The Tor Browser: security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
changeset 0: 6474c204b198
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

 /* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
 /*
  * SSL3 Protocol
  *
  * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 /* TODO(ekr): Implement HelloVerifyRequest on server side. OK for now. */
 #include "cert.h"
 #include "ssl.h"
 #include "cryptohi.h"	/* for DSAU_ stuff */
 #include "keyhi.h"
 #include "secder.h"
 #include "secitem.h"
 #include "sechash.h"
 #include "sslimpl.h"
 #include "sslproto.h"
 #include "sslerr.h"
 #include "prtime.h"
 #include "prinrval.h"
 #include "prerror.h"
 #include "pratom.h"
 #include "prthread.h"
 #include "pk11func.h"
 #include "secmod.h"
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 #include "blapi.h"
 #endif
 #include <stdio.h>
 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
 #include "zlib.h"
 #endif
 #ifndef PK11_SETATTRS
 #define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \
 		(x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l);
 #endif
 static SECStatus ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss);
 static void      ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss);
 static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
                                        PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot);
 static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms);
 static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(      sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_InitState(             sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(       sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateStatus( sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(  sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto(         sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(          sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello(       sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(   sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange( sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes( sslSocket *ss,
                                              const unsigned char *b,
                                              unsigned int l);
 static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
 static int       ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm(SECOidTag oid);
 static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen,
 			     int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input,
 			     int inputLen);
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 static SECStatus ssl3_AESGCMBypass(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys, PRBool doDecrypt,
 				   unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout,
 				   const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
 				   const unsigned char *additionalData,
 				   int additionalDataLen);
 #endif
 #define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */
 #define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH  4000
 /* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of
  * precedence (desirability).  It only includes cipher suites we implement.
  * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites
  * in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c)
  *
  * Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher
  * suites to this list.
  */
 static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = {
    /*      cipher_suite                     policy       enabled   isPresent */
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
    /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around
     * bug 946147.
     */
  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,    SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,    SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,        SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,          SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,        SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,        SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,        SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,        SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,       SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,       SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,            SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
  { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,       SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,       SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,    SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,         SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,           SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
  /* RSA */
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,         SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,            SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,         SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,       SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,            SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,         SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,       SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,               SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,           SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,                SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,                SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE,  PR_FALSE},
  /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */
  { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,            SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,            SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,           SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,                SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  /* export ciphersuites with 1024-bit public key exchange keys */
  { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,     SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  /* export ciphersuites with 512-bit public key exchange keys */
  { TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,          SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,      SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  /* ciphersuites with no encryption */
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
  { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,           SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,             SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,              SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,            SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,                   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,                SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
  { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,                   SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
 };
 /* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order.
  */
 #ifdef DEBUG
 void ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency()
 {
     unsigned int i;
     /* Note that SSL_ImplementedCiphers has more elements than cipherSuites
      * because it SSL_ImplementedCiphers includes SSL 2.0 cipher suites.
      */
     PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers >= PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites));
     for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) {
         PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite);
     }
 }
 #endif
 /* This list of SSL3 compression methods is sorted in descending order of
  * precedence (desirability).  It only includes compression methods we
  * implement.
  */
 static const /*SSLCompressionMethod*/ PRUint8 compressions [] = {
 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
     ssl_compression_deflate,
 #endif
     ssl_compression_null
 };
 static const int compressionMethodsCount =
     sizeof(compressions) / sizeof(compressions[0]);
 /* compressionEnabled returns true iff the compression algorithm is enabled
  * for the given SSL socket. */
 static PRBool
 compressionEnabled(sslSocket *ss, SSLCompressionMethod compression)
 {
     switch (compression) {
     case ssl_compression_null:
 	return PR_TRUE;  /* Always enabled */
 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
     case ssl_compression_deflate:
 	return ss->opt.enableDeflate;
 #endif
     default:
 	return PR_FALSE;
     }
 }
 static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types [] = {
     ct_RSA_sign,
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     ct_ECDSA_sign,
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     ct_DSS_sign,
 };
 /* This block is the contents of the supported_signature_algorithms field of
  * our TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message, in wire format. See
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
  *
  * This block contains only sha256 entries because we only support TLS 1.2
  * CertificateVerify messages that use the handshake hash. */
 static const PRUint8 supported_signature_algorithms[] = {
     tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_rsa,
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_ecdsa,
 #endif
     tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_dsa,
 };
 #define EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH 64	/* bytes */
 /* This global item is used only in servers.  It is is initialized by
 ** SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest().
 */
 CERTDistNames *ssl3_server_ca_list = NULL;
 static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats;
 /* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */
 static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = {
     /*                                       |--------- Lengths --------| */
     /* cipher             calg               k  s  type         i  b  t  n */
     /*                                       e  e               v  l  a  o */
     /*                                       y  c               |  o  g  n */
     /*                                       |  r               |  c  |  c */
     /*                                       |  e               |  k  |  e */
     /*                                       |  t               |  |  |  | */
     {cipher_null,         calg_null,         0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {cipher_rc4,          calg_rc4,         16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {cipher_rc4_40,       calg_rc4,         16, 5, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {cipher_rc4_56,       calg_rc4,         16, 7, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {cipher_rc2,          calg_rc2,         16,16, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0},
     {cipher_rc2_40,       calg_rc2,         16, 5, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0},
     {cipher_des,          calg_des,          8, 8, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0},
     {cipher_3des,         calg_3des,        24,24, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0},
     {cipher_des40,        calg_des,          8, 5, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0},
     {cipher_idea,         calg_idea,        16,16, type_block,  8, 8, 0, 0},
     {cipher_aes_128,      calg_aes,         16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
     {cipher_aes_256,      calg_aes,         32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
     {cipher_camellia_128, calg_camellia,    16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
     {cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia,    32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
     {cipher_seed,         calg_seed,        16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
     {cipher_aes_128_gcm,  calg_aes_gcm,     16,16, type_aead,   4, 0,16, 8},
     {cipher_missing,      calg_null,         0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
 };
 static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] =
 { /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */
     /* kea              exchKeyType signKeyType is_limited limit  tls_keygen */
     {kea_null,           kt_null,     sign_null, PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_rsa,            kt_rsa,      sign_rsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_rsa_export,     kt_rsa,      sign_rsa,  PR_TRUE,  512, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_rsa_export_1024,kt_rsa,      sign_rsa,  PR_TRUE, 1024, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dh_dss,         kt_dh,       sign_dsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dh_dss_export,  kt_dh,       sign_dsa,  PR_TRUE,  512, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dh_rsa,         kt_dh,       sign_rsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dh_rsa_export,  kt_dh,       sign_rsa,  PR_TRUE,  512, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dhe_dss,        kt_dh,       sign_dsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dhe_dss_export, kt_dh,       sign_dsa,  PR_TRUE,  512, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dhe_rsa,        kt_dh,       sign_rsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dhe_rsa_export, kt_dh,       sign_rsa,  PR_TRUE,  512, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dh_anon,        kt_dh,       sign_null, PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_dh_anon_export, kt_dh,       sign_null, PR_TRUE,  512, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_rsa_fips,       kt_rsa,      sign_rsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_TRUE },
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     {kea_ecdh_ecdsa,     kt_ecdh,     sign_ecdsa,  PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_ecdhe_ecdsa,    kt_ecdh,     sign_ecdsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_ecdh_rsa,       kt_ecdh,     sign_rsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_ecdhe_rsa,      kt_ecdh,     sign_rsa,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
     {kea_ecdh_anon,      kt_ecdh,     sign_null,  PR_FALSE,   0, PR_FALSE},
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 };
 /* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */
 static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] =
 {
 /*  cipher_suite                    bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg */
     {TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL,       cipher_null,   mac_null, kea_null},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,         cipher_null,   mac_md5, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,         cipher_null,   mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,      cipher_null,   hmac_sha256, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,      cipher_rc4,    mac_md5, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,      cipher_rc4,    mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
                                     cipher_rc2_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export},
 #if 0 /* not implemented */
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,     cipher_idea,   mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_des40,  mac_sha, kea_rsa_export},
 #endif
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,      cipher_des,    mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des,   mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,  cipher_des,    mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_3des,   mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,  cipher_rc4,    mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
 #if 0 /* not implemented */
     {TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_des40,  mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export},
     {TLS_DH_DSS_DES_CBC_SHA,        cipher_des,    mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
     {TLS_DH_DSS_3DES_CBC_SHA,       cipher_3des,   mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
     {TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_des40,  mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export},
     {TLS_DH_RSA_DES_CBC_SHA,        cipher_des,    mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
     {TLS_DH_RSA_3DES_CBC_SHA,       cipher_3des,   mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_des40,  mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_des40,  mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export},
 #endif
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,  cipher_des,    mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_3des,   mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
 #if 0
     {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_RC4_40_MD5, cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_dh_anon_export},
     {TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_des40,  mac_sha, kea_dh_anon_export},
     {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,  cipher_des,    mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
     {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des,   mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
 #endif
 /* New TLS cipher suites */
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,     	cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,	cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 	cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 	cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,     	cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,	cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 	cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 	cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa},
 #if 0
     {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,  	cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
     {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,  	cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
     {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 	cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
     {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,  	cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss},
     {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,  	cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa},
     {TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 	cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon},
 #endif
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,	    cipher_seed,   mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
      cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
      cipher_camellia_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,	cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
      cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
      cipher_camellia_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
                                     cipher_des,    mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024},
     {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
                                     cipher_rc4_56, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024},
     {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips},
     {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des,    mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips},
     {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa},
     {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,        cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,      cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,        cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,      cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,         cipher_null,    mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,      cipher_rc4,     mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des,    mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,  cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,  cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,         cipher_null,    mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,      cipher_rc4,     mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des,    mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,  cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
     {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,  cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
 #if 0
     {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,         cipher_null,    mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
     {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,      cipher_rc4,     mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
     {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des,    mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
     {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,  cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
     {TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,  cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_ecdh_anon},
 #endif
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 };
 static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = {
 x80000000L,
     CKM_RSA_PKCS,
     CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE,
     CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE,
     CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE
 };
 typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr {
     SSLCipherAlgorithm  calg;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE   cmech;
 } SSLCipher2Mech;
 /* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */
 static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = {
     /* calg,          cmech  */
     { calg_null     , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L	},
     { calg_rc4      , CKM_RC4				},
     { calg_rc2      , CKM_RC2_CBC			},
     { calg_des      , CKM_DES_CBC			},
     { calg_3des     , CKM_DES3_CBC			},
     { calg_idea     , CKM_IDEA_CBC			},
     { calg_fortezza , CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64                },
     { calg_aes      , CKM_AES_CBC			},
     { calg_camellia , CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC			},
     { calg_seed     , CKM_SEED_CBC			},
     { calg_aes_gcm  , CKM_AES_GCM			},
 /*  { calg_init     , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL    }  */
 };
 #define mmech_invalid  (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L
 #define mmech_md5      CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC
 #define mmech_sha      CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC
 #define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC
 #define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
 #define mmech_sha256_hmac CKM_SHA256_HMAC
 static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */
     /* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */
     /* mac      mmech       pad_size  mac_size                       */
     { mac_null, mmech_invalid,    0,  0          },
     { mac_md5,  mmech_md5,       48,  MD5_LENGTH },
     { mac_sha,  mmech_sha,       40,  SHA1_LENGTH},
     {hmac_md5,  mmech_md5_hmac,   0,  MD5_LENGTH },
     {hmac_sha,  mmech_sha_hmac,   0,  SHA1_LENGTH},
     {hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH},
     { mac_aead, mmech_invalid,    0,  0          },
 };
 /* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */
 const char * const ssl3_cipherName[] = {
     "NULL",
     "RC4",
     "RC4-40",
     "RC4-56",
     "RC2-CBC",
     "RC2-CBC-40",
     "DES-CBC",
     "3DES-EDE-CBC",
     "DES-CBC-40",
     "IDEA-CBC",
     "AES-128",
     "AES-256",
     "Camellia-128",
     "Camellia-256",
     "SEED-CBC",
     "AES-128-GCM",
     "missing"
 };
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 /* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of
  * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey
  * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is
  * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field
  * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes.
  *
  * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits
  * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params
  * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS
  * supports arbitrary curves.
  */
 #define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN  504
 typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr {
     PRUint16 size;            /* EC public key size in bits */
     PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */
     PRUint16 pubValueLen;     /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */
     PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen;   /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */
     PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */
     /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key  */
 } ECCWrappedKeyInfo;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 #if defined(TRACE)
 static char *
 ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType)
 {
     char * rv;
     static char line[40];
     switch(msgType) {
     case hello_request:	        rv = "hello_request (0)";               break;
     case client_hello:	        rv = "client_hello  (1)";               break;
     case server_hello:	        rv = "server_hello  (2)";               break;
     case hello_verify_request:  rv = "hello_verify_request (3)";        break;
     case certificate:	        rv = "certificate  (11)";               break;
     case server_key_exchange:	rv = "server_key_exchange (12)";        break;
     case certificate_request:	rv = "certificate_request (13)";        break;
     case server_hello_done:	rv = "server_hello_done   (14)";        break;
     case certificate_verify:	rv = "certificate_verify  (15)";        break;
     case client_key_exchange:	rv = "client_key_exchange (16)";        break;
     case finished:	        rv = "finished     (20)";               break;
     default:
         sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType);
 	rv = line;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static char *
 ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType)
 {
     char * rv;
     static char line[40];
     switch(msgType) {
     case content_change_cipher_spec:
                                 rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)";         break;
     case content_alert:	        rv = "alert      (21)";                 break;
     case content_handshake:	rv = "handshake  (22)";                 break;
     case content_application_data:
                                 rv = "application_data (23)";           break;
     default:
         sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType);
 	rv = line;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 #endif
 SSL3Statistics *
 SSL_GetStatistics(void)
 {
     return &ssl3stats;
 }
 typedef struct tooLongStr {
 #if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
     PRInt32 low;
     PRInt32 high;
 #else
     PRInt32 high;
     PRInt32 low;
 #endif
 } tooLong;
 void SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long * x)
 {
     if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) {
         PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x);
     } else {
     	tooLong * tl = (tooLong *)x;
 	if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0)
 	    PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high);
     }
 }
 static PRBool
 ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(
     ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite,
     const SSLVersionRange *vrange)
 {
     switch (cipherSuite) {
     /* See RFC 4346 A.5. Export cipher suites must not be used in TLS 1.1 or
      * later. This set of cipher suites is similar to, but different from, the
      * set of cipher suites considered exportable by SSL_IsExportCipherSuite.
      */
     case TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5:
     case TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5:
     /*   TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:      never implemented
      *   TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:   never implemented
      *   TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:   never implemented
      *   TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:  never implemented
      *   TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:  never implemented
      *   TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5:     never implemented
      *   TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:  never implemented
      */
 	return vrange->min <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
     case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
     case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
     case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
     case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
     case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
     case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
     case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
     case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
     case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
     case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
     case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
 	return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
     /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and
      * point formats.*/
     case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
     case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
 	return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
     default:
 	return PR_TRUE;
     }
 }
 /* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */
 /* XXX This does a linear search.  A binary search would be better. */
 static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *
 ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite)
 {
     int cipher_suite_def_len =
 	sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]);
     int i;
     for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) {
 	if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite)
 	    return &cipher_suite_defs[i];
     }
     PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);  /* We should never get here. */
     PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
     return NULL;
 }
 /* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */
 /* XXX This does a linear search.  A binary search would be better. */
 static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *
 ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites)
 {
     int i;
     for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
 	if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite)
 	    return &suites[i];
     }
     /* return NULL and let the caller handle it.  */
     PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
     return NULL;
 }
 /* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match
  * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens,
  * regardless of policy or user preference.
  * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3.
  */
 int
 ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *      suite;
     const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def;
     SSLCipherAlgorithm        cipher_alg;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE         cipher_mech;
     SSL3KEAType               exchKeyType;
     int                       i;
     int                       numPresent		= 0;
     int                       numEnabled		= 0;
     PRBool                    isServer;
     sslServerCerts           *svrAuth;
     PORT_Assert(ss);
     if (!ss) {
     	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	return 0;
     }
     if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
     	return 0;
     }
     isServer = (PRBool)(ss->sec.isServer != 0);
     for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
 	suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
 	if (suite->enabled) {
 	    ++numEnabled;
 	    /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle
 	     * this cipher.  It isn't part of the static definition.
 	     */
 	    cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite);
 	    if (!cipher_def) {
 	    	suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
 		continue;
 	    }
 	    cipher_alg = bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg].calg;
 	    PORT_Assert(  alg2Mech[cipher_alg].calg == cipher_alg);
 	    cipher_mech = alg2Mech[cipher_alg].cmech;
 	    exchKeyType =
 	    	    kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType;
 #ifdef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 	    svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType;
 #else
 	    /* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for
 	     * indexing certificates. It doesn't work for
 	     * (EC)DHE-* ciphers. Here we use a hack to ensure
 	     * that the server uses an RSA cert for (EC)DHE-RSA.
 	     */
 	    switch (cipher_def->key_exchange_alg) {
 	    case kea_ecdhe_rsa:
 #if NSS_SERVER_DHE_IMPLEMENTED
 	    /* XXX NSS does not yet implement the server side of _DHE_
 	     * cipher suites.  Correcting the computation for svrAuth,
 	     * as the case below does, causes NSS SSL servers to begin to
 	     * negotiate cipher suites they do not implement.  So, until
 	     * server side _DHE_ is implemented, keep this disabled.
 	     */
 	    case kea_dhe_rsa:
 #endif
 		svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + kt_rsa;
 		break;
 	    case kea_ecdh_ecdsa:
 	    case kea_ecdh_rsa:
 	        /*
 		 * XXX We ought to have different indices for
 		 * ECDSA- and RSA-signed EC certificates so
 		 * we could support both key exchange mechanisms
 		 * simultaneously. For now, both of them use
 		 * whatever is in the certificate slot for kt_ecdh
 		 */
 	    default:
 		svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType;
 		break;
 	    }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 	    /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */
 	    suite->isPresent = (PRBool)
 		(((exchKeyType == kt_null) ||
 		   ((!isServer || (svrAuth->serverKeyPair &&
 		                   svrAuth->SERVERKEY &&
 				   svrAuth->serverCertChain)) &&
 		    PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[exchKeyType]))) &&
 		((cipher_alg == calg_null) || PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)));
 	    if (suite->isPresent)
 	    	++numPresent;
 	}
     }
     PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0);
     if (numPresent <= 0) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED);
     }
     return numPresent;
 }
 /* return PR_TRUE if suite matches policy, enabled state and is applicable to
  * the given version range. */
 /* It would be a REALLY BAD THING (tm) if we ever permitted the use
 ** of a cipher that was NOT_ALLOWED.  So, if this is ever called with
 ** policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, report no match.
 */
 /* adjust suite enabled to the availability of a token that can do the
  * cipher suite. */
 static PRBool
 config_match(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, PRBool enabled,
 	     const SSLVersionRange *vrange)
 {
     PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && enabled != PR_FALSE);
     if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED || !enabled)
     	return PR_FALSE;
     return (PRBool)(suite->enabled &&
                     suite->isPresent &&
 	            suite->policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED &&
 		    suite->policy <= policy &&
 		    ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(
                         suite->cipher_suite, vrange));
 }
 /* return number of cipher suites that match policy, enabled state and are
  * applicable for the configured protocol version range. */
 /* called from ssl3_SendClientHello and ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack */
 static int
 count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy, PRBool enabled)
 {
     int i, count = 0;
     if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
 	return 0;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
 	if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, enabled, &ss->vrange))
 	    count++;
     }
     if (count <= 0) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
     }
     return count;
 }
 /*
  * Null compression, mac and encryption functions
  */
 static SECStatus
 Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen,
 	    const unsigned char *input, int inputLen)
 {
     if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) {
         *outputLen = 0;  /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */
         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     *outputLen = inputLen;
     if (input != output)
 	PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * SSL3 Utility functions
  */
 /* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the
  * highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the
  * highest enabled version.
  *
  * If allowLargerPeerVersion is true, peerVersion is the peer's highest
  * enabled version rather than the peer's selected version.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion,
 		      PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion)
 {
     if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
 	(peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     ss->version = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max);
     PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, ss->version));
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     /* first 4 bytes are reserverd for time */
     rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random->rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_SignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SECItem *buf,
                 PRBool isTLS)
 {
     SECStatus rv		= SECFailure;
     PRBool    doDerEncode       = PR_FALSE;
     int       signatureLen;
     SECItem   hashItem;
     buf->data    = NULL;
     switch (key->keyType) {
     case rsaKey:
 	hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
 	hashItem.len = hash->len;
 	break;
     case dsaKey:
 	doDerEncode = isTLS;
 	/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
 	 * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
 	if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
 	    hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
 	} else {
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
 	    hashItem.len = hash->len;
 	}
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case ecKey:
 	doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
 	/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
 	 * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
 	if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
 	    hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
 	} else {
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
 	    hashItem.len = hash->len;
 	}
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     default:
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
 	goto done;
     }
     PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
     if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
 	if (signatureLen <= 0) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
 	    goto done;
 	}
 	buf->len  = (unsigned)signatureLen;
 	buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
 	if (!buf->data)
 	    goto done;  /* error code was set. */
 	rv = PK11_Sign(key, buf, &hashItem);
     } else {
 	rv = SGN_Digest(key, hash->hashAlg, buf, &hashItem);
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
     } else if (doDerEncode) {
 	SECItem   derSig	= {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
 	/* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
 	rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
 	if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	    PORT_Free(buf->data);	/* discard unencoded signature. */
 	    *buf = derSig;		/* give caller encoded signature. */
 	} else if (derSig.data) {
 	    PORT_Free(derSig.data);
 	}
     }
     PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char*)buf->data, buf->len));
 done:
     if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
 	PORT_Free(buf->data);
 	buf->data = NULL;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, CERTCertificate *cert,
                         SECItem *buf, PRBool isTLS, void *pwArg)
 {
     SECKEYPublicKey * key;
     SECItem *         signature	= NULL;
     SECStatus         rv;
     SECItem           hashItem;
     SECOidTag         encAlg;
     SECOidTag         hashAlg;
     PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes",
                   buf->data, buf->len));
     key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
     if (key == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
     	return SECFailure;
     }
     hashAlg = hash->hashAlg;
     switch (key->keyType) {
     case rsaKey:
 	encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
 	hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
 	hashItem.len = hash->len;
 	break;
     case dsaKey:
 	encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
 	/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
 	 * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
 	if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
 	    hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
 	} else {
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
 	    hashItem.len = hash->len;
 	}
 	/* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */
 	if (isTLS || buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) {
 	    signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key));
 	    if (!signature) {
 	    	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    buf = signature;
 	}
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case ecKey:
 	encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
 	/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
 	 * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part.
