The Tor Browser: security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
changeset 0: 6474c204b198
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 /*
  * This file contains functions to manage asymetric keys, (public and
  * private keys).
  */
 #include "seccomon.h"
 #include "secmod.h"
 #include "secmodi.h"
 #include "secmodti.h"
 #include "pkcs11.h"
 #include "pkcs11t.h"
 #include "pk11func.h"
 #include "cert.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "secitem.h"
 #include "secasn1.h"
 #include "secoid.h"
 #include "secerr.h"
 #include "sslerr.h"
 #include "sechash.h"
 #include "secpkcs5.h"
 #include "blapit.h"
 static SECItem *
 pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
 {
     /* set the ID to the public key so we can find it again */
     SECItem *pubKeyIndex =  NULL;
     switch (pubKey->keyType) {
     case rsaKey:
       pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.rsa.modulus;
       break;
     case dsaKey:
       pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue;
       break;
     case dhKey:
       pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.dh.publicValue;
       break;
     case ecKey:
       pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue;
       break;
     default:
       return NULL;
     }
     PORT_Assert(pubKeyIndex != NULL);
     return PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(pubKeyIndex);
 }
 /*
  * import a public key into the desired slot
  *
  * This function takes a public key structure and creates a public key in a
  * given slot. If isToken is set, then a persistant public key is created.
  *
  * Note: it is possible for this function to return a handle for a key which
  * is persistant, even if isToken is not set.
  */
 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
 PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
 								PRBool isToken)
 {
     CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
     CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[11];
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *signedattr = NULL;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate;
     SECItem *ckaId = NULL;
     SECItem *pubValue = NULL;
     int signedcount = 0;
     int templateCount = 0;
     SECStatus rv;
     /* if we already have an object in the desired slot, use it */
     if (!isToken && pubKey->pkcs11Slot == slot) {
 	return pubKey->pkcs11ID;
     }
     /* free the existing key */
     if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot != NULL) {
 	PK11SlotInfo *oSlot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot;
 	if (!PK11_IsPermObject(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,pubKey->pkcs11ID)) {
 	    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(oSlot);
 	    (void) PK11_GETTAB(oSlot)->C_DestroyObject(oSlot->session,
 							pubKey->pkcs11ID);
 	    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(oSlot);
 	}
 	PK11_FreeSlot(oSlot);
 	pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
     }
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) ); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) ); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, isToken ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 						 sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++;
     if (isToken) {
 	ckaId = pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(pubKey);
 	if (ckaId == NULL) {
 	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
 	    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	}
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ckaId->data, ckaId->len); attrs++;
     }
     /* now import the key */
     {
         switch (pubKey->keyType) {
         case rsaKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_RSA;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT, &cktrue,
 						sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
  	    signedattr = attrs;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.data,
 					 pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
 	     	pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.data,
 				 pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.len); attrs++;
 	    break;
         case dsaKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_DSA;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
  	    signedattr = attrs;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME,    pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.data,
 				pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs,CKA_SUBPRIME,pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.data,
 				pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE,  pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.data,
 					pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE,    pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.data,
 					pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.len); attrs++;
 	    break;
 	case fortezzaKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_DSA;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
  	    signedattr = attrs;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME,pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.data,
 				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs,CKA_SUBPRIME,
 				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.data,
 				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.len);attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE,  pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.data,
 				pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.data,
 				pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.len); attrs++;
             break;
         case dhKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_DH;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
  	    signedattr = attrs;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME,    pubKey->u.dh.prime.data,
 				pubKey->u.dh.prime.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE,  pubKey->u.dh.base.data,
 					pubKey->u.dh.base.len); attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE,    pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
 					pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); attrs++;
 	    break;
         case ecKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_EC;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
  	    signedattr = attrs;
 	    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
 		          pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
 		          pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); attrs++;
 	    if (PR_GetEnv("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) {
 	    	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT,
 			  pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
 			  pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); attrs++;
 	    } else {
 		pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
 			&pubKey->u.ec.publicValue,
 			SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
 		if (pubValue == NULL) {
 		    if (ckaId) {
 			SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId,PR_TRUE);
 		    }
 		    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 		}
 	    	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT,
 			  pubValue->data, pubValue->len); attrs++;
 	    }
 	    break;
 	default:
 	    if (ckaId) {
 		SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId,PR_TRUE);
 	    }
 	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
 	    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	}
 	templateCount = attrs - theTemplate;
 	signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
 	PORT_Assert(templateCount <= (sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)));
 	for (attrs=signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) {
 		pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs);
 	}
         rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, theTemplate,
 				 	templateCount, isToken, &objectID);
 	if (ckaId) {
 	    SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId,PR_TRUE);
 	}
 	if (pubValue) {
 	    SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue,PR_TRUE);
 	}
 	if ( rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	}
     }
     pubKey->pkcs11ID = objectID;
     pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
     return objectID;
 }
 /*
  * take an attribute and copy it into a secitem
  */
 static CK_RV
 pk11_Attr2SecItem(PLArenaPool *arena, const CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, SECItem *item)
 {
     item->data = NULL;
     (void)SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, item, attr->ulValueLen);
     if (item->data == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     PORT_Memcpy(item->data, attr->pValue, item->len);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /*
  * get a curve length from a set of ecParams.
  *
  * We need this so we can reliably determine if the ecPoint passed to us
  * was encoded or not. With out this, for many curves, we would incorrectly
  * identify an unencoded curve as an encoded curve 1 in 65536 times, and for
  * a few we would make that same mistake 1 in 32768 times. These are bad
  * numbers since they are rare enough to pass tests, but common enough to
  * be tripped over in the field.
  *
  * This function will only work for curves we recognized as of March 2009.
  * The assumption is curves in use after March of 2009 would be supplied by
  * PKCS #11 modules that already pass the correct encoding to us.
  *
  * Point length = (Roundup(curveLenInBits/8)*2+1)
  */
 static int
 pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes(PLArenaPool *arena, const SECItem *ecParams)
 {
    SECItem oid;
    SECOidTag tag;
    SECStatus rv;
    /* decode the OID tag */
    rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &oid,
 		SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_ObjectIDTemplate), ecParams);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	/* could be explict curves, allow them to work if the
 	 * PKCS #11 module support them. If we try to parse the
 	 * explicit curve value in the future, we may return -1 here
 	 * to indicate an invalid parameter if the explicit curve
 	 * decode fails. */
 	return 0;
    }
    tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid);
    switch (tag) {
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R2:
 	return 29; /* curve len in bytes = 14 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R2:
 	return 31; /* curve len in bytes = 15 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R2:
 	return 33; /* curve len in bytes = 16 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R2:
 	return 35; /* curve len in bytes = 17 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160K1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R2:
 	return 41; /* curve len in bytes = 20 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V2:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V3:
 	return 43; /* curve len in bytes = 21 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB176V1:
 	return 45; /* curve len in bytes = 22 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V1:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V2:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V3:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192K1:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V2:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V3:
 	return 49; /*curve len in bytes = 24 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R2:
 	return 51; /*curve len in bytes = 25 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB208W1:
 	return 53; /*curve len in bytes = 26 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224K1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1:
 	return 57; /*curve len in bytes = 28 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT239K1:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V1:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V2:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V3:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V1:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V2:
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V3:
 	return 61; /*curve len in bytes = 30 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256K1:
 	return 65; /*curve len in bytes = 32 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB272W1:
 	return 69; /*curve len in bytes = 34 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1:
 	return 73; /*curve len in bytes = 36 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB304W1:
 	return 77; /*curve len in bytes = 38 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB359V1:
 	return 91; /*curve len in bytes = 45 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB368W1:
 	return 93; /*curve len in bytes = 46 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
 	return 97; /*curve len in bytes = 48 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1:
 	return 105; /*curve len in bytes = 52 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB431R1:
 	return 109; /*curve len in bytes = 54 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
 	return 133; /*curve len in bytes = 66 bytes */
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1:
     case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1:
 	return 145; /*curve len in bytes = 72 bytes */
     /* unknown or unrecognized OIDs. return unknown length */
     default:
 	break;
    }
    return 0;
 }
 /*
  * returns the decoded point. In some cases the point may already be decoded.
