The Tor Browser: security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
changeset 0: 6474c204b198
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 /*
  * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
  *
  * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
  *   This implementation has two slots:
  *	slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
  *   It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
  *   It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
  *   not have any token storage.
  *	slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
  *   can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
  *   keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
  *
  *   In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
  *   that created or generated them.
  */
 #include "seccomon.h"
 #include "secitem.h"
 #include "secport.h"
 #include "blapi.h"
 #include "pkcs11.h"
 #include "pkcs11i.h"
 #include "pkcs1sig.h"
 #include "lowkeyi.h"
 #include "secder.h"
 #include "secdig.h"
 #include "lowpbe.h"	/* We do PBE below */
 #include "pkcs11t.h"
 #include "secoid.h"
 #include "alghmac.h"
 #include "softoken.h"
 #include "secasn1.h"
 #include "secerr.h"
 #include "prprf.h"
 #define __PASTE(x,y)    x##y
 /*
  * we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct
  * definitions for them...
  */
 #undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
 #undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
 #define CK_EXTERN extern
 #define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \
 		CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func)
 #define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST	1
 #include "pkcs11f.h"
 typedef struct {
     PRUint8 client_version[2];
     PRUint8 random[46];
 } SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret;
 static void sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit)
 {
     return;
 }
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 #ifdef EC_DEBUG
 #define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \
     printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \
             str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \
     for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \
 	    printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \
     } \
     printf("\n")
 #else
 #define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d)
 #endif
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 /*
  * free routines.... Free local type  allocated data, and convert
  * other free routines to the destroy signature.
  */
 static void
 sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit)
 {
     nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
 }
 static void
 sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
 {
     PORT_Free(data);
 }
 /*
  * map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl
  * functions to CKR_xxx.  return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward
  * compatibility.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_MapCryptError(int error)
 {
     switch (error) {
 	case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
 	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:  /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */
 	    return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 	case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN:
 	    return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
 	case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN:
 	    return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
 	case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
 	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 	case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
 	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
 	    return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
 	case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
 	    return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
 	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY:  /* an EC public key that fails validation */
 	    return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;  /* the closest error code */
 	case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM:
 	    return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	/* EC functions set this error if NSS_DISABLE_ECC is defined */
 	case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG:
 	    return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE:
 	    return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
 	/* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */
 	case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM:
 	    return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
     }
     return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 }
 /* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_MapDecryptError(int error)
 {
     switch (error) {
 	case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:
 	    return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
 	default:
 	    return sftk_MapCryptError(error);
     }
 }
 /*
  * return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID instead of CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for
  * backward compatibilty.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_MapVerifyError(int error)
 {
     CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
     if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR)
 	crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
     return crv;
 }
 /*
  * turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by
  * Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey)
 {
     unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae };
     unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 };
     unsigned char enc_src[8];
     unsigned char enc_dest[8];
     unsigned int leng,i;
     DESContext *descx;
     SECStatus rv;
     /* zero the parity bits */
     for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
 	enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe;
     }
     /* encrypt with key 1 */
     descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
     if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
     DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
     /* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/
     for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
 	if (i & 1) {
 	    enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe;
 	} else {
 	    enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e;
 	}
     }
     /* encrypt with key 2 */
     descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
     if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
     DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
     /* set the corret parity on our new des key */
     sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
 CK_RV
 NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
 {
     SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKObject *object;
     SFTKFreeStatus status;
     CHECK_FORK();
     if (slot == NULL) {
 	return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the
      * requested object.
      */
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) {
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session);
     if (object == NULL) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */
     if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) &&
 				(sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	sftk_FreeObject(object);
 	return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
     }
     /* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */
     if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) &&
 				(sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	sftk_FreeObject(object);
 	return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
     }
     sftk_DeleteObject(session,object);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     /*
      * get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not
      * 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that
      * should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half"
      * destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still
      * be in the data base.
      */
     status = sftk_FreeObject(object);
     return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     Utilities ************************
  */
 /*
  * Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into
  * HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447.
  */
 static HASH_HashType
 GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
 {
     switch (mech) {
         case CKM_SHA_1:
         case CKG_MGF1_SHA1:
             return HASH_AlgSHA1;
         case CKM_SHA224:
         case CKG_MGF1_SHA224:
             return HASH_AlgSHA224;
         case CKM_SHA256:
         case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
             return HASH_AlgSHA256;
         case CKM_SHA384:
         case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
             return HASH_AlgSHA384;
         case CKM_SHA512:
         case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
             return HASH_AlgSHA512;
         default:
             return HASH_AlgNULL;
     }
 }
 /*
  * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters
  */
 static PRBool
 sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params)
 {
     if (!params) {
         return PR_FALSE;
     }
     if (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
         GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
         return PR_FALSE;
     }
     return PR_TRUE;
 }
 /*
  * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters
  */
 static PRBool
 sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params)
 {
     if (!params) {
         return PR_FALSE;
     }
     /* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which
      * state:
      *   If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and
      *   ulSourceDataLen must be zero.
      */
     if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED ||
         (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
         (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
         (params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) ||
         (params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) {
         return PR_FALSE;
     }
     return PR_TRUE;
 }
 /*
  * return a context based on the SFTKContext type.
  */
 SFTKSessionContext *
 sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type)
 {
     switch (type) {
 	case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
 	case SFTK_DECRYPT:
 	    return session->enc_context;
 	case SFTK_HASH:
 	    return session->hash_context;
 	case SFTK_SIGN:
 	case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
 	case SFTK_VERIFY:
 	case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
 	    return session->hash_context;
     }
     return NULL;
 }
 /*
  * change a context based on the SFTKContext type.
  */
 void
 sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type,
 						SFTKSessionContext *context)
 {
     switch (type) {
 	case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
 	case SFTK_DECRYPT:
 	    session->enc_context = context;
 	    break;
 	case SFTK_HASH:
 	    session->hash_context = context;
 	    break;
 	case SFTK_SIGN:
 	case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
 	case SFTK_VERIFY:
 	case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
 	    session->hash_context = context;
 	    break;
     }
     return;
 }
 /*
  * code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal,
  * and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type,
  * and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context,
  * and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session
  * pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
 	SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle);
     if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,type);
     /* make sure the context is valid */
     if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){
         sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
     }
     *contextPtr = context;
     if (sessionPtr != NULL) {
 	*sessionPtr = session;
     } else {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
     }
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /** Terminate operation (in the PKCS#11 spec sense).
  *  Intuitive name for FreeContext/SetNullContext pair.
  */
 static void
 sftk_TerminateOp( SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType ctype,
         SFTKSessionContext *context )
 {
     sftk_FreeContext( context );
     sftk_SetContextByType( session, ctype, NULL );
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     Encrypt ************************
  */
 /*
  * All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they
  * all need to do at the beginning. This is done here.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
 		 SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr,
 		 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr,
 		 CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
 {
     SFTKObject *key = NULL;
     SFTKAttribute *att;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     /* We can only init if there is not current context active */
     if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) {
 	return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
     }
     /* find the key */
     if (keyPtr) {
         key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
         if (key == NULL) {
 	    return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
     	}
 	/* make sure it's a valid  key for this operation */
 	if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType))
 					|| !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) {
 	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	    return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	}
 	/* get the key type */
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	    return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	}
 	PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
 	if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
 	    sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 	}
 	PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	*keyPtr = key;
     }
     /* allocate the context structure */
     context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext));
     if (context == NULL) {
 	if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     context->type = ctype;
     context->multi = PR_TRUE;
     context->rsa = PR_FALSE;
     context->cipherInfo = NULL;
     context->hashInfo = NULL;
     context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
     context->padDataLength = 0;
     context->key = key;
     context->blockSize = 0;
     context->maxLen = 0;
     *contextPtr = context;
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 static int
 sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
 {
     switch (mechanism) {
     case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
     case CKM_AES_CBC:
 	return NSS_AES_CBC;
     case CKM_AES_ECB:
 	return NSS_AES;
     case CKM_AES_CTS:
 	return NSS_AES_CTS;
     case CKM_AES_CTR:
 	return NSS_AES_CTR;
     case CKM_AES_GCM:
 	return NSS_AES_GCM;
     }
     return -1;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSAEncryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
                    unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                    const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = RSA_EncryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
                         inputLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSADecryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
                    unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                    const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = RSA_DecryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
                         inputLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSAEncrypt(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
                 unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                 const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = RSA_EncryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
                           inputLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSADecrypt(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
                 unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                 const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = RSA_DecryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
                           inputLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
                     unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                     const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     HASH_HashType hashAlg;
     HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
     PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
     maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
     return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
                            (const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
                            info->params->ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0,
                            output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
                     unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                     const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     HASH_HashType hashAlg;
     HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
     PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
     maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
     rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
                          (const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
                          info->params->ulSourceDataLen,
                          output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
      if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /** NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation.
  *
  * Always called by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, NSC_WrapKey,NSC_UnwrapKey.
  * Called by NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac) only for block
  *  ciphers MAC'ing.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
      CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE mechUsage, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
 		 SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKObject *key;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     SFTKAttribute *att;
     CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param;
 #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
     CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param;
     SECItem rc5Key;
 #endif
     CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     unsigned effectiveKeyLength;
     unsigned char newdeskey[24];
     PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE;
     int t;
     crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, mechUsage );
     if (crv != CKR_OK)
     	return crv;
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type,
     			isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, keyUsage);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
     switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
     case CKM_RSA_X_509:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
 	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
 	if (isEncrypt) {
 	    NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
 	    if (pubKey == NULL) {
 	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 		break;
 	    }
 	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey);
 	    context->cipherInfo =  (void *)pubKey;
 	    context->update = (SFTKCipher)
 		(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
 					? sftk_RSAEncryptRaw : sftk_RSAEncrypt);
 	} else {
 	    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
 	    if (privKey == NULL) {
 	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 		break;
 	    }
 	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
 	    context->cipherInfo =  (void *)privKey;
 	    context->update = (SFTKCipher)
 		(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
 					? sftk_RSADecryptRaw : sftk_RSADecrypt);
 	}
 	context->destroy = sftk_Null;
 	break;
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) ||
 	    !sftk_ValidateOaepParams((CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
 	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
 	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
 	if (isEncrypt) {
 	    SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo);
 	    if (info == NULL) {
 	        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	        break;
 	    }
 	    info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
 	    info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
 	    if (info->key == NULL) {
 	        PORT_Free(info);
 	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	        break;
 	    }
 	    context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP;
 	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key);
 	    context->cipherInfo = info;
 	} else {
 	    SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo);
 	    if (info == NULL) {
 	        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	        break;
 	    }
 	    info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
 	    info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
 	    if (info->key == NULL) {
 	        PORT_Free(info);
 	        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	        break;
 	    }
 	    context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSADecryptOAEP;
 	    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
 	    context->cipherInfo = info;
 	}
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
 	break;
     case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_RC2_ECB:
     case CKM_RC2_CBC:
 	context->blockSize = 8;
 	if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8;
 	context->cipherInfo =
 	    RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 			      att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv,
 			      pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 :
 			      NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext;
 	break;
 #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
     case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_RC5_ECB:
     case CKM_RC5_CBC:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RC5) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2;
 	rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
 	rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
 	context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds,
 	   rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv,
 		 pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext;
 	break;
 #endif
     case CKM_RC4:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RC4) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo =
 	    RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 			      att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;  /* WRONG !!! */
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
     case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
 	if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC;
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	goto finish_des;
     case CKM_DES_ECB:
 	if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	t = NSS_DES;
 	goto finish_des;
     case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_DES_CBC:
 	if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	t = NSS_DES_CBC;
 	goto finish_des;
     case CKM_DES3_ECB:
 	if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	t = NSS_DES_EDE3;
 	goto finish_des;
     case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_DES3_CBC:
 	if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
 finish_des:
 	context->blockSize = 8;
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (key_type == CKK_DES2 &&
             (t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) {
 	    /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */
 	    memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16);
 	    memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8);
 	    useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
 	} else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) {
 	    crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey);
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 		break;
 	    }
 	    useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(
 		useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt);
 	if (useNewKey)
 	    memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_SEED_CBC:
         if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
 	     pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
             crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
             break;
         }
         /* fall thru */
     case CKM_SEED_ECB:
 	context->blockSize = 16;
 	if (key_type != CKK_SEED) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext(
 	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
 	    pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC,
 	    isEncrypt);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC:
 	if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
 		 pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
 	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB:
 	context->blockSize = 16;
 	if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext(
 	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
 	    pMechanism->mechanism ==
 	    CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB ? NSS_CAMELLIA : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC,
 	    isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ?