 	 * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1
 	 * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with
 	 * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA.
 	 */
 	if (hash->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	    hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
 	    hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
 	} else {
 	    hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
 	    hashItem.len = hash->len;
 	}
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     default:
     	SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified",
                   hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
     if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || key->keyType == dsaKey) {
 	/* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded.
 	 * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code
 	 * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when
 	 * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify.
 	 */
 	rv = PK11_Verify(key, buf, &hashItem, pwArg);
     } else {
 	rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg,
 				    pwArg);
     }
     SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
     if (signature) {
     	SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE);
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
 /* Called from ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash
  *             ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash
  * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange.
  *
  * hashAlg: either the OID for a hash algorithm or SEC_OID_UNKNOWN to specify
  * the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SECOidTag hashAlg,
 			  PRUint8 * hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen,
 			  SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11)
 {
     SECStatus     rv 		= SECSuccess;
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (bypassPKCS11) {
 	if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	    MD5_HashBuf (hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    SHA1_HashBuf(hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
 	} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
 	    SHA1_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    hashes->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
 	} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA256) {
 	    SHA256_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    hashes->len = SHA256_LENGTH;
 	} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA384) {
 	    SHA384_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    hashes->len = SHA384_LENGTH;
 	} else if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_SHA512) {
 	    SHA512_HashBuf(hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    hashes->len = SHA512_LENGTH;
 	} else {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     } else
 #endif
     {
 	if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	    rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 		goto done;
 	    }
 	    rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
 	} else {
 	    hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
 	    if (hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 		goto done;
 	    }
 	    rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashAlg, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg;
 done:
     return rv;
 }
 /* Caller must set hiLevel error code.
 ** Called from ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and
 **             ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange.
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(SECOidTag hashAlg,
 			     SECItem modulus, SECItem publicExponent,
 			     SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand,
 			     SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11)
 {
     PRUint8     * hashBuf;
     PRUint8     * pBuf;
     SECStatus     rv 		= SECSuccess;
     unsigned int  bufLen;
     PRUint8       buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8];
     bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + modulus.len + 2 + publicExponent.len;
     if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) {
     	hashBuf = buf;
     } else {
     	hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
 	if (!hashBuf) {
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     	pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
     memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     	pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
     pBuf[0]  = (PRUint8)(modulus.len >> 8);
     pBuf[1]  = (PRUint8)(modulus.len);
     	pBuf += 2;
     memcpy(pBuf, modulus.data, modulus.len);
     	pBuf += modulus.len;
     pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len >> 8);
     pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len);
     	pBuf += 2;
     memcpy(pBuf, publicExponent.data, publicExponent.len);
     	pBuf += publicExponent.len;
     PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen);
     rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes,
 				   bypassPKCS11);
     PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen));
     if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: MD5 result",
 		  hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
 	PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: SHA1 result",
 		  hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
     } else {
 	PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: result",
 		  hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
     }
     if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL)
     	PORT_Free(hashBuf);
     return rv;
 }
 /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(SECOidTag hashAlg,
 		      SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys,
 		      SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand,
 		      SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool bypassPKCS11)
 {
     PRUint8     * hashBuf;
     PRUint8     * pBuf;
     SECStatus     rv 		= SECSuccess;
     unsigned int  bufLen;
     PRUint8       buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8];
     bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + dh_p.len + 2 + dh_g.len + 2 + dh_Ys.len;
     if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) {
     	hashBuf = buf;
     } else {
     	hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
 	if (!hashBuf) {
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     	pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
     memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     	pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
     pBuf[0]  = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len >> 8);
     pBuf[1]  = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len);
     	pBuf += 2;
     memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len);
     	pBuf += dh_p.len;
     pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len >> 8);
     pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len);
     	pBuf += 2;
     memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len);
     	pBuf += dh_g.len;
     pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len >> 8);
     pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len);
     	pBuf += 2;
     memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len);
     	pBuf += dh_Ys.len;
     PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen);
     rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes,
 				   bypassPKCS11);
     PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen));
     if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result",
 		  hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
 	PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result",
 		  hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
     } else {
 	PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result",
 		  hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
     }
     if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL)
     	PORT_Free(hashBuf);
     return rv;
 }
 static void
 ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(SSL3SequenceNumber *num)
 {
     num->low++;
     if (num->low == 0)
 	num->high++;
 }
 /* Called twice, only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */
 static void
 ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat)
 {
     if (mat->write_key != NULL) {
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key);
 	mat->write_key = NULL;
     }
     if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) {
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key);
 	mat->write_mac_key = NULL;
     }
     if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE);
 	mat->write_mac_context = NULL;
     }
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and
 **	       ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs()
 **             ssl3_DestroySSL3Info
 ** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock.
 */
 void
 ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, PRBool freeSrvName)
 {
     PRBool freeit = (PRBool)(!spec->bypassCiphers);
 /*  PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */
     if (spec->destroy) {
 	spec->destroy(spec->encodeContext, freeit);
 	spec->destroy(spec->decodeContext, freeit);
 	spec->encodeContext = NULL; /* paranoia */
 	spec->decodeContext = NULL;
     }
     if (spec->destroyCompressContext && spec->compressContext) {
 	spec->destroyCompressContext(spec->compressContext, 1);
 	spec->compressContext = NULL;
     }
     if (spec->destroyDecompressContext && spec->decompressContext) {
 	spec->destroyDecompressContext(spec->decompressContext, 1);
 	spec->decompressContext = NULL;
     }
     if (freeSrvName && spec->srvVirtName.data) {
         SECITEM_FreeItem(&spec->srvVirtName, PR_FALSE);
     }
     if (spec->master_secret != NULL) {
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret);
 	spec->master_secret = NULL;
     }
     spec->msItem.data = NULL;
     spec->msItem.len  = 0;
     ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client);
     ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server);
     spec->bypassCiphers = PR_FALSE;
     spec->destroy=NULL;
     spec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
     spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
 }
 /* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite.
 ** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material.
 ** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello()
 ** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock.
 ** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock.
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     ssl3CipherSpec *          pwSpec;
     ssl3CipherSpec *          cwSpec;
     ssl3CipherSuite           suite     = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
     SSL3MACAlgorithm          mac;
     SSL3BulkCipher            cipher;
     SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm  kea;
     const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def;
     PRBool                    isTLS;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);  /*******************************/
     pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ss->ssl3.prSpec);
     /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */
     cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
     if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
 	/* SSL records are not being MACed. */
 	cwSpec->version = ss->version;
     }
     pwSpec->version  = ss->version;
     isTLS  = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite));
     suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite);
     if (suite_def == NULL) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
 	return SECFailure;	/* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	/* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */
 	PORT_Assert((suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4) &&
 		    (suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4_40) &&
 		    (suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4_56));
     }
     cipher = suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg;
     kea    = suite_def->key_exchange_alg;
     mac    = suite_def->mac_alg;
     if (mac <= ssl_mac_sha && mac != ssl_mac_null && isTLS)
 	mac += 2;
     ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suite_def;
     ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def   = &kea_defs[kea];
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea);
     pwSpec->cipher_def   = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher];
     PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher);
     pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac];
     PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac);
     ss->sec.keyBits       = pwSpec->cipher_def->key_size        * BPB;
     ss->sec.secretKeyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB;
     ss->sec.cipherType    = cipher;
     pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
     pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
     pwSpec->mac_size = pwSpec->mac_def->mac_size;
     pwSpec->compression_method = ss->ssl3.hs.compression;
     pwSpec->compressContext = NULL;
     pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL;
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);  /*******************************/
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
 #define SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE sizeof(z_stream)
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_MapZlibError(int zlib_error)
 {
     switch (zlib_error) {
     case Z_OK:
         return SECSuccess;
     default:
         return SECFailure;
     }
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_DeflateInit(void *void_context)
 {
     z_stream *context = void_context;
     context->zalloc = NULL;
     context->zfree = NULL;
     context->opaque = NULL;
     return ssl3_MapZlibError(deflateInit(context, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION));
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_InflateInit(void *void_context)
 {
     z_stream *context = void_context;
     context->zalloc = NULL;
     context->zfree = NULL;
     context->opaque = NULL;
     context->next_in = NULL;
     context->avail_in = 0;
     return ssl3_MapZlibError(inflateInit(context));
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_DeflateCompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len,
                      int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
 {
     z_stream *context = void_context;
     if (!inlen) {
         *out_len = 0;
         return SECSuccess;
     }
     context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in;
     context->avail_in = inlen;
     context->next_out = out;
     context->avail_out = maxout;
     if (deflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
     if (context->avail_out == 0) {
         /* We ran out of space! */
         SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Ran out of buffer while compressing",
                     SSL_GETPID()));
         return SECFailure;
     }
     *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_DeflateDecompress(void *void_context, unsigned char *out, int *out_len,
                        int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
 {
     z_stream *context = void_context;
     if (!inlen) {
         *out_len = 0;
         return SECSuccess;
     }
     context->next_in = (unsigned char*) in;
     context->avail_in = inlen;
     context->next_out = out;
     context->avail_out = maxout;
     if (inflate(context, Z_SYNC_FLUSH) != Z_OK) {
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     *out_len = maxout - context->avail_out;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_DestroyCompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused)
 {
     deflateEnd(void_context);
     PORT_Free(void_context);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext(void *void_context, PRBool unused)
 {
     inflateEnd(void_context);
     PORT_Free(void_context);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */
 /* Initialize the compression functions and contexts for the given
  * CipherSpec.  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_InitCompressionContext(ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec)
 {
     /* Setup the compression functions */
     switch (pwSpec->compression_method) {
     case ssl_compression_null:
 	pwSpec->compressor = NULL;
 	pwSpec->decompressor = NULL;
 	pwSpec->compressContext = NULL;
 	pwSpec->decompressContext = NULL;
 	pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = NULL;
 	pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
 	break;
 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB
     case ssl_compression_deflate:
 	pwSpec->compressor = ssl3_DeflateCompress;
 	pwSpec->decompressor = ssl3_DeflateDecompress;
 	pwSpec->compressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE);
 	pwSpec->decompressContext = PORT_Alloc(SSL3_DEFLATE_CONTEXT_SIZE);
 	pwSpec->destroyCompressContext = ssl3_DestroyCompressContext;
 	pwSpec->destroyDecompressContext = ssl3_DestroyDecompressContext;
 	ssl3_DeflateInit(pwSpec->compressContext);
 	ssl3_InflateInit(pwSpec->decompressContext);
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ZLIB */
     default:
 	PORT_Assert(0);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 /* Initialize encryption contexts for pending spec.
  * MAC contexts are set up when computing the mac, not here.
  * Master Secret already is derived in spec->msItem
  * Caller holds Spec write lock.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(sslSocket *ss)
 {
       ssl3CipherSpec  *  pwSpec;
       const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
       void *             serverContext = NULL;
       void *             clientContext = NULL;
       BLapiInitContextFunc initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)NULL;
       int                mode     = 0;
       unsigned int       optArg1  = 0;
       unsigned int       optArg2  = 0;
       PRBool             server_encrypts = ss->sec.isServer;
       SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
       SECStatus          rv;
     PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
     pwSpec        = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     cipher_def    = pwSpec->cipher_def;
     calg = cipher_def->calg;
     if (calg == ssl_calg_aes_gcm) {
 	pwSpec->encode = NULL;
 	pwSpec->decode = NULL;
 	pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
 	pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
 	pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
 	pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCMBypass;
 	ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec);
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     serverContext = pwSpec->server.cipher_context;
     clientContext = pwSpec->client.cipher_context;
     switch (calg) {
     case ssl_calg_null:
 	pwSpec->encode  = Null_Cipher;
 	pwSpec->decode  = Null_Cipher;
         pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
 	goto success;
     case ssl_calg_rc4:
       	initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC4_InitContext;
 	pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) RC4_Encrypt;
 	pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) RC4_Decrypt;
 	pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case ssl_calg_rc2:
       	initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)RC2_InitContext;
 	mode = NSS_RC2_CBC;
 	optArg1 = cipher_def->key_size;
 	pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) RC2_Encrypt;
 	pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) RC2_Decrypt;
 	pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case ssl_calg_des:
       	initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext;
 	mode = NSS_DES_CBC;
 	optArg1 = server_encrypts;
 	pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt;
 	pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt;
 	pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case ssl_calg_3des:
       	initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)DES_InitContext;
 	mode = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
 	optArg1 = server_encrypts;
 	pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) DES_Encrypt;
 	pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) DES_Decrypt;
 	pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case ssl_calg_aes:
       	initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)AES_InitContext;
 	mode = NSS_AES_CBC;
 	optArg1 = server_encrypts;
 	optArg2 = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) AES_Encrypt;
 	pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) AES_Decrypt;
 	pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) AES_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case ssl_calg_camellia:
       	initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)Camellia_InitContext;
 	mode = NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC;
 	optArg1 = server_encrypts;
 	optArg2 = CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Encrypt;
 	pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) Camellia_Decrypt;
 	pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case ssl_calg_seed:
       	initFn = (BLapiInitContextFunc)SEED_InitContext;
 	mode = NSS_SEED_CBC;
 	optArg1 = server_encrypts;
 	optArg2 = SEED_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) SEED_Encrypt;
 	pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) SEED_Decrypt;
 	pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext;
 	break;
     case ssl_calg_idea:
     case ssl_calg_fortezza :
     default:
 	PORT_Assert(0);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	goto bail_out;
     }
     rv = (*initFn)(serverContext,
 		   pwSpec->server.write_key_item.data,
 		   pwSpec->server.write_key_item.len,
 		   pwSpec->server.write_iv_item.data,
 		   mode, optArg1, optArg2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	PORT_Assert(0);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	goto bail_out;
     }
     switch (calg) {
     case ssl_calg_des:
     case ssl_calg_3des:
     case ssl_calg_aes:
     case ssl_calg_camellia:
     case ssl_calg_seed:
 	/* For block ciphers, if the server is encrypting, then the client
 	* is decrypting, and vice versa.
 	*/
         optArg1 = !optArg1;
         break;
     /* kill warnings. */
     case ssl_calg_null:
     case ssl_calg_rc4:
     case ssl_calg_rc2:
     case ssl_calg_idea:
     case ssl_calg_fortezza:
     case ssl_calg_aes_gcm:
         break;
     }
     rv = (*initFn)(clientContext,
 		   pwSpec->client.write_key_item.data,
 		   pwSpec->client.write_key_item.len,
 		   pwSpec->client.write_iv_item.data,
 		   mode, optArg1, optArg2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	PORT_Assert(0);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	goto bail_out;
     }
     pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext;
     pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext;
     ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec);
 success:
     return SECSuccess;
 bail_out:
     return SECFailure;
 }
 #endif
 /* This function should probably be moved to pk11wrap and be named
  * PK11_ParamFromIVAndEffectiveKeyBits
  */
 static SECItem *
 ssl3_ParamFromIV(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mtype, SECItem *iv, CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits)
 {
     SECItem * param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mtype, iv);
     if (param && param->data  && param->len >= sizeof(CK_RC2_PARAMS)) {
 	switch (mtype) {
 	case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
 	case CKM_RC2_ECB:
 	case CKM_RC2_CBC:
 	case CKM_RC2_MAC:
 	case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
 	case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
 	    *(CK_RC2_PARAMS *)param->data = ulEffectiveBits;
 	default: break;
 	}
     }
     return param;
 }
 /* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data
  * which is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |out| and returns
  * its length. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the
  * definition of the AEAD additional data.
  *
  * TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which
  * pseudo-header defintiion to use should be decided based on the version of
  * the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT
  * based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed
  * to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version|
  * argument should be the record's version value.
  */
 static unsigned int
 ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(unsigned char *out,
 			     SSL3SequenceNumber seq_num,
 			     SSL3ContentType type,
 			     PRBool includesVersion,
 			     SSL3ProtocolVersion version,
 			     PRBool isDTLS,
 			     int length)
 {
     out[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 24);
     out[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 16);
     out[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >>  8);
     out[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >>  0);
     out[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >> 24);
     out[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >> 16);
     out[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >>  8);
     out[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >>  0);
     out[8] = type;
     /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */
     if (!includesVersion) {
 	out[9]  = MSB(length);
 	out[10] = LSB(length);
 	return 11;
     }
     /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */
     if (isDTLS) {
 	SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version;
 	dtls_version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version);
 	out[9]  = MSB(dtls_version);
 	out[10] = LSB(dtls_version);
     } else {
 	out[9]  = MSB(version);
 	out[10] = LSB(version);
     }
     out[11] = MSB(length);
     out[12] = LSB(length);
     return 13;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
 	    PRBool doDecrypt,
 	    unsigned char *out,
 	    int *outlen,
 	    int maxout,
 	    const unsigned char *in,
 	    int inlen,
 	    const unsigned char *additionalData,
 	    int additionalDataLen)
 {
     SECItem            param;
     SECStatus          rv = SECFailure;
     unsigned char      nonce[12];
     unsigned int       uOutLen;
     CK_GCM_PARAMS      gcmParams;
     static const int   tagSize = 16;
     static const int   explicitNonceLen = 8;
     /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the
      * nonce is formed. */
     memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, 4);
     if (doDecrypt) {
 	memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen);
 	in += explicitNonceLen;
 	inlen -= explicitNonceLen;
 	*outlen = 0;
     } else {
 	if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
 	    return SECFailure;
         }
 	/* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */
 	memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
 	memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
 	out += explicitNonceLen;
 	maxout -= explicitNonceLen;
 	*outlen = explicitNonceLen;
     }
     param.type = siBuffer;
     param.data = (unsigned char *) &gcmParams;
     param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
     gcmParams.pIv = nonce;
     gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce);
     gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData;  /* const cast */
     gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen;
     gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8;
     if (doDecrypt) {
 	rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, &param, out, &uOutLen,
 			  maxout, in, inlen);
     } else {
 	rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, &param, out, &uOutLen,
 			  maxout, in, inlen);
     }
     *outlen += (int) uOutLen;
     return rv;
 }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_AESGCMBypass(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
 		  PRBool doDecrypt,
 		  unsigned char *out,
 		  int *outlen,
 		  int maxout,
 		  const unsigned char *in,
 		  int inlen,
 		  const unsigned char *additionalData,
 		  int additionalDataLen)
 {
     SECStatus          rv = SECFailure;
     unsigned char      nonce[12];
     unsigned int       uOutLen;
     AESContext        *cx;
     CK_GCM_PARAMS      gcmParams;
     static const int   tagSize = 16;
     static const int   explicitNonceLen = 8;
     /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288#section-3 for details of how the
      * nonce is formed. */
     PORT_Assert(keys->write_iv_item.len == 4);
     if (keys->write_iv_item.len != 4) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv_item.data, 4);
     if (doDecrypt) {
 	memcpy(nonce + 4, in, explicitNonceLen);
 	in += explicitNonceLen;
 	inlen -= explicitNonceLen;
 	*outlen = 0;
     } else {
 	if (maxout < explicitNonceLen) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
 	    return SECFailure;
         }
 	/* Use the 64-bit sequence number as the explicit nonce. */
 	memcpy(nonce + 4, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
 	memcpy(out, additionalData, explicitNonceLen);
 	out += explicitNonceLen;
 	maxout -= explicitNonceLen;
 	*outlen = explicitNonceLen;
     }
     gcmParams.pIv = nonce;
     gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce);
     gcmParams.pAAD = (unsigned char *)additionalData;  /* const cast */
     gcmParams.ulAADLen = additionalDataLen;
     gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8;
     cx = (AESContext *)keys->cipher_context;
     rv = AES_InitContext(cx, keys->write_key_item.data,
 			 keys->write_key_item.len,
 			 (unsigned char *)&gcmParams, NSS_AES_GCM, !doDecrypt,
 			 AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;
     }
     if (doDecrypt) {
 	rv = AES_Decrypt(cx, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
     } else {
 	rv = AES_Encrypt(cx, out, &uOutLen, maxout, in, inlen);
     }
     AES_DestroyContext(cx, PR_FALSE);
     *outlen += (int) uOutLen;
     return rv;
 }
 #endif
 /* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec.
  * Master Secret already is derived.