  * this function tries to detect those cases and return the point in
  * publicKeyValue. In other cases it's DER encoded. In those cases the point
  * is first decoded and returned. Space for the point is allocated out of
  * the passed in arena.
  */
 static CK_RV
 pk11_get_Decoded_ECPoint(PLArenaPool *arena, const SECItem *ecParams,
 	const CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecPoint, SECItem *publicKeyValue)
 {
     SECItem encodedPublicValue;
     SECStatus rv;
     int keyLen;
     if (ecPoint->ulValueLen == 0) {
 	return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * The PKCS #11 spec requires ecPoints to be encoded as a DER OCTET String.
      * NSS has mistakenly passed unencoded values, and some PKCS #11 vendors
      * followed that mistake. Now we need to detect which encoding we were
      * passed in. The task is made more complicated by the fact the the
      * DER encoding byte (SEC_ASN_OCTET_STRING) is the same as the
      * EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED byte (0x04), so we can't use that to
      * determine which curve we are using.
      */
     /* get the expected key length for the passed in curve.
      * pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes only returns valid values for curves
      * NSS has traditionally recognized. If the curve is not recognized,
      * it will return '0', and we have to figure out if the key was
      * encoded or not heuristically. If the ecParams are invalid, it
      * will return -1 for the keyLen.
      */
     keyLen = pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes(arena, ecParams);
     if (keyLen < 0) {
 	return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
     }
     /* If the point is uncompressed and the lengths match, it
      * must be an unencoded point */
     if ((*((char *)ecPoint->pValue) == EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)
 	&& (ecPoint->ulValueLen == keyLen)) {
 	    return pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecPoint, publicKeyValue);
     }
     /* now assume the key passed to us was encoded and decode it */
     if (*((char *)ecPoint->pValue) == SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
 	/* OK, now let's try to decode it and see if it's valid */
 	encodedPublicValue.data = ecPoint->pValue;
 	encodedPublicValue.len = ecPoint->ulValueLen;
 	rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, publicKeyValue,
 		SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate), &encodedPublicValue);
 	/* it coded correctly & we know the key length (and they match)
 	 * then we are done, return the results. */
         if (keyLen && rv == SECSuccess && publicKeyValue->len == keyLen) {
 	    return CKR_OK;
 	}
 	/* if we know the key length, one of the above tests should have
 	 * succeded. If it doesn't the module gave us bad data */
 	if (keyLen) {
 	    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 	}
 	/* We don't know the key length, so we don't know deterministically
 	 * which encoding was used. We now will try to pick the most likely
 	 * form that's correct, with a preference for the encoded form if we
 	 * can't determine for sure. We do this by checking the key we got
 	 * back from SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem for defects. If no defects are
 	 * found, we assume the encoded parameter was was passed to us.
 	 * our defect tests include:
 	 *   1) it didn't decode.
 	 *   2) The decode key had an invalid length (must be odd).
 	 *   3) The decoded key wasn't an UNCOMPRESSED key.
 	 *   4) The decoded key didn't include the entire encoded block
 	 *   except the DER encoding values. (fixing DER length to one
 	 *   particular value).
 	 */
 	if ((rv != SECSuccess)
 	    || ((publicKeyValue->len & 1) != 1)
 	    || (publicKeyValue->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED)
 	    || (PORT_Memcmp(&encodedPublicValue.data[encodedPublicValue.len -
 		 	    publicKeyValue->len], publicKeyValue->data,
 			    publicKeyValue->len) != 0)) {
 	    /* The decoded public key was flawed, the original key must have
 	     * already been in decoded form. Do a quick sanity check then
 	     * return the original key value.
 	     */
 	    if ((encodedPublicValue.len & 1) == 0) {
 		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 	    }
 	    return pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecPoint, publicKeyValue);
 	}
 	/* as best we can figure, the passed in key was encoded, and we've
 	 * now decoded it. Note: there is a chance this could be wrong if the
 	 * following conditions hold:
 	 *  1) The first byte or bytes of the X point looks like a valid length
 	 * of precisely the right size (2*curveSize -1). this means for curves
 	 * less than 512 bits (64 bytes), this will happen 1 in 256 times*.
 	 * for curves between 512 and 1024, this will happen 1 in 65,536 times*
 	 * for curves between 1024 and 256K this will happen 1 in 16 million*
 	 *  2) The length of the 'DER length field' is odd
 	 * (making both the encoded and decode
 	 * values an odd length. this is true of all curves less than 512,
 	 * as well as curves between 1024 and 256K).
 	 *  3) The X[length of the 'DER length field'] == 0x04, 1 in 256.
 	 *
 	 *  (* assuming all values are equally likely in the first byte,
 	 * This isn't true if the curve length is not a multiple of 8. In these
 	 * cases, if the DER length is possible, it's more likely,
 	 * if it's not possible, then we have no false decodes).
 	 *
 	 * For reference here are the odds for the various curves we currently
 	 * have support for (and the only curves SSL will negotiate at this
 	 * time). NOTE: None of the supported curves will show up here
 	 * because we return a valid length for all of these curves.
 	 * The only way to get here is to have some application (not SSL)
 	 * which supports some unknown curve and have some vendor supplied
 	 * PKCS #11 module support that curve. NOTE: in this case, one
 	 * presumes that that pkcs #11 module is likely to be using the
 	 * correct encodings.
 	 *
 	 * Prime Curves (GFp):
 	 *   Bit	False	    Odds of
 	 *  Size	DER Len	 False Decode Positive
 	 *  112 	27	   1 in 65536
 	 *  128 	31	   1 in 65536
 	 *  160 	39	   1 in 65536
 	 *  192 	47	   1 in 65536
 	 *  224 	55	   1 in 65536
 	 *  239 	59	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
 	 *  256 	63	   1 in 65536
 	 *  521 	129,131	     0        (decoded value would be even)
 	 *
 	 * Binary curves (GF2m).
 	 *   Bit	False	    Odds of
 	 *  Size	DER Len	 False Decode Positive
 	 *  131 	33	     0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
 	 *  163 	41	     0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
 	 *  176 	43	   1 in 65536
 	 *  191 	47	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
 	 *  193 	49	     0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
 	 *  208 	51	   1 in 65536
 	 *  233 	59	     0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
 	 *  239 	59	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
 	 *  272 	67	   1 in 65536
 	 *  283 	71	     0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
 	 *  304 	75	   1 in 65536
 	 *  359 	89	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
 	 *  368 	91	   1 in 65536
 	 *  409 	103	     0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
 	 *  431 	107	   1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
 	 *  571 	129,143	     0        (decoded value would be even)
 	 *
 	 */
 	return CKR_OK;
     }
     /* In theory, we should handle the case where the curve == 0 and
      * the first byte is EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED, (which would be
      * handled by doing a santity check on the key length and returning
      * pk11_Attr2SecItem() to copy the ecPoint to the publicKeyValue).