 					Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
 	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_AES_ECB:
     case CKM_AES_CBC:
 	context->blockSize = 16;
     case CKM_AES_CTS:
     case CKM_AES_CTR:
     case CKM_AES_GCM:
 	if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
 	    context->multi = PR_FALSE;
 	}
 	if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext(
 	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
 	    sftk_aes_mode(pMechanism->mechanism),
 	    isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
     	context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP:
 	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
 	context->blockSize = 8;
 	if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext(
 	    (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 	    (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
 	    isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt
 	                                          : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt);
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         sftk_FreeContext(context);
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 		 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT,
 						SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
 }
 /* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
 					CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
 {
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int outlen,i;
     unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
     unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     SECStatus rv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (!pEncryptedPart) {
 	if (context->doPad) {
 	    CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength;
 	    CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize;
 	    *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize;
 	    return CKR_OK;
 	}
 	*pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
 	return CKR_OK;
     }
     /* do padding */
     if (context->doPad) {
 	/* deal with previous buffered data */
 	if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
 	    /* fill in the padded to a full block size */
 	    for (i=context->padDataLength;
 			(ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) {
 		context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
 		ulPartLen--;
 		context->padDataLength++;
 	    }
 	    /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
 	    if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) {
 		*pulEncryptedPartLen = 0;
 		return CKR_OK;
 	    }
 	    /* encrypt the current padded data */
     	    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
 		&padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf,
 							context->blockSize);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    }
 	    pEncryptedPart += padoutlen;
 	    maxout -= padoutlen;
 	}
 	/* save the residual */
 	context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
 	if (context->padDataLength) {
 	    PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
 			&pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength],
 							context->padDataLength);
 	    ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
 	}
 	/* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
 	if (ulPartLen == 0) {
 	    *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen;
 	    return CKR_OK;
 	}
     }
     /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
     rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart,
 					&outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
     *pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 }
 /* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int outlen,i;
     unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
     if (!pLastEncryptedPart) {
 	/* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
 	if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) {
 	    *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize;
 	    contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */
 	}
 	goto finish;
     }
     /* do padding */
     if (context->doPad) {
 	unsigned char  padbyte = (unsigned char)
 				(context->blockSize - context->padDataLength);
 	/* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
 	for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) {
 	    context->padBuf[i] = padbyte;
 	}
 	rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart,
 			&outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
 	if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
     }
 finish:
     if (contextFinished)
         sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 }
 /* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
 CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
     		   CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
 		   CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int outlen;
     unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     CK_RV crv2;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     SECItem   pText;
     pText.type = siBuffer;
     pText.data = pData;
     pText.len  = ulDataLen;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (!pEncryptedData) {
 	*pulEncryptedDataLen = context->rsa ? context->maxLen :
 		ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize;
 	goto finish;
     }
     if (context->doPad) {
 	if (context->multi) {
 	    CK_ULONG finalLen;
 	    /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
 	     * code deal with it */
 	    sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	    crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
 	                            pulEncryptedDataLen);
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK)
 	    	*pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
 	    maxoutlen      -= *pulEncryptedDataLen;
 	    pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen;
 	    finalLen = maxoutlen;
 	    crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
 	    if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
 	    	*pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen;
 	    return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
 	}
 	/* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first
 	** and only update.  There will be no final.
 	*/
 	PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1);
 	if (context->blockSize > 1) {
 	    CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize;
 	    CK_ULONG padding   = context->blockSize - remainder;
 	    pText.len += padding;
 	    pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
 	    if (pText.data) {
 		memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen);
 		memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding);
 	    } else {
 		crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 		goto fail;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
     rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
 			    &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len);
     crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
     *pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
     if (pText.data != pData)
     	PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
 fail:
     sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
 finish:
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     Decrypt ************************
  */
 /* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 			 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT,
 						SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
 }
 /* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
     				CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
 {
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
     unsigned int outlen;
     unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     SECStatus rv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     /* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */
     PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0)
 		|| context->padDataLength == context->blockSize);
     if (context->doPad) {
 	/* Check the data length for block ciphers. If we are padding,
 	 * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case
 	 * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption
 	 * function when we do the actual decrypt. We need to do the
 	 * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller
 	 * or reading before the beginning of the pEncryptedPart buffer.
  	 */
 	if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) ||
 	    (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) {
 	    return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
 	}
     }
     if (!pPart) {
 	if (context->doPad) {
 	    *pulPartLen =
 		ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize;
 	    return CKR_OK;
 	}
 	/* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen.
 	 * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is
 	 * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output.
 	 */
 	*pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
 	return CKR_OK;
     }
     if (context->doPad) {
 	/* first decrypt our saved buffer */
 	if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
     	    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen,
 		 maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
     	    if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    pPart += padoutlen;
 	    maxout -= padoutlen;
 	}
 	/* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */
 	PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen -
 				context->blockSize], context->blockSize);
 	context->padDataLength = context->blockSize;
 	ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
     }
     /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
     rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen,
 		 maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen);
     *pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
     return (rv == SECSuccess)  ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
 }
 /* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int outlen;
     unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     *pulLastPartLen = 0;
     if (!pLastPart) {
 	/* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
 	if (context->padDataLength > 0) {
 	    *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength;
 	}
 	goto finish;
     }
     if (context->doPad) {
 	/* decrypt our saved buffer */
 	if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
 	    /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole*
 	     * buffer!!! */
     	    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen,
 		 maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		crv = sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    } else {
 		unsigned int padSize =
 			    (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1];
 		if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) {
 		    crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
 		} else {
 		    unsigned int i;
 		    unsigned int badPadding = 0;  /* used as a boolean */
 		    for (i = 0; i < padSize; i++) {
 			badPadding |=
 			    (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1-i] ^
 			    padSize;
 		    }
 		    if (badPadding) {
 			crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
 		    } else {
 			*pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize;
 		    }
 		}
 	    }
 	}
     }
     sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
 finish:
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
 CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
     						CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int outlen;
     unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     CK_RV crv2;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (!pData) {
 	*pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize;
 	goto finish;
     }
     if (context->doPad && context->multi) {
 	CK_ULONG finalLen;
 	/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
 	 * code deal with it */
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen,
 							pData, pulDataLen);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK)
 	    *pulDataLen = 0;
 	maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen;
 	pData     += *pulDataLen;
 	finalLen = maxoutlen;
 	crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
 	if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
 	    *pulDataLen += finalLen;
 	return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
     }
     rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
 					pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
     /* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */
     crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
     if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) {
 	unsigned int padding = pData[outlen - 1];
 	if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) {
 	    crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
 	} else {
 	    unsigned int i;
 	    unsigned int badPadding = 0;  /* used as a boolean */
 	    for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
 		badPadding |= (unsigned int) pData[outlen - 1 - i] ^ padding;
 	    }
 	    if (badPadding) {
 		crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
 	    } else {
 		outlen -= padding;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
     sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
 finish:
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     Digest (HASH)  ************************
  */
 /* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     					CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     CHECK_FORK();
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL)
     	return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
 #define INIT_MECH(mech,mmm) \
     case mech: { \
 	mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
 	context->cipherInfo    = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \
 	context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \
 	context->currentMech   = mech; \
 	context->hashUpdate    = (SFTKHash)    mmm ## _Update; \
 	context->end           = (SFTKEnd)     mmm ## _End; \
 	context->destroy       = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
 	context->maxLen        = mmm ## _LENGTH; \
         if (mmm ## _ctx) \
 	    mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \
 	else  \
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
 	break; \
     }
     switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
     INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2,    MD2)
     INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5,    MD5)
     INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1,  SHA1)
     INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA224, SHA224)
     INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256)
     INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384)
     INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512)
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         sftk_FreeContext(context);
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */
 CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
     						CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int digestLen;
     unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (pDigest == NULL) {
 	*pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
 	goto finish;
     }
     /* do it: */
     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
     /*  NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
     (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout);
     *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
     sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
 finish:
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
 					    CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
 {
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     /* do it: */
     (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
     						CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
     unsigned int digestLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (pDigest != NULL) {
         (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
         *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
         sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
     } else {
 	*pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
     }
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /*
  * these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions
  * that use hashes as part of their operations.
  */
 #define DOSUB(mmm) \
 static CK_RV \
 sftk_doSub ## mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) { \
     mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
     context->hashInfo    = (void *)      mmm ## _ctx; \
     context->hashUpdate  = (SFTKHash)    mmm ## _Update; \
     context->end         = (SFTKEnd)     mmm ## _End; \
     context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
     if (!context->hashInfo) { \
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
     } \
     mmm ## _Begin( mmm ## _ctx ); \
     return CKR_OK; \
 }
 DOSUB(MD2)
 DOSUB(MD5)
 DOSUB(SHA1)
 DOSUB(SHA224)
 DOSUB(SHA256)
 DOSUB(SHA384)
 DOSUB(SHA512)
 static SECStatus
 sftk_SignCopy(
 	CK_ULONG *copyLen,
 	void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
 	unsigned int maxLength,
 	const unsigned char *hashResult,
 	unsigned int hashResultLength)
 {
     unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen;
     if (toCopy > maxLength) {
 	toCopy = maxLength;
     }
     if (toCopy > hashResultLength) {
 	toCopy = hashResultLength;
     }
     memcpy(out, hashResult, toCopy);
     if (outLength) {
 	*outLength = toCopy;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */
 static SECStatus
 sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
 				unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
 {
     return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ;
 }
 /*
  * common HMAC initalization routine
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash,
 					SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
 {
     SFTKAttribute *keyval;
     HMACContext *HMACcontext;
     CK_ULONG *intpointer;
     const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash);
     PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
     /* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */
     if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length/2)) {
 	return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
     }
     keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
     if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
     HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj,
 		(const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue,
 		keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
     context->hashInfo = HMACcontext;
     context->multi = PR_TRUE;
     sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
     if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
 	if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) {
 	    return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
 	}
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) HMAC_Update;
     context->end = (SFTKEnd) HMAC_Finish;
     context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) HMAC_Destroy;
     intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
     if (intpointer == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     *intpointer = mac_size;
     context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
     context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
     context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
     context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_HMACCmp;
     context->maxLen = hashObj->length;
     HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /*
  *  SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
  * hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
  */
 /*
  * FROM SSL:
  * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
  * We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table
  * in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes.
  */
 static unsigned char ssl_pad_1 [60] = {
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
 };
 static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = {
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
 };
 static SECStatus
 sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen,
 		unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
 {
     unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
     unsigned int out;
     info->begin(info->hashContext);
     info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
     info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
     info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
     info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
     PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize);
     *sigLen = info->macSize;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
 		unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
 {
     unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
     unsigned int out;
     info->begin(info->hashContext);
     info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
     info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
     info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
     info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
     return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ?
 						SECSuccess : SECFailure;
 }
 /*
  * common HMAC initalization routine
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid,
 					SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
 {
     SFTKAttribute *keyval;
     SFTKBegin begin;
     int padSize;
     SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
     if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
 	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
 	begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin;
 	padSize = 40;
     } else {
 	crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
 	begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin;
 	padSize = 48;
     }
     context->multi = PR_TRUE;
     keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
     if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
     context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue,
 						 keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
     context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize);
     sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo));
     if (sslmacinfo == NULL) {
         sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size;
     sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo;
     PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue,
 					keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
     sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen;
     sslmacinfo->begin = begin;
     sslmacinfo->end = context->end;
     sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate;
     sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize;
     sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
     context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo;
     context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
     context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SSLMACSign;
     context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_SSLMACVerify;
     context->maxLen = mac_size;
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     Sign  ************************
  */
 /**
  * Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are.