  * Caller holds Spec write lock.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(sslSocket *ss)
 {
       ssl3CipherSpec  *  pwSpec;
       const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
       PK11Context *      serverContext = NULL;
       PK11Context *      clientContext = NULL;
       SECItem *          param;
       CK_MECHANISM_TYPE  mechanism;
       CK_MECHANISM_TYPE  mac_mech;
       CK_ULONG           macLength;
       CK_ULONG           effKeyBits;
       SECItem            iv;
       SECItem            mac_param;
       SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
     pwSpec        = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     cipher_def    = pwSpec->cipher_def;
     macLength     = pwSpec->mac_size;
     calg          = cipher_def->calg;
     PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
     pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
     pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
     if (calg == calg_aes_gcm) {
 	pwSpec->encode = NULL;
 	pwSpec->decode = NULL;
 	pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
 	pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL;
 	pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL;
 	pwSpec->aead = ssl3_AESGCM;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     /*
     ** Now setup the MAC contexts,
     **   crypto contexts are setup below.
     */
     mac_mech       = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech;
     mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength;
     mac_param.len  = sizeof(macLength);
     mac_param.type = 0;
     pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
 	    mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param);
     if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL)  {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
 	goto fail;
     }
     pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
 	    mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param);
     if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
 	goto fail;
     }
     /*
     ** Now setup the crypto contexts.
     */
     if (calg == calg_null) {
 	pwSpec->encode  = Null_Cipher;
 	pwSpec->decode  = Null_Cipher;
 	pwSpec->destroy = NULL;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
     effKeyBits = cipher_def->key_size * BPB;
     /*
      * build the server context
      */
     iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv;
     iv.len  = cipher_def->iv_size;
     param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits);
     if (param == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE);
     	goto fail;
     }
     serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism,
 				(ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT),
 				pwSpec->server.write_key, param);
     iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len);
     if (iv.data)
     	PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len);
     SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
     if (serverContext == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
     	goto fail;
     }
     /*
      * build the client context
      */
     iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv;
     iv.len  = cipher_def->iv_size;
     param = ssl3_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv, effKeyBits);
     if (param == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE);
     	goto fail;
     }
     clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism,
 				(ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT : CKA_ENCRYPT),
 				pwSpec->client.write_key, param);
     iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len);
     if (iv.data)
     	PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len);
     SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE);
     if (clientContext == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
     	goto fail;
     }
     pwSpec->encode  = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp;
     pwSpec->decode  = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp;
     pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) PK11_DestroyContext;
     pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext;
     pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext;
     serverContext = NULL;
     clientContext = NULL;
     ssl3_InitCompressionContext(pwSpec);
     return SECSuccess;
 fail:
     if (serverContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE);
     if (clientContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(clientContext, PR_TRUE);
     if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) {
     	PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE);
 	pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
     }
     if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) {
     	PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE);
 	pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
     }
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts
  * for the pending Cipher Spec.
  * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange 	(for Full handshake)
  *              ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange	(for Full handshake)
  *              ssl3_HandleServerHello		(for session restart)
  *              ssl3_HandleClientHello		(for session restart)
  * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate.
  * NULL pms means re-use old master_secret.
  *
  * This code is common to the bypass and PKCS11 execution paths.
  * For the bypass case,  pms is NULL.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms)
 {
     ssl3CipherSpec  *  pwSpec;
     ssl3CipherSpec  *  cwSpec;
     SECStatus          rv;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);	/**************************************/
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
     pwSpec        = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     cwSpec        = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
     if (pms || (!pwSpec->msItem.len && !pwSpec->master_secret)) {
 	rv = ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(ss, pms);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto done;  /* err code set by ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret */
 	}
     }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && pwSpec->msItem.len && pwSpec->msItem.data) {
 	/* Double Bypass succeeded in extracting the master_secret */
 	const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
 	PRBool             isTLS   = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen ||
                                 (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
 	pwSpec->bypassCiphers = PR_TRUE;
 	rv = ssl3_KeyAndMacDeriveBypass( pwSpec,
 			     (const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
 			     (const unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
 			     isTLS,
 			     (PRBool)(kea_def->is_limited));
 	if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	    rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsBypass(ss);
 	}
     } else
 #endif
     if (pwSpec->master_secret) {
 	rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(ss);
 	if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	    rv = ssl3_InitPendingContextsPKCS11(ss);
 	}
     } else {
 	PORT_Assert(pwSpec->master_secret);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	rv = SECFailure;
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;
     }
     /* Generic behaviors -- common to all crypto methods */
     if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high = 0;
     } else {
 	if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) {
 	    /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many
 	     * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The
 	     * spec says you should be discarding the connection
 	     * and start over, so not much we can do here. */
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto done;
 	}
 	/* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */
 	pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1;
 	pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high =
 	    pwSpec->epoch << 16;
 	dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords);
     }
     pwSpec->read_seq_num.low = pwSpec->write_seq_num.low = 0;
 done:
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);	/******************************/
     if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
     return rv;
 }
 /*
  * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
  */
 static const unsigned char mac_pad_1 [60] = {
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
 x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
 };
 static const unsigned char mac_pad_2 [60] = {
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
 x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
 };
 /* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord()
 ** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
     ssl3CipherSpec *   spec,
     PRBool             useServerMacKey,
     const unsigned char *header,
     unsigned int       headerLen,
     const SSL3Opaque * input,
     int                inputLength,
     unsigned char *    outbuf,
     unsigned int *     outLength)
 {
     const ssl3MACDef * mac_def;
     SECStatus          rv;
     PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen));
     PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength));
     mac_def = spec->mac_def;
     if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
 	*outLength = 0;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (spec->bypassCiphers) {
 	/* bypass version */
 	const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
 	unsigned int       pad_bytes = 0;
 	PRUint64           write_mac_context[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
 	switch (mac_def->mac) {
 	case ssl_mac_null:
 	    *outLength = 0;
 	    return SECSuccess;
 	case ssl_mac_md5:
 	    pad_bytes = 48;
 	    hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5);
 	    break;
 	case ssl_mac_sha:
 	    pad_bytes = 40;
 	    hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1);
 	    break;
 	case ssl_hmac_md5: /* used with TLS */
 	    hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5);
 	    break;
 	case ssl_hmac_sha: /* used with TLS */
 	    hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1);
 	    break;
 	case ssl_hmac_sha256: /* used with TLS */
 	    hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
 	    break;
 	default:
 	    break;
 	}
 	if (!hashObj) {
 	    PORT_Assert(0);
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
 	    unsigned int tempLen;
 	    unsigned char temp[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
 	    /* compute "inner" part of SSL3 MAC */
 	    hashObj->begin(write_mac_context);
 	    if (useServerMacKey)
 		hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
 				spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data,
 				spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len);
 	    else
 		hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
 				spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data,
 				spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len);
 	    hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_1, pad_bytes);
 	    hashObj->update(write_mac_context, header, headerLen);
 	    hashObj->update(write_mac_context, input, inputLength);
 	    hashObj->end(write_mac_context,    temp, &tempLen, sizeof temp);
 	    /* compute "outer" part of SSL3 MAC */
 	    hashObj->begin(write_mac_context);
 	    if (useServerMacKey)
 		hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
 				spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data,
 				spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len);
 	    else
 		hashObj->update(write_mac_context,
 				spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data,
 				spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len);
 	    hashObj->update(write_mac_context, mac_pad_2, pad_bytes);
 	    hashObj->update(write_mac_context, temp, tempLen);
 	    hashObj->end(write_mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size);
 	    rv = SECSuccess;
 	} else { /* is TLS */
 #define cx ((HMACContext *)write_mac_context)
 	    if (useServerMacKey) {
 		rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj,
 			       spec->server.write_mac_key_item.data,
 			       spec->server.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE);
 	    } else {
 		rv = HMAC_Init(cx, hashObj,
 			       spec->client.write_mac_key_item.data,
 			       spec->client.write_mac_key_item.len, PR_FALSE);
 	    }
 	    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 		HMAC_Begin(cx);
 		HMAC_Update(cx, header, headerLen);
 		HMAC_Update(cx, input, inputLength);
 		rv = HMAC_Finish(cx, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size);
 		HMAC_Destroy(cx, PR_FALSE);
 	    }
 #undef cx
 	}
     } else
 #endif
     {
 	PK11Context *mac_context =
 	    (useServerMacKey ? spec->server.write_mac_context
 	                     : spec->client.write_mac_context);
 	rv  = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context);
 	rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, header, headerLen);
 	rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength);
 	rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size);
     }
     PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
     PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength));
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	rv = SECFailure;
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord()
  * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
  *
  * On entry:
  *   originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
     ssl3CipherSpec *   spec,
     PRBool             useServerMacKey,
     const unsigned char *header,
     unsigned int       headerLen,
     const SSL3Opaque * input,
     int                inputLen,
     int                originalLen,
     unsigned char *    outbuf,
     unsigned int *     outLen)
 {
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE            macType;
     CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params;
     SECItem                      param, inputItem, outputItem;
     SECStatus                    rv;
     PK11SymKey *                 key;
     PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->mac_size);
     PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen);
     if (spec->bypassCiphers) {
 	/* This function doesn't support PKCS#11 bypass. We fallback on the
 	 * non-constant time version. */
 	goto fallback;
     }
     if (spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
 	*outLen = 0;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
     if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
 	macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
     }
     params.macAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech;
     params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen;
     params.pHeader = (unsigned char *) header;  /* const cast */
     params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen;
     param.data = (unsigned char*) &params;
     param.len = sizeof(params);
     param.type = 0;
     inputItem.data = (unsigned char *) input;
     inputItem.len = inputLen;
     inputItem.type = 0;
     outputItem.data = outbuf;
     outputItem.len = *outLen;
     outputItem.type = 0;
     key = spec->server.write_mac_key;
     if (!useServerMacKey) {
 	key = spec->client.write_mac_key;
     }
     rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, &param, &outputItem, &inputItem);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) {
 	    goto fallback;
 	}
 	*outLen = 0;
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
 	return rv;
     }
     PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
     *outLen = outputItem.len;
     return rv;
 fallback:
     /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC expects the MAC to have been removed from the
      * length already. */
     inputLen -= spec->mac_size;
     return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey, header, headerLen,
 				 input, inputLen, outbuf, outLen);
 }
 static PRBool
 ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) {
     PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
     PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE;
     /* we only care if we are doing client auth */
     if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) {
 	return PR_TRUE;
     }
     /* get the slot */
     slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID,
 	                     sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID);
     if (slot == NULL ||
 	!PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
 	sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries     != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) ||
 	sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID     != PK11_GetSlotID(slot)     ||
 	sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID   != PK11_GetModuleID(slot)   ||
 	(PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) {
 	isPresent = PR_FALSE;
     }
     if (slot) {
 	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
     }
     return isPresent;
 }
 /* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *   cwSpec,
 		              PRBool             isServer,
 			      PRBool             isDTLS,
 			      PRBool             capRecordVersion,
                               SSL3ContentType    type,
 		              const SSL3Opaque * pIn,
 		              PRUint32           contentLen,
 		              sslBuffer *        wrBuf)
 {
     const ssl3BulkCipherDef * cipher_def;
     SECStatus                 rv;
     PRUint32                  macLen = 0;
     PRUint32                  fragLen;
     PRUint32  p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0;
     PRUint16                  headerLen;
     int                       ivLen = 0;
     int                       cipherBytes = 0;
     unsigned char             pseudoHeader[13];
     unsigned int              pseudoHeaderLen;
     cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def;
     headerLen = isDTLS ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
     if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
 	cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
 	/* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from
 	 * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically
 	 * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous
 	 * record.
 	 */
 	ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
 	if (ivLen > wrBuf->space - headerLen) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(wrBuf->buf + headerLen, ivLen);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
 	    return rv;
 	}
 	rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext,
 	    wrBuf->buf + headerLen,
 	    &cipherBytes,                       /* output and actual outLen */
 	    ivLen,                              /* max outlen */
 	    wrBuf->buf + headerLen,
 	    ivLen);                             /* input and inputLen*/
 	if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytes != ivLen) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     if (cwSpec->compressor) {
 	int outlen;
 	rv = cwSpec->compressor(
 	    cwSpec->compressContext,
 	    wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen, &outlen,
 	    wrBuf->space - headerLen - ivLen, pIn, contentLen);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    return rv;
 	pIn = wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen;
 	contentLen = outlen;
     }
     pseudoHeaderLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
 	pseudoHeader, cwSpec->write_seq_num, type,
 	cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->version,
 	isDTLS, contentLen);
     PORT_Assert(pseudoHeaderLen <= sizeof(pseudoHeader));
     if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
 	const int nonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size;
 	const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size;
 	if (headerLen + nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > wrBuf->space) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	cipherBytes = contentLen;
 	rv = cwSpec->aead(
 		isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client,
 		PR_FALSE,                                   /* do encrypt */
 		wrBuf->buf + headerLen,                     /* output  */
 		&cipherBytes,                               /* out len */
 		wrBuf->space - headerLen,                   /* max out */
 		pIn, contentLen,                            /* input   */
 		pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     } else {
 	/*
 	 * Add the MAC
 	 */
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, isServer,
 	    pseudoHeader, pseudoHeaderLen, pIn, contentLen,
 	    wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + contentLen, &macLen);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	p1Len   = contentLen;
 	p2Len   = macLen;
 	fragLen = contentLen + macLen;	/* needs to be encrypted */
 	PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024);
 	/*
 	 * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher)
 	 * then Encrypt it
 	 */
 	if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
 	    unsigned char * pBuf;
 	    int             padding_length;
 	    int             i;
 	    oddLen = contentLen % cipher_def->block_size;
 	    /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */
 	    padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 -
 			    ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1));
 	    fragLen += padding_length + 1;
 	    PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0);
 	    /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */
 	    pBuf = &wrBuf->buf[headerLen + ivLen + fragLen - 1];
 	    for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) {
 		*pBuf-- = padding_length;
 	    }
 	    /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */
 	    p2Len = fragLen - p1Len;
 	}
 	if (p1Len < 256) {
 	    oddLen = p1Len;
 	    p1Len = 0;
 	} else {
 	    p1Len -= oddLen;
 	}
 	if (oddLen) {
 	    p2Len += oddLen;
 	    PORT_Assert( (cipher_def->block_size < 2) || \
 			 (p2Len % cipher_def->block_size) == 0);
 	    memmove(wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len, pIn + p1Len,
 		    oddLen);
 	}
 	if (p1Len > 0) {
 	    int cipherBytesPart1 = -1;
 	    rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext,
 		wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen,         /* output */
 		&cipherBytesPart1,                      /* actual outlen */
 		p1Len,                                  /* max outlen */
 		pIn, p1Len);                      /* input, and inputlen */
 	    PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == (int) p1Len);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != (int) p1Len) {
 		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    cipherBytes += cipherBytesPart1;
 	}
 	if (p2Len > 0) {
 	    int cipherBytesPart2 = -1;
 	    rv = cwSpec->encode( cwSpec->encodeContext,
 		wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len,
 		&cipherBytesPart2,          /* output and actual outLen */
 		p2Len,                             /* max outlen */
 		wrBuf->buf + headerLen + ivLen + p1Len,
 		p2Len);                            /* input and inputLen*/
 	    PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == (int) p2Len);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != (int) p2Len) {
 		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    cipherBytes += cipherBytesPart2;
 	}
     }
     PORT_Assert(cipherBytes <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024);
     wrBuf->len    = cipherBytes + headerLen;
     wrBuf->buf[0] = type;
     if (isDTLS) {
 	SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
 	version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(cwSpec->version);
 	wrBuf->buf[1] = MSB(version);
 	wrBuf->buf[2] = LSB(version);
 	wrBuf->buf[3] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 24);
 	wrBuf->buf[4] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >> 16);
 	wrBuf->buf[5] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >>  8);
 	wrBuf->buf[6] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high >>  0);
 	wrBuf->buf[7] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low  >> 24);
 	wrBuf->buf[8] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low  >> 16);
 	wrBuf->buf[9] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low  >>  8);
 	wrBuf->buf[10] = (unsigned char)(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low >>  0);
 	wrBuf->buf[11] = MSB(cipherBytes);
 	wrBuf->buf[12] = LSB(cipherBytes);
     } else {
 	SSL3ProtocolVersion version = cwSpec->version;
 	if (capRecordVersion) {
 	    version = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, version);
 	}
 	wrBuf->buf[1] = MSB(version);
 	wrBuf->buf[2] = LSB(version);
 	wrBuf->buf[3] = MSB(cipherBytes);
 	wrBuf->buf[4] = LSB(cipherBytes);
     }
     ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&cwSpec->write_seq_num);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Process the plain text before sending it.
  * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent
  * 	plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the
  *	output (write) buffer.
  * Returns SECFailure on a hard IO error, memory error, or crypto error.
  * Does NOT return SECWouldBlock.
  *
  * Notes on the use of the private ssl flags:
  * (no private SSL flags)
  *    Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext
  *    If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK,
  *    or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty,
  *    then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf,
  *    and continue to do that for all succssive records until all
  *    bytes are used.
  * ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER
  *    As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces
  *    all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer.
  * ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS)
  *    Forces the use of the provided epoch
  * ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION
  *    Caps the record layer version number of TLS ClientHello to { 3, 1 }
  *    (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore
  *    ClientHello.client_version and use the record layer version number
  *    (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when negotiating protocol versions. In
  *    addition, if the record layer version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 }
  *    (TLS 1.1) or higher, these servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly,
  *    some F5 BIG-IP servers hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a
  *    version greater than { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this
  *    flag to work around such servers.
  */
 PRInt32
 ssl3_SendRecord(   sslSocket *        ss,
                    DTLSEpoch          epoch, /* DTLS only */
                    SSL3ContentType    type,
 		   const SSL3Opaque * pIn,   /* input buffer */
 		   PRInt32            nIn,   /* bytes of input */
 		   PRInt32            flags)
 {
     sslBuffer      *          wrBuf 	  = &ss->sec.writeBuf;
     SECStatus                 rv;
     PRInt32                   totalSent   = 0;
     PRBool                    capRecordVersion;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type),
 		nIn));
     PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
     capRecordVersion = ((flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION) != 0);
     if (capRecordVersion) {
 	/* ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION can only be used with the
 	 * TLS initial ClientHello. */
 	PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss));
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
 	PORT_Assert(type == content_handshake);
 	PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello);
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.initialized == PR_FALSE) {
 	/* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record
 	** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're
 	** trying to send an alert.
 	*/
 	PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert);
 	rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return SECFailure;	/* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
     	}
     }
     /* check for Token Presence */
     if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     while (nIn > 0) {
 	PRUint32  contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
 	unsigned int spaceNeeded;
 	unsigned int numRecords;
 	ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);    /********************************/
 	if (nIn > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV &&
 	    ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
 	    type == content_application_data &&
 	    ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block /* CBC mode */) {
 	    /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record,
 	     * as explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h
 	     */
 	    numRecords = 2;
 	} else {
 	    numRecords = 1;
 	}
 	spaceNeeded = contentLen + (numRecords * SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE);
 	if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
 	    ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->type == type_block) {
 	    spaceNeeded += ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size;
 	}
 	if (spaceNeeded > wrBuf->space) {
 	    rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
 			 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded));
 		goto spec_locked_loser; /* sslBuffer_Grow set error code. */
 	    }
 	}
 	if (numRecords == 2) {
 	    sslBuffer secondRecord;
 	    rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec,
 					       ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss),
 					       capRecordVersion, type, pIn,
 , wrBuf);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	        goto spec_locked_loser;
 	    PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [1/2]:",
 	                   wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len));
 	    secondRecord.buf = wrBuf->buf + wrBuf->len;
 	    secondRecord.len = 0;
 	    secondRecord.space = wrBuf->space - wrBuf->len;
 	    rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec,
 	                                       ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss),
 					       capRecordVersion, type,
 					       pIn + 1, contentLen - 1,
 	                                       &secondRecord);
 	    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	        PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data [2/2]:",
 	                       secondRecord.buf, secondRecord.len));
 	        wrBuf->len += secondRecord.len;
 	    }
 	} else {
 	    if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 		rv = ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss->ssl3.cwSpec,
 						   ss->sec.isServer,
 						   IS_DTLS(ss),
 						   capRecordVersion,
 						   type, pIn,
 						   contentLen, wrBuf);
 	    } else {
 		rv = dtls_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ss, epoch,
 						   !!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH),
 						   type, pIn,
 						   contentLen, wrBuf);
 	    }
 	    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	        PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:",
 	                       wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len));
 	    }
 	}
 spec_locked_loser:
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    return SECFailure;
 	pIn += contentLen;
 	nIn -= contentLen;
 	PORT_Assert( nIn >= 0 );
 	/* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext,
 	 * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet,
 	 * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved.
 	 */
 	if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) ||
 	    (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
 	    rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		/* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    wrBuf->len = 0;	/* All cipher text is saved away. */
 	    if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
 		PRInt32   sent;
 		ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
 		sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
 		if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
 		    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
 		    return SECFailure;
 		}
 		if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
 		    flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
 		}
 	    }
 	} else if (wrBuf->len > 0) {
 	    PRInt32   sent;
 	    ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
 	    sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, wrBuf->buf, wrBuf->len,
 			       flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK);
 	    if (sent < 0) {
 		if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
 		    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
 		    return SECFailure;
 		}
 		/* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */
 		sent = 0;
 	    }
 	    wrBuf->len -= sent;
 	    if (wrBuf->len) {
 		if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 		    /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */
 		    PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
 		    return SECFailure;
 		}
 		/* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and
 		 * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext.
 		 */
 		rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, wrBuf->buf + sent, wrBuf->len);
 		if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		    /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
 		    return SECFailure;
 		}
 	    }
 	}
 	totalSent += contentLen;
     }
     return totalSent;
 }
 #define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024
 /* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record.
  * Returns "len" or SECFailure,   never SECWouldBlock, nor SECSuccess.
  */
 int
 ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in,
 			 PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags)
 {
     PRInt32   totalSent	= 0;
     PRInt32   discarded = 0;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
     /* These flags for internal use only */
     PORT_Assert(!(flags & (ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH |
 			   ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)));
     if (len < 0 || !in) {
 	PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER &&
         !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) {
 	PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
 	PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) {
 	PORT_Assert (in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered));
 	if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) {
 	    PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     	in++;
 	len--;
 	discarded = 1;
     }
     while (len > totalSent) {
 	PRInt32   sent, toSend;
 	if (totalSent > 0) {
 	    /*
 	     * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a
 	     * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in
 	     * the middle of a large application data write.  (See
 	     * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.)
 	     */
 	    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
 	    PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);	/* PR_Yield(); */
 	    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
 	}
 	toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
 	/*
 	 * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require
 	 * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above.