      *
      * This test is unnecessary, however, due to the fact that
      * EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED == SEC_ASIN1_OCTET_STRING, that case is
      * handled in the above if. That means if we get here, the initial
      * byte of our ecPoint value was invalid, so we can safely return.
      * invalid attribute.
      */
     return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 }
 /*
  * extract a public key from a slot and id
  */
 SECKEYPublicKey *
 PK11_ExtractPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,KeyType keyType,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id)
 {
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
     PLArenaPool *arena;
     PLArenaPool *tmp_arena;
     SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
     int templateCount = 0;
     CK_KEY_TYPE pk11KeyType;
     CK_RV crv;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE template[8];
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs= template;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *modulus,*exponent,*base,*prime,*subprime,*value;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecparams;
     /* if we didn't know the key type, get it */
     if (keyType== nullKey) {
         pk11KeyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,id,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
 	if (pk11KeyType ==  CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) {
 	    return NULL;
 	}
 	switch (pk11KeyType) {
 	case CKK_RSA:
 	    keyType = rsaKey;
 	    break;
 	case CKK_DSA:
 	    keyType = dsaKey;
 	    break;
 	case CKK_DH:
 	    keyType = dhKey;
 	    break;
 	case CKK_EC:
 	    keyType = ecKey;
 	    break;
 	default:
 	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
 	    return NULL;
 	}
     }
     /* now we need to create space for the public key */
     arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (arena == NULL) return NULL;
     tmp_arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (tmp_arena == NULL) {
 	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     pubKey = (SECKEYPublicKey *)
 			PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey));
     if (pubKey == NULL) {
 	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
 	PORT_FreeArena (tmp_arena, PR_FALSE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     pubKey->arena = arena;
     pubKey->keyType = keyType;
     pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
     pubKey->pkcs11ID = id;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass,
 						sizeof(keyClass)); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &pk11KeyType,
 						sizeof(pk11KeyType) ); attrs++;
     switch (pubKey->keyType) {
     case rsaKey:
 	modulus = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	exponent = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	templateCount = attrs - template;
 	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
 	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_RSA)) {
 	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,modulus,&pubKey->u.rsa.modulus);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,exponent,&pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	break;
     case dsaKey:
 	prime = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	subprime = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	base = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	value = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	templateCount = attrs - template;
 	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
 	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DSA)) {
 	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,prime,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,subprime,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,base,&pubKey->u.dsa.params.base);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,value,&pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	break;
     case dhKey:
 	prime = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	base = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	value =attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	templateCount = attrs - template;
 	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
 	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DH)) {
 	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,prime,&pubKey->u.dh.prime);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,base,&pubKey->u.dh.base);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,value,&pubKey->u.dh.publicValue);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	break;
     case ecKey:
 	pubKey->u.ec.size = 0;
 	ecparams = attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	value =attrs;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT, NULL, 0); attrs++;
 	templateCount = attrs - template;
 	PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
 	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena,slot,id,template,templateCount);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_EC)) {
 	    crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena,ecparams,
 	                        &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = pk11_get_Decoded_ECPoint(arena,
 		 &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, value,
 		 &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue);
 	break;
     case fortezzaKey:
     case nullKey:
     default:
 	crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     PORT_FreeArena(tmp_arena,PR_FALSE);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
 	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	return NULL;
     }
     return pubKey;
 }
 /*
  * Build a Private Key structure from raw PKCS #11 information.
  */
 SECKEYPrivateKey *
 PK11_MakePrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, KeyType keyType,
 			PRBool isTemp, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID, void *wincx)
 {
     PLArenaPool *arena;
     SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
     PRBool isPrivate;
     SECStatus rv;
     /* don't know? look it up */
     if (keyType == nullKey) {
 	CK_KEY_TYPE pk11Type = CKK_RSA;
 	pk11Type = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,privID,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
 	isTemp = (PRBool)!PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,privID,CKA_TOKEN,PR_FALSE);
 	switch (pk11Type) {
 	case CKK_RSA: keyType = rsaKey; break;
 	case CKK_DSA: keyType = dsaKey; break;
 	case CKK_DH: keyType = dhKey; break;
 	case CKK_KEA: keyType = fortezzaKey; break;
 	case CKK_EC: keyType = ecKey; break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
     }
     /* if the key is private, make sure we are authenticated to the
      * token before we try to use it */
     isPrivate = (PRBool)PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,privID,CKA_PRIVATE,PR_FALSE);
     if (isPrivate) {
 	rv = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
  	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
  	    return NULL;
  	}
     }
     /* now we need to create space for the private key */
     arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (arena == NULL) return NULL;
     privKey = (SECKEYPrivateKey *)
 			PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPrivateKey));
     if (privKey == NULL) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     privKey->arena = arena;
     privKey->keyType = keyType;
     privKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
     privKey->pkcs11ID = privID;
     privKey->pkcs11IsTemp = isTemp;
     privKey->wincx = wincx;
     return privKey;
 }
 PK11SlotInfo *
 PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *key)
 {
     PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot;
     slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
     return slot;
 }
 /*
  * Get the modulus length for raw parsing
  */
 int
 PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(SECKEYPrivateKey *key)
 {
     CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate = { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 };
     PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot;
     CK_RV crv;
     int length;
     switch (key->keyType) {
     case rsaKey:
 	crv = PK11_GetAttributes(NULL, slot, key->pkcs11ID, &theTemplate, 1);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	    return -1;
 	}
 	length = theTemplate.ulValueLen;
 	if ( *(unsigned char *)theTemplate.pValue == 0) {
 	    length--;
 	}
 	if (theTemplate.pValue != NULL)
 	    PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue);
 	return (int) length;
     case fortezzaKey:
     case dsaKey:
     case dhKey:
     default:
 	break;
     }
     if (theTemplate.pValue != NULL)
 	PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue);
     PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY );
     return -1;
 }
 /*
  * take a private key in one pkcs11 module and load it into another:
  *  NOTE: the source private key is a rare animal... it can't be sensitive.
  *  This is used to do a key gen using one pkcs11 module and storing the
  *  result into another.
  */
 static SECKEYPrivateKey *
 pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
 		SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags)
 {
     CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = {
         /* class must be first */
 	{ CKA_CLASS, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
 	/* RSA - the attributes below will be replaced for other
 	 *       key types.
 	 */
 	{ CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_PRIME_1, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_PRIME_2, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_EXPONENT_1, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_EXPONENT_2, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_COEFFICIENT, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_SIGN, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_UNWRAP, NULL, 0 },
 	/* reserve space for the attributes that may be
 	 * specified in attrFlags */
 	{ CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_PRIVATE, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_EXTRACTABLE, NULL, 0 },
 #define NUM_RESERVED_ATTRS 5    /* number of reserved attributes above */
     };
     CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = NULL, *ap;
     const int templateSize = sizeof(privTemplate)/sizeof(privTemplate[0]);
     PLArenaPool *arena;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
     int i, count = 0;
     int extra_count = 0;
     CK_RV crv;
     SECStatus rv;
     PRBool token = ((attrFlags & PK11_ATTR_TOKEN) != 0);
     if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	return NULL;
     }
     for (i=0; i < templateSize; i++) {
 	if (privTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS) {
 	    attrs= &privTemplate[i];
 	    count = i;
 	    break;
 	}
     }
     PORT_Assert(attrs != NULL);
     if (attrs == NULL) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     ap = attrs;
     switch (privKey->keyType) {
     case rsaKey:
 	count = templateSize - NUM_RESERVED_ATTRS;
 	extra_count = count - (attrs - privTemplate);
 	break;
     case dsaKey:
 	ap->type = CKA_PRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_SUBPRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_BASE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_SIGN; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	break;
     case dhKey:
 	ap->type = CKA_PRIME; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_BASE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_DERIVE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	break;
     case ecKey:
 	ap->type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_VALUE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_DERIVE; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	ap->type = CKA_SIGN; ap++; count++; extra_count++;
 	break;
      default:
 	count = 0;
 	extra_count = 0;
 	break;
      }
      if (count == 0) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return NULL;
      }
      arena = PORT_NewArena( DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
      if (arena == NULL) return NULL;
      /*
       * read out the old attributes.