  *  @param contextType SFTK_SIGN or SFTK_VERIFY
  *  @param keyUsage    check whether key allows this usage
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
  	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
 						 SFTKContextType contextType)
 {
     CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
     CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
     CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
 #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
     CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
     CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
 #endif
     unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_RV crv;
     unsigned int blockSize;
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
     case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes =
 	    ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_RC2_MAC:
 	/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
 	 * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */
 	rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)
 				pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits;
 	PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv));
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params);
 	blockSize = 8;
 	break;
 #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
     case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes =
 	    ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_RC5_MAC:
 	/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
 	 * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */
 	rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize;
 	rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds;
 	rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock;
 	if( (blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2) > SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE )
             return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize;
 	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params);
 	break;
 #endif
     /* add cast and idea later */
     case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_DES_MAC:
 	blockSize = 8;
 	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
 	break;
     case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_DES3_MAC:
 	blockSize = 8;
 	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
 	break;
     case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_CDMF_MAC:
 	blockSize = 8;
 	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
 	break;
     case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_SEED_MAC:
 	blockSize = 16;
 	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
 	break;
     case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC:
 	blockSize = 16;
 	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
 	break;
     case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
 	mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_AES_MAC:
 	blockSize = 16;
 	PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
 	cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
 	cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
 	cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
 	break;
     default:
 	return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
     }
     /* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked.
      */
     if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE)
         mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1;
     else {
         if( mac_bytes > blockSize )
             return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
     }
     crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey,
             CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */
             keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE );
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL);
     /* this shouldn't happen! */
     PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     context->blockSize = blockSize;
     context->macSize = mac_bytes;
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /*
  * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
  */
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
                  unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                  const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
 {
     PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen,
                         hash, hashLen);
 }
 /* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */
 static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
     { DER_SEQUENCE,
 , NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
     { DER_OBJECT_ID,
 	  offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm), },
     { DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
 	  offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters), },
     { 0, }
 };
 /*
  * XXX OLD Template.  Once all uses have been switched over to new one,
  * remove this.
  */
 static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = {
     { DER_SEQUENCE,
 , NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) },
     { DER_INLINE,
 	  offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digestAlgorithm),
 	  SECAlgorithmIDTemplate, },
     { DER_OCTET_STRING,
 	  offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digest), },
     { 0, }
 };
 /*
  * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
  */
 SECStatus
 RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key,
              unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
              const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     SECItem digder;
     PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
     SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
     digder.data = NULL;
     arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (!arena) {
         goto loser;
     }
     /* Construct digest info */
     di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen);
     if (!di) {
         goto loser;
     }
     /* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */
     rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         goto loser;
     }
     /*
     ** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature
     ** block
     */
     rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, maxLen, digder.data,
                   digder.len);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
   loser:
     SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
     if (arena != NULL) {
         PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSASign(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
              unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
              const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
                   inputLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSASignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
                 unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
                 const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = RSA_SignRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
                      inputLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
                 unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
                 const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     HASH_HashType hashAlg;
     HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
     CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
     PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
     maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
     rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL,
                      params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
         sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
                                void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
 {
     SECItem signature, digest;
     NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
     signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
     signature.len = sigLen;
     digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
     digest.len = dataLen;
     return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
 }
 static SECStatus
 nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
                   unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
                   void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
 {
     SECItem signature, digest;
     SECStatus rv;
     NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
     signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
     signature.len = maxSigLen;
     digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
     digest.len = dataLen;
     rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 	sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     *sigLen = signature.len;
     return rv;
 }
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 static SECStatus
 nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
                     void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
 {
     SECItem signature, digest;
     NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
     signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
     signature.len = sigLen;
     digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
     digest.len = dataLen;
     return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
 }
 static SECStatus
 nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
                   unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
                   void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
 {
     SECItem signature, digest;
     SECStatus rv;
     NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
     signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
     signature.len = maxSigLen;
     digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
     digest.len = dataLen;
     rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
     if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 	sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
     }
     *sigLen = signature.len;
     return rv;
 }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 /* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic
  * types of signing:
  *	(1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied
  *  to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an
  *  encrypt, with data coming in and data going out).
  *	(2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply
  *  some sort of signature to the end.
  *	(3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key,
  *  and only the final block is part of the mac.
  *
  *  For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context
  *  (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and
  *  C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't
  *  have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC.
  *
  *  For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it
  *  multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final
  *  calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which
  *  operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as
  *  opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a
  *  copy (as is the case with HMAC).
  */
 CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 		 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKObject *key;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
     SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
     crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN);
     if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
     /* we're not using a block cipher mac */
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type,
 						CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     context->multi = PR_FALSE;
 #define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \
     case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
         context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
 	crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAHashSign; \
 	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \
 	if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
 	info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
 	goto finish_rsa;
     switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
     INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5)
     INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2)
     INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1)
     INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224)
     INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256)
     INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384)
     INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512)
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASign;
 	goto finish_rsa;
     case CKM_RSA_X_509:
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignRaw;
 finish_rsa:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
 	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
 	if (privKey == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism.
 	 * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final
 	 * signature.
 	 */
 	if (info) {
 	    info->key = privKey;
 	    context->cipherInfo = info;
 	    context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
 	} else {
 	    context->cipherInfo = privKey;
 	    context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null;
 	}
 	context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
 	break;
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
 	if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
 	    !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
 	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo);
 	if (info == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
 	info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
 	if (info->key == NULL) {
 	    PORT_Free(info);
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = info;
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignPSS;
 	context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
 	break;
     case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
         context->multi = PR_TRUE;
 	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_DSA:
 	if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
 	if (privKey == NULL) {
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = privKey;
 	context->update     = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub;
 	context->destroy    = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
 		(SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
 	context->maxLen     = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
 	context->multi = PR_TRUE;
 	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_ECDSA:
 	if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
 	if (privKey == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = privKey;
 	context->update     = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub;
 	context->destroy    = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
 		(SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
 	context->maxLen     = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 #define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \
     case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC_GENERAL: \
 	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \
 				*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \
 	break; \
     case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC: \
 	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \
 	break;
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
     case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
 	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
 				*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
 	break;
     case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
 	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
 	break;
     case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
 	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
 					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
 	break;
     case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
 	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
 					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
 	break;
     case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
 	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL);
 	break;
     case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
 	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256);
 	break;
     case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
 	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
 	    sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
 	CK_ULONG *intpointer;
 	if (ctx == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 	    break;
 	}
 	intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
 	if (intpointer == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	*intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
 	context->cipherInfo    = intpointer;
 	context->hashInfo      = ctx;
 	context->currentMech   = pMechanism->mechanism;
 	context->hashUpdate    = sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update;
 	context->hashdestroy   = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
 	context->end           = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
 	context->update        = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
 	context->destroy       = sftk_Space;
 	context->maxLen        = 64;
 	context->multi         = PR_TRUE;
 	break;
     }
     case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
 	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
 	    sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
 	CK_ULONG *intpointer;
 	if (ctx == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 	    break;
 	}
 	intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
 	if (intpointer == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	*intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
 	context->cipherInfo    = intpointer;
 	context->hashInfo      = ctx;
 	context->currentMech   = pMechanism->mechanism;
 	context->hashUpdate    = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update;
 	context->hashdestroy   = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
 	context->end           = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
 	context->update        = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
 	context->destroy       = sftk_Space;
 	context->maxLen        = 64;
 	context->multi         = PR_TRUE;
 	break;
     }
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	if (info) PORT_Free(info);
         sftk_FreeContext(context);
         sftk_FreeSession(session);
         return crv;
     }
     sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /** MAC one block of data by block cipher
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_MACBlock( SFTKSessionContext *ctx, void *blk )
 {
     unsigned int outlen;
     return ( SECSuccess == (ctx->update)( ctx->cipherInfo, ctx->macBuf, &outlen,
                 SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, blk, ctx->blockSize ))
             ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 }
 /** MAC last (incomplete) block of data by block cipher
  *
  *  Call once, then terminate MACing operation.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_MACFinal( SFTKSessionContext *ctx )
 {
     unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength;
     /* pad and proceed the residual */
     if( padLen ) {
         /* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */
         PORT_Memset( ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen );
         return sftk_MACBlock( ctx, ctx->padBuf );
     } else
         return CKR_OK;
 }
 /** The common implementation for {Sign,Verify}Update. (S/V only vary in their
  * setup and final operations).
  *
  * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
     					CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_RV crv;
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,type, PR_TRUE, &session );
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (context->hashInfo) {
 	(*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
     } else {
     	/* must be block cipher MACing */
         unsigned int  blkSize   = context->blockSize;
         unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */
                                 context->padBuf + context->padDataLength;
         unsigned int  minInput  = /* min input for MACing at least one block */
                                 blkSize - context->padDataLength;
         /* not enough data even for one block */
         if( ulPartLen < minInput ) {
             PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, ulPartLen );
             context->padDataLength += ulPartLen;
             goto cleanup;
         }
         /* MACing residual */
         if( context->padDataLength ) {
             PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, minInput );
             ulPartLen -= minInput;
             pPart     += minInput;
             if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, context->padBuf )) )
                 goto terminate;
         }
         /* MACing full blocks */
         while( ulPartLen >= blkSize )
         {
             if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, pPart )) )
                 goto terminate;
             ulPartLen -= blkSize;
             pPart     += blkSize;
         }
         /* save the residual */
         if( (context->padDataLength = ulPartLen) )
             PORT_Memcpy( context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen );
     } /* blk cipher MACing */
     goto  cleanup;
 terminate:
     sftk_TerminateOp( session, type, context );
 cleanup:
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
  * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
  * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
  *
  * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
  */
 CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
     							CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN);
 }
 /* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
  * returning the signature. */
 CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
 					    CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int outlen;
     unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (context->hashInfo) {
         unsigned int digestLen;
         unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
         if( !pSignature ) {
             outlen = context->maxLen; goto finish;
         }
         (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
         if( SECSuccess != (context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
                     &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
             crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
         /* CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL here isn't continuable, let operation terminate.