 	 */
 	sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_application_data,
 	                       in + totalSent, toSend, flags);
 	if (sent < 0) {
 	    if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
 		PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
 	    	break;
 	    }
 	    return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
 	}
 	totalSent += sent;
 	if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
 	    /* must be a non-blocking socket */
 	    PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
 	    PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
 	    break;
 	}
     }
     if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
 	/* Must be non-blocking. */
 	PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
 	if (totalSent > 0) {
 	    ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1];
 	}
 	totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1;
 	if (totalSent <= 0) {
 	    PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
 	    totalSent = SECFailure;
 	}
 	return totalSent;
     }
     ss->appDataBuffered = 0;
     return totalSent + discarded;
 }
 /* Attempt to send buffered handshake messages.
  * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock.
  * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
  *
  * Depending on whether we are doing DTLS or not, this either calls
  *
  * - ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages if non-DTLS
  * - dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages if DTLS
  *
  * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(),
  *             ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(),
  *             ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(),
  *             ssl3_SendFinished(),
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
 {
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
         return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
     } else {
         return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
     }
 }
 /* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record.
  * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock.
  * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
  *
  * Called from ssl3_FlushHandshake
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
 {
     static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER |
                                         ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION;
     PRInt32 rv = SECSuccess;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
     if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len)
 	return rv;
     /* only these flags are allowed */
     PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags));
     if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
 	rv = SECFailure;
     } else {
 	rv = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_handshake, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf,
 			     ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags);
     }
     if (rv < 0) {
     	int err = PORT_GetError();
 	PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
 	if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	}
     } else if (rv < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) {
     	/* short write should never happen */
 	PORT_Assert(rv >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	rv = SECFailure;
     } else {
 	rv = SECSuccess;
     }
     /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */
     ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0;
     return rv;
 }
 /*
  * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when
  * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request.
  * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth.
  *         SECSuccess otherwise.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) {
 	if (ss->sec.peerKey != NULL) {
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey);
 	    ss->sec.peerKey = NULL;
 	}
 	CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
 	ss->sec.peerCert = NULL;
     }
     ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
     /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't
      * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no
      * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure
      * an error.  We only do this if we haven't already completed the
      * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we
      * know the server is paying attention to the certificate.
      */
     if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
 	(!ss->firstHsDone &&
 	 (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) {
 	PRFileDesc * lower;
 	if (ss->sec.uncache)
             ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
 	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate);
 	lower = ss->fd->lower;
 #ifdef _WIN32
 	lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND);
 #else
 	lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH);
 #endif
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /************************************************************************
  * Alerts
  */
 /*
 ** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks.
 ** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter	<-
 **              ssl3_HandshakeFailure	<-
 **              ssl3_HandleAlert	<- ssl3_HandleRecord.
 **              ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord
 **              ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <-
 **              ssl3_HandleHelloRequest	<-
 **              ssl3_HandleServerHello	<-
 **              ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <-
 **              ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <-
 **              ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <-
 **              ssl3_HandleClientHello	<-
 **              ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <-
 **              ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <-
 **              ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <-
 **              ssl3_HandleCertificate	<-
 **              ssl3_HandleFinished	<-
 **              ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <-
 **              ssl3_HandleRecord	<-
 **
 */
 SECStatus
 SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc)
 {
     PRUint8 	bytes[2];
     SECStatus	rv;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
     bytes[0] = level;
     bytes[1] = desc;
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     if (level == alert_fatal) {
 	if (!ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.uncache) {
 	    ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
 	}
     }
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
     rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	PRInt32 sent;
 	sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_alert, bytes, 2,
 			       desc == no_certificate
 			       ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0);
 	rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
     }
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     return rv;	/* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */
 }
 /*
  * Send illegal_parameter alert.  Set generic error number.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
     PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
                                    : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER );
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /*
  * Send handshake_Failure alert.  Set generic error number.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
     PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
                                     : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER );
     return SECFailure;
 }
 static void
 ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket * ss, PRErrorCode errCode)
 {
     SSL3AlertDescription desc	= bad_certificate;
     PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS;
     switch (errCode) {
     case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:     desc = unsupported_certificate; break;
     case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_expired;     break;
     case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_revoked;     break;
     case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:
     case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE:
 		                        desc = certificate_unknown;     break;
     case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
 		    desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; break;
     case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
     case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
 		    desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; break;
     case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
 		    desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; break;
     case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE:
     case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID:
     case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
     case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
     default:                            desc = bad_certificate;     break;
     }
     SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d",
 	     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode));
     (void) SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
 }
 /*
  * Send decode_error alert.  Set generic error number.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
 		  ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error
 							: illegal_parameter);
     PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
                                     : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER );
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
 ** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
 {
     SSL3AlertLevel       level;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc;
     int                  error;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     if (buf->len != 2) {
 	(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0];
     desc  = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1];
     buf->len = 0;
     SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d",
         SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
     switch (desc) {
     case close_notify:		ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1;
 		        	error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT;     break;
     case unexpected_message: 	error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT;
 									  break;
     case bad_record_mac: 	error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; 	  break;
     case decryption_failed_RESERVED:
                                 error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT;
     									  break;
     case record_overflow: 	error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT;  break;
     case decompression_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT;
 									  break;
     case handshake_failure: 	error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT;
 			        					  break;
     case no_certificate: 	error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE;	  break;
     case bad_certificate: 	error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; 	  break;
     case unsupported_certificate:error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT;break;
     case certificate_revoked: 	error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; 	  break;
     case certificate_expired: 	error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; 	  break;
     case certificate_unknown: 	error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT;
 			        					  break;
     case illegal_parameter: 	error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT;break;
     case inappropriate_fallback:
         error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
         break;
     /* All alerts below are TLS only. */
     case unknown_ca: 		error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT;       break;
     case access_denied: 	error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT;    break;
     case decode_error: 		error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT;     break;
     case decrypt_error: 	error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT;    break;
     case export_restriction: 	error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT;
     									  break;
     case protocol_version: 	error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; break;
     case insufficient_security: error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT;
     									  break;
     case internal_error: 	error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;   break;
     case user_canceled: 	error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT;    break;
     case no_renegotiation: 	error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; break;
     /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */
     case unsupported_extension:
 			error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT;    break;
     case certificate_unobtainable:
 			error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; break;
     case unrecognized_name:
 			error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;        break;
     case bad_certificate_status_response:
 			error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; break;
     case bad_certificate_hash_value:
 			error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT;      break;
     default: 		error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT;               break;
     }
     if (level == alert_fatal) {
 	if (!ss->opt.noCache) {
 	    if (ss->sec.uncache)
                 ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
 	}
 	if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) &&
 	    (desc == handshake_failure)) {
 	    /* XXX This is a hack.  We're assuming that any handshake failure
 	     * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers.
 	     */
 	    error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
 	}
 	PORT_SetError(error);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) {
     	/* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
 	SECStatus rv;
 	PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
 	rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
 	return rv;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * Change Cipher Specs
  * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone,
  *             ssl3_HandleClientHello,
  * and         ssl3_HandleFinished
  *
  * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
  * and pending write spec pointers.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     PRUint8           change = change_cipher_spec_choice;
     ssl3CipherSpec *  pwSpec;
     SECStatus         rv;
     PRInt32           sent;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
     }
     if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, 0, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1,
 			       ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
 	if (sent < 0) {
 	    return (SECStatus)sent;	/* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
 	}
     } else {
 	rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;
 	}
     }
     /* swap the pending and current write specs. */
     ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);	/**************************************/
     pwSpec                     = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
     ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd ));
     /* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */
     /* If we are really through with the old cipher spec
      * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it.
      */
     if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) {
 	if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	    ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.pwSpec, PR_FALSE/*freeSrvName*/);
 	} else {
 	    /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final
 	     * message got lost */
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = DTLS_FINISHED_TIMER_MS;
 	    dtls_StartTimer(ss, dtls_FinishedTimerCb);
 	}
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
 ** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
  *
  * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
  * and pending write spec pointers.
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
 {
     ssl3CipherSpec *           prSpec;
     SSL3WaitState              ws      = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
     SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     if (ws != wait_change_cipher) {
 	if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	    /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */
 	    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order "
 			"DTLS change_cipher_spec",
 			SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	    buf->len = 0;
 	    return SECSuccess;
 	}
 	(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if(buf->len != 1) {
 	(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0];
     if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) {
 	/* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */
 	(void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     buf->len = 0;
     /* Swap the pending and current read specs. */
     ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);   /*************************************/
     prSpec                    = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
     ss->ssl3.prSpec  = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
     ss->ssl3.crSpec  = prSpec;
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws   = wait_finished;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd ));
     /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec
      * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it.
      */
     if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) {
     	ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE/*freeSrvName*/);
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);   /*************************************/
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* This method uses PKCS11 to derive the MS from the PMS, where PMS
 ** is a PKCS11 symkey. This is used in all cases except the
 ** "triple bypass" with RSA key exchange.
 ** Called from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec.   prSpec is pwSpec.
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms)
 {
     ssl3CipherSpec *  pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     const ssl3KEADef *kea_def= ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
     unsigned char *   cr     = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
     unsigned char *   sr     = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
     PRBool            isTLS  = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen ||
                                 (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
     PRBool            isTLS12=
 	    (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
     /*
      * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
      * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size
      * data into a 48-byte value.
      */
     PRBool    isDH = (PRBool) ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) ||
 	                       (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_ecdh));
     SECStatus         rv = SECFailure;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
     SECItem           params;
     CK_FLAGS          keyFlags;
     CK_VERSION        pms_version;
     CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
     if (isTLS12) {
 	if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256;
 	else master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256;
 	key_derive    = CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256;
 	keyFlags      = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
     } else if (isTLS) {
 	if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
 	else master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
 	key_derive    = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
 	keyFlags      = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
     } else {
 	if (isDH) master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
 	else master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
 	key_derive    = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
 	keyFlags      = 0;
     }
     if (pms || !pwSpec->master_secret) {
 	if (isDH) {
 	    master_params.pVersion                     = NULL;
 	} else {
 	    master_params.pVersion                     = &pms_version;
 	}
 	master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom     = cr;
 	master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
 	master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom     = sr;
 	master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
 	params.data = (unsigned char *) &master_params;
 	params.len  = sizeof master_params;
     }
     if (pms != NULL) {
 #if defined(TRACE)
 	if (ssl_trace >= 100) {
 	    SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms);
 	    if (extractRV == SECSuccess) {
 		SECItem * keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms);
 		if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) {
 		    ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret",
 				 keyData->data, keyData->len);
 		}
 	    }
 	}
 #endif
 	pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive,
 				&params, key_derive, CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
 	if (!isDH && pwSpec->master_secret && ss->opt.detectRollBack) {
 	    SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version;
 	    client_version = pms_version.major << 8 | pms_version.minor;
 	    if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 		client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version);
 	    }
 	    if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) {
 		/* Destroy it.  Version roll-back detected. */
 		PK11_FreeSymKey(pwSpec->master_secret);
 	    	pwSpec->master_secret = NULL;
 	    }
 	}
 	if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 	    /* Generate a faux master secret in the same slot as the old one. */
 	    PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey((PK11SymKey *)pms);
 	    PK11SymKey *   fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot);
 	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	    if (fpms != NULL) {
 		pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms,
 					master_derive, &params, key_derive,
 					CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
 		PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms);
 	    }
 	}
     }
     if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 	/* Generate a faux master secret from the internal slot. */
 	PK11SlotInfo *  slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
 	PK11SymKey *    fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot);
 	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	if (fpms != NULL) {
 	    pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms,
 					master_derive, &params, key_derive,
 					CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
 	    if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 	    	pwSpec->master_secret = fpms; /* use the fpms as the master. */
 		fpms = NULL;
 	    }
 	}
 	if (fpms) {
 	    PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms);
     	}
     }
     if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
 	return rv;
     }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	SECItem * keydata;
 	/* In hope of doing a "double bypass",
 	 * need to extract the master secret's value from the key object
 	 * and store it raw in the sslSocket struct.
 	 */
 	rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pwSpec->master_secret);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;
 	}
 	/* This returns the address of the secItem inside the key struct,
 	 * not a copy or a reference.  So, there's no need to free it.
 	 */
 	keydata = PK11_GetKeyData(pwSpec->master_secret);
 	if (keydata && keydata->len <= sizeof pwSpec->raw_master_secret) {
 	    memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, keydata->data, keydata->len);
 	    pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
 	    pwSpec->msItem.len  = keydata->len;
 	} else {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
 #endif
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret
  * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure.
  *
  * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(),
  * which in turn is called from
  *              sendRSAClientKeyExchange        (for Full handshake)
  *              sendDHClientKeyExchange         (for Full handshake)
  *              ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange    (for Full handshake)
  *              ssl3_HandleServerHello          (for session restart)
  *              ssl3_HandleClientHello          (for session restart)
  * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock.
  * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that.
  *
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     ssl3CipherSpec *         pwSpec     = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     const ssl3KEADef *       kea_def    = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
     unsigned char *   cr     = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
     unsigned char *   sr     = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
     PRBool            isTLS  = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen ||
                                 (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
     PRBool            isTLS12=
 	    (PRBool)(isTLS && pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
     /* following variables used in PKCS11 path */
     const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def;
     PK11SlotInfo *         slot   = NULL;
     PK11SymKey *           symKey = NULL;
     void *                 pwArg  = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
     int                    keySize;
     CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params;
     CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT    returnedKeys;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE      key_derive;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE      bulk_mechanism;
     SSLCipherAlgorithm     calg;
     SECItem                params;
     PRBool         skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == calg_null);
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
     if (!pwSpec->master_secret) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /*
      * generate the key material
      */
     key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size           * BPB;
     key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size* BPB;
     key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits  = cipher_def->iv_size        * BPB;
     if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
 	pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
 	/* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */
 	key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
 	memset(pwSpec->client.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
 	memset(pwSpec->server.write_iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
     }
     key_material_params.bIsExport = (CK_BBOOL)(kea_def->is_limited);
     key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom     = cr;
     key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
     key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom     = sr;
     key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
     key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial         = &returnedKeys;
     returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv;
     returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv;
     keySize                = cipher_def->key_size;
     if (skipKeysAndIVs) {
 	keySize                             = 0;
         key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0;
         key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits  = 0;
     	returnedKeys.pIVClient              = NULL;
     	returnedKeys.pIVServer              = NULL;
     }
     calg = cipher_def->calg;
     PORT_Assert(     alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
     bulk_mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
     params.data    = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params;
     params.len     = sizeof(key_material_params);
     if (isTLS12) {
 	key_derive    = CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256;
     } else if (isTLS) {
 	key_derive    = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
     } else {
 	key_derive    = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
     }
     /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and
      * DERIVE by DEFAULT */
     symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, &params,
                          bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize);
     if (!symKey) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we
      * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both
      * mac's map to the same keytype.
      */
     slot  = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey);
     PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */
     pwSpec->client.write_mac_key =
     	PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
 	    CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
     if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL ) {
 	goto loser;	/* loser sets err */
     }
     pwSpec->server.write_mac_key =
     	PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
 	    CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
     if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL ) {
 	goto loser;	/* loser sets err */
     }
     if (!skipKeysAndIVs) {
 	pwSpec->client.write_key =
 		PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
 		     bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
 	if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL ) {
 	    goto loser;	/* loser sets err */
 	}
 	pwSpec->server.write_key =
 		PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive,
 		     bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg);
 	if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL ) {
 	    goto loser;	/* loser sets err */
 	}
     }
     PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
     return SECSuccess;
 loser:
     if (symKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
     ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in
  * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown);
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone);
 	if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
 	    /* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
 	     * then this will need to be updated. */
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
 	    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone = (void (*)(void *, void *))SHA256_Clone;
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single;
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->begin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
 	} else {
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo;
 	    MD5_Begin((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx);
 	    SHA1_Begin((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
 	}
     } else
 #endif
     {
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha);
 	/*
 	 * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these
 	 * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots
 	 * that the master secret will wind up in ...
 	 */
 	if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
 	    /* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
 	     * then this will need to be updated. */
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA256);
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single;
 	    if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    /* Create a backup SHA-1 hash for a potential client auth
 	     * signature.
 	     *
 	     * In TLS 1.2, ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes always uses the
 	     * handshake hash function (SHA-256). If the server or the client
 	     * does not support SHA-256 as a signature hash, we can either
 	     * maintain a backup SHA-1 handshake hash or buffer all handshake
 	     * messages.
 	     */
 	    if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
 		ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
 		if (ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash == NULL) {
 		    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		    return SECFailure;
 		}
 		if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) != SECSuccess) {
 		    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		    return SECFailure;
 		}
 	    }
 	} else {
 	    /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or
 	     * created successfully. */
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
 		PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
 		ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo;
 	    if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) {
 	if (ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
 				       ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) !=
 	    SECSuccess) {
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes",
 	    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd ));
     ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown;
     ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj = NULL;
     ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone = NULL;
 #endif
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5,PR_TRUE);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha,PR_TRUE);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /*
  * Handshake messages
  */
 /* Called from	ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes()
 **		ssl3_AppendHandshake()
 **		ssl3_StartHandshakeHash()
 **		ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
 **		ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage()
 ** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock.
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b,
 			   unsigned int l)
 {
     SECStatus  rv = SECSuccess;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     /* We need to buffer the handshake messages until we have established
      * which handshake hash function to use. */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) {
 	return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages, b, l);
     }
     PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "handshake hash input:", b, l));
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->update(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, b, l);
 	} else {
 	    MD5_Update((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, b, l);
 	    SHA1_Update((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, b, l);
 	}
 	return rv;
     }
 #endif
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
 	rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    return rv;
 	}
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) {
 	    rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, b, l);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		return rv;
 	    }
 	}
     } else {
 	rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    return rv;
 	}
 	rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    return rv;
 	}
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /**************************************************************************
  * Append Handshake functions.
  * All these functions set appropriate error codes.
  * Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code.
  **************************************************************************/
 SECStatus
 ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes)
 {
     unsigned char *  src  = (unsigned char *)void_src;
     int              room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len;
     SECStatus        rv;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); /* protects sendBuf. */
     if (!bytes)
     	return SECSuccess;
     if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) {
 	rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH,
 		 PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes)));
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    return rv;	/* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
 	room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len;
     }
     PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char*)void_src, bytes));
     rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes);
     if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	return rv;	/* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */
     while (bytes > room) {
 	if (room > 0)
 	    PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src,
 	                room);
 	ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room;
 	rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;	/* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
 	}
 	bytes -= room;
 	src += room;
 	room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space;
 	PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0);
     }
     PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes);
     ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     PRUint8   b[4];
     PRUint8 * p = b;
     switch (lenSize) {
       case 4:
 	*p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff;
       case 3:
 	*p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff;
       case 2:
 	*p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff;
       case 1:
 	*p = num & 0xff;
     }
     SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID()));
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize);
     return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
 }
 SECStatus
 ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
     sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Opaque *src, PRInt32 bytes, PRInt32 lenSize)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     PORT_Assert((bytes < (1<<8) && lenSize == 1) ||
 	      (bytes < (1L<<16) && lenSize == 2) ||
 	      (bytes < (1L<<24) && lenSize == 3));
     SSL_TRC(60,("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID()));
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
     }
     SSL_TRC(60, ("data:"));
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes);
     return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
 }
 SECStatus
 ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it.
      * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call
      * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary.
      */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;
 	}
     }
     SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s",
     	SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t)));
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	/* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the
 	 * transmission code, if necessary */
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
 	}
 	ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++;
 	/* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
 	}
 	/* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
 	}
     }
     return rv;		/* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
 }
 /* ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm appends the serialisation of
  * |sigAndHash| to the current handshake message. */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(
 	sslSocket *ss, const SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm* sigAndHash)
 {
     unsigned char serialized[2];
     serialized[0] = ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm(sigAndHash->hashAlg);
     if (serialized[0] == 0) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     serialized[1] = sigAndHash->sigAlg;
     return ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, serialized, sizeof(serialized));
 }
 /**************************************************************************
  * Consume Handshake functions.
  *
  * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks,
  * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock
  **************************************************************************/
 /* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
  * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v".
  * Reduces *length by bytes.  Advances *b by bytes.
  *
  * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert,
  * and has set a generic error code.  The caller should probably
  * override the generic error code by setting another.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b,
 		      PRUint32 *length)
 {
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) {
 	return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
     }
     PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes);
     PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
     *b      += bytes;
     *length -= bytes;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
  * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an
  * integer in network byte order.  Returns the received value.
  * Reduces *length by bytes.  Advances *b by bytes.
  *
  * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure.
  * This value is indistinguishable from the equivalent received value.
  * Only positive numbers are to be received this way.
  * Thus, the largest value that may be sent this way is 0x7fffffff.
  * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
  */
 PRInt32
 ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b,
 			    PRUint32 *length)
 {
     PRUint8  *buf = *b;
     int       i;
     PRInt32   num = 0;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( bytes <= sizeof num);
     if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) {
 	return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
     }
     PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
     for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
 	num = (num << 8) + buf[i];
     *b      += bytes;
     *length -= bytes;
     return num;
 }
 /* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is
  * *length bytes long.  The first value is a number whose size is "bytes"
  * bytes long.  The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value
  * of the first number received.  The latter byte-string, and its length,
  * is returned in the SECItem i.
  *
  * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure.
  * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
  *
  * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11.  All callers of this function make copies
  * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here
  * is simply wasteful.  So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to
  * point to the values in the buffer **b.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRInt32 bytes,
 			      SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length)
 {
     PRInt32   count;
     PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3);
     i->len  = 0;
     i->data = NULL;
     count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, b, length);
     if (count < 0) { 		/* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */
     	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (count > 0) {
 	if ((PRUint32)count > *length) {
 	    return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
 	}
 	i->data = *b;
 	i->len  = count;
 	*b      += count;
 	*length -= count;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* tlsHashOIDMap contains the mapping between TLS hash identifiers and the
  * SECOidTag used internally by NSS. */
 static const struct {
     int tlsHash;
     SECOidTag oid;
 } tlsHashOIDMap[] = {
     { tls_hash_md5, SEC_OID_MD5 },
     { tls_hash_sha1, SEC_OID_SHA1 },
     { tls_hash_sha224, SEC_OID_SHA224 },
     { tls_hash_sha256, SEC_OID_SHA256 },
     { tls_hash_sha384, SEC_OID_SHA384 },
     { tls_hash_sha512, SEC_OID_SHA512 }
 };
 /* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value.