       */
      crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID,
 		privTemplate,count);
      if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
 	return NULL;
      }
      /* Set token, private, modifiable, sensitive, and extractable */
      count += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, &privTemplate[count],
 					&cktrue, &ckfalse);
      /* Not everyone can handle zero padded key values, give
       * them the raw data as unsigned */
      for (ap=attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) {
 	pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
      }
      /* now Store the puppies */
      rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, privTemplate,
 						count, token, &objectID);
      PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
      if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return NULL;
      }
      /* try loading the public key */
      if (pubKey) {
 	PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, token);
 	if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot) {
 	    PK11_FreeSlot(pubKey->pkcs11Slot);
 	    pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
 	    pubKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	}
      }
      /* build new key structure */
      return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, privKey->keyType, !token,
 						objectID, privKey->wincx);
 }
 static SECKEYPrivateKey *
 pk11_loadPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
 		SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool token, PRBool sensitive)
 {
     PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;
     if (token) {
 	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
     } else {
 	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_SESSION | PK11_ATTR_PUBLIC);
     }
     if (sensitive) {
 	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE;
     } else {
 	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_INSENSITIVE;
     }
     return pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(slot, privKey, pubKey, attrFlags);
 }
 /*
  * export this for PSM
  */
 SECKEYPrivateKey *
 PK11_LoadPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
 		SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool token, PRBool sensitive)
 {
     return pk11_loadPrivKey(slot,privKey,pubKey,token,sensitive);
 }
 /*
  * Use the token to generate a key pair.
  */
 SECKEYPrivateKey *
 PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
    void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags,
    CK_FLAGS opFlags, CK_FLAGS opFlagsMask, void *wincx)
 {
     /* we have to use these native types because when we call PKCS 11 modules
      * we have to make sure that we are using the correct sizes for all the
      * parameters. */
     CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
     CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_ULONG modulusBits;
     CK_BYTE publicExponent[4];
     CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = {
 	{ CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_PRIVATE,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_UNWRAP,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_SIGN,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_DECRYPT,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_EXTRACTABLE, NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
     };
     CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPubTemplate[] = {
 	{ CKA_MODULUS_BITS, NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
     };
     CK_ATTRIBUTE dsaPubTemplate[] = {
 	{ CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
 	{ CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
     };
     CK_ATTRIBUTE dhPubTemplate[] = {
       { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
       { CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
       { CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
     };
     CK_ATTRIBUTE ecPubTemplate[] = {
       { CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0 },
       { CKA_TOKEN,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_DERIVE,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_WRAP,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_VERIFY,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_ENCRYPT,  NULL, 0},
       { CKA_MODIFIABLE,  NULL, 0},
     };
     SECKEYECParams * ecParams;
     /*CK_ULONG key_size = 0;*/
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *pubTemplate;
     int privCount = 0;
     int pubCount = 0;
     PK11RSAGenParams *rsaParams;
     SECKEYPQGParams *dsaParams;
     SECKEYDHParams * dhParams;
     CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
     CK_MECHANISM test_mech;
     CK_MECHANISM test_mech2;
     CK_SESSION_HANDLE session_handle;
     CK_RV crv;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID,pubID;
     SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
     KeyType keyType;
     PRBool restore;
     int peCount,i;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *privattrs;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE setTemplate;
     CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass;
     SECItem *cka_id;
     PRBool haslock = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool pubIsToken = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool token = ((attrFlags & PK11_ATTR_TOKEN) != 0);
     /* subset of attrFlags applicable to the public key */
     PK11AttrFlags pubKeyAttrFlags = attrFlags &
 	(PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_SESSION
 	| PK11_ATTR_MODIFIABLE | PK11_ATTR_UNMODIFIABLE);
     if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
 	PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS );
 	return NULL;
     }
     if (!param) {
         PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS );
         return NULL;
     }
     /*
      * The opFlags and opFlagMask parameters allow us to control the
      * settings of the key usage attributes (CKA_ENCRYPT and friends).
      * opFlagMask is set to one if the flag is specified in opFlags and
      *  zero if it is to take on a default value calculated by
      *  PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags.
      * opFlags specifies the actual value of the flag 1 or 0.
      *   Bits not corresponding to one bits in opFlagMask should be zero.
      */
     /* if we are trying to turn on a flag, it better be in the mask */
     PORT_Assert ((opFlags & ~opFlagsMask) == 0);
     opFlags &= opFlagsMask;
     PORT_Assert(slot != NULL);
     if (slot == NULL) {
 	PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     /* if our slot really doesn't do this mechanism, Generate the key
      * in our internal token and write it out */
     if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot,type)) {
 	PK11SlotInfo *int_slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
 	/* don't loop forever looking for a slot */
 	if (slot == int_slot) {
 	    PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot);
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return NULL;
 	}
 	/* if there isn't a suitable slot, then we can't do the keygen */
 	if (int_slot == NULL) {
 	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE );
 	    return NULL;
 	}
 	/* generate the temporary key to load */
 	privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(int_slot,type, param, pubKey, PR_FALSE,
 							PR_FALSE, wincx);
 	PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot);
 	/* if successful, load the temp key into the new token */
 	if (privKey != NULL) {
 	    SECKEYPrivateKey *newPrivKey = pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(slot,
 						privKey,*pubKey,attrFlags);
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
 	    if (newPrivKey == NULL) {
 		SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey);
 		*pubKey = NULL;
 	    }
 	    return newPrivKey;
 	}
 	return NULL;
    }
     mechanism.mechanism = type;
     mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
     mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
     test_mech.pParameter = NULL;
     test_mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
     test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
     test_mech2.pParameter = NULL;
     test_mech2.ulParameterLen = 0;
     /* set up the private key template */
     privattrs = privTemplate;
     privattrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, privattrs,
 						&cktrue, &ckfalse);
     /* set up the mechanism specific info */
     switch (type) {
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
     case CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
 	rsaParams = (PK11RSAGenParams *)param;
 	if (rsaParams->pe == 0) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	    return NULL;
 	}
 	modulusBits = rsaParams->keySizeInBits;
 	peCount = 0;
 	/* convert pe to a PKCS #11 string */
 	for (i=0; i < 4; i++) {
 	    if (peCount || (rsaParams->pe &
 				((unsigned long)0xff000000L >> (i*8)))) {
 		publicExponent[peCount] =
 				(CK_BYTE)((rsaParams->pe >> (3-i)*8) & 0xff);
 		peCount++;
 	    }
 	}
 	PORT_Assert(peCount != 0);
 	attrs = rsaPubTemplate;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS_BITS,
 				&modulusBits, sizeof(modulusBits)); attrs++;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
 				publicExponent, peCount);attrs++;
 	pubTemplate = rsaPubTemplate;
 	keyType = rsaKey;
 	test_mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
 	break;
     case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
 	dsaParams = (SECKEYPQGParams *)param;
 	attrs = dsaPubTemplate;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dsaParams->prime.data,
 				dsaParams->prime.len); attrs++;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, dsaParams->subPrime.data,
 					dsaParams->subPrime.len); attrs++;
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dsaParams->base.data,
 						dsaParams->base.len); attrs++;
 	pubTemplate = dsaPubTemplate;
 	keyType = dsaKey;
 	test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
 	break;
     case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
         dhParams = (SECKEYDHParams *)param;
         attrs = dhPubTemplate;
         PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dhParams->prime.data,
                       dhParams->prime.len);   attrs++;
         PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dhParams->base.data,
                       dhParams->base.len);    attrs++;
         pubTemplate = dhPubTemplate;
         keyType = dhKey;
         test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
 	break;
     case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
         ecParams = (SECKEYECParams *)param;
         attrs = ecPubTemplate;
         PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams->data,
 	              ecParams->len);   attrs++;
         pubTemplate = ecPubTemplate;
         keyType = ecKey;
 	/*
 	 * ECC supports 2 different mechanism types (unlike RSA, which
 	 * supports different usages with the same mechanism).