          * Keeping "too small" CK_RV intact is a standard violation, but allows
          * application read EXACT signature length */
     } else {
         /* must be block cipher MACing */
         outlen = context->macSize;
         /* null or "too small" buf doesn't terminate operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]*/
         if( !pSignature  ||  maxoutlen < outlen ) {
             if( pSignature ) crv = CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
             goto finish;
         }
         if( CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal( context )) )
 	    PORT_Memcpy(pSignature, context->macBuf, outlen );
     }
     sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_SIGN, context );
 finish:
     *pulSignatureLen = outlen;
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part,
  * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
  * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
 CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
     					CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (!pSignature) {
         /* see also how C_SignUpdate implements this */
 	*pulSignatureLen = (!context->multi || context->hashInfo)
             ? context->maxLen
             : context->macSize; /* must be block cipher MACing */
 	goto finish;
     }
     /* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and
      * sign Final */
     if (context->multi) {
         /* SignFinal can't follow failed SignUpdate */
 	if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen) ))
             crv = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
     } else {
     	/* single-part PKC signature (e.g. CKM_ECDSA) */
         unsigned int outlen;
         unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
         if( SECSuccess != (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
                     &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen))
             crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
         *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
         /*  "too small" here is certainly continuable */
         if( crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
             sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
     } /* single-part */
 finish:
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     Sign Recover  ************************
  */
 /* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation,
  * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
  * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
 CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 			 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
     case CKM_RSA_X_509:
 	return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey);
     default:
 	break;
     }
     return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 }
 /* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation
  * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
  * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
 CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
   CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen);
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     verify  ************************
  */
 /* Handle RSA Signature formatting */
 static SECStatus
 sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
                    unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
                    unsigned int digestLen)
 {
     PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, digest,
                              digestLen);
 }
 SECStatus
 RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
                   const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
                   const unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen)
 {
     unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData;
     SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
     SECItem digest;
     unsigned int bufferSize;
     SECStatus rv;
     /* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */
     bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
     pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize);
     if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData;
     pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize;
     /* decrypt the block */
     rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, pkcs1DigestInfo.data,
                              &pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len,
                              sig, sigLen);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
     } else {
         digest.data = (PRUint8*) digestData;
         digest.len = digestLen;
         rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
                 digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
                 PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
     }
     PORT_Free(pkcs1DigestInfoData);
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSACheckSign(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
                   unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
                   unsigned int digestLen)
 {
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     return RSA_CheckSign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSACheckSignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
                      unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
                      unsigned int digestLen)
 {
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     return RSA_CheckSignRaw(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
                      unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
                      unsigned int digestLen)
 {
     HASH_HashType hashAlg;
     HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
     CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
     PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
     maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
     return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
                             params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
 }
 /* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
  * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
  * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
 CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 			   CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKObject *key;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
     SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
     crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY);
     if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type,
 						CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     context->multi = PR_FALSE;
 #define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \
     case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
         context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
 	crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
 	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \
 	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \
 	if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
 	info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
 	goto finish_rsa;
     switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
     INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5)
     INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2)
     INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1)
     INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224)
     INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256)
     INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384)
     INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512)
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
 	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSign;
 	goto finish_rsa;
     case CKM_RSA_X_509:
 	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignRaw;
 finish_rsa:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
 	    if (info) PORT_Free(info);
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
 	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
 	if (pubKey == NULL) {
 	    if (info) PORT_Free(info);
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (info) {
 	    info->key = pubKey;
 	    context->cipherInfo = info;
 	    context->destroy = sftk_Space;
 	} else {
 	    context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
 	    context->destroy = sftk_Null;
 	}
 	break;
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
 	if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
 	    !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
 	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo);
 	if (info == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
 	info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
 	if (info->key == NULL) {
 	    PORT_Free(info);
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = info;
 	context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
 	context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignPSS;
 	break;
     case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
         context->multi = PR_TRUE;
 	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_DSA:
 	if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
 	if (pubKey == NULL) {
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
 	context->verify     = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub;
 	context->destroy    = sftk_Null;
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
 	context->multi = PR_TRUE;
 	crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	/* fall through */
     case CKM_ECDSA:
 	if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
 	if (pubKey == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
 	context->verify     = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub;
 	context->destroy    = sftk_Null;
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
     INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
     case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
 	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
 				*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
 	break;
     case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
 	crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
 	break;
     case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
 	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
 					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
 	break;
     case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
 	crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
 					*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
 	break;
     case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
 	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL);
 	break;
     case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
 	crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256);
 	break;
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	if (info) PORT_Free(info);
         sftk_FreeContext(context);
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
  * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
  * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
 CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
     CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     /* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and
      * VerifyFinal */
     if (context->multi) {
         /* VerifyFinal can't follow failed VerifyUpdate */
 	if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
             crv = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
     } else {
         if (SECSuccess != (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature,
                                              ulSignatureLen, pData, ulDataLen))
             crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
         sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
     }
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation,
  * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
  * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
  *
  * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
  */
 CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
 						CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY);
 }
 /* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation,
  * checking the signature. */
 CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 			CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     if (!pSignature)
     	return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK)
     	return crv;
     if (context->hashInfo) {
         unsigned int digestLen;
         unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
         (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
         if( SECSuccess != (context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
                                             ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
             crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
     } else if (ulSignatureLen != context->macSize) {
 	/* must be block cipher MACing */
 	crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
     } else if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context))) {
 	if (PORT_Memcmp(pSignature, context->macBuf, ulSignatureLen))
 	    crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
     }
     sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return crv;
 }
 /*
  ************** Crypto Functions:     Verify  Recover ************************
  */
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSACheckSignRecover(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
                          unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
                          const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
 {
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     return RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
                                 sig, sigLen);
 }
 static SECStatus
 sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
                             unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
                             const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
 {
     PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
     if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     return RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
                                    sig, sigLen);
 }
 /* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation,
  * where the data is recovered from the signature.
  * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
 CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 			CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKObject *key;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
     CHECK_FORK();
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
 			&key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     context->multi = PR_TRUE;
     switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
     case CKM_RSA_X_509:
 	if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->multi = PR_FALSE;
 	context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
 	pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
 	if (pubKey == NULL) {
 	    break;
 	}
 	context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
 	context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
 			? sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw : sftk_RSACheckSignRecover);
 	context->destroy = sftk_Null;
 	break;
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         PORT_Free(context);
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return crv;
     }
     sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
  * where the data is recovered from the signature.
  * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
 CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 		 CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
     				CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     unsigned int outlen;
     unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
     CK_RV crv;
     SECStatus rv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
 							PR_FALSE,&session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     if (pData == NULL) {
 	/* to return the actual size, we need  to do the decrypt, just return
 	 * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */
 	*pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
 	goto finish;
     }
     rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
 						pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
     *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
     sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
 finish:
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return (rv == SECSuccess)  ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError());
 }
 /*
  **************************** Random Functions:  ************************
  */
 /* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number
  * generator. */
 CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
     CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen);
     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 }
 /* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
 CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR	pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen);
     /*
      * This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't
      * seeded with enough entropy.
      */
     return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 }
 /*
  **************************** Key Functions:  ************************
  */
 /*
  * generate a password based encryption key. This code uses
  * PKCS5 to do the work.
  */
 static CK_RV
 nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
 			void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES)
 {
     SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem;
     CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
     CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
     *key_length = 0;
     iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0;
     if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
 	pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword;
 	/* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */
 	pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen;
     } else {
 	pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword;
 	pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen;
     }
     pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES);
     if (pbe_key == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len);
     *key_length = pbe_key->len;
     SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE);
     pbe_key = NULL;
     if (iv.data) {
         if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) {
 	    PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len);
         }
         PORT_Free(iv.data);
     }
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /*
  * this is coded for "full" support. These selections will be limitted to
  * the official subset by freebl.
  */
 static unsigned int
 sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(unsigned int primeBits)
 {
    if (primeBits <= 1024) {
 	return 160;
    } else if (primeBits <= 2048) {
 	return 224;
    } else if (primeBits <= 3072) {
 	return 256;
    } else if (primeBits <= 7680) {
 	return 384;
    } else {
 	return 512;
    }
 }
 static CK_RV
 nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key)
 {
     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
     CK_ULONG counter;
     unsigned int seedBits = 0;
     unsigned int subprimeBits = 0;
     unsigned int primeBits;
     unsigned int j = 8; /* default to 1024 bits */
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     PQGParams *params = NULL;
     PQGVerify *vfy = NULL;
     SECStatus rv;
     attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
     if (attribute == NULL) {
 	return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
     }
     primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
     sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
     if (primeBits < 1024) {
 	j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits);
 	if (j == (unsigned int)-1) {
 	    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 	}
     }
     attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
     if (attribute != NULL) {
 	seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
     }
     attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
     if (attribute != NULL) {
 	subprimeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
     }
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
     /* use the old PQG interface if we have old input data */
     if ((primeBits < 1024) || ((primeBits == 1024) && (subprimeBits == 0))) {
 	if (seedBits == 0) {
 	    rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, &params, &vfy);
 	} else {
 	    rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, &params, &vfy);
 	}
     } else {
 	if (subprimeBits == 0) {
 	    subprimeBits = sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(primeBits);
         }
 	if (seedBits == 0) {
 	    seedBits = primeBits;
 	}
 	rv = PQG_ParamGenV2(primeBits, subprimeBits, seedBits/8, &params, &vfy);
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 	    sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
 	}
 	return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
     }
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME,
 				 params->prime.data, params->prime.len);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME,
 				 params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE,
 				 params->base.data, params->base.len);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
     counter = vfy->counter;
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER,
 				 &counter, sizeof(counter));
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED,
 				 vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H,
 				 vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 loser:
     PQG_DestroyParams(params);
     if (vfy) {
 	PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy);
     }
     return crv;
 }
 static CK_RV
 nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type,
 							CK_ULONG *key_length)
 {
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     switch (mechanism) {
     case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_RC2;
 	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	break;
 #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
     case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_RC5;
 	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	break;
 #endif
     case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_RC4;
 	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	break;
     case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
 	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	break;
     case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_CDMF;
 	*key_length = 8;
 	break;
     case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_DES;
 	*key_length = 8;
 	break;
     case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_DES2;
 	*key_length = 16;
 	break;
     case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_DES3;
 	*key_length = 24;
 	break;
     case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_SEED;
 	*key_length = 16;
 	break;
     case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA;
 	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	break;
     case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
 	*key_type = CKK_AES;
 	if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	break;
     default:
 	PORT_Assert(0);
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     return crv;
 }
 CK_RV
 nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe)
 {
     SECItem  salt;
     CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
     NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
     PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
     SECStatus rv;
     *pbe = NULL;
     arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
     if (arena == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
 				sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
     if (params == NULL) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     params->poolp = arena;
     params->ivLen = 0;
     params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
     params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
     params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */
     params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
     params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
     pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
     params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration;
     salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
     salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
     rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,&params->salt,&salt);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
 	params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
 	params->keyLen = 20;
 	break;
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
 	params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
 	params->keyLen = 16;
 	break;
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
 	params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
 	params->keyLen = 16;
 	break;
     default:
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
 	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
     }
     *pbe = params;
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* maybe this should be table driven? */
 static CK_RV
 nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter  **pbe,
 				CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length)
 {
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     SECOidData *oid;
     CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
     NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL;
     CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
     SECItem salt;
     CK_ULONG iteration = 0;
     *pbe = NULL;
     oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism);
     if (oid == NULL) {
 	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
     }
     if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
 	pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) {
 	    return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	}
 	salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData;
 	salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;
 	iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations;
     } else {
 	pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
 	salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
 	iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration;
     }
     params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, &salt, iteration);
     if (params == NULL) {
 	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
     }
     switch (params->encAlg) {
     case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
 	*key_type = CKK_DES;
 	*key_length = params->keyLen;
 	break;
     case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
 	*key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3;
 	*key_length = params->keyLen;
 	break;
     case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
 	*key_type = CKK_RC2;
 	*key_length = params->keyLen;
 	break;
     case SEC_OID_RC4:
 	*key_type = CKK_RC4;
 	*key_length = params->keyLen;
 	break;
     case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2:
 	/* sigh, PKCS #11 currently only defines SHA1 for the KDF hash type.
 	 * we do the check here because this where we would handle multiple
 	 * hash types in the future */
 	if (pbkd2_params == NULL ||
 		pbkd2_params->prf != CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1) {
 	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* key type must already be set */
 	if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters
 	 */
 	if (*key_length == 0) {
 	    *key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type);
 	}
 	if (*key_length == 0) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    break;
 	}
 	params->keyLen = *key_length;
 	break;
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params);
 	break;
     }
     if (crv == CKR_OK) {
     	*pbe = params;
     }
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */
 CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount,
     						CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
 {
     SFTKObject *key;
     SFTKSession *session;
     PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE;
     CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
     CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
     int i;
     SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
     unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
     enum {nsc_pbe, nsc_ssl, nsc_bulk, nsc_param, nsc_jpake} key_gen_type;
     NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param;
     SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
     CK_VERSION *version;
     /* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key
      * generation methods.  We want to beable to read these, but not
      * produce them any more.  The affected algorithm was 3DES.
      */
     PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE;
     HASH_HashType hashType;
     CHECK_FORK();
     if (!slot) {
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
      */
     key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
     if (key == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     /*
      * load the template values into the object
      */
     for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) {
 	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
 	    key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
 	    continue;
 	}
 	/* some algorithms need keytype specified */
 	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
 	    key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
 	    continue;
 	}
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	return crv;
     }
     /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE);
     /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
     key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
     case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
 	checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
         /* fall through */
     case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
 #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
     case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
 #endif
 	crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length);
 	break;
     case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
 	key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
 	key_length = 48;
 	key_gen_type = nsc_ssl;
 	break;
     case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
 	key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
 	key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
 	crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param);
 	break;
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC:
 	faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE;
         /* fall through */
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4:
     case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4:
     case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC:
     case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC:
     case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC:
     case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC:
     case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
     case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40:
     case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC:
     case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC:
     case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
 	key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
 	crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length);
 	break;
     case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN:
 	key_gen_type = nsc_param;
 	key_type = CKK_DSA;
 	objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS;
 	crv = CKR_OK;
 	break;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1:   hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;   goto jpake1;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake1;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake1;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake1;
 jpake1:
 	key_gen_type = nsc_jpake;
 	key_type = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1;
         objclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
         if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
             pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params)) {
             crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
             break;
         }
         if (sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) {
             crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
             break;
         }
         crv = CKR_OK;
         break;
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 	break;
     }
     /* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */
     if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) {
 	/* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can
 	 * be... */
         crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
     /* if there was no error,
      * key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */
     PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE );
     /*
      * now to the actual key gen.