  * If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned.
  *
  * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
 SECOidTag
 ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(int hashFunc)
 {
     unsigned int i;
     for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(tlsHashOIDMap); i++) {
 	if (hashFunc == tlsHashOIDMap[i].tlsHash) {
 	    return tlsHashOIDMap[i].oid;
 	}
     }
     return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
 }
 /* ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm converts an OID to a TLS hash algorithm
  * identifier. If the hash is not recognised, zero is returned.
  *
  * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
 static int
 ssl3_OIDToTLSHashAlgorithm(SECOidTag oid)
 {
     unsigned int i;
     for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(tlsHashOIDMap); i++) {
 	if (oid == tlsHashOIDMap[i].oid) {
 	    return tlsHashOIDMap[i].tlsHash;
 	}
     }
     return 0;
 }
 /* ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType returns the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm
  * identifier for a given KeyType. */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(KeyType keyType,
 				     TLSSignatureAlgorithm *out)
 {
     switch (keyType) {
     case rsaKey:
 	*out = tls_sig_rsa;
 	return SECSuccess;
     case dsaKey:
 	*out = tls_sig_dsa;
 	return SECSuccess;
     case ecKey:
 	*out = tls_sig_ecdsa;
 	return SECSuccess;
     default:
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
 }
 /* ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate returns the TLS 1.2 signature
  * algorithm identifier for the given certificate. */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate(CERTCertificate *cert,
 					 TLSSignatureAlgorithm *out)
 {
     SECKEYPublicKey *key;
     KeyType keyType;
     key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
     if (key == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
     	return SECFailure;
     }
     keyType = key->keyType;
     SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
     return ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(keyType, out);
 }
 /* ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency checks that the signature
  * algorithm identifier in |sigAndHash| is consistent with the public key in
  * |cert|. If so, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise, PORT_SetError is called
  * and SECFailure is returned. */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
 	const SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm *sigAndHash, CERTCertificate* cert)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     TLSSignatureAlgorithm sigAlg;
     rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForCertificate(cert, &sigAlg);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;
     }
     if (sigAlg != sigAndHash->sigAlg) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm reads a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
  * structure from |b| and puts the resulting value into |out|. |b| and |length|
  * are updated accordingly.
  *
  * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss,
 				      SSL3Opaque **b,
 				      PRUint32 *length,
 				      SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm *out)
 {
     unsigned char bytes[2];
     SECStatus rv;
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, bytes, sizeof(bytes), b, length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;
     }
     out->hashAlg = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(bytes[0]);
     if (out->hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     out->sigAlg = bytes[1];
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /**************************************************************************
  * end of Consume Handshake functions.
  **************************************************************************/
 /* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point.
  * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify
  *             ssl3_SendFinished
  *             ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage
  *
  * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock.
  * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock.
  *	(There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.)
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *     ss,
                             ssl3CipherSpec *spec,   /* uses ->master_secret */
 			    SSL3Hashes *    hashes, /* output goes here. */
 			    PRUint32        sender)
 {
     SECStatus     rv        = SECSuccess;
     PRBool        isTLS     = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     unsigned int  outLength;
     SSL3Opaque    md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
     SSL3Opaque    sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 &&
 	ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
 	/* compute them without PKCS11 */
 	PRUint64      sha_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
 	if (!spec->msItem.data) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone(sha_cx, ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->end(sha_cx, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
 				 sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA-256: result", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
 	/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
 	 * then this will need to be updated. */
 	hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
     } else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	/* compute them without PKCS11 */
 	PRUint64      md5_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
 	PRUint64      sha_cx[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
 #define md5cx ((MD5Context *)md5_cx)
 #define shacx ((SHA1Context *)sha_cx)
 	if (!spec->msItem.data) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	MD5_Clone (md5cx,  (MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx);
 	SHA1_Clone(shacx, (SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
 	if (!isTLS) {
 	    /* compute hashes for SSL3. */
 	    unsigned char s[4];
 	    s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24);
 	    s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16);
 	    s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8);
 	    s[3] = (unsigned char)sender;
 	    if (sender != 0) {
 		MD5_Update(md5cx, s, 4);
 		PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4));
 	    }
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
 			    mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
 	    MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
 	    MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
 	    MD5_End(md5cx, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength));
 	    if (sender != 0) {
 		SHA1_Update(shacx, s, 4);
 		PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4));
 	    }
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
 			    mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
 	    SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
 	    SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
 	    SHA1_End(shacx, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength));
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
 			    mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH));
 	    MD5_Begin(md5cx);
 	    MD5_Update(md5cx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
 	    MD5_Update(md5cx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
 	    MD5_Update(md5cx, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH);
 	}
 	MD5_End(md5cx, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
 	if (!isTLS) {
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
 			    mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH));
 	    SHA1_Begin(shacx);
 	    SHA1_Update(shacx, spec->msItem.data, spec->msItem.len);
 	    SHA1_Update(shacx, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
 	    SHA1_Update(shacx, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH);
 	}
 	SHA1_End(shacx, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
 	hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
 #undef md5cx
 #undef shacx
     } else
 #endif
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
 	/* compute hashes with PKCS11 */
 	PK11Context *h;
 	unsigned int  stateLen;
 	unsigned char stackBuf[1024];
 	unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
 	if (!spec->master_secret) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
 	stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf,
 					 sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen);
 	if (stateBuf == NULL) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    goto tls12_loser;
 	}
 	rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
 			       sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto tls12_loser;
 	}
 	/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
 	 * then this will need to be updated. */
 	hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA256;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
 tls12_loser:
 	if (stateBuf) {
 	    if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    if (stateBuf != stackBuf) {
 		PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen);
 	    }
 	}
     } else {
 	/* compute hashes with PKCS11 */
 	PK11Context * md5;
 	PK11Context * sha       = NULL;
 	unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL;
 	unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL;
 	unsigned int  md5StateLen, shaStateLen;
 	unsigned char md5StackBuf[256];
 	unsigned char shaStackBuf[512];
 	if (!spec->master_secret) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf,
 					    sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen);
 	if (md5StateBuf == NULL) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5;
 	shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf,
 					    sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen);
 	if (shaStateBuf == NULL) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
 	if (!isTLS) {
 	    /* compute hashes for SSL3. */
 	    unsigned char s[4];
 	    s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24);
 	    s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16);
 	    s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8);
 	    s[3] = (unsigned char)sender;
 	    if (sender != 0) {
 		rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4);
 		PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4));
 	    }
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
 			  mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5,spec->master_secret);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
 	    PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 		goto loser;
 	    }
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength));
 	    if (sender != 0) {
 		rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4);
 		PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4));
 	    }
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1,
 			  mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
 	    PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 		goto loser;
 	    }
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength));
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
 			  mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size));
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH));
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH);
 	}
 	rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
 	PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
 	if (!isTLS) {
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2,
 			  mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size));
 	    PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH));
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha,spec->master_secret);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size);
 	    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH);
 	}
 	rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
 	PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
 	hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
 	rv = SECSuccess;
     loser:
 	if (md5StateBuf) {
 	    if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen)
 		 != SECSuccess)
 	    {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) {
 		PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen);
 	    }
 	}
 	if (shaStateBuf) {
 	    if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen)
 		 != SECSuccess)
 	    {
 		ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 		rv = SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) {
 		PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen);
 	    }
 	}
     }
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeBackupHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss,
 				  SSL3Hashes * hashes) /* output goes here. */
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( !ss->sec.isServer );
     PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single );
     rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
 			  sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     hashes->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
 loser:
     PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE);
     ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL;
     return rv;
 }
 /*
  * SSL 2 based implementations pass in the initial outbound buffer
  * so that the handshake hash can contain the included information.
  *
  * Called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() in sslcon.c
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_StartHandshakeHash(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char * buf, int length)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);  /**************************************/
     rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;		/* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;
     }
     PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     PORT_Memcpy(
 	&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES],
 	&ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge,
 	SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
     rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buf, length);
     /* if it failed, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes has set the error code. */
 done:
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);  /**************************************/
     return rv;
 }
 /**************************************************************************
  * end of Handshake Hash functions.
  * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes.
  **************************************************************************/
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(),
  *             ssl3_RedoHandshake()
  *             ssl2_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session)
  *             dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE)
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool resending)
 {
     sslSessionID *   sid;
     ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec;
     SECStatus        rv;
     int              i;
     int              length;
     int              num_suites;
     int              actual_count = 0;
     PRBool           isTLS = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool           requestingResume = PR_FALSE, fallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE;
     PRInt32          total_exten_len = 0;
     unsigned         paddingExtensionLen;
     unsigned         numCompressionMethods;
     PRInt32          flags;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
 		ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
     rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;		/* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; /* Must be reset every handshake */
     PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || !resending);
     SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
     ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
     /* We might be starting a session renegotiation in which case we should
      * clear previous state.
      */
     PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
     rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;
     }
     /*
      * During a renegotiation, ss->clientHelloVersion will be used again to
      * work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled.
      */
     if (ss->firstHsDone) {
 	if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
 	    ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup
      * handles expired entries and other details.
      * XXX If we've been called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake, then
      * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful.
      */
     sid = (ss->opt.noCache) ? NULL
 	    : ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url);
     /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists,
      * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ...
      * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds
      * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc.
      */
     if (sid) {
 	PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE;
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
 	    /* Session key was wrapped, which means it was using PKCS11, */
 	    PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid && !ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 		slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
 					 sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
 	    }
 	    if (slot == NULL) {
 	       sidOK = PR_FALSE;
 	    } else {
 		PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL;
 		if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
 		    ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot,
 						sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
 						sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
 						sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
 						ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL) ) {
 		    sidOK = PR_FALSE;
 		}
 		if (wrapKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
 		PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 		slot = NULL;
 	    }
 	}
 	/* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that
 	** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been
 	** removed, etc.
 	*/
 	if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) {
 	    sidOK = PR_FALSE;
 	}
 	/* TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246) Appendix E says:
 	 *   Whenever a client already knows the highest protocol known to
 	 *   a server (for example, when resuming a session), it should
 	 *   initiate the connection in that native protocol.
 	 * So we pass sid->version to ssl3_NegotiateVersion() here, except
 	 * when renegotiating.
 	 *
 	 * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
 	 * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
 	 * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
 	 * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
 	 * continue to use the client_version used in the initial
 	 * ClientHello when renegotiating.
 	 */
 	if (sidOK) {
 	    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
 		/*
 		 * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still
 		 * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that
 		 * sid->version is bounded within
 		 * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we
 		 * can't use sid.
 		 */
 		if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min &&
 		    sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) {
 		    ss->version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
 		} else {
 		    sidOK = PR_FALSE;
 		}
 	    } else {
 		if (ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, sid->version,
 					  PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) {
 		    sidOK = PR_FALSE;
 		}
 	    }
 	}
 	if (!sidOK) {
 	    SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok );
 	    if (ss->sec.uncache)
                 (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid);
 	    ssl_FreeSID(sid);
 	    sid = NULL;
 	}
     }
     if (sid) {
 	requestingResume = PR_TRUE;
 	SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits );
 	PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
 		      sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength));
 	ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy;
     } else {
 	SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses );
 	/*
 	 * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
 	 * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
 	 * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
 	 * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
 	 * continue to use the client_version used in the initial
 	 * ClientHello when renegotiating.
 	 */
 	if (ss->firstHsDone) {
 	    ss->version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
 	} else {
 	    rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED,
 				       PR_TRUE);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess)
 		return rv;	/* error code was set */
 	}
 	sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
 	if (!sid) {
 	    return SECFailure;	/* memory error is set */
         }
     }
     isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
     cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
     if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
 	/* SSL records are not being MACed. */
 	cwSpec->version = ss->version;
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
     if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) {
 	ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);	/* decrement ref count, free if zero */
     }
     ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
     ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
     /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */
     if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
 	PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled");
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
     	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* how many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */
     num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
     if (!num_suites)
     	return SECFailure;	/* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */
     /* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0.  On initial handshake, prepend SCSV,
      * only if TLS is disabled.
      */
     if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) {
 	/* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders,
 	 * to suppress sending of empty RI extension.
 	 */
 	ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE;
     }
     /* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to
      * prevent races with other resumption connections that receive a
      * NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced.
      * Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it
      * is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold
      * the lock across the calls to ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders.
      */
     if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
         PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
     }
     if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) {
 	PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535; /* 2^16 - 1 */
 	PRInt32  extLen;
 	extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, NULL);
 	if (extLen < 0) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	maxBytes        -= extLen;
 	total_exten_len += extLen;
 	if (total_exten_len > 0)
 	    total_exten_len += 2;
     }
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     if (!total_exten_len || !isTLS) {
 	/* not sending the elliptic_curves and ec_point_formats extensions */
     	ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, NULL); /* disable all ECC suites */
     }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
     }
     /* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */
     num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE);
     if (!num_suites) {
     	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
     	return SECFailure;	/* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */
     }
     fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && (!requestingResume ||
 						  ss->version < sid->version);
     /* make room for SCSV */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
 	++num_suites;
     }
     if (fallbackSCSV) {
 	++num_suites;
     }
     /* count compression methods */
     numCompressionMethods = 0;
     for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) {
 	if (compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i]))
 	    numCompressionMethods++;
     }
     length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH +
 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) +
 + num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) +
 + numCompressionMethods + total_exten_len;
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	length += 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.cookieLen;
     }
     /* A padding extension may be included to ensure that the record containing
      * the ClientHello doesn't have a length between 256 and 511 bytes
      * (inclusive). Initial, ClientHello records with such lengths trigger bugs
      * in F5 devices.
      *
      * This is not done for DTLS nor for renegotiation. */
     if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && isTLS && !ss->firstHsDone) {
         paddingExtensionLen = ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(length);
         total_exten_len += paddingExtensionLen;
         length += paddingExtensionLen;
     } else {
         paddingExtensionLen = 0;
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     if (ss->firstHsDone) {
 	/* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around
 	 * the Windows SChannel bug described above. */
 	PORT_Assert(ss->version == ss->clientHelloVersion);
     }
     ss->clientHelloVersion = ss->version;
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	PRUint16 version;
 	version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2);
     } else {
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2);
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     if (!resending) { /* Don't re-generate if we are in DTLS re-sending mode */
 	rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return rv;	/* err set by GetNewRandom. */
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
                               SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     if (sid)
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
 	    ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
     else
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
 	    ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie, ss->ssl3.hs.cookieLen, 1);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
 	/* Add the actual SCSV */
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,
 					sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
 	}
 	actual_count++;
     }
     if (fallbackSCSV) {
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV,
 					sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
 	}
 	actual_count++;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
 	ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
 	if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &ss->vrange)) {
 	    actual_count++;
 	    if (actual_count > num_suites) {
 		if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 		/* set error card removal/insertion error */
 		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite,
 					    sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 		return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
 	    }
 	}
     }
     /* if cards were removed or inserted between count_cipher_suites and
      * generating our list, detect the error here rather than send it off to
      * the server.. */
     if (actual_count != num_suites) {
 	/* Card removal/insertion error */
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, numCompressionMethods, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) {
 	if (!compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i]))
 	    continue;
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, compressions[i], 1);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
 	}
     }
     if (total_exten_len) {
 	PRUint32 maxBytes = total_exten_len - 2;
 	PRInt32  extLen;
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, maxBytes, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
 	extLen = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, maxBytes, NULL);
 	if (extLen < 0) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	maxBytes -= extLen;
 	extLen = ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(ss, paddingExtensionLen, maxBytes);
 	if (extLen < 0) {
 	    if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); }
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	maxBytes -= extLen;
 	PORT_Assert(!maxBytes);
     }
     if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
         PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
     }
     if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) {
         SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes);
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
 	/* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */
 	TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
 	xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
 	    ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn;
     }
     flags = 0;
     if (!ss->firstHsDone && !IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_CAP_RECORD_VERSION;
     }
     rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello;
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 Hello Request.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
     SECStatus     rv;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello)
 	return SECSuccess;
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) {
 	(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
 	ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
 	rv = SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation);
 	ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (sid) {
 	if (ss->sec.uncache)
             ss->sec.uncache(sid);
 	ssl_FreeSID(sid);
 	ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
     }
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
     rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, PR_FALSE);
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
     return rv;
 }
 #define UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM 0x7fffffff
 static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = {
     CKM_DES3_ECB,
     CKM_CAST5_ECB,
     CKM_DES_ECB,
     CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS,
     CKM_IDEA_ECB,
     CKM_CAST3_ECB,
     CKM_CAST_ECB,
     CKM_RC5_ECB,
     CKM_RC2_ECB,
     CKM_CDMF_ECB,
     CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
     CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64,
     CKM_AES_ECB,
     CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB,
     CKM_SEED_ECB,
     UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM
 };
 static int
 ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
 {
     const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *pMech = wrapMechanismList;
     while (mech != *pMech && *pMech != UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) {
     	++pMech;
     }
     return (*pMech == UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) ? -1
                                               : (pMech - wrapMechanismList);
 }
 static PK11SymKey *
 ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(
 	SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk,
 	SECKEYPrivateKey *        svrPrivKey,
 	SSL3KEAType               exchKeyType,
 	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE         masterWrapMech,
 	void *                    pwArg)
 {
     PK11SymKey *             unwrappedWrappingKey  = NULL;
     SECItem                  wrappedKey;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     PK11SymKey *             Ks;
     SECKEYPublicKey          pubWrapKey;
     ECCWrappedKeyInfo        *ecWrapped;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     /* found the wrapping key on disk. */
     PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech);
     PORT_Assert(pWswk->exchKeyType      == exchKeyType);
     if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech ||
 	pWswk->exchKeyType      != exchKeyType) {
 	goto loser;
     }
     wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
     wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
     wrappedKey.len  = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen;
     PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
     switch (exchKeyType) {
     case kt_rsa:
 	unwrappedWrappingKey =
 	    PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey,
 				 masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case kt_ecdh:
         /*
          * For kt_ecdh, we first create an EC public key based on
          * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next,
          * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and
          * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
          * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e.,
          * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key.
          *
          * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined
          * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
          */
         ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
         PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
             ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
         if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
             ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
             PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
             goto loser;
         }
         pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey;
         pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size;
         pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
         pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var;
         pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
         pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var +
             ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
         wrappedKey.len  = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen;
         wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
             ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
         /* Derive Ks using ECDH */
         Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
 				   NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
 				   CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
         if (Ks == NULL) {
             goto loser;
         }
         /*  Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */
         unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL,
 						 &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech,
 						 CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
         PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
         break;
 #endif
     default:
 	/* Assert? */
 	SET_ERROR_CODE
 	goto loser;
     }
 loser:
     return unwrappedWrappingKey;
 }
 /* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of
  * SymKey pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap
  * the master secrets.  There is one key for each KEA type.  These Symkeys
  * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache.
  */
 typedef struct {
     PK11SymKey *      symWrapKey[kt_kea_size];
 } ssl3SymWrapKey;
 static PZLock *          symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
 static ssl3SymWrapKey    symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS];
 SECStatus ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void)
 {
     if (symWrapKeysLock) {
         PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock);
         symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
         return SECSuccess;
     }
     PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 SECStatus
 SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void)
 {
     int             i, j;
     if (!symWrapKeysLock)
     	return SECSuccess;	/* lock was never initialized */
     PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
     /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */
     for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) {
     	for (j = 0; j < kt_kea_size; ++j) {
 	    PK11SymKey **   pSymWrapKey;
 	    pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j];
 	    if (*pSymWrapKey) {
 		PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey);
 	    	*pSymWrapKey = NULL;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
     ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks();
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void)
 {
     symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
     return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
 }
 /* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array.
  * If that fails, look for one on disk.
  * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk,
  * Put the new key in the in-memory array.
  */
 static PK11SymKey *
 getWrappingKey( sslSocket *       ss,
 		PK11SlotInfo *    masterSecretSlot,
 		SSL3KEAType       exchKeyType,
                 CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech,
 	        void *            pwArg)
 {
     SECKEYPrivateKey *       svrPrivKey;
     SECKEYPublicKey *        svrPubKey             = NULL;
     PK11SymKey *             unwrappedWrappingKey  = NULL;
     PK11SymKey **            pSymWrapKey;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE        asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
     int                      length;
     int                      symWrapMechIndex;
     SECStatus                rv;
     SECItem                  wrappedKey;
     SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     PK11SymKey *      Ks = NULL;
     SECKEYPublicKey   *pubWrapKey = NULL;
     SECKEYPrivateKey  *privWrapKey = NULL;
     ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     svrPrivKey  = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].SERVERKEY;
     PORT_Assert(svrPrivKey != NULL);
     if (!svrPrivKey) {
     	return NULL;	/* why are we here?!? */
     }
     symWrapMechIndex = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech);
     PORT_Assert(symWrapMechIndex >= 0);
     if (symWrapMechIndex < 0)
     	return NULL;	/* invalid masterWrapMech. */
     pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[exchKeyType];
     ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE);
     PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
     unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey;
     if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) {
 	if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) {
 	    unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
 	    goto done;
 	}
 	/* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
 	*pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
     }
     /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */
     /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */
     if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, exchKeyType, &wswk)) {
     	/* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */
 	unwrappedWrappingKey =
 	    ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType,
                                      masterWrapMech, pwArg);
 	if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
 	    goto install;
 	}
     }
     if (!masterSecretSlot) 	/* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */
     	goto loser;
     length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech);
     /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
      * It's ambiguous.
      */
     unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL,
                                        length, pwArg);
     if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) {
     	goto loser;
     }
     /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey,
      * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key.
