRUint32) bytes;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
     } else {
 	/* we are going to fill or overflow the buffer. In this case we will
 	 * fill the entropy buffer, reseed with it, start a new buffer with the
 	 * remainder. We know the remainder will fit in the buffer because
 	 * we already handled the case where bytes > the size of the buffer.
 	 */
 	size_t bufRemain = (sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache)
 					- globalrng->additionalAvail;
 	/* fill the rest of the buffer */
 	if (bufRemain) {
 	    PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache
 			+globalrng->additionalAvail,
 			data, bufRemain);
 	    data = ((unsigned char *)data) + bufRemain;
 	    bytes -= bufRemain;
 	}
 	/* reseed from buffer */
 	rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0,
 				        globalrng->additionalDataCache,
 					sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache);
 	/* copy the rest into the cache */
 	PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache, data, bytes);
 	globalrng->additionalAvail = (PRUint32) bytes;
     }
     PZ_Unlock(globalrng->lock);
     return rv;
 }
 /*
 ** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator
 ** object.
 */
 static SECStatus
 prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(RNGContext *rng,
                                void *dest, size_t len)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     PRUint8 *output = dest;
     /* check for a valid global RNG context */
     PORT_Assert(rng != NULL);
     if (rng == NULL) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* FIPS limits the amount of entropy available in a single request */
     if (len > PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* --- LOCKED --- */
     PZ_Lock(rng->lock);
     /* Check the amount of seed data in the generator.  If not enough,
      * don't produce any data.
      */
     if (rng->reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) {
 	rv = prng_reseed_test(rng, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
 	PZ_Unlock(rng->lock);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;
 	}
 	RNG_SystemInfoForRNG();
 	PZ_Lock(rng->lock);
     }
     /*
      * see if we have enough bytes to fulfill the request.
      */
     if (len <= rng->dataAvail) {
 	memcpy(output, rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), len);
 	memset(rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), 0, len);
 	rng->dataAvail -= len;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
     /* if we are asking for a small number of bytes, cache the rest of
      * the bytes */
     } else if (len < sizeof rng->data) {
 	rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, rng->data, sizeof rng->data,
 			rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL,
 			rng->additionalAvail);
 	rng->additionalAvail = 0;
 	if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	    memcpy(output, rng->data, len);
 	    memset(rng->data, 0, len);
 	    rng->dataAvail = (sizeof rng->data) - len;
 	}
     /* we are asking for lots of bytes, just ask the generator to pass them */
     } else {
 	rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, output, len,
 			rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL,
 			rng->additionalAvail);
 	rng->additionalAvail = 0;
     }
     PZ_Unlock(rng->lock);
     /* --- UNLOCKED --- */
     return rv;
 }
 /*
 ** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator
 ** object.
 */
 SECStatus
 RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(void *dest, size_t len)
 {
     return prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(globalrng, dest, len);
 }
 void
 RNG_RNGShutdown(void)
 {
     /* check for a valid global RNG context */
     PORT_Assert(globalrng != NULL);
     if (globalrng == NULL) {
 	/* Should set a "not initialized" error code. */
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
 	return;
     }
     /* clear */
     prng_freeRNGContext(globalrng);
     globalrng = NULL;
     /* reset the callonce struct to allow a new call to RNG_RNGInit() */
     coRNGInit = pristineCallOnce;
 }
 /*
  * Test case interface. used by fips testing and power on self test
  */
  /* make sure the test context is separate from the global context, This
   * allows us to test the internal random number generator without losing
   * entropy we may have previously collected. */
 RNGContext testContext;
 /*
  * Test vector API. Use NIST SP 800-90 general interface so one of the
  * other NIST SP 800-90 algorithms may be used in the future.