      */
     switch (key_gen_type) {
     case nsc_pbe:
 	crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length,
 			       faultyPBE3DES);
 	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
 	break;
     case nsc_ssl:
 	rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf;
 	version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major;
         rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor;
         crv =
 	    NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random));
 	break;
     case nsc_bulk:
 	/* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */
 	do {
             crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length);
 	} while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf,key_type));
 	break;
     case nsc_param:
 	/* generate parameters */
 	*buf = 0;
 	crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key);
 	break;
     case nsc_jpake:
         crv = jpake_Round1(hashType,
                            (CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
                            key);
         break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
     /* Add the class, key_type, and value */
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
     if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
     crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
     if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
     if (key_length != 0) {
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
     }
     /* get the session */
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * handle the base object stuff
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
 	sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
     if (!sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
 	sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
     *phKey = key->handle;
     sftk_FreeObject(key);
     return crv;
 }
 #define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH			SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */
 #define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH			20          /* 160-bits */
 /*
  * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair.
  *
  * This function returns
  *   CKR_OK               if pairwise consistency check passed
  *   CKR_GENERAL_ERROR    if pairwise consistency check failed
  *   other error codes    if paiswise consistency check could not be
  *                        performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
 {
     /*
      *                      Key type    Mechanism type
      *                      --------------------------------
      * For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA  => CKM_RSA_PKCS
      *                      others   => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
      *
      * For sign/verify:     CKK_RSA  => CKM_RSA_PKCS
      *                      CKK_DSA  => CKM_DSA
      *                      CKK_EC   => CKM_ECDSA
      *                      others   => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
      *
      * None of these mechanisms has a parameter.
      */
     CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0};
     CK_ULONG modulusLen;
     CK_ULONG subPrimeLen;
     PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE;
     CK_RV crv;
     /* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */
     unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message";
     unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
     CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted;
     unsigned char *ciphertext;
     unsigned char *text_compared;
     CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted;
     CK_ULONG bytes_compared;
     CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH;
     /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */
     /* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */
     unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)
 				"Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!";
     unsigned char *signature;
     CK_ULONG signature_length;
     if (keyType == CKK_RSA) {
 	SFTKAttribute *attribute;
 	/* Get modulus length of private key. */
 	attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
 	if (attribute == NULL) {
 	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 	}
 	modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
 	if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
 	    modulusLen--;
 	}
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
     } else if (keyType == CKK_DSA) {
 	SFTKAttribute *attribute;
 	/* Get subprime length of private key. */
 	attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
 	if (attribute == NULL) {
 	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 	}
 	subPrimeLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
 	if (subPrimeLen > 1 && *(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
 	    subPrimeLen--;
 	}
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
     }
     /**************************************************/
     /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */
     /**************************************************/
     isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT);
     /*
      * If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt
      * with the public key and decrypt with the private key.
      */
     if (isEncryptable) {
 	if (keyType != CKK_RSA) {
 	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 	}
 	bytes_encrypted = modulusLen;
 	mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
 	/* Allocate space for ciphertext. */
 	ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted);
 	if (ciphertext == NULL) {
 	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	}
 	/* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */
 	crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
 	    return crv;
 	}
 	/* Encrypt using the public key. */
 	crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,
 			  known_message,
 			  PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH,
 			  ciphertext,
 			  &bytes_encrypted);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
 	    return crv;
 	}
 	/* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */
 	bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
 	/*
 	 * If there was a failure, the plaintext
 	 * goes at the end, therefore . . .
 	 */
 	text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared;
 	/*
 	 * Check to ensure that ciphertext does
 	 * NOT EQUAL known input message text
 	 * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive.
 	 */
 	if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message,
 			bytes_compared) == 0) {
 	    /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
 	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
 	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 	}
 	/* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */
 	crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(ciphertext);
 	    return crv;
 	}
 	memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
 	/*
 	 * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the
 	 * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH.
 	 */
 	bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
 	/*
 	 * Decrypt using the private key.
 	 * NOTE:  No need to reset the
 	 *        value of bytes_encrypted.
 	 */
 	crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession,
 			  ciphertext,
 			  bytes_encrypted,
 			  plaintext,
 			  &bytes_decrypted);
 	/* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */
 	PORT_Free(ciphertext);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    return crv;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Check to ensure that the output plaintext
 	 * does EQUAL known input message text.
 	 */
 	if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) ||
 	    (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message,
 			 PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) {
 	    /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 	}
     }
     /**********************************************/
     /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */
     /**********************************************/
     canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN);
     if (canSignVerify) {
 	/* Determine length of signature. */
 	switch (keyType) {
 	case CKK_RSA:
 	    signature_length = modulusLen;
 	    mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
 	    break;
 	case CKK_DSA:
 	    signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
 	    pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen;
 	    mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
 	    break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 	case CKK_EC:
 	    signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
 	    mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
 	    break;
 #endif
 	default:
 	    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 	}
 	/* Allocate space for signature data. */
 	signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length);
 	if (signature == NULL) {
 	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	}
 	/* Sign the known hash using the private key. */
 	crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(signature);
 	    return crv;
 	}
 	crv = NSC_Sign(hSession,
 		       known_digest,
 		       pairwise_digest_length,
 		       signature,
 		       &signature_length);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(signature);
 	    return crv;
 	}
 	/* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
 	crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(signature);
 	    return crv;
 	}
 	crv = NSC_Verify(hSession,
 			 known_digest,
 			 pairwise_digest_length,
 			 signature,
 			 signature_length);
 	/* Free signature data. */
 	PORT_Free(signature);
 	if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) ||
 		(crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) {
 	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
 	}
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    return crv;
 	}
     }
     /**********************************************/
     /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation  */
     /**********************************************/
     isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE);
     if (isDerivable) {
 	/*
 	 * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key -
 	 * otherwise it would be here
 	 * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys
 	 * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise
 	 * consistency check for signing/verification.
 	 */
 	/*
 	 * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for
 	 * public and private keys used for key agreement:
 	 *   If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the
 	 *   cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible
 	 *   key pair.  The cryptographic module shall perform both
 	 *   sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare
 	 *   the resulting shared values.  If the shared values are
 	 *   not equal, the test shall fail.
 	 * This test was removed in Change Notice 3.
 	 */
     }
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
  * creating new key objects. */
 CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
     CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
     CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
     					CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
 {
     SFTKObject *	publicKey,*privateKey;
     SFTKSession *	session;
     CK_KEY_TYPE 	key_type;
     CK_RV 		crv 	= CKR_OK;
     CK_BBOOL 		cktrue 	= CK_TRUE;
     SECStatus 		rv;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS 	pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS 	privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
     int 		i;
     SFTKSlot *		slot 	= sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
     unsigned int bitSize;
     /* RSA */
     int 		public_modulus_bits = 0;
     SECItem 		pubExp;
     RSAPrivateKey *	rsaPriv;
     /* DSA */
     PQGParams 		pqgParam;
     DHParams  		dhParam;
     DSAPrivateKey *	dsaPriv;
     /* Diffie Hellman */
     int 		private_value_bits = 0;
     DHPrivateKey *	dhPriv;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     /* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */
     SECItem  		ecEncodedParams;  /* DER Encoded parameters */
     ECPrivateKey *	ecPriv;
     ECParams *          ecParams;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     CHECK_FORK();
     if (!slot) {
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
      */
     publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
     if (publicKey == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     /*
      * load the template values into the publicKey
      */
     for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
 	if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) {
 	    public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
 	    continue;
 	}
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,
 				    sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i]));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
     if (privateKey == NULL) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     /*
      * now load the private key template
      */
     for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
 	if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) {
 	    private_value_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
 	    continue;
 	}
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,
 				    sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i]));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
     sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
     /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
     case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
 	/* format the keys */
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT);
 	key_type = CKK_RSA;
 	if (public_modulus_bits == 0) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
 	    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) {
 	    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* extract the exponent */
 	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
         bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len);
 	if (bitSize < 2) {
 	    crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
 				    		    sftk_item_expand(&pubExp));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp);
 	PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
 	if (rsaPriv == NULL) {
 	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
 	    }
 	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    break;
 	}
         /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient));
 kpg_done:
 	/* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */
 	PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
 	break;
     case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME);
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
 	key_type = CKK_DSA;
 	/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to the private key */
 	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey,
 	                            CKA_SUBPRIME);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	    break;
 	}
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME,
 				    sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME,
 			    	    sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE,
 			    	    sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * these are checked by DSA_NewKey
 	 */
         bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data,
 							pqgParam.subPrime.len);
         if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_Q_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_Q_BITS))  {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
         bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data,pqgParam.prime.len);
         if ((bitSize <  DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
         bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data,pqgParam.base.len);
         if ((bitSize <  2) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* Generate the key */
 	rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv);
 	PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
 	PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
 	PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
 	    }
 	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* store the generated key into the attributes */
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
         /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue));
 dsagn_done:
 	/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
 	PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
 	break;
     case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
 	key_type = CKK_DH;
 	/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
         crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey,
 				      CKA_PRIME);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
 				    sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
 				    sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
         bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data,dhParam.prime.len);
         if ((bitSize <  DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
         bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data,dhParam.base.len);
         if ((bitSize <  1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
 	    PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv);
 	PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
 	PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
 	    }
 	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    break;
 	}
 	crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
 				sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
 	crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
 			      sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue));
 dhgn_done:
 	/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
 	PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS);
 	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
     	sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
 	key_type = CKK_EC;
 	/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
 	crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey,
 				      CKA_EC_PARAMS);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
 				    sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	  PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
 	  break;
 	}
 	/* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */
 	rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams);
 	PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    break;
 	}
 	rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv);
 	PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
 		sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
 	    }
 	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (getenv("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) {
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
 				sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
 	} else {
 	    SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
 					&ecPriv->publicValue,
 					SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
 	    if (!pubValue) {
 		crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 		goto ecgn_done;
 	    }
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
 				sftk_item_expand(pubValue));
 	    SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
 	}
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
 			      sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
         crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
 			   sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
 ecgn_done:
 	/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
 	PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
 	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	return crv;
     }
     /* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out
      *  on errors and clean up at the bottom */
     session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/
 		    /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */
     do {
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass,
 						sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
         if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass,
 						sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
         if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
 						sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
         if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
 						sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
         if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
         session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
         if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     } while (0);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	 sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
 	 sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	 return crv;
     }
     /*
      * handle the base object cleanup for the public Key
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey,session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
         sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
 	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	return crv;
     }
     /*
      * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
      * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
      * created and linked.
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey,session);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
 	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
 	return crv;
     }
     if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
 	sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
 						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
     if (sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
 	sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
 						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
     if (!sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
 	sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
 						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
     if (!sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
 	sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
 						&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
     }
     /* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */
     crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession,
 					publicKey, privateKey, key_type);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle);
 	sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
 	NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
 	sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
 	if (sftk_audit_enabled) {
 	    char msg[128];
 	    PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg,
 			"C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, "
 			"pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX "
 			"self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed",
 			(PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
 			(PRUint32)crv);
 	    sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
 	}
 	return crv;
     }
     *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
     *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
     sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
     sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 static SECItem *sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp)
 {
     NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL;
     NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
     SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL;
     PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
     SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
     void *dummy, *param = NULL;
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     SECItem *encodedKey = NULL;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     SECItem *fordebug;
     int savelen;
 #endif
     if(!key) {
 	*crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */
 	return NULL;
     }
     attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
     if(!attribute) {
 	*crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	return NULL;
     }
     lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp);
     sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
     if(!lk) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); 	/* XXX different size? */
     if(!arena) {
 	*crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
 					sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
     if(!pki) {
 	*crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     pki->arena = arena;
     param = NULL;
     switch(lk->keyType) {
 	case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
 	    prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
 	    dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
 				       nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate);
 	    algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
 	    break;
 	case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
             prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk);
 	    dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
 				       nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate);
 	    prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params);
 	    param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params),
 				       nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate);
 	    algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
 	    break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
         case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
             prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
 	    /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length
 	     * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust
 	     * immediately after.