      */
     PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk);	/* eliminate UMRs. */
     if (ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair) {
 	svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKeyPair->pubKey;
     }
     if (svrPubKey == NULL) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;
     }
     wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
     wrappedKey.len  = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
     wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
     PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
     if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey)
     	goto loser;
     /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */
     switch (exchKeyType) {
     case kt_rsa:
 	asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
 	rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey,
 	                        unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case kt_ecdh:
 	/*
 	 * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH
 	 * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and
 	 * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
 	 * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks,
 	 * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate
 	 * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all
 	 * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in
 	 * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as
 	 * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
 	 */
 	PORT_Assert(svrPubKey->keyType == ecKey);
 	if (svrPubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
 	    /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto ec_cleanup;
 	}
 	privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(
 	    &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL);
 	if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) {
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto ec_cleanup;
 	}
 	/* Set the key size in bits */
 	if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) {
 	    pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey);
 	}
 	PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
 	    pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
 	if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
 	    pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto ec_cleanup;
 	}
 	/* Derive Ks using ECDH */
 	Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
 				   NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
 				   CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
 	if (Ks == NULL) {
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto ec_cleanup;
 	}
 	ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *) (wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
 	ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size;
 	ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len;
 	PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
 	    pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len);
 	ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
 	PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen,
 		    pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
 		    pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
 	wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN -
 	    (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen);
 	wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
 	    ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
 	/* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */
 	rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks,
 			     unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto ec_cleanup;
 	}
 	/* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer
 	 * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset
 	 */
 	ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len;
 ec_cleanup:
 	if (privWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey);
 	if (pubWrapKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey);
 	if (Ks) PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
 	asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech;
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     default:
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	break;
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;
     }
     PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM);
     wswk.symWrapMechanism  = masterWrapMech;
     wswk.symWrapMechIndex  = symWrapMechIndex;
     wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism;
     wswk.exchKeyType       = exchKeyType;
     wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen  = wrappedKey.len;
     /* put it on disk. */
     /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set,
      * then abandon the value we just computed and
      * use the one we got from the disk.
      */
     if (ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk)) {
     	/* somebody beat us to it.  The original contents of our wswk
 	 * has been replaced with the content on disk.  Now, discard
 	 * the key we just created and unwrap this new one.
 	 */
     	PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
 	unwrappedWrappingKey =
 	    ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType,
                                      masterWrapMech, pwArg);
     }
 install:
     if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
 	*pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
     }
 loser:
 done:
     PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
     return unwrappedWrappingKey;
 }
 /* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2|
  * bytes to |out|. */
 static void
 hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length)
 {
     static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
     unsigned int i;
     for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
 	*(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4];
 	*(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15];
     }
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
 /* Presently, this always uses PKCS11.  There is no bypass for this. */
 static SECStatus
 sendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey)
 {
     PK11SymKey *	pms 		= NULL;
     SECStatus           rv    		= SECFailure;
     SECItem 		enc_pms 	= {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     PRBool              isTLS;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     /* Generate the pre-master secret ...  */
     ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL);
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
     if (pms == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;
     }
     /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */
     enc_pms.len  = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
     enc_pms.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len);
     if (enc_pms.data == NULL) {
 	goto loser;	/* err set by PORT_Alloc */
     }
     /* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */
     rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;
     }
     if (ssl_keylog_iob) {
 	SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms);
 	if (extractRV == SECSuccess) {
 	    SECItem * keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms);
 	    if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) {
 #ifdef TRACE
 		if (ssl_trace >= 100) {
 		    ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret",
 				 keyData->data, keyData->len);
 		}
 #endif
 		if (ssl_keylog_iob && enc_pms.len >= 8 && keyData->len == 48) {
 		    /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */
 		    /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the
 		     * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to
 		     * fwrite. */
 		    char buf[4 + 8*2 + 1 + 48*2 + 1];
 		    strcpy(buf, "RSA ");
 		    hexEncode(buf + 4, enc_pms.data, 8);
 		    buf[20] = ' ';
 		    hexEncode(buf + 21, keyData->data, 48);
 		    buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
 		    fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob);
 		    fflush(ssl_keylog_iob);
 		}
 	    }
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss,  pms);
     PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL;
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange,
 				    isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 : enc_pms.len);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     if (isTLS) {
     	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2);
     } else {
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len);
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     rv = SECSuccess;
 loser:
     if (enc_pms.data != NULL) {
 	PORT_Free(enc_pms.data);
     }
     if (pms != NULL) {
     	PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
 /* Presently, this always uses PKCS11.  There is no bypass for this. */
 static SECStatus
 sendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey)
 {
     PK11SymKey *	pms 		= NULL;
     SECStatus           rv    		= SECFailure;
     PRBool              isTLS;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	target;
     SECKEYDHParams	dhParam;		/* DH parameters */
     SECKEYPublicKey	*pubKey = NULL;		/* Ephemeral DH key */
     SECKEYPrivateKey	*privKey = NULL;	/* Ephemeral DH key */
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     /* Copy DH parameters from server key */
     if (svrPubKey->keyType != dhKey) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
 	goto loser;
     }
     dhParam.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data;
     dhParam.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
     dhParam.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data;
     dhParam.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len;
     /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */
     privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL);
     if (!privKey || !pubKey) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	    goto loser;
     }
     PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:",
 					pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
 					pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len));
     if (isTLS) target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
     else target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
     /* Determine the PMS */
     pms = PK11_PubDerive(privKey, svrPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL,
 			    CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL);
     if (pms == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;
     }
     SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
     privKey = NULL;
     rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss,  pms);
     PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL;
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange,
 					pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len + 2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
 					pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
 					pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len, 2);
     SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
     pubKey = NULL;
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;	/* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
     }
     rv = SECSuccess;
 loser:
     if(pms) PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
     if(privKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
     if(pubKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECKEYPublicKey *	serverKey 	= NULL;
     SECStatus 		rv 		= SECFailure;
     PRBool              isTLS;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) {
 	serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert);
 	if (serverKey == NULL) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     } else {
 	serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey;
 	ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */
     }
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     /* enforce limits on kea key sizes. */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited) {
 	int keyLen = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(serverKey);	/* bytes */
 	if (keyLen * BPB > ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->key_size_limit) {
 	    if (isTLS)
 		(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, export_restriction);
 	    else
 		(void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
 	    goto loser;
 	}
     }
     ss->sec.keaType    = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
     ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey);
     switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
     case kt_rsa:
 	rv = sendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
 	break;
     case kt_dh:
 	rv = sendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case kt_ecdh:
 	rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     default:
 	/* got an unknown or unsupported Key Exchange Algorithm.  */
 	SEND_ALERT
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
 	break;
     }
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 loser:
     if (serverKey)
     	SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey);
     return rv;	/* err code already set. */
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus     rv		= SECFailure;
     PRBool        isTLS;
     PRBool        isTLS12;
     SECItem       buf           = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SSL3Hashes    hashes;
     KeyType       keyType;
     unsigned int  len;
     SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single &&
 	ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) {
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeBackupHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes);
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash);
     } else {
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;	/* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */
     }
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
     keyType = ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey->keyType;
     rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey, &buf, isTLS);
     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	PK11SlotInfo * slot;
 	sslSessionID * sid   = ss->sec.ci.sid;
     	/* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing.
 	** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this.
 	** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail.
 	*/
 	slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
 	sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries     = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot);
 	sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID     = PK11_GetSlotID(slot);
 	sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID   = PK11_GetModuleID(slot);
 	sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid      = PR_TRUE;
 	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
     }
     SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
     ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;	/* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */
     }
     len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0);
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, len);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake */
     }
     if (isTLS12) {
 	rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(keyType,
 						  &sigAndHash.sigAlg);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto done;
 	}
 	sigAndHash.hashAlg = hashes.hashAlg;
 	rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto done; 	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake */
     }
 done:
     if (buf.data)
 	PORT_Free(buf.data);
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 ServerHello message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     sslSessionID *sid		= ss->sec.ci.sid;
     PRInt32       temp;		/* allow for consume number failure */
     PRBool        suite_found   = PR_FALSE;
     int           i;
     int           errCode	= SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
     SECStatus     rv;
     SECItem       sidBytes 	= {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     PRBool        sid_match;
     PRBool        isTLS		= PR_FALSE;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc   = illegal_parameter;
     SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake",
     	SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.initialized );
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) {
         errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO;
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */
     if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
        CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
        ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) {
        CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
        ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) {
        SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
        ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
     }
     temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
     if (temp < 0) {
     	goto loser; 	/* alert has been sent */
     }
     version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	/* RFC 4347 required that you verify that the server versions
 	 * match (Section 4.2.1) in the HelloVerifyRequest and the
 	 * ServerHello.
 	 *
 	 * RFC 6347 suggests (SHOULD) that servers always use 1.0
 	 * in HelloVerifyRequest and allows the versions not to match,
 	 * especially when 1.2 is being negotiated.
 	 *
 	 * Therefore we do not check for matching here.
 	 */
 	version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(version);
 	if (version == 0) {  /* Insane version number */
             goto alert_loser;
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_FALSE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
 						   : handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	desc = internal_error;
 	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
 	ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	goto loser; 	/* alert has been sent */
     }
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	goto loser; 	/* alert has been sent */
     }
     if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
 	if (isTLS)
 	    desc = decode_error;
 	goto alert_loser;	/* malformed. */
     }
     /* find selected cipher suite in our list. */
     temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
     if (temp < 0) {
     	goto loser; 	/* alert has been sent */
     }
     ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
     for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
 	ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
 	if (temp == suite->cipher_suite) {
 	    SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
 	    if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange)) {
 		/* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is
 		 * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here
 		 * in order to give a more precise error code. */
 		if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(temp, &vrange)) {
 		    desc    = handshake_failure;
 		    errCode = SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION;
 		    goto alert_loser;
 		}
 		break;	/* failure */
 	    }
 	    suite_found = PR_TRUE;
 	    break;	/* success */
 	}
     }
     if (!suite_found) {
     	desc    = handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp;
     ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def    = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef((ssl3CipherSuite)temp);
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def);
     if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) {
     	PORT_SetError(errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	goto loser;	/* we don't send alerts for our screw-ups. */
     }
     /* find selected compression method in our list. */
     temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length);
     if (temp < 0) {
     	goto loser; 	/* alert has been sent */
     }
     suite_found = PR_FALSE;
     for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) {
 	if (temp == compressions[i]) {
 	    if (!compressionEnabled(ss, compressions[i])) {
 		break;	/* failure */
 	    }
 	    suite_found = PR_TRUE;
 	    break;	/* success */
     	}
     }
     if (!suite_found) {
     	desc    = handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.compression = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp;
     /* Note that if !isTLS and the extra stuff is not extensions, we
      * do NOT goto alert_loser.
      * There are some old SSL 3.0 implementations that do send stuff
      * after the end of the server hello, and we deliberately ignore
      * such stuff in the interest of maximal interoperability (being
      * "generous in what you accept").
      * Update: Starting in NSS 3.12.6, we handle the renegotiation_info
      * extension in SSL 3.0.
      */
     if (length != 0) {
 	SECItem extensions;
 	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2, &b, &length);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) {
 	    if (isTLS)
 		goto alert_loser;
 	} else {
 	    rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &extensions.data,
 					    &extensions.len);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess)
 		goto alert_loser;
 	}
     }
     if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
          (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection ||
 	 ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) &&
 	!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
 	desc = handshake_failure;
 	errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED
 	                          : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */
     desc    = handshake_failure;
     /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the
      * key exchange algorithm. */
     rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto alert_loser;	/* error code is set. */
     }
     /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or
      * not and if so it may match the one we sent.
      * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so...
      * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error.
      */
     sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes.len > 0 &&
 	sidBytes.len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength &&
 	!PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len));
     if (sid_match &&
 	sid->version == ss->version &&
 	sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite == ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) do {
 	ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
 	SECItem       wrappedMS;   /* wrapped master secret. */
 	ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm;
 	ss->sec.authKeyBits   = sid->authKeyBits;
 	ss->sec.keaType       = sid->keaType;
 	ss->sec.keaKeyBits    = sid->keaKeyBits;
 	/* 3 cases here:
 	 * a) key is wrapped (implies using PKCS11)
 	 * b) key is unwrapped, but we're still using PKCS11
 	 * c) key is unwrapped, and we're bypassing PKCS11.
 	 */
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
 	    PK11SlotInfo *slot;
 	    PK11SymKey *  wrapKey;     /* wrapping key */
 	    CK_FLAGS      keyFlags      = 0;
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 	    if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 		/* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a
 		** bypass socket.
 		*/
 		break;
 	    }
 #endif
 	    /* unwrap master secret with PKCS11 */
 	    slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
 				     sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
 	    if (slot == NULL) {
 		break;		/* not considered an error. */
 	    }
 	    if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) {
 		PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 		break;		/* not considered an error. */
 	    }
 	    wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
 				      sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
 				      sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
 				      ss->pkcs11PinArg);
 	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	    if (wrapKey == NULL) {
 		break;		/* not considered an error. */
 	    }
 	    if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {	/* isTLS */
 		keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
 	    }
 	    wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	    wrappedMS.len  = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
 	    pwSpec->master_secret =
 		PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
 			    NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
 			    CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags);
 	    errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	    PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
 	    if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 		break;	/* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */
 	    }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 	} else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	    /* MS is not wrapped */
 	    wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	    wrappedMS.len  = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
 	    memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len);
 	    pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
 	    pwSpec->msItem.len  = wrappedMS.len;
 #endif
 	} else {
 	    /* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */
 	    /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */
 	    PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
 	    wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	    wrappedMS.len  = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
 	    pwSpec->master_secret =
 		PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
 				  PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT,
 				  &wrappedMS, NULL);
 	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	    if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 		break;
 	    }
 	}
 	/* Got a Match */
 	SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits );
 	/* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */
 	if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello)
 	    SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes );
 	if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
 	else
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
 	/* copy the peer cert from the SID */
 	if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
 	    ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
 	}
 	/* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */
 	rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss,  NULL);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto alert_loser;	/* err code was set */
 	}
 	return SECSuccess;
     } while (0);
     if (sid_match)
 	SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok );
     else
 	SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses );
     /* throw the old one away */
     sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE;
     if (ss->sec.uncache)
         (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid);
     ssl_FreeSID(sid);
     /* get a new sid */
     ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
     if (sid == NULL) {
 	goto alert_loser;	/* memory error is set. */
     }
     sid->version = ss->version;
     sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
     PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len);
     ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws         = wait_server_cert;
     return SECSuccess;
 alert_loser:
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
 loser:
     errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /* ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne returns true iff |mpint|, taken as an unsigned,
  * big-endian integer is > 1 */
 static PRBool
 ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne(const SECItem* mpint) {
     unsigned char firstNonZeroByte = 0;
     unsigned int i;
     for (i = 0; i < mpint->len; i++) {
 	if (mpint->data[i]) {
 	    firstNonZeroByte = mpint->data[i];
 	    break;
 	}
     }
     if (firstNonZeroByte == 0)
 	return PR_FALSE;
     if (firstNonZeroByte > 1)
 	return PR_TRUE;
     /* firstNonZeroByte == 1, therefore mpint > 1 iff the first non-zero byte
      * is followed by another byte. */
     return (i < mpint->len - 1);
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     PLArenaPool *    arena     = NULL;
     SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey   = NULL;
     PRBool           isTLS, isTLS12;
     SECStatus        rv;
     int              errCode   = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc  = illegal_parameter;
     SSL3Hashes       hashes;
     SECItem          signature = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
     sigAndHash.hashAlg = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key &&
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert) {
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
     switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
     case kt_rsa: {
 	SECItem          modulus   = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
 	SECItem          exponent  = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &modulus, 2, &b, &length);
     	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
     	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &exponent, 2, &b, &length);
     	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
 	if (isTLS12) {
 	    rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length,
 						       &sigAndHash);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto loser;	/* malformed or unsupported. */
 	    }
 	    rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
 		    &sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto loser;
 	    }
 	}
     	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length);
     	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
     	if (length != 0) {
 	    if (isTLS)
 		desc = decode_error;
 	    goto alert_loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
 	/* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */
 	/* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */
     	desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
     	/*
      	 *  check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy
      	 */
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, modulus, exponent,
 					  &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
 					  &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
 					  &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode =
 	    	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
         rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature,
 				    isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)  {
 	    errCode =
 	    	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer
 	 * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate
 	 * pkcs11 slots and ID's.
 	 */
     	arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
 	if (arena == NULL) {
 	    goto no_memory;
 	}
     	peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey);
     	if (peerKey == NULL) {
             PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
 	    goto no_memory;
 	}
 	peerKey->arena              = arena;
 	peerKey->keyType            = rsaKey;
 	peerKey->pkcs11Slot         = NULL;
 	peerKey->pkcs11ID           = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.modulus,        &modulus) ||
 	    SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.publicExponent, &exponent))
 	{
             PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
 	    goto no_memory;
         }
     	ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey;
     	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
     	return SECSuccess;
     }
     case kt_dh: {
 	SECItem          dh_p      = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
 	SECItem          dh_g      = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
 	SECItem          dh_Ys     = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length);
     	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
 	if (dh_p.len < 512/8) {
 	    errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY;
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
     	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length);
     	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
 	if (dh_g.len > dh_p.len || !ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne(&dh_g))
 	    goto alert_loser;
     	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length);
     	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
 	if (dh_Ys.len > dh_p.len || !ssl3_BigIntGreaterThanOne(&dh_Ys))
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	if (isTLS12) {
 	    rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length,
 						       &sigAndHash);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto loser;	/* malformed or unsupported. */
 	    }
 	    rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
 		    &sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto loser;
 	    }
 	}
     	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length);
     	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
     	if (length != 0) {
 	    if (isTLS)
 		desc = decode_error;
 	    goto alert_loser;		/* malformed. */
 	}
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len));
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len));
 	PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len));
 	/* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */
 	/* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */
     	desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
     	/*
      	 *  check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy
      	 */
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg, dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys,
 					  &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
 					  &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
 					  &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode =
 	    	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
         rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature,
 				    isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)  {
 	    errCode =
 	    	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer
 	 * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate
 	 * pkcs11 slots and ID's.
 	 */
     	arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
 	if (arena == NULL) {
 	    goto no_memory;
 	}
     	ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey);
     	if (peerKey == NULL) {
 	    goto no_memory;
 	}
 	peerKey->arena              = arena;
 	peerKey->keyType            = dhKey;
 	peerKey->pkcs11Slot         = NULL;
 	peerKey->pkcs11ID           = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
 	if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime,        &dh_p) ||
 	    SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base,         &dh_g) ||
 	    SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue,  &dh_Ys))
 	{
             PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
 	    goto no_memory;
         }
     	ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey;
     	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
     	return SECSuccess;
     }
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case kt_ecdh:
 	rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
 	return rv;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     default:
     	desc    = handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
 	break;		/* goto alert_loser; */
     }
 alert_loser:
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
 loser:
     PORT_SetError( errCode );
     return SECFailure;
 no_memory:	/* no-memory error has already been set. */
     ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /*
  * Returns the TLS signature algorithm for the client authentication key and
  * whether it is an RSA or DSA key that may be able to sign only SHA-1 hashes.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ExtractClientKeyInfo(sslSocket *ss,
 			  TLSSignatureAlgorithm *sigAlg,
 			  PRBool *preferSha1)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     SECKEYPublicKey *pubk;
     pubk = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
     if (pubk == NULL) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto done;
     }
     rv = ssl3_TLSSignatureAlgorithmForKeyType(pubk->keyType, sigAlg);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;
     }
     /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that
      * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older
      * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and
      * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must
      * be SHA-1.
      */
     if (pubk->keyType == rsaKey || pubk->keyType == dsaKey) {
 	*preferSha1 = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(pubk) <= 128;
     } else {
 	*preferSha1 = PR_FALSE;
     }
 done:
     if (pubk)
 	SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubk);
     return rv;
 }
 /* Destroys the backup handshake hash context if we don't need it. Note that
  * this function selects the hash algorithm for client authentication
  * signatures; ssl3_SendCertificateVerify uses the presence of the backup hash
  * to determine whether to use SHA-1 or SHA-256. */
 static void
 ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(sslSocket *ss,
 					   const SECItem *algorithms)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     TLSSignatureAlgorithm sigAlg;
     PRBool preferSha1;
     PRBool supportsSha1 = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool supportsSha256 = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool needBackupHash = PR_FALSE;
     unsigned int i;
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     /* Backup handshake hash is not supported in PKCS #11 bypass mode. */
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash);
 	return;
     }
 #endif
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash);
     /* Determine the key's signature algorithm and whether it prefers SHA-1. */
     rv = ssl3_ExtractClientKeyInfo(ss, &sigAlg, &preferSha1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto done;
     }
     /* Determine the server's hash support for that signature algorithm. */
     for (i = 0; i < algorithms->len; i += 2) {
 	if (algorithms->data[i+1] == sigAlg) {
 	    if (algorithms->data[i] == tls_hash_sha1) {
 		supportsSha1 = PR_TRUE;
 	    } else if (algorithms->data[i] == tls_hash_sha256) {
 		supportsSha256 = PR_TRUE;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     /* If either the server does not support SHA-256 or the client key prefers
      * SHA-1, leave the backup hash. */
     if (supportsSha1 && (preferSha1 || !supportsSha256)) {
 	needBackupHash = PR_TRUE;
     }
 done:
     if (!needBackupHash) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL;
     }
 }
 typedef struct dnameNode {
     struct dnameNode *next;
     SECItem           name;
 } dnameNode;
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 Certificate Request message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     PLArenaPool *        arena       = NULL;
     dnameNode *          node;
     PRInt32              remaining;
     PRBool               isTLS       = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool               isTLS12     = PR_FALSE;
     int                  i;
     int                  errCode     = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST;
     int                  nnames      = 0;
     SECStatus            rv;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc        = illegal_parameter;
     SECItem              cert_types  = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SECItem              algorithms  = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     CERTDistNames        ca_list;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request &&
     	ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) {
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL);
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL);
     PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL);
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess)
     	goto loser;		/* malformed, alert has been sent */
     if (isTLS12) {
 	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &b, &length);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed, alert has been sent */
 	/* An empty or odd-length value is invalid.