  */
 SECStatus
 PRNGTEST_Instantiate(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
 		const PRUint8 *nonce, unsigned int nonce_len,
 		const PRUint8 *personal_string, unsigned int ps_len)
 {
    int bytes_len = entropy_len + nonce_len + ps_len;
    PRUint8 *bytes = NULL;
    SECStatus rv;
    if (entropy_len < 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    bytes = PORT_Alloc(bytes_len);
    if (bytes == NULL) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    /* concatenate the various inputs, internally NSS only instantiates with
     * a single long string */
    PORT_Memcpy(bytes, entropy, entropy_len);
    if (nonce) {
 	PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len], nonce, nonce_len);
    } else {
 	PORT_Assert(nonce_len == 0);
    }
    if (personal_string) {
        PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len+nonce_len], personal_string, ps_len);
    } else {
 	PORT_Assert(ps_len == 0);
    }
    rv = prng_instantiate(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len);
    PORT_ZFree(bytes, bytes_len);
    if (rv == SECFailure) {
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    testContext.isValid = PR_TRUE;
    return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 PRNGTEST_Reseed(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
 		  const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len)
 {
     if (!testContext.isValid) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
    /* This magic input tells us to set the reseed count to it's max count,
     * so we can simulate PRNGTEST_Generate reaching max reseed count */
     if ((entropy == NULL) && (entropy_len == 0) &&
 		(additional == NULL) && (additional_len == 0)) {
 	testContext.reseed_counter[0] = RESEED_VALUE;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     return prng_reseed(&testContext, entropy, entropy_len, additional,
 			additional_len);
 }
 SECStatus
 PRNGTEST_Generate(PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int bytes_len,
 		  const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     if (!testContext.isValid) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* replicate reseed test from prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes */
     if (testContext.reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) {
 	rv = prng_reseed(&testContext, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;
 	}
     }
     return prng_generateNewBytes(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len,
 			additional, additional_len);
 }
 SECStatus
 PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate()
 {
     if (!testContext.isValid) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
    PORT_Memset(&testContext, 0, sizeof testContext);
    return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests()
 {
    static const PRUint8 entropy[] = {
 x8e,0x9c,0x0d,0x25,0x75,0x22,0x04,0xf9,
 xc5,0x79,0x10,0x8b,0x23,0x79,0x37,0x14,
 x9f,0x2c,0xc7,0x0b,0x39,0xf8,0xee,0xef,
 x95,0x0c,0x97,0x59,0xfc,0x0a,0x85,0x41,
 x76,0x9d,0x6d,0x67,0x00,0x4e,0x19,0x12,
 x02,0x16,0x53,0xea,0xf2,0x73,0xd7,0xd6,
 x7f,0x7e,0xc8,0xae,0x9c,0x09,0x99,0x7d,
 xbb,0x9e,0x48,0x7f,0xbb,0x96,0x46,0xb3,
 x03,0x75,0xf8,0xc8,0x69,0x45,0x3f,0x97,
 x5e,0x2e,0x48,0xe1,0x5d,0x58,0x97,0x4c };
    static const PRUint8 rng_known_result[] = {
 x16,0xe1,0x8c,0x57,0x21,0xd8,0xf1,0x7e,
 x5a,0xa0,0x16,0x0b,0x7e,0xa6,0x25,0xb4,
 x24,0x19,0xdb,0x54,0xfa,0x35,0x13,0x66,
 xbb,0xaa,0x2a,0x1b,0x22,0x33,0x2e,0x4a,
 x14,0x07,0x9d,0x52,0xfc,0x73,0x61,0x48,
 xac,0xc1,0x22,0xfc,0xa4,0xfc,0xac,0xa4,
 xdb,0xda,0x5b,0x27,0x33,0xc4,0xb3 };
    static const PRUint8 reseed_entropy[] = {
 xc6,0x0b,0x0a,0x30,0x67,0x07,0xf4,0xe2,
 x24,0xa7,0x51,0x6f,0x5f,0x85,0x3e,0x5d,
 x67,0x97,0xb8,0x3b,0x30,0x9c,0x7a,0xb1,
 x52,0xc6,0x1b,0xc9,0x46,0xa8,0x62,0x79 };
    static const PRUint8 additional_input[] = {
 x86,0x82,0x28,0x98,0xe7,0xcb,0x01,0x14,
 xae,0x87,0x4b,0x1d,0x99,0x1b,0xc7,0x41,
 x33,0xff,0x33,0x66,0x40,0x95,0x54,0xc6,
 x67,0x4d,0x40,0x2a,0x1f,0xf9,0xeb,0x65 };
    static const PRUint8 rng_reseed_result[] = {
 x02,0x0c,0xc6,0x17,0x86,0x49,0xba,0xc4,
 x7b,0x71,0x35,0x05,0xf0,0xdb,0x4a,0xc2,
 x2c,0x38,0xc1,0xa4,0x42,0xe5,0x46,0x4a,
 x7d,0xf0,0xbe,0x47,0x88,0xb8,0x0e,0xc6,
 x25,0x2b,0x1d,0x13,0xef,0xa6,0x87,0x96,