 	     *
 	     * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the
 	     * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID
 	     * length before encoding and restore it later.
 	     */
 	    lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3;
 	    savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len;
 	    lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0;
 	    dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
 				       nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate);
 	    lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen;
 	    lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
 	    fordebug = &pki->privateKey;
 	    SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType,
 		      fordebug);
 	    param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
 	    algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
 	    break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 	case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
 	default:
 	    dummy = NULL;
 	    break;
     }
     if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) {
 	*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm,
 			       (SECItem*)param);
     if(rv != SECSuccess) {
 	*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version,
 				  NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION);
     if(!dummy) {
 	*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki,
 				    nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
     *crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     fordebug = encodedKey;
     SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType,
 	      fordebug);
 #endif
 loser:
     if(arena) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
     }
     if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) {
 	nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk);
     }
     if(param) {
 	SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE);
     }
     if(rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     return encodedKey;
 }
 /* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
  * level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv)
 {
     switch (crv) {
     case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID:  crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break;
     }
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
 CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
 					 CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
 {
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKAttribute *attribute;
     SFTKObject *key;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) {
     	return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (key == NULL) {
 	return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     switch(key->objclass) {
 	case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
 	  {
 	    SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
 	    SECItem pText;
 	    attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
 	    if (attribute == NULL) {
 		crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 		break;
 	    }
 	    crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
 				CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
 		break;
 	    }
 	    pText.type = siBuffer;
 	    pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
 	    pText.len  = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
 	    /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */
 	    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK || !context)
 	        break;
 	    if (context->blockSize > 1) {
 		unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize;
 	        if (!context->doPad && remainder) {
 		    /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers,
 		    ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out
 		    ** a full block.
 		    */
 		    pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder;
 		    pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
 		    if (pText.data)
 			memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue,
 			                   attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
 		    else {
 			crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 			break;
 		    }
 		}
 	    }
 	    crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data,
 		              pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
 	    /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when
 	     * we are just getting the size */
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
 	    	CK_RV lcrv ;
 		lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
 				       SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
 		sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
 	    	if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
 		    sftk_FreeContext(context);
 		}
     	    }
 	    if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue)
 	    	PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
 	    sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
 	    break;
 	  }
 	case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
 	    {
 		SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv);
 		SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
 		if(!bpki) {
 		    break;
 		}
 		crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
 				CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
 		if(crv != CKR_OK) {
 		    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
 		    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 		    break;
 		}
 		crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len,
 					pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
 		/* always force a finalize */
 		if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
 	    	    CK_RV lcrv ;
 		    lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
 					   SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
 		    sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
 	    	    if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context)  {
 			sftk_FreeContext(context);
 		    }
 		}
 		SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
 		break;
 	    }
 	default:
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
     }
     sftk_FreeObject(key);
     return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
 }
 /*
  * import a pprivate key info into the desired slot
  */
 static SECStatus
 sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki)
 {
     CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
     const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate;
     void *paramDest = NULL;
     PLArenaPool *arena;
     NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL;
     NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
     arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
     if(!arena) {
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
 					sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
     if(!pki) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki)
 				!= SECSuccess) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
 						  sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
     if(lpk == NULL) {
 	goto loser;
     }
     lpk->arena = arena;
     switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) {
 	case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
 	    keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate;
 	    paramTemplate = NULL;
 	    paramDest = NULL;
 	    lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey;
 	    prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
 	    break;
 	case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
 	    keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate;
 	    paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate;
 	    paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params);
 	    lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey;
 	    prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk);
 	    prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params);
 	    break;
 	/* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
         case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
 	    keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate;
 	    paramTemplate = NULL;
 	    paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
 	    lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey;
 	    prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
 	    prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams);
 	    break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 	default:
 	    keyTemplate = NULL;
 	    paramTemplate = NULL;
 	    paramDest = NULL;
 	    break;
     }
     if(!keyTemplate) {
 	goto loser;
     }
     /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */
     rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey);
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) {
         /* convert length in bits to length in bytes */
 	lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
         rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,
 			      &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding),
 	                      &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
 	if(rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;
 	}
     }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     if(rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;
     }
     if(paramDest && paramTemplate) {
 	rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate,
 				 &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
 	if(rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;
 	}
     }
     rv = SECFailure;
     switch (lpk->keyType) {
         case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_RSA;
 	    if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) {
 		sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
 	    }
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
 					sizeof(keyType));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue,
 					sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue,
 					sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
 					sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
 				    sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS,
 				sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
 	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
 	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1,
 				sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2,
 	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
 	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
 	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
 	     			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient));
 	    break;
         case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_DSA;
 	    crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
 						CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
 						sizeof(keyType));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
 						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
 						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
 				    sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
 				 sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
 				    sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
 			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    break;
 #ifdef notdef
         case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
 	    template = dhTemplate;
 	    templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
 	    keyType = CKK_DH;
 	    break;
 #endif
 	/* what about fortezza??? */
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
         case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
 	    keyType = CKK_EC;
 	    crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
 						CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
 						sizeof(keyType));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
 						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
 						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue,
 						sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
 				 sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
 			sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue));
 	    if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */
 	    break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 	default:
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
     }
 loser:
     if(lpk) {
 	nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk);
     }
     if(crv != CKR_OK) {
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */
 CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
     CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
     CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
 						 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
 {
     SFTKObject *key = NULL;
     SFTKSession *session;
     CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
     unsigned char * buf = NULL;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     int i;
     CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
     SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
     SECItem bpki;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
     CHECK_FORK();
     if (!slot) {
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
      */
     key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
     if (key == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     /*
      * load the template values into the object
      */
     for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
 	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
 	    key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
 	    continue;
 	}
         if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
 	    target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
 	}
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	return crv;
     }
     crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP,
 					CKA_UNWRAP, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
     }
     /* allocate the buffer to decrypt into
      * this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the
      * wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */
     buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen);
     bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
     crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	PORT_Free(buf);
 	return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
     }
     switch(target_type) {
 	case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
 	    if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
 		crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 		break;
 	    }
 	    if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) {
 		key_length = bsize;
 	    }
 	    if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) {
 		crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 		break;
 	    }
 	    /* add the value */
 	    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
 	    break;
 	case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
 	    bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
 	    bpki.len = bsize;
 	    crv = CKR_OK;
 	    if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) {
 		crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    }
 	    break;
 	default:
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
     }
     PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
     /* get the session */
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * handle the base object stuff
      */
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
     *phKey = key->handle;
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     sftk_FreeObject(key);
     return crv;
 }
 /*
  * The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the
  * details of each of these key creation.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey,
     PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize,
 						 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle)
 {
     SFTKObject *key;
     SFTKSession *session;
     CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
     CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
     CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     /*
      * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
      */
     *keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
     key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot);
     if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
     crv = sftk_CopyObject(key,baseKey);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
     if (isMacKey) {
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
     }
     crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
     /* get the session */
     crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) { goto loser; }
     crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     *keyHandle = key->handle;
 loser:
     if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
     return crv;
 }
 /*
  * if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL
  * This is the routine that will do it..
  */
 static void
 sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
 				CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial )
 {
 	if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
 	   NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret);
 	}
 	if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
 	   NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret);
 	}
 	if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
 	   NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey);
 	}
 	if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
 	   NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey);
 	}
 }
 /*
  * when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some
  * of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these
  * semantics.
  */
 static CK_RV
 sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey,SFTKObject *destKey)
 {
     PRBool hasSensitive;
     PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool hasExtractable;
     PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     SFTKAttribute *att;
     hasSensitive = PR_FALSE;
     att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
     if (att) {
         hasSensitive = PR_TRUE;
 	sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
     }
     hasExtractable = PR_FALSE;
     att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
     if (att) {
         hasExtractable = PR_TRUE;
 	extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
     }
     /* don't make a key more accessible */
     if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive &&
 						(sensitive == PR_FALSE)) {
 	return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
     }
     if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable &&
 						(extractable == PR_TRUE)) {
 	return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
     }
     /* inherit parent's sensitivity */
     if (!hasSensitive) {
         att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
 	if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     }
     if (!hasExtractable) {
         att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
 	if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     }
     /* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info,
      * but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do
      * something special. */
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 /*
  * make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
  */
 unsigned long
 sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
 {
     switch (keyType) {
     case CKK_CDMF:
 	return 8;
     case CKK_DES:
 	return 8;
     case CKK_DES2:
 	return 16;
     case CKK_DES3:
 	return 24;
     /* IDEA and CAST need to be added */
     default:
 	break;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 /* Inputs:
  *  key_len: Length of derived key to be generated.
  *  SharedSecret: a shared secret that is the output of a key agreement primitive.
  *  SharedInfo: (Optional) some data shared by the entities computing the secret key.
  *  SharedInfoLen: the length in octets of SharedInfo
  *  Hash: The hash function to be used in the KDF
  *  HashLen: the length in octets of the output of Hash
  * Output:
  *  key: Pointer to a buffer containing derived key, if return value is SECSuccess.