 	 *    SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
 	 *      supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
 	 */
 	if (algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0)
 	    goto alert_loser;
     }
     arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (arena == NULL)
     	goto no_mem;
     remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
     if (remaining < 0)
     	goto loser;	 	/* malformed, alert has been sent */
     if ((PRUint32)remaining > length)
 	goto alert_loser;
     ca_list.head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode);
     if (node == NULL)
     	goto no_mem;
     while (remaining > 0) {
 	PRInt32 len;
 	if (remaining < 2)
 	    goto alert_loser;	/* malformed */
 	node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
 	if (len <= 0)
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed, alert has been sent */
 	remaining -= 2;
 	if (remaining < len)
 	    goto alert_loser;	/* malformed */
 	node->name.data = b;
 	b         += len;
 	length    -= len;
 	remaining -= len;
 	nnames++;
 	if (remaining <= 0)
 	    break;		/* success */
 	node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode);
 	node = node->next;
 	if (node == NULL)
 	    goto no_mem;
     }
     ca_list.nnames = nnames;
     ca_list.names  = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, nnames);
     if (nnames > 0 && ca_list.names == NULL)
         goto no_mem;
     for(i = 0, node = (dnameNode*)ca_list.head;
 	i < nnames;
 	i++, node = node->next) {
 	ca_list.names[i] = node->name;
     }
     if (length != 0)
         goto alert_loser;   	/* malformed */
     desc = no_certificate;
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done;
     if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) {
 	/* XXX Should pass cert_types and algorithms in this call!! */
 	rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg,
 						 ss->fd, &ca_list,
 						 &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
 						 &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
     } else {
 	rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */
     }
     switch (rv) {
     case SECWouldBlock:	/* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */
 	ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(ss);
 	break;	/* not an error */
     case SECSuccess:
         /* check what the callback function returned */
         if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) {
             /* we are missing either the key or cert */
             if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) {
                 /* got a cert, but no key - free it */
                 CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
                 ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
             }
             if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey) {
                 /* got a key, but no cert - free it */
                 SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
                 ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
             }
             goto send_no_certificate;
         }
 	/* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause
 	 * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate.
 	 */
 	ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert(
 					ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
 					certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE);
 	if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) {
 	    CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
 	    ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
 	    ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
 	    goto send_no_certificate;
 	}
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
 	    ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(ss, &algorithms);
 	}
 	break;	/* not an error */
     case SECFailure:
     default:
 send_no_certificate:
 	if (isTLS) {
 	    ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE;
 	} else {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate);
 	}
 	rv = SECSuccess;
 	break;
     }
     goto done;
 no_mem:
     rv = SECFailure;
     PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
     goto done;
 alert_loser:
     if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter)
     	desc = decode_error;
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
 loser:
     PORT_SetError(errCode);
     rv = SECFailure;
 done:
     if (arena != NULL)
     	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending );
     PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart );
     if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) {
 	SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start",
 		    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     } else {
 	PRBool maybeFalseStart;
 	SECStatus rv;
 	/* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
 	 * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
 	 * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
 	 * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */
         ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
         maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10;
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	if (!maybeFalseStart) {
 	    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher",
 			SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	} else {
 	    rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd,
 					     ss->canFalseStartCallbackData,
 					     &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
 	    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 		SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s",
 			    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
 			    ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"));
 	    } else {
 		SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)",
 			    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
 			    PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError())));
 	    }
 	    return rv;
 	}
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 PRBool
 ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     PRBool result;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
     case wait_new_session_ticket:
         result = PR_TRUE;
         break;
     case wait_change_cipher:
         result = !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn);
         break;
     default:
         result = PR_FALSE;
         break;
     }
     return result;
 }
 static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 Server Hello Done message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus     rv;
     SSL3WaitState ws          = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (ws != wait_hello_done  &&
         ws != wait_server_cert &&
 	ws != wait_server_key  &&
 	ws != wait_cert_request) {
 	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss);
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone and ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
  *
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     PRBool sendClientCert;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert &&
 		     ss->ssl3.clientCertChain  != NULL &&
 		     ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL;
     if (!sendClientCert &&
 	ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single &&
 	ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash) {
 	/* Don't need the backup handshake hash. */
 	PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash, PR_TRUE);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.backupHash = NULL;
     }
     /* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before
      * sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client
      * certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the
      * domain we are connecting to.
      *
      * XXX: We should do the same for the NPN extension, but for that we
      * need an option to give the application the ability to leak the NPN
      * information to get better performance.
      *
      * During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive
      * application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate;
      * i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher
      * specs agreed upon for that handshake. During a renegotiation, we may
      * continue sending and receiving application data during the handshake
      * interleaved with the handshake records. If we were to send the client's
      * second round for a renegotiation before the server's certificate was
      * authenticated, then the application data sent/received after this point
      * would be using cipher spec that hadn't been authenticated. By waiting
      * until the server's certificate has been authenticated during
      * renegotiations, we ensure that renegotiations have the same property
      * as initial handshakes; i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake
      * before using the cipher specs agreed upon for that handshake for
      * application data.
      */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
 	PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget");
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending &&
 	(sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) {
 	SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
 		    " certificate authentication is still pending.",
 		    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound;
 	return SECWouldBlock;
     }
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);		/*******************************/
     if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) {
 	ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE;
 	rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss);
 	/* Don't send verify */
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;	/* error code is set. */
     	}
     } else if (sendClientCert) {
 	rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;	/* error code is set. */
     	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	goto loser;	/* err is set. */
     }
     if (sendClientCert) {
 	rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;	/* err is set. */
         }
     }
     rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;	/* err code was set. */
     }
     /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in
      * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information
      * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart
      * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from
      * the functions that depend on this being set.
      */
     ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
     if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
 	/* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
 	 * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
 	 */
 	rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;	/* err code was set. */
 	}
 	if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
 	    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
 		/* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
 		 * false starting before we try to flush the client second
 		 * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully
 		 * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished,
 		 * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that
 		 * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being
 		 * done before its false start callback is called.
 		 */
 		ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
 		rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
 		ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
 		if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		    goto loser;
 		}
 	    } else {
 		/* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished
 		 * message are racing each other. If the certificate
 		 * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in
 		 * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
 		 */
 		SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because"
 			    " certificate authentication is still pending.",
 			    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	    }
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;	/* err code was set. */
     }
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);		/*******************************/
     if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
     else
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
     PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss));
     return SECSuccess;
 loser:
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
     return rv;
 }
 /*
  * Routines used by servers
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
 		ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake */
     }
     rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * Called from:
  *	ssl3_HandleClientHello()
  */
 static SECComparison
 ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2)
 {
     if (!name1 != !name2) {
         return SECLessThan;
     }
     if (!name1) {
         return SECEqual;
     }
     if (name1->type != name2->type) {
         return SECLessThan;
     }
     return SECITEM_CompareItem(name1, name2);
 }
 /* Sets memory error when returning NULL.
  * Called from:
  *	ssl3_SendClientHello()
  *	ssl3_HandleServerHello()
  *	ssl3_HandleClientHello()
  *	ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
  */
 sslSessionID *
 ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server)
 {
     sslSessionID *sid;
     sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID);
     if (sid == NULL)
     	return sid;
     if (is_server) {
         const SECItem *  srvName;
         SECStatus        rv = SECSuccess;
         ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);	/********************************/
         srvName = &ss->ssl3.prSpec->srvVirtName;
         if (srvName->len && srvName->data) {
             rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName);
         }
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             PORT_Free(sid);
             return NULL;
         }
     }
     sid->peerID		= (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID);
     sid->urlSvrName	= (ss->url    == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url);
     sid->addr           = ss->sec.ci.peer;
     sid->port           = ss->sec.ci.port;
     sid->references     = 1;
     sid->cached         = never_cached;
     sid->version        = ss->version;
     sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE;
     sid->u.ssl3.policy         = SSL_ALLOWED;
     sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = NULL;
     sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = NULL;
     if (is_server) {
 	SECStatus rv;
 	int       pid = SSL_GETPID();
 	sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES;
 	sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0]    = (pid >> 8) & 0xff;
 	sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1]    =  pid       & 0xff;
 	rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2,
 	                         SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES -2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_FreeSID(sid);
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
 	    return NULL;
     	}
     }
     return sid;
 }
 /* Called from:  ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
     SECStatus         rv;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
     rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err code is set. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code is set. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code is set. */
     }
     /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello,
      * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello().
      */
     kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
     ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_FALSE;
     if (kea_def->is_limited && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa) {
 	/* see if we can legally use the key in the cert. */
 	int keyLen;  /* bytes */
 	keyLen = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(
 			    ss->serverCerts[kea_def->exchKeyType].SERVERKEY);
 	if (keyLen > 0 &&
 	    keyLen * BPB <= kea_def->key_size_limit ) {
 	    /* XXX AND cert is not signing only!! */
 	    /* just fall through and use it. */
 	} else if (ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL) {
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_TRUE;
 	    rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		return rv;	/* err code was set. */
 	    }
 	} else {
 #ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
 	    return rv;
 #endif
 	}
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     } else if ((kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
 	       (kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa)) {
 	rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;	/* err code was set. */
 	}
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     }
     if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) {
 	rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;		/* err code is set. */
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;		/* err code is set. */
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert
                                                : wait_client_key;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */
 static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00};
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 Client Hello message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     sslSessionID *      sid      = NULL;
     PRInt32		tmp;
     unsigned int        i;
     int                 j;
     SECStatus           rv;
     int                 errCode  = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc    = illegal_parameter;
     SSL3AlertLevel      level    = alert_fatal;
     SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
     SECItem             sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SECItem             cookieBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SECItem             suites   = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SECItem             comps    = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     PRBool              haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
     PRBool              haveXmitBufLock   = PR_FALSE;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake",
     	SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.initialized );
     /* Get peer name of client */
     rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;		/* error code is set. */
     }
     /* Clearing the handshake pointers so that ssl_Do1stHandshake won't
      * call ssl2_HandleMessage.
      *
      * The issue here is that TLS ordinarily starts out in
      * ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord() because of the backward-compatibility
      * code paths. That function zeroes these next pointers. But with DTLS,
      * we don't even try to do the v2 ClientHello so we skip that function
      * and need to reset these values here.
      */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	ss->nextHandshake     = 0;
 	ss->securityHandshake = 0;
     }
     /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should
      * clear previous state.
      */
     PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
     ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE;
     if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) &&
 	(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) {
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake  &&
         ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
 	desc    = no_renegotiation;
 	level   = alert_warning;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
     }
     tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
     if (tmp < 0)
 	goto loser;		/* malformed, alert already sent */
     /* Translate the version */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	ss->clientHelloVersion = version =
 	    dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp);
     } else {
 	ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp;
     }
     rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
 	                                           : handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	desc = internal_error;
 	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     /* grab the client random data. */
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
 	ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;		/* malformed */
     }
     /* grab the client's SID, if present. */
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;		/* malformed */
     }
     /* grab the client's cookie, if present. */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookieBytes, 1, &b, &length);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed */
 	}
     }
     /* grab the list of cipher suites. */
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &suites, 2, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;		/* malformed */
     }
     /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a
      * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */
     if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) {
 	for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
 	    PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
 	    if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
 		continue;
 	    desc = inappropriate_fallback;
 	    errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
     }
     /* grab the list of compression methods. */
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &comps, 1, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;		/* malformed */
     }
     desc = handshake_failure;
     /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if
      * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been
      * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension.
      * Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake
      * of interoperability (and backwards compatibility).
      */
     if (length) {
 	/* Get length of hello extensions */
 	PRInt32 extension_length;
 	extension_length = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
 	if (extension_length < 0) {
 	    goto loser;				/* alert already sent */
 	}
 	if (extension_length != length) {
 	    ssl3_DecodeError(ss);		/* send alert */
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b, &length);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* malformed */
 	}
     }
     if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
     	/* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV,
 	 * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension
 	 * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
 	    PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
 	    if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
 		SSL3Opaque * b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext;
 		PRUint32     L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
 		(void)ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2);
 	    	break;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     if (ss->firstHsDone &&
         (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN ||
         ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) &&
 	!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
 	desc    = no_renegotiation;
 	level   = alert_warning;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
          (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) &&
 	!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
 	desc = handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
     	goto alert_loser;
     }
     /* We do stateful resumes only if either of the following
      * conditions are satisfied: (1) the client does not support the
      * session ticket extension, or (2) the client support the session
      * ticket extension, but sent an empty ticket.
      */
     if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) ||
 	ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket) {
 	if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) {
 	    SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x",
 			SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0],
 			ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1],
 			ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2],
 			ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3]));
 	    if (ssl_sid_lookup) {
 		sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data,
 					sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle);
 	    } else {
 		errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED;
 		goto loser;
 	    }
 	}
     } else if (ss->statelessResume) {
 	/* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume.
 	 * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.)
 	 */
 	sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
 	PORT_Assert(sid != NULL);  /* Should have already been filled in.*/
 	if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
 	    sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
 	    PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data,
 		sidBytes.len);
 	    sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
 	} else {
 	    sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0;
 	}
 	ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
     }
     /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports
      * the extension and we are unable to do either a stateful or
      * stateless resume.
      *
      * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful
      * resumption.  (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session
      * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume,
      * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while
      * resuming.)
      */
     if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && sid == NULL) {
 	ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss,
 	    ssl_session_ticket_xtn, ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn);
     }
     if (sid != NULL) {
 	/* We've found a session cache entry for this client.
 	 * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert,
 	 * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache,
 	 * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo),
 	 * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session.
 	 */
 	if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate &&
 	    ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
 	     (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) ||
 	     ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE)
 	      && !ss->firstHsDone))) {
 	    SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok );
 	    if (ss->sec.uncache)
                 ss->sec.uncache(sid);
 	    ssl_FreeSID(sid);
 	    sid = NULL;
 	}
     }
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     /* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */
     ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss);
 #endif
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
     }
 #ifdef PARANOID
     /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */
     j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
     if (j <= 0) {		/* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */
     	errCode = PORT_GetError();	/* error code is already set. */
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
 #endif
     /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the
     ** same cipher suite and compression method we picked before.
     ** This is not a loop, despite appearances.
     */
     if (sid) do {
 	ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
 #ifdef PARANOID
 	SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
 #endif
 	/* Check that the cached compression method is still enabled. */
 	if (!compressionEnabled(ss, sid->u.ssl3.compression))
 	    break;
 	/* Check that the cached compression method is in the client's list */
 	for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) {
 	    if (comps.data[i] == sid->u.ssl3.compression)
 		break;
 	}
 	if (i == comps.len)
 	    break;
 	suite = ss->cipherSuites;
 	/* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */
 	for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) {
 	    if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)
 		break;
 	}
 	PORT_Assert(j > 0);
 	if (j <= 0)
 	    break;
 #ifdef PARANOID
 	/* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled,
 	 * implemented, and allowed by policy.  Might have been disabled.
 	 * The product policy won't change during the process lifetime.
 	 * Implemented ("isPresent") shouldn't change for servers.
 	 */
 	if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange))
 	    break;
 #else
 	if (!suite->enabled)
 	    break;
 #endif
 	/* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's list */
 	for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
 	    PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
 	    if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
 		ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
 		ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
 		    ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
 		/* Use the cached compression method. */
 		ss->ssl3.hs.compression = sid->u.ssl3.compression;
 		goto compression_found;
 	    }
 	}
     } while (0);
     /* START A NEW SESSION */
 #ifndef PARANOID
     /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */
     j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
     if (j <= 0) {		/* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */
     	errCode = PORT_GetError();	/* error code is already set. */
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
 #endif
     /* Select a cipher suite.
     **
     ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
     ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello().
     **
     ** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client
     ** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS
     ** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure
     ** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all,
     ** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export
     ** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites
     ** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we
     ** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled.
     */
     for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
 	ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j];
 	SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
 	if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange)) {
 	    continue;
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
 	    PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
 	    if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
 		ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
 		ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
 		    ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
 		goto suite_found;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
     goto alert_loser;
 suite_found:
     /* Select a compression algorithm. */
     for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) {
 	if (!compressionEnabled(ss, comps.data[i]))
 	    continue;
 	for (j = 0; j < compressionMethodsCount; j++) {
 	    if (comps.data[i] == compressions[j]) {
 		ss->ssl3.hs.compression =
 					(SSLCompressionMethod)compressions[j];
 		goto compression_found;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP;
     				/* null compression must be supported */
     goto alert_loser;
 compression_found:
     suites.data = NULL;
     comps.data = NULL;
     ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
     /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid,
      * we don't consider them to be errors.  Instead, We just behave
      * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one.
      */
     if (sid != NULL) do {
 	ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
 	SECItem         wrappedMS;  	/* wrapped key */
 	if (sid->version != ss->version  ||
 	    sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite ||
 	    sid->u.ssl3.compression != ss->ssl3.hs.compression) {
 	    break;	/* not an error */
 	}
 	if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
 	    if (ss->sec.uncache)
                 ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
 	    PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid);  /* should be impossible, but ... */
 	    if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) {
 		ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
 	    }
 	    ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
 	}
 	/* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */
 	ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);  haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE;
 	pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
 	if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
 	    PK11SymKey *    wrapKey; 	/* wrapping key */
 	    CK_FLAGS        keyFlags      = 0;
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 	    if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 		/* we cannot restart a non-bypass session in a
 		** bypass socket.
 		*/
 		break;
 	    }
 #endif
 	    wrapKey = getWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType,
 				     sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
 				     ss->pkcs11PinArg);
 	    if (!wrapKey) {
 		/* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */
 		break;
 	    }
 	    if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {	/* isTLS */
 		keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
 	    }
 	    wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	    wrappedMS.len  = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
 	    /* unwrap the master secret. */
 	    pwSpec->master_secret =
 		PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
 			    NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
 			    CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags);
 	    PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
 	    if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 		break;	/* not an error */
 	    }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 	} else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	    wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	    wrappedMS.len  = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
 	    memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, wrappedMS.data, wrappedMS.len);
 	    pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
 	    pwSpec->msItem.len  = wrappedMS.len;
 #endif
 	} else {
 	    /* We CAN restart a bypass session in a non-bypass socket. */
 	    /* need to import the raw master secret to session object */
 	    PK11SlotInfo * slot;
 	    wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	    wrappedMS.len  = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
 	    slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
 	    pwSpec->master_secret =
 		PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
 				  PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &wrappedMS,
 				  NULL);
 	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	    if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) {
 		break;	/* not an error */
 	    }
 	}
 	ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
 	if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
 	    ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session.
 	 *
 	 * XXX make sure compression still matches
 	 */
 	SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits );
 	if (ss->statelessResume)
 	    SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes );
 	ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
         ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm;
 	ss->sec.authKeyBits   = sid->authKeyBits;
 	ss->sec.keaType       = sid->keaType;
 	ss->sec.keaKeyBits    = sid->keaKeyBits;
 	/* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent,
 	** but they do remember the kea type we originally used, so we
 	** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket
 	** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one.
 	*/
 	ss->sec.localCert     =
 		CERT_DupCertificate(ss->serverCerts[sid->keaType].serverCert);
         /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */
         if (sid != NULL &&
             sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
             sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) {
             /* Set server name from sid */
             SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName;
             SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
             if (pwsName->data) {
                 SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
             }
             rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName);
             if (rv != SECSuccess) {
                 errCode = PORT_GetError();
                 desc = internal_error;
                 goto alert_loser;
             }
         }
         /* Clean up sni name array */
         if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn) &&
             ss->xtnData.sniNameArr) {
             PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr);
             ss->xtnData.sniNameArr = NULL;
             ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize = 0;
         }
 	ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE;
 	rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
 	    ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
 	    haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
 	}
 	/* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */
 	rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss,  NULL);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	if (haveXmitBufLock) {
 	    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
 	    haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
 	}
         return SECSuccess;
     } while (0);
     if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
 	haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
     }
     if (sid) { 	/* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */
 	SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok );
 	if (ss->sec.uncache)
             ss->sec.uncache(sid);
 	ssl_FreeSID(sid);
 	sid = NULL;
     }
     SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses );
     if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) {
         int ret = 0;
         if (ss->sniSocketConfig) do { /* not a loop */
             ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
             /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */
             if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
                 /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */
                 ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd,
                                          ss->xtnData.sniNameArr,
                                       ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize,
                                           ss->sniSocketConfigArg);
             }
             if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
                 /* Application does not know the name or was not able to
                  * properly reconfigure the socket. */
                 errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
                 desc = unrecognized_name;
                 break;
             } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) {
                 SECStatus       rv = SECSuccess;
                 SECItem *       cwsName, *pwsName;
                 ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);  /*******************************/
                 pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
                 cwsName = &ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName;
 #ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
                 /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
                 if (ss->firstHsDone) {
                     if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) {
                         ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);  /******************/
                         errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
                         desc = handshake_failure;
                         ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
                         break;
                     }
                 }
 #endif
                 if (pwsName->data) {
                     SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
                 }
                 if (cwsName->data) {
                     rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName);
                 }
                 ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);  /**************************/
                 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
                     errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
                     desc = internal_error;
                     ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
                     break;
                 }
             } else if (ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
                 /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it
                  * and save the name. */
                 SECStatus       rv;
                 SECItem *       name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret];
                 int             configedCiphers;
                 SECItem *       pwsName;
                 /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */
                 /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */
                 ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);  /*******************************/
 #ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
                 /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
                 if (ss->firstHsDone) {
                     SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName;
                     if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) {
                         ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);  /******************/
                         errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
                         desc = handshake_failure;
                         ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
                         break;
                     }
                 }
 #endif
                 pwsName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
                 if (pwsName->data) {
                     SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
                 }
                 rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name);
                 ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);  /***************************/
                 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
                     errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
                     desc = internal_error;
                     ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
                     break;
                 }
                 configedCiphers = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
                 if (configedCiphers <= 0) {
                     /* no ciphers are working/supported */
                     errCode = PORT_GetError();
                     desc = handshake_failure;
                     ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
                     break;
                 }
                 /* Need to tell the client that application has picked
                  * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket.