 xa3,0x7d,0x5b,0x80,0xc2,0x38,0x76,0x61,
 xc7,0x80,0x5d,0x0f,0x05,0x76,0x85 };
    static const PRUint8 rng_no_reseed_result[] = {
 xc4,0x40,0x41,0x8c,0xbf,0x2f,0x70,0x23,
 x88,0xf2,0x7b,0x30,0xc3,0xca,0x1e,0xf3,
 xef,0x53,0x81,0x5d,0x30,0xed,0x4c,0xf1,
 xff,0x89,0xa5,0xee,0x92,0xf8,0xc0,0x0f,
 x88,0x53,0xdf,0xb6,0x76,0xf0,0xaa,0xd3,
 x2e,0x1d,0x64,0x37,0x3e,0xe8,0x4a,0x02,
 xff,0x0a,0x7f,0xe5,0xe9,0x2b,0x6d };
    SECStatus rng_status = SECSuccess;
    PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(rng_known_result) >= sizeof(rng_reseed_result));
    PRUint8 result[sizeof(rng_known_result)];
    /********************************************/
    /*   First test instantiate error path.     */
    /*   In this case we supply enough entropy, */
    /*   but not enough seed. This will trigger */
    /*   the code that checks for a entropy     */
    /*   source failure.                        */
    /********************************************/
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE,
 				     NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
    if (rng_status == SECSuccess) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    /* we failed with the proper error code, we can continue */
    /********************************************/
    /* Generate random bytes with a known seed. */
    /********************************************/
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, sizeof entropy,
 				     NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
    if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
 	/* Error set by PRNGTEST_Instantiate */
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_known_result, NULL, 0);
    if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess)  ||
         ( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_known_result,
                        sizeof rng_known_result ) != 0 ) ) {
 	PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, sizeof reseed_entropy,
 				additional_input, sizeof additional_input);
    if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
 	/* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */
 	PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0);
    if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess)  ||
         ( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_reseed_result,
                        sizeof rng_reseed_result ) != 0 ) ) {
 	PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    /* This magic forces the reseed count to it's max count, so we can see if
     * PRNGTEST_Generate will actually when it reaches it's count */
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
    if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
 	PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
 	/* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    /* This generate should now reseed */
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0);
    if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess)  ||
 	/* NOTE we fail if the result is equal to the no_reseed_result.
          * no_reseed_result is the value we would have gotten if we didn't
 	 * do an automatic reseed in PRNGTEST_Generate */
         ( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_no_reseed_result,
                        sizeof rng_no_reseed_result ) == 0 ) ) {
 	PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    /* make sure reseed fails when we don't supply enough entropy */
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, 4, NULL, 0);
    if (rng_status == SECSuccess) {
 	PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) {
 	PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
    if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
 	/* Error set by PRNG_Uninstantiate */
 	return rng_status;
    }
    /* make sure uninstantiate fails if the contest is not initiated (also tests
     * if the context was cleared in the previous Uninstantiate) */
    rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
    if (rng_status == SECSuccess) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
    }
    if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 	return rng_status;
    }
    return SECSuccess;
 }

The Tor Browser / annotate

security/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c