  */
 static CK_RV sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret,
 		CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
 		SECStatus Hash(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, PRUint32),
 		CK_ULONG HashLen)
 {
     unsigned char *buffer = NULL, *output_buffer = NULL;
     PRUint32 buffer_len, max_counter, i;
     SECStatus rv;
     CK_RV crv;
     /* Check that key_len isn't too long.  The maximum key length could be
      * greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
      * to a maximum value of 255. */
     if (key_len > 254 * HashLen)
 	return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
     if (SharedInfo == NULL)
 	SharedInfoLen = 0;
     buffer_len = SharedSecret->len + 4 + SharedInfoLen;
     buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(buffer_len);
     if (buffer == NULL) {
 	crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	goto loser;
     }
     max_counter = key_len/HashLen;
     if (key_len > max_counter * HashLen)
 	max_counter++;
     output_buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(max_counter * HashLen);
     if (output_buffer == NULL) {
 	crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	goto loser;
     }
     /* Populate buffer with SharedSecret || Counter || [SharedInfo]
      * where Counter is 0x00000001 */
     PORT_Memcpy(buffer, SharedSecret->data, SharedSecret->len);
     buffer[SharedSecret->len] = 0;
     buffer[SharedSecret->len + 1] = 0;
     buffer[SharedSecret->len + 2] = 0;
     buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3] = 1;
     if (SharedInfo) {
 	PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[SharedSecret->len + 4], SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen);
     }
     for(i=0; i < max_counter; i++) {
 	rv = Hash(&output_buffer[i * HashLen], buffer, buffer_len);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    /* 'Hash' should not fail. */
 	    crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	/* Increment counter (assumes max_counter < 255) */
 	buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3]++;
     }
     PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
     if (key_len < max_counter * HashLen) {
 	PORT_Memset(output_buffer + key_len, 0, max_counter * HashLen - key_len);
     }
     *key = output_buffer;
     return CKR_OK;
     loser:
 	if (buffer) {
 	    PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
 	}
 	if (output_buffer) {
 	    PORT_ZFree(output_buffer, max_counter * HashLen);
 	}
 	return crv;
 }
 static CK_RV sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len,
 		SECItem *SharedSecret,
 		CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
 		CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf)
 {
     if (kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF)
 	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
 		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA1_HashBuf, SHA1_LENGTH);
     else if (kdf == CKD_SHA224_KDF)
 	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
 		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA224_HashBuf, SHA224_LENGTH);
     else if (kdf == CKD_SHA256_KDF)
 	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
 		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA256_HashBuf, SHA256_LENGTH);
     else if (kdf == CKD_SHA384_KDF)
 	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
 		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA384_HashBuf, SHA384_LENGTH);
     else if (kdf == CKD_SHA512_KDF)
 	return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
 		   		 SharedInfoLen, SHA512_HashBuf, SHA512_LENGTH);
     else
 	return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
 }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 /*
  * SSL Key generation given pre master secret
  */
 #define NUM_MIXERS 9
 static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
     "A",
     "BB",
     "CCC",
     "DDDD",
     "EEEEE",
     "FFFFFF",
     "GGGGGGG",
     "HHHHHHHH",
     "IIIIIIIII" };
 #define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48
 #define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
 #define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32
 /* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */
 CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 	 CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
 	 CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
 						CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
 {
     SFTKSession *   session;
     SFTKSlot    *   slot	= sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
     SFTKObject  *   key;
     SFTKObject  *   sourceKey;
     SFTKAttribute * att = NULL;
     SFTKAttribute * att2 = NULL;
     unsigned char * buf;
     SHA1Context *   sha;
     MD5Context *    md5;
     MD2Context *    md2;
     CK_ULONG        macSize;
     CK_ULONG        tmpKeySize;
     CK_ULONG        IVSize;
     CK_ULONG        keySize	= 0;
     CK_RV           crv 	= CKR_OK;
     CK_BBOOL        cktrue	= CK_TRUE;
     CK_KEY_TYPE     keyType	= CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
     CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType	= CKO_SECRET_KEY;
     CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr;
     PRBool          isTLS = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool          isSHA256 = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool          isDH = PR_FALSE;
     SECStatus       rv;
     int             i;
     unsigned int    outLen;
     unsigned char   sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
     unsigned char   key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH];
     unsigned char   key_block2[MD5_LENGTH];
     PRBool          isFIPS;
     HASH_HashType   hashType;
     PRBool          extractValue = PR_TRUE;
     CHECK_FORK();
     if (!slot) {
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     /*
      * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
      */
     if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
     key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
     if (key == NULL) {
 	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
     }
     isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
     /*
      * load the template values into the object
      */
     for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
 	crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
 	    keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
 	}
 	if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
 	    keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
 	}
     }
     if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
     if (keySize == 0) {
 	keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType);
     }
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1:   /* fall through */
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: /* fall through */
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: /* fall through */
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
           extractValue = PR_FALSE;
           classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
           break;
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1:   /* fall through */
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */
       case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
           extractValue = PR_FALSE;
           /* fall through */
       default:
           classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
     }
     crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType));
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	return crv;
     }
     /* look up the base key we're deriving with */
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
         return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (sourceKey == NULL) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
         return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     if (extractValue) {
         /* get the value of the base key */
         att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE);
         if (att == NULL) {
             sftk_FreeObject(key);
             sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
             return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
         }
     }
     switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
     /*
      * generate the master secret
      */
     case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256:
     case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256:
 	isSHA256 = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
     case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
 	isTLS = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
     case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
       {
 	CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master;
 	SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *          rsa_pms;
 	unsigned char                     crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
         if ((pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
             (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
             (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256))
 		isDH = PR_TRUE;
 	/* first do the consistancy checks */
 	if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
 	if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
 					CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
 	    if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
 	    break;
 	}
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
 	if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
 	    break;
 	}
 	if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* finally do the key gen */
 	ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
 					pMechanism->pParameter;
 	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
 	            ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
 	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
 	            ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
 	if (ssl3_master->pVersion) {
 	    SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
 	    rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue;
 	    /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */
 	    if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
 		ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff;
 		ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
 	    } else {
 		ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
 		ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
 	    }
 	}
 	if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
 	   crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	   break;
 	}
 	if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
 	   crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	   break;
 	}
         if (isTLS) {
 	    SECStatus status;
  	    SECItem crsr   = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
  	    SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
  	    SECItem pms    = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
  	    crsr.data   = crsrdata;
 	    crsr.len    = sizeof crsrdata;
  	    master.data = key_block;
 	    master.len  = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
  	    pms.data    = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
 	    pms.len     =                 att->attrib.ulValueLen;
 	    if (isSHA256) {
 		status = TLS_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA256, &pms, "master secret",
 				    &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
 	    } else {
 		status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
 	    }
 	    if (status != SECSuccess) {
 	    	crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 		break;
 	    }
 	} else {
 	    /* now allocate the hash contexts */
 	    md5 = MD5_NewContext();
 	    if (md5 == NULL) {
 		crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 		break;
 	    }
 	    sha = SHA1_NewContext();
 	    if (sha == NULL) {
 		PORT_Free(md5);
 		crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 		break;
 	    }
             for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
               SHA1_Begin(sha);
               SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
               SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 			  att->attrib.ulValueLen);
               SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
               SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
               PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
               MD5_Begin(md5);
               MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 			 att->attrib.ulValueLen);
               MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
               MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
               PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
             }
 	    PORT_Free(md5);
 	    PORT_Free(sha);
 	}
 	/* store the results */
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute
 			(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
 	if (isTLS) {
 	    /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */
 	    /* XXX This seems like a hack.   But SFTK_Derive only accepts
 	     * one "operation" argument. */
 	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,  &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */
 	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	}
 	break;
       }
     case CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256:
 	isSHA256 = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
 	isTLS = PR_TRUE;
 	/* fall thru */
     case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
       {
 	CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys;
 	CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *   ssl3_keys_out;
 	CK_ULONG                effKeySize;
 	unsigned int            block_needed;
 	unsigned char           srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
 	unsigned char           crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
 	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
 	    break;
 	}
 	att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
 	if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
 					CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
 	    if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
 	    crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
 	    break;
 	}
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
 	md5 = MD5_NewContext();
 	if (md5 == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	sha = SHA1_NewContext();
 	if (sha == NULL) {
 	    PORT_Free(md5);
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
 	PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata,
 	            ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
 	PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
 		    ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
 	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
 		    ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
 	PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
 		    ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
 	/*
 	 * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
 	 */
 	ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial;
 	ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey       = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey       = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	/*
 	 * How much key material do we need?
 	 */
 	macSize    = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8;
 	effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8;
 	IVSize     = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8;
 	if (keySize == 0) {
 	    effKeySize = keySize;
 	}
 	block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize +
 	                    ((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize));
 	PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block);
 	if (block_needed > sizeof key_block)
 	    block_needed = sizeof key_block;
 	/*
 	 * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the
 	 * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it.
 	 */
 	if (isTLS) {
 	    SECStatus     status;
 	    SECItem       srcr   = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 	    SECItem       keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 	    SECItem       master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 	    srcr.data   = srcrdata;
 	    srcr.len    = sizeof srcrdata;
 	    keyblk.data = key_block;
 	    keyblk.len  = block_needed;
 	    master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
 	    master.len  =                 att->attrib.ulValueLen;
 	    if (isSHA256) {
 		status = TLS_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA256, &master, "key expansion",
 				    &srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
 	    } else {
 		status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk,
 				 isFIPS);
 	    }
 	    if (status != SECSuccess) {
 		goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 	    }
 	} else {
 	    unsigned int block_bytes = 0;
 	    /* key_block =
 	     *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
 	     *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
 	     *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
 	     *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
 	     *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
 	     *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
 	     *     [...];
 	     */
 	    for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) {
 	      SHA1_Begin(sha);
 	      SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
 	      SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 			  att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	      SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
 	      SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
 	      PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
 	      MD5_Begin(md5);
 	      MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 			 att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	      MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
 	      MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
 	      PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
 	      block_bytes += outLen;
 	    }
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Put the key material where it goes.
 	 */
 	i = 0;			/* now shows how much consumed */
 	/*
 	 * The key_block is partitioned as follows:
 	 * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
 	 */
 	crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
 					 &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK)
 	    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 	i += macSize;
 	/*
 	 * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
 	 */
 	crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
 					    &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 	}
 	i += macSize;
 	if (keySize) {
 	    if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) {
 		/*
 		** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
 		** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
 		*/
 		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
 					keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
 		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		i += keySize;
 		/*
 		** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
 		*/
 		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
 					keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
 		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		i += keySize;
 		/*
 		** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
 		*/
 		if (IVSize > 0) {
 		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient,
 		                &key_block[i], IVSize);
 		    i += IVSize;
 		}
 		/*
 		** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
 		*/
 		if (IVSize > 0) {
 		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer,
 		                &key_block[i], IVSize);
 		    i += IVSize;
 		}
 		PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block);
 	    } else if (!isTLS) {
 		/*
 		** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs.
 		** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
 		** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key +
 		**                   ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
 		*/
 		MD5_Begin(md5);
 		MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
             	MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
 		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
 		i += effKeySize;
 		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
 				 	keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
 		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		/*
 		** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
 		** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key +
 		**                    ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
 		*/
 		MD5_Begin(md5);
 		MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
             	MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
 		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
 		i += effKeySize;
 		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
 					 keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
 		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		/*
 		** client_write_IV =
 		**	MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
 		*/
 		MD5_Begin(md5);
             	MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
 		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
 		PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize);
 		/*
 		** server_write_IV =
 		**	MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
 		*/
 		MD5_Begin(md5);
             	MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
 		MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
 		PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize);