 	 * We may need to query both mechanism types and or the results
 	 * together -- but we only do that if either the user has
 	 * requested both usages, or not specified any usages.
 	 */
 	if ((opFlags & (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DERIVE)) == (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DERIVE)) {
 	    /* We've explicitly turned on both flags, use both mechanism */
 	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
 	    test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
 	} else if (opFlags & CKF_SIGN) {
 	    /* just do signing */
 	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
 	} else if (opFlags & CKF_DERIVE) {
 	    /* just do ECDH */
 	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
 	} else {
 	    /* neither was specified default to both */
 	    test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
 	    test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
 	}
         break;
     default:
 	PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
 	return NULL;
     }
     /* now query the slot to find out how "good" a key we can generate */
     if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID,
 				test_mech.mechanism,&mechanism_info);
     /*
      * EC keys are used in multiple different types of mechanism, if we
      * are using dual use keys, we need to query the second mechanism
      * as well.
      */
     if (test_mech2.mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
 	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info2;
 	CK_RV crv2;
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    /* the first failed, make sure there is no trash in the
 	     * mechanism flags when we or it below */
 	    mechanism_info.flags = 0;
 	}
 	crv2 = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID,
 				test_mech2.mechanism, &mechanism_info2);
 	if (crv2 == CKR_OK) {
 	    crv = CKR_OK; /* succeed if either mechnaism info succeeds */
 	    /* combine the 2 sets of mechnanism flags */
 	    mechanism_info.flags |= mechanism_info2.flags;
 	}
     }
     if (!slot->isThreadSafe) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
     if ((crv != CKR_OK) || (mechanism_info.flags == 0)) {
 	/* must be old module... guess what it should be... */
 	switch (test_mech.mechanism) {
 	case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
 	    mechanism_info.flags = (CKF_SIGN | CKF_DECRYPT |
 		CKF_WRAP | CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER | CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_WRAP);
 	    break;
 	case CKM_DSA:
 	    mechanism_info.flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
 	    break;
 	case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
 	    mechanism_info.flags = CKF_DERIVE;
 	    break;
 	case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
 	    mechanism_info.flags = CKF_DERIVE;
 	    if (test_mech2.mechanism == CKM_ECDSA) {
 		mechanism_info.flags |= CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
 	    }
 	    break;
 	case CKM_ECDSA:
 	    mechanism_info.flags =  CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
 	    break;
 	default:
 	    break;
 	}
     }
     /* now adjust our flags according to the user's key usage passed to us */
     mechanism_info.flags = (mechanism_info.flags & (~opFlagsMask)) | opFlags;
     /* set the public key attributes */
     attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(pubKeyAttrFlags, attrs,
 						&cktrue, &ckfalse);
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_WRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); attrs++;
     /* set the private key attributes */
     PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DERIVE,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_UNWRAP,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_UNWRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_SIGN,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_SIGN ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DECRYPT,
 		mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
 					 sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); privattrs++;
     if (token) {
 	session_handle = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
 	haslock = PK11_RWSessionHasLock(slot,session_handle);
 	restore = PR_TRUE;
     } else {
 	session_handle = slot->session;
 	if (session_handle != CK_INVALID_SESSION)
 	    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
 	restore = PR_FALSE;
 	haslock = PR_TRUE;
     }
     if (session_handle == CK_INVALID_SESSION) {
     	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
 	return NULL;
     }
     privCount = privattrs - privTemplate;
     pubCount = attrs - pubTemplate;
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GenerateKeyPair(session_handle, &mechanism,
 	pubTemplate,pubCount,privTemplate,privCount,&pubID,&privID);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	if (restore)  {
 	    PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle);
 	} else PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
 	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	return NULL;
     }
     /* This locking code is dangerous and needs to be more thought
      * out... the real problem is that we're holding the mutex open this long
      */
     if (haslock) { PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot); }
     /* swap around the ID's for older PKCS #11 modules */
     keyClass = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot,pubID,CKA_CLASS);
     if (keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) {
 	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE tmp = pubID;
 	pubID = privID;
 	privID = tmp;
     }
     *pubKey = PK11_ExtractPublicKey(slot, keyType, pubID);
     if (*pubKey == NULL) {
 	if (restore)  {
 	    /* we may have to restore the mutex so it get's exited properly
 	     * in RestoreROSession */
             if (haslock)  PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
 	    PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle);
 	}
 	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,pubID);
 	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID);
 	return NULL;
     }
     /* set the ID to the public key so we can find it again */
     cka_id = pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(*pubKey);
     pubIsToken = (PRBool)PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot,pubID, CKA_TOKEN,PR_FALSE);
     PK11_SETATTRS(&setTemplate, CKA_ID, cka_id->data, cka_id->len);
     if (haslock) { PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot); }
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, privID,
 		&setTemplate, 1);
     if (crv == CKR_OK && pubIsToken) {
     	crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, pubID,
 		&setTemplate, 1);
     }
     if (restore) {
 	PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,session_handle);
     } else {
 	PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
     }
     SECITEM_FreeItem(cka_id,PR_TRUE);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,pubID);
 	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID);
 	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	*pubKey = NULL;
 	return NULL;
     }
     privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot,keyType,!token,privID,wincx);
     if (privKey == NULL) {
 	SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey);
 	PK11_DestroyObject(slot,privID);
 	*pubKey = NULL;
 	return NULL;
     }
     return privKey;
 }
 SECKEYPrivateKey *
 PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
    void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx)
 {
     return PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags(slot,type,param,pubKey,attrFlags,
 , 0, wincx);
 }
 /*
  * Use the token to generate a key pair.