 	    } else {
 		/*
 		** Generate TLS 1.0 Export write keys and IVs.
 		*/
 		SECStatus     status;
 		SECItem       secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 		SECItem       crsr   = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 		SECItem       keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
 		/*
 		** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
 		** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key,
 		**                              "client write key",
 		**                              client_random + server_random);
 		*/
 		secret.data = &key_block[i];
 		secret.len  = effKeySize;
 		i          += effKeySize;
 		crsr.data   = crsrdata;
 		crsr.len    = sizeof crsrdata;
 		keyblk.data = key_block2;
 		keyblk.len  = sizeof key_block2;
 		status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
 				  isFIPS);
 		if (status != SECSuccess) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
 				       keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
 		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		/*
 		** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
 		** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key,
 		**                              "server write key",
 		**                              client_random + server_random);
 		*/
 		secret.data = &key_block[i];
 		secret.len  = effKeySize;
 		i          += effKeySize;
 		keyblk.data = key_block2;
 		keyblk.len  = sizeof key_block2;
 		status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
 				  isFIPS);
 		if (status != SECSuccess) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
 				       keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
 		if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		}
 		/*
 		** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block",
 		**                    client_random + server_random);
 		** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
 		** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
 		*/
 		if (IVSize) {
 		    secret.data = NULL;
 		    secret.len  = 0;
 		    keyblk.data = &key_block[i];
 		    keyblk.len  = 2 * IVSize;
 		    status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk,
 				      isFIPS);
 		    if (status != SECSuccess) {
 			goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
 		    }
 		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize);
 		    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize,
                                 IVSize);
 		}
 	    }
 	}
 	crv = CKR_OK;
 	if (0) {
 key_and_mac_derive_fail:
 	    if (crv == CKR_OK)
 	    	crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 	    sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out);
 	}
 	MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
 	SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	key = NULL;
 	break;
       }
     case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY:
       {
 	SFTKObject *newKey;
 	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
 	if (session == NULL) {
             crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
     	}
 	newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)
 					pMechanism->pParameter,session);
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	if ( newKey == NULL) {
             crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
 	    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,
 							sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
 		break;
 	    }
 	}
 	att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE);
 	if (att2 == NULL) {
 	    sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
             crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen;
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
 	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
 	    sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
 	    sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
 	if (buf == NULL) {
 	    sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
 	    sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,
 				att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
 	PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
 	sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
 	sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
 	break;
       }
     case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA:
 	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter;
 	tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
 	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
 	if (buf == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData,
 							stringPtr->ulLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
 	PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
 	break;
     case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE:
 	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
 	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
 	if (buf == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen);
 	PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue,
 							att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
 	PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
 	break;
     case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
 	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen);
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
 	if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
 	if (buf == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize);
 	for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
 	    buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i];
 	}
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
 	PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
 	break;
     case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY:
       {
 	/* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */
 	CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
 	CK_ULONG shift   = extract & 0x7;      /* extract mod 8 the fast way */
 	CK_ULONG offset  = extract >> 3;       /* extract div 8 the fast way */
 	crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
 	if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	if (keySize == 0)  {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */
 	if (att->attrib.ulValueLen <
 			(offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) {
 	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
 	if (buf == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* copy the bits we need into the new key */
 	for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
 	    unsigned char *value =
 			 ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i;
 	    if (shift) {
 	        buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift));
 	    } else {
 		buf[i] = value[0];
 	    }
 	}
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
 	PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
 	break;
       }
     case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION:
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH;
 	if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* now allocate the hash contexts */
 	md2 = MD2_NewContext();
 	if (md2 == NULL) {
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	    break;
 	}
 	MD2_Begin(md2);
 	MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		   att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH);
 	MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
 	break;
     case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH;
 	if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	MD5_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		   att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
 	break;
      case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH;
 	if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	SHA1_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
 	break;
      case CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION:
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA224_LENGTH;
 	if (keySize > SHA224_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	SHA224_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
 	break;
      case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION:
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA256_LENGTH;
 	if (keySize > SHA256_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	SHA256_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
 	break;
      case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION:
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA384_LENGTH;
 	if (keySize > SHA384_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	SHA384_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
 	break;
      case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION:
 	if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA512_LENGTH;
 	if (keySize > SHA512_LENGTH) {
 	    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	    break;
 	}
 	SHA512_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
 		    att->attrib.ulValueLen);
 	crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
 	break;
     case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
       {
 	SECItem  derived,  dhPublic;
 	SECItem  dhPrime,  dhValue;
 	/* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */
 	/* get prime and value attributes */
 	crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME);
 	if (crv != SECSuccess) break;
 	crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
 	if (crv != SECSuccess) {
  	    PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
 	    break;
 	}
 	dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter;
 	dhPublic.len  = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;
 	/* calculate private value - oct */
 	rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
 	PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
 	PORT_Free(dhValue.data);
 	if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	    sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
 	    PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len);
 	} else
 	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	break;
       }
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
     case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
       {
 	SECItem  ecScalar, ecPoint;
 	SECItem  tmp;
 	PRBool   withCofactor = PR_FALSE;
 	unsigned char *secret;
 	unsigned char *keyData = NULL;
 	int secretlen, curveLen, pubKeyLen;
 	CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams;
 	NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
 	PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
 	/* Check mechanism parameters */
 	mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
 	if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) ||
 	    ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) &&
 		((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) ||
 		    (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) {
 	    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
 	    break;
 	}
 	privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
 	if (privKey == NULL) {
 	    break;
 	}
 	/* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */
 	SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue);
 	ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData;
 	ecPoint.len  = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen;
 	curveLen = (privKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.size +7)/8;
 	pubKeyLen = (2*curveLen) + 1;
 	/* if the len is too small, can't be a valid point */
 	if (ecPoint.len < pubKeyLen) {
 	    goto ec_loser;
 	}
 	/* if the len is too large, must be an encoded point (length is
 	 * equal case just falls through */
 	if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) {
 	    SECItem newPoint;
 	    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
 	    if (arena == NULL) {
 		goto ec_loser;
 	    }
 	    rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint,
 					SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
 					&ecPoint);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto ec_loser;
 	    }
 	    ecPoint = newPoint;
 	}
 	if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) {
 	    withCofactor = PR_TRUE;
 	} else {
 	    /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should
 	     * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup
 	     * attacks.
 	     */
 	    if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint)
 		!= SECSuccess) {
 		goto ec_loser;
 	    }
 	}
 	rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
 	                 withCofactor, &tmp);
 	PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
 	ecScalar.data = NULL;
 	if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
 	   nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
 	   privKey=NULL;
 	}
 	if (arena) {
 	    PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
 	    arena=NULL;
 	}
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
 	    break;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * apply the kdf function.
 	 */
 	if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) {
 	    /*
 	     * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
 	     * secret and secretlen are the values we will
 	     * eventually pass as our generated key.
 	     */
 	    secret = tmp.data;
 	    secretlen = tmp.len;
 	} else {
 	    secretlen = keySize;
 	    crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
 			&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
 			mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
 	    PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 		break;
 	    }
 	    tmp.data = secret;
 	    tmp.len = secretlen;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific
 	 * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize'
 	 * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may
 	 * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive
 	 * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros).
  	 */
 	if (keySize) {
 	    if (secretlen < keySize) {
 	        keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize);
 		if (!keyData) {
 		    PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
 		    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 		    break;
 		}
 		PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen);
 		secret = keyData;
 	    } else {
 		secret += (secretlen - keySize);
 	    }
 	    secretlen = keySize;
 	}
 	sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
 	PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
 	if (keyData) {
 	    PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
 	}
 	break;
 ec_loser:
 	crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 	PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
 	if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo)
 	    nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
 	if (arena) {
 	    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
 	}
 	break;
       }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     /* See RFC 5869 and CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
     case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1:   hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;   goto hkdf;
     case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto hkdf;
     case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto hkdf;
     case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto hkdf;
 hkdf: {
         const CK_NSS_HKDFParams * params =
             (const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *) pMechanism->pParameter;
         const SECHashObject * rawHash;
         unsigned hashLen;
         CK_BYTE buf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
         CK_BYTE * prk;  /* psuedo-random key */
         CK_ULONG prkLen;
         CK_BYTE * okm;  /* output keying material */
         rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
         if (rawHash == NULL || rawHash->length > sizeof buf) {
             crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
             break;
         }
         hashLen = rawHash->length;
         if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_HKDFParams) ||
             !params || (!params->bExpand && !params->bExtract) ||
             (params->bExtract && params->ulSaltLen > 0 && !params->pSalt) ||
             (params->bExpand && params->ulInfoLen > 0 && !params->pInfo)) {
             crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
             break;
         }
         if (keySize == 0 || keySize > sizeof key_block ||
             (!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
             (params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
             crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
             break;
         }
         crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
         if (crv != CKR_OK)
             break;
         /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
         if (params->bExtract) {
             CK_BYTE * salt;
             CK_ULONG saltLen;
             HMACContext * hmac;
             unsigned int bufLen;
             salt = params->pSalt;
             saltLen = params->ulSaltLen;
             if (salt == NULL) {
                 saltLen = hashLen;
                 salt = buf;
                 memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
             }
             hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
             if (!hmac) {
                 crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                 break;
             }
             HMAC_Begin(hmac);
             HMAC_Update(hmac, (const unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue,
 		        att->attrib.ulValueLen);
             HMAC_Finish(hmac, buf, &bufLen, sizeof(buf));
             HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
             PORT_Assert(bufLen == rawHash->length);
             prk = buf;
             prkLen = bufLen;
         } else {
             /* PRK = base key value */
             prk = (CK_BYTE*) att->attrib.pValue;
             prkLen = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
         }
         /* HKDF-Expand */
         if (!params->bExpand) {
             okm = prk;
         } else {
             /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
              * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
              * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
              */
             HMACContext * hmac;
             CK_BYTE i;
             unsigned iterations = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen) / hashLen;
             hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, prk, prkLen, isFIPS);
             if (hmac == NULL) {
                 crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                 break;
             }
             for (i = 1; i <= iterations; ++i) {
                 unsigned len;
                 HMAC_Begin(hmac);
                 if (i > 1) {
                     HMAC_Update(hmac, key_block + ((i-2) * hashLen), hashLen);
                 }
                 if (params->ulInfoLen != 0) {
                     HMAC_Update(hmac, params->pInfo, params->ulInfoLen);
                 }
                 HMAC_Update(hmac, &i, 1);
                 HMAC_Finish(hmac, key_block + ((i-1) * hashLen), &len,
                             hashLen);
                 PORT_Assert(len == hashLen);
             }
             HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
             okm = key_block;
         }
         /* key material = prk */
         crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, okm, keySize);
         break;
       } /* end of CKM_NSS_HKDF_* */
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake2;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake2;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake2;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake2;
 jpake2:
         if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
             pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params))
             crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
         if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN))
             crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
 	if (crv == CKR_OK)
             crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
 	if (crv == CKR_OK)
             crv = jpake_Round2(hashType,
                         (CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
                         sourceKey, key);
         break;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpakeFinal;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpakeFinal;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpakeFinal;
     case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpakeFinal;
 jpakeFinal:
         if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
             pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams))
             crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
         /* We purposely do not do the derive sensitivity check; we want to be
            able to derive non-sensitive keys while allowing the ROUND1 and
            ROUND2 keys to be sensitive (which they always are, since they are
            in the CKO_PRIVATE_KEY class). The caller must include CKA_SENSITIVE
            in the template in order for the resultant keyblock key to be
            sensitive.
          */
         if (crv == CKR_OK)
             crv = jpake_Final(hashType,
                         (CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams *) pMechanism->pParameter,
                         sourceKey, key);
         break;
     default:
 	crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
     }
     if (att) {
         sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
     }
     sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	return crv;
     }
     /* link the key object into the list */
     if (key) {
 	SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
 	PORT_Assert(sessKey);
 	/* get the session */
 	sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
 	session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
 	if (session == NULL) {
 	    sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	    return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
 	}
 	crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
 	sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	*phKey = key->handle;
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
     }
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running
  * in parallel with an application. */
 CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
 }
 /* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */
 CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
 {
     CHECK_FORK();
     return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
 }
 /* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic
  *operation in a session.
  * NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need
  * to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state
  * can be saved */
 CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 	CK_BYTE_PTR  pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
 {
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     SFTKSession *session;
     CK_RV crv;
     CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen;
     CHECK_FORK();
     /* make sure we're legal */
     crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     *pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)
 				+ sizeof(SFTKContextType);
     if (pOperationState == NULL) {
         sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	return CKR_OK;
     } else {
 	if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) {
 	    return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
 	}
     }
     PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
     pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
     PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech,
 						sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
     pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
     PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     return CKR_OK;
 }
 #define sftk_Decrement(stateSize,len) \
 	stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \
 				((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0;
 /* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
  * operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of
  * states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */
 CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 	CK_BYTE_PTR  pOperationState, CK_ULONG  ulOperationStateLen,
         CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
 {
     SFTKSessionContext *context;
     SFTKSession *session;
     SFTKContextType type;
     CK_MECHANISM mech;
     CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
     CHECK_FORK();
     while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) {
 	/* get what type of state we're dealing with... */
 	PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
 	/* fix up session contexts based on type */
 	session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
 	if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
 	sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL);
 	if (context) {
 	     sftk_FreeContext(context);
 	}
 	pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
 	sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
 	/* get the mechanism structure */
 	PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
 	pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
 	sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
 	/* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */
 	mech.pParameter = NULL;
 	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
 	switch (type) {
 	case SFTK_HASH:
 	    crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech);
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE,
 								NULL);
 	    if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
 	    PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState,
 						context->cipherInfoLen);
 	    pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen;
 	    sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen);
 	    break;
 	default:
 	    /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */
 	    crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
          }
          sftk_FreeSession(session);
 	 if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
     }
     return crv;
 }
 /* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
 /* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption
  * operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR  pPart,
     CK_ULONG  ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedPart,
 					 CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
 {
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
 						      pulEncryptedPartLen);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
  * digesting operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
     CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG  ulEncryptedPartLen,
     				CK_BYTE_PTR  pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
 {
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen,
 							pPart,	pulPartLen);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
  * encryption operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR  pPart,
 	 CK_ULONG  ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedPart,
 					 CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
 {
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
 						      pulEncryptedPartLen);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
  * and verify operation. */
 CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 	CK_BYTE_PTR  pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG  ulEncryptedDataLen,
 				CK_BYTE_PTR  pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
 {
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
 							pData,	pulDataLen);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
     crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen);
     return crv;
 }
 /* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation,
  * by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested.
  */
 CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
 {
     SFTKSession *session = NULL;
     SFTKObject *key = NULL;
     SFTKAttribute *att;
     CK_RV crv;
     CHECK_FORK();
     session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
     if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
     key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
     sftk_FreeSession(session);
     if (key == NULL)  return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
     /* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */
     /* make sure it's a valid  key for this operation */
     if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
 	sftk_FreeObject(key);
 	return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
     }
     /* get the key value */
     att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
     sftk_FreeObject(key);
     if (!att) {
         return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
     }
     crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue,
 			   att->attrib.ulValueLen);
     sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
     return crv;
 }

The Tor Browser / annotate

security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c