  */
 SECKEYPrivateKey *
 PK11_GenerateKeyPair(PK11SlotInfo *slot,CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
    void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PRBool token,
 					PRBool sensitive, void *wincx)
 {
     PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;
     if (token) {
 	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_TOKEN;
     } else {
 	attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_SESSION;
     }
     if (sensitive) {
 	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
     } else {
 	attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_INSENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PUBLIC);
     }
     return PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(slot, type, param, pubKey,
 						attrFlags, wincx);
 }
 /* build a public KEA key from the public value */
 SECKEYPublicKey *
 PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(unsigned char *keyData,int length)
 {
     SECKEYPublicKey *pubk;
     SECItem pkData;
     SECStatus rv;
     PLArenaPool *arena;
     pkData.data = keyData;
     pkData.len = length;
     arena = PORT_NewArena (DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (arena == NULL)
 	return NULL;
     pubk = (SECKEYPublicKey *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey));
     if (pubk == NULL) {
 	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     pubk->arena = arena;
     pubk->pkcs11Slot = 0;
     pubk->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
     pubk->keyType = fortezzaKey;
     rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.fortezza.KEAKey, &pkData);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     return pubk;
 }
 /*
  * NOTE: This function doesn't return a SECKEYPrivateKey struct to represent
  * the new private key object.  If it were to create a session object that
  * could later be looked up by its nickname, it would leak a SECKEYPrivateKey.
  * So isPerm must be true.
  */
 SECStatus
 PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
 			SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki, SECItem *pwitem,
 			SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm,
 			PRBool isPrivate, KeyType keyType,
 			unsigned int keyUsage, void *wincx)
 {
     if (!isPerm) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     return PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoAndReturnKey(slot, epki,
 		pwitem, nickname, publicValue, isPerm, isPrivate, keyType,
 		keyUsage, NULL, wincx);
 }
 SECStatus
 PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoAndReturnKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
 			SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki, SECItem *pwitem,
 			SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm,
 			PRBool isPrivate, KeyType keyType,
 			unsigned int keyUsage, SECKEYPrivateKey **privk,
 			void *wincx)
 {
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE pbeMechType;
     SECItem *crypto_param = NULL;
     PK11SymKey *key = NULL;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
     SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL;
     PRBool faulty3DES = PR_FALSE;
     int usageCount = 0;
     CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE *usage = NULL;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE rsaUsage[] = {
 		 CKA_UNWRAP, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_SIGN, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER };
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dsaUsage[] = { CKA_SIGN };
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dhUsage[] = { CKA_DERIVE };
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE ecUsage[] = { CKA_SIGN, CKA_DERIVE };
     if((epki == NULL) || (pwitem == NULL))
 	return SECFailure;
     pbeMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_FindOIDTag(
 					&epki->algorithm.algorithm));
     switch (keyType) {
     default:
     case rsaKey:
 	key_type = CKK_RSA;
 	switch  (keyUsage & (KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
 	case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:
 	    usage = rsaUsage;
 	    usageCount = 2;
 	    break;
 	case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
 	    usage = &rsaUsage[2];
 	    usageCount = 2;
 	    break;
 	case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
 	case 0: /* default to everything */
 	    usage = rsaUsage;
 	    usageCount = 4;
 	    break;
 	}
         break;
     case dhKey:
 	key_type = CKK_DH;
 	usage = dhUsage;
 	usageCount = sizeof(dhUsage)/sizeof(dhUsage[0]);
 	break;
     case dsaKey:
 	key_type = CKK_DSA;
 	usage = dsaUsage;
 	usageCount = sizeof(dsaUsage)/sizeof(dsaUsage[0]);
 	break;
     case ecKey:
 	key_type = CKK_EC;
 	switch  (keyUsage & (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
 	case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
 	    usage = ecUsage;
 	    usageCount = 1;
 	    break;
 	case KU_KEY_AGREEMENT:
 	    usage = &ecUsage[1];
 	    usageCount = 1;
 	    break;
 	case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT:
 	default: /* default to everything */
 	    usage = ecUsage;
 	    usageCount = 2;
 	    break;
 	}
 	break;
     }
 try_faulty_3des:
     key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, &epki->algorithm, pwitem, faulty3DES, wincx);
     if (key == NULL) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto done;
     }
     cryptoMechType = pk11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(&epki->algorithm,
 					 &crypto_param, pwitem, faulty3DES);
     if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto done;
     }
     cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMechType);
     PORT_Assert(usage != NULL);
     PORT_Assert(usageCount != 0);
     privKey = PK11_UnwrapPrivKey(slot, key, cryptoMechType,
 				 crypto_param, &epki->encryptedData,
 				 nickname, publicValue, isPerm, isPrivate,
 				 key_type, usage, usageCount, wincx);
     if(privKey) {
 	if (privk) {
 	    *privk = privKey;
 	} else {
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
 	}
 	privKey = NULL;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
 	goto done;
     }
     /* if we are unable to import the key and the pbeMechType is
      * CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC, then it is possible that
      * the encrypted blob was created with a buggy key generation method
      * which is described in the PKCS 12 implementation notes.  So we
      * need to try importing via that method.
      */
     if((pbeMechType == CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC) && (!faulty3DES)) {
 	/* clean up after ourselves before redoing the key generation. */
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
 	key = NULL;
 	if(crypto_param) {
 	    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
 	    crypto_param = NULL;
 	}
 	faulty3DES = PR_TRUE;
 	goto try_faulty_3des;
     }
     /* key import really did fail */
     rv = SECFailure;
 done:
     if(crypto_param != NULL) {
 	SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
     }
     if(key != NULL) {
     	PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
     }
     return rv;
 }
 SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo *
 PK11_ExportPrivateKeyInfo(CERTCertificate *cert, void *wincx)
 {
     SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
     SECKEYPrivateKey     *pk  = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, wincx);
     if (pk != NULL) {
 	pki = PK11_ExportPrivKeyInfo(pk, wincx);
 	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(pk);
     }
     return pki;
 }
 SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *
 PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfo(
    PK11SlotInfo     *slot,      /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
    SECOidTag         algTag,    /* encrypt key with this algorithm */
    SECItem          *pwitem,    /* password for PBE encryption */
    SECKEYPrivateKey *pk,        /* encrypt this private key */
    int               iteration, /* interations for PBE alg */
    void             *wincx)     /* context for password callback ? */
 {
     SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki      = NULL;
     PLArenaPool                   *arena     = NULL;
     SECAlgorithmID                *algid;
     SECOidTag			  pbeAlgTag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
     SECItem                       *crypto_param = NULL;
     PK11SymKey                    *key       = NULL;
     SECKEYPrivateKey		  *tmpPK = NULL;
     SECStatus                      rv        = SECSuccess;
     CK_RV                          crv;
     CK_ULONG                       encBufLen;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE              pbeMechType;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE              cryptoMechType;
     CK_MECHANISM                   cryptoMech;
     if (!pwitem || !pk) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	return NULL;
     }
     algid = sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(algTag, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
 				&pbeAlgTag, 0, NULL, iteration);
     if (algid == NULL) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
     if (arena)
 	epki = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo);
     if(epki == NULL) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     epki->arena = arena;
     /* if we didn't specify a slot, use the slot the private key was in */
     if (!slot) {
 	slot = pk->pkcs11Slot;
     }
     /* if we specified a different slot, and the private key slot can do the
      * pbe key gen, generate the key in the private key slot so we don't have
      * to move it later */
     pbeMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(pbeAlgTag);
     if (slot != pk->pkcs11Slot) {
 	if (PK11_DoesMechanism(pk->pkcs11Slot,pbeMechType)) {
 	    slot = pk->pkcs11Slot;
 	}
     }
     key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, algid, pwitem, PR_FALSE, wincx);
     if (key == NULL) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(algid, &crypto_param, pwitem);
     if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     cryptoMech.mechanism = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMechType);
     cryptoMech.pParameter = crypto_param ? crypto_param->data : NULL;
     cryptoMech.ulParameterLen = crypto_param ? crypto_param->len : 0;
     /* If the key isn't in the private key slot, move it */
     if (key->slot != pk->pkcs11Slot) {
 	PK11SymKey *newkey = pk11_CopyToSlot(pk->pkcs11Slot,
 						key->type, CKA_WRAP, key);
 	if (newkey == NULL) {
             /* couldn't import the wrapping key, try exporting the
              * private key */
 	    tmpPK = pk11_loadPrivKey(key->slot, pk, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
 	    if (tmpPK == NULL) {
 		rv = SECFailure;
 		goto loser;
 	    }
 	    pk = tmpPK;
 	} else {
 	    /* free the old key and use the new key */
 	    PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
 	    key = newkey;
 	}
     }
     /* we are extracting an encrypted privateKey structure.
      * which needs to be freed along with the buffer into which it is
      * returned.  eventually, we should retrieve an encrypted key using
      * pkcs8/pkcs5.
      */
     encBufLen = 0;
     PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(pk->pkcs11Slot)->C_WrapKey(pk->pkcs11Slot->session,
     		&cryptoMech, key->objectID, pk->pkcs11ID, NULL,
 		&encBufLen);
     PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     epki->encryptedData.data = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, encBufLen);
     if (!epki->encryptedData.data) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(pk->pkcs11Slot)->C_WrapKey(pk->pkcs11Slot->session,
     		&cryptoMech, key->objectID, pk->pkcs11ID,
 		epki->encryptedData.data, &encBufLen);
     PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
     epki->encryptedData.len = (unsigned int) encBufLen;
     if(crv != CKR_OK) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     if(!epki->encryptedData.len) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(arena, &epki->algorithm, algid);
 loser:
     if(crypto_param != NULL) {
 	SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
 	crypto_param = NULL;
     }
     if(key != NULL) {
     	PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
     }
     if (tmpPK != NULL) {
 	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(tmpPK);
     }
     SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(algid, PR_TRUE);
     if(rv == SECFailure) {
 	if(arena != NULL) {
 	    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
 	}
 	epki = NULL;
     }
     return epki;
 }
 SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *
 PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(
    PK11SlotInfo    *slot,      /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
    SECOidTag        algTag,    /* encrypt key with this algorithm */
    SECItem         *pwitem,    /* password for PBE encryption */
    CERTCertificate *cert,      /* wrap priv key for this user cert */
    int              iteration, /* interations for PBE alg */
    void            *wincx)     /* context for password callback ? */
 {
     SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki = NULL;
     SECKEYPrivateKey              *pk   = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, wincx);
     if (pk != NULL) {
 	epki = PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfo(slot, algTag, pwitem, pk,
 	                                       iteration, wincx);
 	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(pk);
     }
     return epki;
 }
 SECItem*
 PK11_DEREncodePublicKey(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
 {
     return SECKEY_EncodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubk);
 }
 char *
 PK11_GetPrivateKeyNickname(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
 {
     return PK11_GetObjectNickname(privKey->pkcs11Slot,privKey->pkcs11ID);
 }
 char *
 PK11_GetPublicKeyNickname(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
 {
     return PK11_GetObjectNickname(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,pubKey->pkcs11ID);
 }
 SECStatus
 PK11_SetPrivateKeyNickname(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const char *nickname)
 {
     return PK11_SetObjectNickname(privKey->pkcs11Slot,
 					privKey->pkcs11ID,nickname);
 }
 SECStatus
 PK11_SetPublicKeyNickname(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const char *nickname)
 {
     return PK11_SetObjectNickname(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,
 					pubKey->pkcs11ID,nickname);
 }
 SECKEYPQGParams *
 PK11_GetPQGParamsFromPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
 {
     CK_ATTRIBUTE pTemplate[] = {
 	{ CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
     };
     int pTemplateLen = sizeof(pTemplate)/sizeof(pTemplate[0]);
     PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
     SECKEYPQGParams *params;
     CK_RV crv;
     arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
     if (arena == NULL) {
 	goto loser;
     }
     params=(SECKEYPQGParams *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,sizeof(SECKEYPQGParams));
     if (params == NULL) {
 	goto loser;
     }
     crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID,
 						pTemplate, pTemplateLen);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	goto loser;
     }
     params->arena = arena;
     params->prime.data = pTemplate[0].pValue;
     params->prime.len = pTemplate[0].ulValueLen;
     params->subPrime.data = pTemplate[1].pValue;
     params->subPrime.len = pTemplate[1].ulValueLen;
     params->base.data = pTemplate[2].pValue;
     params->base.len = pTemplate[2].ulValueLen;
     return params;
 loser:
     if (arena != NULL) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
     }
     return NULL;
 }
 SECKEYPrivateKey*
 PK11_CopyTokenPrivKeyToSessionPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *destSlot,
 				      SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
 {
     CK_RV             crv;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  newKeyID;
     static const CK_BBOOL     ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
     static const CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1] = {
        { CKA_TOKEN, (CK_BBOOL *)&ckfalse, sizeof ckfalse }
     };
     if (destSlot && destSlot != privKey->pkcs11Slot) {
 	SECKEYPrivateKey *newKey =
 	       pk11_loadPrivKey(destSlot,
 				privKey,
 			        NULL,     /* pubKey    */
 			        PR_FALSE, /* token     */
 			        PR_FALSE);/* sensitive */
 	if (newKey)
 	    return newKey;
     }
     destSlot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
     PK11_Authenticate(destSlot, PR_TRUE, privKey->wincx);
     PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(destSlot);
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(destSlot)->C_CopyObject(	destSlot->session,
 						privKey->pkcs11ID,
 						(CK_ATTRIBUTE *)template,
 , &newKeyID);
     PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(destSlot);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	return NULL;
     }
     return PK11_MakePrivKey(destSlot, privKey->keyType, PR_TRUE /*isTemp*/,
 			    newKeyID, privKey->wincx);
 }
 SECKEYPrivateKey*
 PK11_ConvertSessionPrivKeyToTokenPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privk, void* wincx)
 {
     PK11SlotInfo* slot = privk->pkcs11Slot;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1];
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = template;
     CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_RV crv;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKeyID;
     CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue)); attrs++;
     PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
     rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
     if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_SESSION) {
     	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
 	return NULL;
     }
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CopyObject(rwsession, privk->pkcs11ID,
         template, 1, &newKeyID);
     PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
         return NULL;
     }
     return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey /*KeyType*/, PR_FALSE /*isTemp*/,
         newKeyID, NULL /*wincx*/);
 }
 /*
  * destroy a private key if there are no matching certs.
  * this function also frees the privKey structure.
  */
 SECStatus
 PK11_DeleteTokenPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, PRBool force)
 {
     CERTCertificate *cert=PK11_GetCertFromPrivateKey(privKey);
     SECStatus rv = SECWouldBlock;
     if (!cert || force) {
 	/* now, then it's safe for the key to go away */
 	rv = PK11_DestroyTokenObject(privKey->pkcs11Slot,privKey->pkcs11ID);
     }
     if (cert) {
 	CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
     }
     SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
     return rv;
 }
 /*
  * destroy a private key if there are no matching certs.
  * this function also frees the privKey structure.
  */
 SECStatus
 PK11_DeleteTokenPublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
 {
     /* now, then it's safe for the key to go away */
     if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot == NULL) {
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     PK11_DestroyTokenObject(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,pubKey->pkcs11ID);
     SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * key call back structure.
  */
 typedef struct pk11KeyCallbackStr {
 	SECStatus (* callback)(SECKEYPrivateKey *,void *);
 	void *callbackArg;
 	void *wincx;
 } pk11KeyCallback;
 /*
  * callback to map Object Handles to Private Keys;
  */
 SECStatus
 pk11_DoKeys(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle, void *arg)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
     pk11KeyCallback *keycb = (pk11KeyCallback *) arg;
     if (!arg) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
     privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot,nullKey,PR_TRUE,keyHandle,keycb->wincx);
     if (privKey == NULL) {
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (keycb->callback) {
 	rv = (*keycb->callback)(privKey,keycb->callbackArg);
     }
     SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
     return rv;
 }
 /***********************************************************************
  * PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot
  *
  * Traverses all the private keys on a slot.
  *
  * INPUTS
  *      slot
  *          The PKCS #11 slot whose private keys you want to traverse.
  *      callback
  *          A callback function that will be called for each key.
  *      arg
  *          An argument that will be passed to the callback function.
  */
 SECStatus
 PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot( PK11SlotInfo *slot,
     SECStatus(* callback)(SECKEYPrivateKey*, void*), void *arg)
 {
     pk11KeyCallback perKeyCB;
     pk11TraverseSlot perObjectCB;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS privkClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
     CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[2];
     int templateSize = 2;
     theTemplate[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
     theTemplate[0].pValue = &privkClass;
     theTemplate[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(privkClass);
     theTemplate[1].type = CKA_TOKEN;
     theTemplate[1].pValue = &ckTrue;
     theTemplate[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(ckTrue);
     if(slot==NULL) {
         return SECSuccess;
     }
     perObjectCB.callback = pk11_DoKeys;
     perObjectCB.callbackArg = &perKeyCB;
     perObjectCB.findTemplate = theTemplate;
     perObjectCB.templateCount = templateSize;
     perKeyCB.callback = callback;
     perKeyCB.callbackArg = arg;
     perKeyCB.wincx = NULL;
     return PK11_TraverseSlot(slot, &perObjectCB);
 }
 /*
  * return the private key with the given ID
  */
 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
 pk11_FindPrivateKeyFromCertID(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyID)
 {
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS privKey = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[] = {
 	{ CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
 	{ CKA_CLASS, NULL, 0 },
     };
     /* if you change the array, change the variable below as well */
     int tsize = sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(theTemplate[0]);
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyID->data, keyID->len ); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &privKey, sizeof(privKey));
     return pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot,theTemplate,tsize);
 }
 SECKEYPrivateKey *
 PK11_FindKeyByKeyID(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyID, void *wincx)
 {
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle;
     SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
     keyHandle = pk11_FindPrivateKeyFromCertID(slot, keyID);
     if (keyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     privKey =  PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey, PR_TRUE, keyHandle, wincx);
     return privKey;
 }
 /*
  * Generate a CKA_ID from the relevant public key data. The CKA_ID is generated
  * from the pubKeyData by SHA1_Hashing it to produce a smaller CKA_ID (to make
  * smart cards happy.
  */
 SECItem *
 PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(SECItem *pubKeyData)
 {
     PK11Context *context;
     SECItem *certCKA_ID;
     SECStatus rv;
     if (pubKeyData->len <= SHA1_LENGTH) {
 	/* probably an already hashed value. The strongest known public
 	 * key values <= 160 bits would be less than 40 bit symetric in
 	 * strength. Don't hash them, just return the value. There are
 	 * none at the time of this writing supported by previous versions
 	 * of NSS, so change is binary compatible safe */
 	return SECITEM_DupItem(pubKeyData);
     }
     context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
     if (context == NULL) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
     	rv = PK11_DigestOp(context,pubKeyData->data,pubKeyData->len);
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     certCKA_ID = (SECItem *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SECItem));
     if (certCKA_ID == NULL) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     certCKA_ID->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
     certCKA_ID->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(certCKA_ID->len);
     if (certCKA_ID->data == NULL) {
 	PORT_Free(certCKA_ID);
 	PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
         return NULL;
     }
     rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context,certCKA_ID->data,&certCKA_ID->len,
 								SHA1_LENGTH);
     PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	SECITEM_FreeItem(certCKA_ID,PR_TRUE);
 	return NULL;
     }
     return certCKA_ID;
 }
 /* Looking for PK11_GetKeyIDFromPrivateKey?
  * Call PK11_GetLowLevelKeyIDForPrivateKey instead.
  */
 SECItem *
 PK11_GetLowLevelKeyIDForPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
 {
     return pk11_GetLowLevelKeyFromHandle(privKey->pkcs11Slot,privKey->pkcs11ID);
 }
 static SECStatus
 privateKeyListCallback(SECKEYPrivateKey *key, void *arg)
 {
     SECKEYPrivateKeyList *list = (SECKEYPrivateKeyList*)arg;
     return SECKEY_AddPrivateKeyToListTail(list, SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(key));
 }
 SECKEYPrivateKeyList*
 PK11_ListPrivateKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot)
 {
     SECStatus status;
     SECKEYPrivateKeyList *keys;
     keys = SECKEY_NewPrivateKeyList();
     if(keys == NULL) return NULL;
     status = PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot(slot, privateKeyListCallback,
 		(void*)keys);
     if( status != SECSuccess ) {
 	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKeyList(keys);
 	keys = NULL;
     }
     return keys;
 }
 SECKEYPublicKeyList*
 PK11_ListPublicKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname)
 {
     CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
     CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
     int tsize = 0;
     int objCount = 0;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
     SECKEYPublicKeyList *keys;
     int i,len;
     attrs = findTemp;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass)); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue)); attrs++;
     if (nickname) {
 	len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len); attrs++;
     }
     tsize = attrs - findTemp;
     PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
     key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot,findTemp,tsize,&objCount);
     if (key_ids == NULL) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     keys = SECKEY_NewPublicKeyList();
     if (keys == NULL) {
 	PORT_Free(key_ids);
 	return NULL;
     }
     for (i=0; i < objCount ; i++) {
 	SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey =
 				PK11_ExtractPublicKey(slot,nullKey,key_ids[i]);
 	if (pubKey) {
 	    SECKEY_AddPublicKeyToListTail(keys, pubKey);
 	}
    }
    PORT_Free(key_ids);
    return keys;
 }
 SECKEYPrivateKeyList*
 PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname, void *wincx)
 {
     CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
     CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
     int tsize = 0;
     int objCount = 0;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
     SECKEYPrivateKeyList *keys;
     int i,len;
     attrs = findTemp;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass)); attrs++;
     PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue)); attrs++;
     if (nickname) {
 	len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
 	PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len); attrs++;
     }
     tsize = attrs - findTemp;
     PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
     key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot,findTemp,tsize,&objCount);
     if (key_ids == NULL) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     keys = SECKEY_NewPrivateKeyList();
     if (keys == NULL) {
 	PORT_Free(key_ids);
 	return NULL;
     }
     for (i=0; i < objCount ; i++) {
 	SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey =
 		PK11_MakePrivKey(slot,nullKey,PR_TRUE,key_ids[i],wincx);
 	SECKEY_AddPrivateKeyToListTail(keys, privKey);
    }
    PORT_Free(key_ids);
    return keys;
 }

The Tor Browser / annotate

security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c