                  */
                 ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn,
                                                         ssl3_SendServerNameXtn);
             } else {
                 /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */
                 PORT_Assert(ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize);
                 errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
                 desc = internal_error;
                 ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
                 break;
             }
         } while (0);
         /* Free sniNameArr. The data that each SECItem in the array
          * points into is the data from the input buffer "b". It will
          * not be available outside the scope of this or it's child
          * functions.*/
         if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArr) {
             PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr);
             ss->xtnData.sniNameArr = NULL;
             ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize = 0;
         }
         if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
             /* desc and errCode should be set. */
             goto alert_loser;
         }
     }
 #ifndef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
     else if (ss->firstHsDone) {
         /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec
          * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */
         PRBool passed = PR_TRUE;
         ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);  /*******************************/
         if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->srvVirtName.data) {
             passed = PR_FALSE;
         }
         ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);  /***************************/
         if (!passed) {
             errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
             desc = handshake_failure;
             goto alert_loser;
         }
     }
 #endif
     sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
     if (sid == NULL) {
 	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto loser;	/* memory error is set. */
     }
     ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
     ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
     rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto loser;
     }
     if (haveXmitBufLock) {
 	ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
 	haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 alert_loser:
     if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
 	haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
     }
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc);
     /* FALLTHRU */
 loser:
     if (haveSpecWriteLock) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
 	haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE;
     }
     if (haveXmitBufLock) {
 	ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
 	haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
     }
     PORT_SetError(errCode);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /*
  * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes
  * in asking to use the V3 handshake.
  * Called from ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage() in sslcon.c
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length)
 {
     sslSessionID *      sid 		= NULL;
     unsigned char *     suites;
     unsigned char *     random;
     SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
     SECStatus           rv;
     int                 i;
     int                 j;
     int                 sid_length;
     int                 suite_length;
     int                 rand_length;
     int                 errCode  = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc    = handshake_failure;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
     rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
 	return rv;		/* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
 	return rv;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) {
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
 	goto loser;	/* alert_loser */
     }
     version      = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2];
     suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4];
     sid_length   = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6];
     rand_length  = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8];
     ss->clientHelloVersion = version;
     rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	/* send back which ever alert client will understand. */
     	desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version : handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	desc = internal_error;
 	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */
     if (length !=
         SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + rand_length) {
 	SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d",
 		 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length,
 		 SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length +
 		 rand_length));
 	goto loser;	/* malformed */	/* alert_loser */
     }
     suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
     random = suites + suite_length + sid_length;
     if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES ||
 	rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) {
 	goto loser;	/* malformed */	/* alert_loser */
     }
     PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     PORT_Memcpy(
 	&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length],
 	random, rand_length);
     PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand[0],
 		   SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH));
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     /* Disable any ECC cipher suites for which we have no cert. */
     ssl3_FilterECCipherSuitesByServerCerts(ss);
 #endif
     i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
     if (i <= 0) {
     	errCode = PORT_GetError();	/* error code is already set. */
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     /* Select a cipher suite.
     **
     ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
     ** ssl3_HandleClientHello().
     **
     ** See the comments about export cipher suites in ssl3_HandleClientHello().
     */
     for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
 	ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j];
 	SSLVersionRange vrange = {ss->version, ss->version};
 	if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, PR_TRUE, &vrange)) {
 	    continue;
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i+2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
 	    PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16)|(suites[i+1] << 8)|suites[i+2];
 	    if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
 		ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
 		ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
 		    ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
 		goto suite_found;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
     goto alert_loser;
 suite_found:
     /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI
      * extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
      */
     for (i = 0; i+2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
 	PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i+1] << 8) | suites[i+2];
 	if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
 	    SSL3Opaque * b2 = (SSL3Opaque *)emptyRIext;
 	    PRUint32     L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
 	    (void)ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2);
 	    break;
 	}
     }
     if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation &&
 	!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
 	desc = handshake_failure;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
     	goto alert_loser;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.compression = ssl_compression_null;
     ss->sec.send            = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
     /* we don't even search for a cache hit here.  It's just a miss. */
     SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses );
     sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
     if (sid == NULL) {
     	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto loser;	/* memory error is set. */
     }
     ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
     /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */
     /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */
     rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto loser;
     }
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
     rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	goto loser;
     }
     /* XXX_1 	The call stack to here is:
      * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage -> here.
      * ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage returns whatever we return here.
      * ssl_Do1stHandshake will continue looping if it gets back either
      *		SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
      * SECSuccess is preferable here.  See XXX_1 in sslgathr.c.
      */
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     return SECSuccess;
 alert_loser:
     SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
 loser:
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     PORT_SetError(errCode);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version.
 **
 ** Called from:  ssl3_HandleClientHello                     (resuming session),
 ** 	ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello   (new session),
 ** 	ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session)
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     sslSessionID *sid;
     SECStatus     rv;
     PRUint32      maxBytes = 65535;
     PRUint32      length;
     PRInt32       extensions_len = 0;
     SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
 		ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
 	if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     } else {
 	PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0));
 	if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0)) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
     extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes,
 					       &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]);
     if (extensions_len > 0)
     	extensions_len += 2; /* Add sizeof total extension length */
     length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 1 +
              ((sid == NULL) ? 0: sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) +
 	     sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + 1 + extensions_len;
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version);
     } else {
 	version = ss->version;
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, version, 2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
 	return rv;
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(
 	ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     if (sid)
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
 	    ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
     else
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     if (extensions_len) {
 	PRInt32 sent_len;
     	extensions_len -= 2;
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */
 	sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len,
 					   &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]);
         PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len);
 	if (sent_len != extensions_len) {
 	    if (sent_len >= 0)
 	    	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm selects a hash algorithm to use when signing
  * elements of the handshake. (The negotiated cipher suite determines the
  * signature algorithm.) Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always
  * used. With TLS 1.2, a client may advertise its support for signature and
  * hash combinations. */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(sslSocket *ss,
 				SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm* out)
 {
     TLSSignatureAlgorithm sigAlg;
     unsigned int i, j;
     /* hashPreference expresses our preferences for hash algorithms, most
      * preferable first. */
     static const PRUint8 hashPreference[] = {
 	tls_hash_sha256,
 	tls_hash_sha384,
 	tls_hash_sha512,
 	tls_hash_sha1,
     };
     switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea) {
     case kea_rsa:
     case kea_rsa_export:
     case kea_rsa_export_1024:
     case kea_dh_rsa:
     case kea_dh_rsa_export:
     case kea_dhe_rsa:
     case kea_dhe_rsa_export:
     case kea_rsa_fips:
     case kea_ecdh_rsa:
     case kea_ecdhe_rsa:
 	sigAlg = tls_sig_rsa;
 	break;
     case kea_dh_dss:
     case kea_dh_dss_export:
     case kea_dhe_dss:
     case kea_dhe_dss_export:
 	sigAlg = tls_sig_dsa;
 	break;
     case kea_ecdh_ecdsa:
     case kea_ecdhe_ecdsa:
 	sigAlg = tls_sig_ecdsa;
 	break;
     default:
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     out->sigAlg = sigAlg;
     if (ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
 	/* SEC_OID_UNKNOWN means the MD5/SHA1 combo hash used in TLS 1.1 and
 	 * prior. */
 	out->hashAlg = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash == 0) {
 	/* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then
 	 * we can assume that they support SHA-1:
 	 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
 	out->hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(hashPreference); i++) {
 	for (j = 0; j < ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash; j++) {
 	    const SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm* sh =
 		&ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[j];
 	    if (sh->sigAlg == sigAlg && sh->hashAlg == hashPreference[i]) {
 		out->hashAlg = sh->hashAlg;
 		return SECSuccess;
 	    }
 	}
     }
     PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     const ssl3KEADef * kea_def     = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
     SECStatus          rv          = SECFailure;
     int                length;
     PRBool             isTLS;
     SECItem            signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SSL3Hashes         hashes;
     SECKEYPublicKey *  sdPub;	/* public key for step-down */
     SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     if (ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash) != SECSuccess) {
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
     case kt_rsa:
 	/* Perform SSL Step-Down here. */
 	sdPub = ss->stepDownKeyPair->pubKey;
 	PORT_Assert(sdPub != NULL);
 	if (!sdPub) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sigAndHash.hashAlg,
 					  sdPub->u.rsa.modulus,
 					  sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent,
 	                                  &ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
 	                                  &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
 					  &hashes, ss->opt.bypassPKCS11);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    return rv;
 	}
 	isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
 	rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY,
 	                     &signed_hash, isTLS);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;		/* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */
 	}
 	if (signed_hash.data == NULL) {
 	    /* how can this happen and rv == SECSuccess ?? */
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 	length = 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len +
 + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len +
 + signed_hash.len;
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser; 	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.data,
 					  sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser; 	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(
 				ss, sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.data,
 				sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser; 	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
 	if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
 	    rv = ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &sigAndHash);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto loser; 	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	    }
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data,
 	                                  signed_hash.len, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser; 	/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
 	PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
 	return SECSuccess;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case kt_ecdh: {
 	rv = ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, &sigAndHash);
 	return rv;
     }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     case kt_dh:
     case kt_null:
     default:
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
 	break;
     }
 loser:
     if (signed_hash.data != NULL)
     	PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     PRBool         isTLS12;
     SECItem *      name;
     CERTDistNames *ca_list;
     const PRUint8 *certTypes;
     const PRUint8 *sigAlgs;
     SECItem *      names	= NULL;
     SECStatus      rv;
     int            length;
     int            i;
     int            calen	= 0;
     int            nnames	= 0;
     int            certTypesLength;
     int            sigAlgsLength;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
     /* ssl3.ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */
     ca_list = ss->ssl3.ca_list;
     if (!ca_list) {
 	ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list;
     }
     if (ca_list != NULL) {
 	names = ca_list->names;
 	nnames = ca_list->nnames;
     }
     for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) {
 	calen += 2 + name->len;
     }
     certTypes       = certificate_types;
     certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types;
     sigAlgs         = supported_signature_algorithms;
     sigAlgsLength   = sizeof supported_signature_algorithms;
     length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen;
     if (isTLS12) {
 	length += 2 + sigAlgsLength;
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     if (isTLS12) {
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) {
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	}
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 Certificate Verify message
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
 			     SSL3Hashes *hashes)
 {
     SECItem              signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     SECStatus            rv;
     int                  errCode     = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc        = handshake_failure;
     PRBool               isTLS, isTLS12;
     SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm sigAndHash;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify || ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     if (isTLS12) {
 	rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length,
 						   &sigAndHash);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto loser;	/* malformed or unsupported. */
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
 		&sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	    desc = decrypt_error;
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
 	/* We only support CertificateVerify messages that use the handshake
 	 * hash. */
 	if (sigAndHash.hashAlg != hashes->hashAlg) {
 	    errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM;
 	    desc = decrypt_error;
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto loser;		/* malformed. */
     }
     /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */
     rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signed_hash,
 				 isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
     	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     signed_hash.data = NULL;
     if (length != 0) {
 	desc    = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter;
 	goto alert_loser;	/* malformed */
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
     return SECSuccess;
 alert_loser:
     SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
 loser:
     PORT_SetError(errCode);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA.
  * Then generate and return the PMS.
  * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use
  * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot.
  *
  * Called from  ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11()  (above)
  *		sendRSAClientKeyExchange()         (above)
  *		ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange()  (below)
  * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock
  */
 static PK11SymKey *
 ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
                     PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot)
 {
     PK11SymKey *      pms		= NULL;
     PK11SlotInfo *    slot		= serverKeySlot;
     void *	      pwArg 		= ss->pkcs11PinArg;
     SECItem           param;
     CK_VERSION 	      version;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3];
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (slot == NULL) {
 	SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
 	/* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on
 	** read locks.  Also, all the callers who call with a non-null
 	** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock.
 	*/
 	PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
 	PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
         calg = spec->cipher_def->calg;
 	PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
 	/* First get an appropriate slot.  */
 	mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN;
 	mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
 	mechanism_array[2] = alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
 	slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg);
 	if (slot == NULL) {
 	   /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */
 	    slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg);
 	    if (slot == NULL) {
 		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND);
 		return pms;	/* which is NULL */
 	    }
 	}
     }
     /* Generate the pre-master secret ...  */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	SSL3ProtocolVersion temp;
 	temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
 	version.major = MSB(temp);
 	version.minor = LSB(temp);
     } else {
 	version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
 	version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
     }
     param.data = (unsigned char *)&version;
     param.len  = sizeof version;
     pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, &param, 0, pwArg);
     if (!serverKeySlot)
 	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
     if (pms == NULL) {
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
     }
     return pms;
 }
 /* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER
  * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message,
  * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message.
  * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly
  * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS.
  * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection.
  * Instead, we generate a random PMS.  This will cause a failure
  * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where
  * the failure must occur.
  *
  * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
                                 SSL3Opaque *b,
 				PRUint32 length,
 				SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey)
 {
     PK11SymKey *      pms;
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     unsigned char *   cr     = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
     unsigned char *   sr     = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
     ssl3CipherSpec *  pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
     unsigned int      outLen = 0;
 #endif
     PRBool            isTLS  = PR_FALSE;
     SECStatus         rv;
     SECItem           enc_pms;
     unsigned char     rsaPmsBuf[SSL3_RSA_PMS_LENGTH];
     SECItem           pmsItem = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec );
     enc_pms.data = b;
     enc_pms.len  = length;
     pmsItem.data = rsaPmsBuf;
     pmsItem.len  = sizeof rsaPmsBuf;
     if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
 	PRInt32 kLen;
 	kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len);
 	if (kLen < 0) {
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) {
 	    enc_pms.len = kLen;
 	}
 	isTLS = PR_TRUE;
     } else {
 	isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->tls_keygen != 0);
     }
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	/* TRIPLE BYPASS, get PMS directly from RSA decryption.
 	 * Use PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1 to decrypt the PMS to a buffer,
 	 * then, check for version rollback attack, then
 	 * do the equivalent of ssl3_DeriveMasterSecret, placing the MS in
 	 * pwSpec->msItem.  Finally call ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec with
 	 * ss and NULL, so that it will use the MS we've already derived here.
 	 */
 	rv = PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1(serverKey, rsaPmsBuf, &outLen,
 				   sizeof rsaPmsBuf, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    /* triple bypass failed.  Let's try for a double bypass. */
 	    goto double_bypass;
 	} else if (ss->opt.detectRollBack) {
 	    SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version =
 					 (rsaPmsBuf[0] << 8) | rsaPmsBuf[1];
 	    if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 		client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version);
 	    }
 	    if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) {
 		/* Version roll-back detected. ensure failure.  */
 		rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(rsaPmsBuf, sizeof rsaPmsBuf);
 	    }
 	}
 	/* have PMS, build MS without PKCS11 */
 	rv = ssl3_MasterKeyDeriveBypass(pwSpec, cr, sr, &pmsItem, isTLS,
 					PR_TRUE);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
 	    pwSpec->msItem.len  = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
 	    PK11_GenerateRandom(pwSpec->msItem.data, pwSpec->msItem.len);
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss,  NULL);
     } else
 #endif
     {
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 double_bypass:
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer
 	 * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do
 	 *	the unwrap.  Rather, it is the mechanism with which the
 	 *      unwrapped pms will be used.
 	 */
 	pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKey, &enc_pms,
 				   CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0);
 	if (pms != NULL) {
 	    PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "decrypted premaster secret:",
 			   PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->data,
 			   PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->len));
 	} else {
 	    /* unwrap failed. Generate a bogus PMS and carry on. */
 	    PK11SlotInfo *  slot   = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKey);
 	    ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
 	    pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot);
 	    ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
 	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	}
 	if (pms == NULL) {
 	    /* last gasp.  */
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	/* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */
 	rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss,  pms);
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
     }
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	SEND_ALERT
 	return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey         = NULL;
     SECStatus         rv;
     const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
     ssl3KeyPair     *serverKeyPair      = NULL;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     SECKEYPublicKey *serverPubKey       = NULL;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) {
 	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
     	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     kea_def   = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.usedStepDownKey) {
 	 PORT_Assert(kea_def->is_limited /* XXX OR cert is signing only */
 		 && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa
 		 && ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL);
 	 if (!kea_def->is_limited  ||
 	      kea_def->exchKeyType != kt_rsa ||
 	      ss->stepDownKeyPair == NULL) {
 	 	/* shouldn't happen, don't use step down if it does */
 		goto skip;
 	 }
     	serverKeyPair = ss->stepDownKeyPair;
 	ss->sec.keaKeyBits = EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB;
     } else
 skip:
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     /* XXX Using SSLKEAType to index server certifiates
      * does not work for (EC)DHE ciphers. Until we have
      * an indexing mechanism general enough for all key
      * exchange algorithms, we'll need to deal with each
      * one seprately.
      */
     if ((kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
                (kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa)) {
 	if (ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair != NULL) {
 	   serverKeyPair = ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair;
 	   if (serverKeyPair->pubKey) {
 		ss->sec.keaKeyBits =
 		    SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey);
 	   }
 	}
     } else
 #endif
     {
 	sslServerCerts * sc = ss->serverCerts + kea_def->exchKeyType;
 	serverKeyPair = sc->serverKeyPair;
 	ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits;
     }
     if (serverKeyPair) {
 	serverKey = serverKeyPair->privKey;
     }
     if (serverKey == NULL) {
     	SEND_ALERT
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     ss->sec.keaType    = kea_def->exchKeyType;
     switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
     case kt_rsa:
 	rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKey);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    SEND_ALERT
 	    return SECFailure;	/* error code set */
 	}
 	break;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     case kt_ecdh:
 	/* XXX We really ought to be able to store multiple
 	 * EC certs (a requirement if we wish to support both
 	 * ECDH-RSA and ECDH-ECDSA key exchanges concurrently).
 	 * When we make that change, we'll need an index other
 	 * than kt_ecdh to pick the right EC certificate.
 	 */
 	if (serverKeyPair) {
 	    serverPubKey = serverKeyPair->pubKey;
         }
 	if (serverPubKey == NULL) {
 	    /* XXX Is this the right error code? */
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length,
 					      serverPubKey, serverKey);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return SECFailure;	/* error code set */
 	}
 	break;
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
     default:
 	(void) ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus            rv;
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, 3);
     if (rv == SECSuccess) {
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3);
     }
     return rv;	/* error, if any, set by functions called above. */
 }
 SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     SECItem ticketData;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
     PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket);
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) {
 	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
      * until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in
      * ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details.
      */
     ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time();
     if (length < 4) {
 	(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint =
 	(PRUint32)ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &b, &length);
     rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length);
     if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) {
 	(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
 	return SECFailure;  /* malformed */
     }
     /* If the server sent a zero-length ticket, ignore it and keep the
      * existing ticket. */
     if (ticketData.len != 0) {
 	rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket,
 			      &ticketData);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;
 	}
 	ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 #ifdef NISCC_TEST
 static PRInt32 connNum = 0;
 static SECStatus
 get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex)
 {
     PRFileDesc *cf;
     char *      testdir;
     char *      startat;
     char *      stopat;
     const char *extension;
     int         fileNum;
     PRInt32     numBytes   = 0;
     PRStatus    prStatus;
     PRFileInfo  info;
     char        cfn[100];
     pCertItem->data = 0;
     if ((testdir = PR_GetEnv("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) {
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     *pIndex   = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root"));
     extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der");
     fileNum     = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1;
     if ((startat = PR_GetEnv("START_AT")) != NULL) {
 	fileNum += atoi(startat);
     }
     if ((stopat = PR_GetEnv("STOP_AT")) != NULL &&
 	fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) {
 	*pIndex = -1;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     sprintf(cfn, "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension);
     cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0);
     if (!cf) {
 	goto loser;
     }
     prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info);
     if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) {
 	PR_Close(cf);
 	goto loser;
     }
     pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size);
     if (pCertItem) {
 	numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size);
     }
     PR_Close(cf);
     if (numBytes != info.size) {
 	SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO);
 	goto loser;
     }
     fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn);
     return SECSuccess;
 loser:
     fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn);
     *pIndex = -1;
     return SECFailure;
 }
 #endif
 /*
  * Used by both client and server.
  * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus            rv;
     CERTCertificateList *certChain;
     int                  len 		= 0;
     int                  i;
     SSL3KEAType          certIndex;
 #ifdef NISCC_TEST
     SECItem              fakeCert;
     int                  ndex           = -1;
 #endif
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     if (ss->sec.localCert)
     	CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
     if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	sslServerCerts * sc = NULL;
 	/* XXX SSLKEAType isn't really a good choice for
 	 * indexing certificates (it breaks when we deal
 	 * with (EC)DHE-* cipher suites. This hack ensures
 	 * the RSA cert is picked for (EC)DHE-RSA.
 	 * Revisit this when we add server side support
 	 * for ECDHE-ECDSA or client-side authentication
 	 * using EC certificates.
 	 */
 	if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
 	    (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) {
 	    certIndex = kt_rsa;
 	} else {
 	    certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
 	}
 	sc                    = ss->serverCerts + certIndex;
 	certChain             = sc->serverCertChain;
 	ss->sec.authKeyBits   = sc->serverKeyBits;
 	ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType;
 	ss->sec.localCert     = CERT_DupCertificate(sc->serverCert);
     } else {
 	certChain          = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain;
 	ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
     }
 #ifdef NISCC_TEST
     rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex);
 #endif
     if (certChain) {
 	for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
 #ifdef NISCC_TEST
 	    if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
 		len += fakeCert.len + 3;
 	    } else {
 		len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
 	    }
 #else
 	    len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
 #endif
 	}
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len, 3);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     if (certChain) {
         for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
 #ifdef NISCC_TEST
             if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
                 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data,
                                                   fakeCert.len, 3);
                 SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE);
             } else {
                 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
                                                   certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
             }
 #else
             rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
                                               certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
 #endif
             if (rv != SECSuccess) {
                 return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
             }
         }
     }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
  * Used by server only.
  * single-stapling, send only a single cert status
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     int len = 0;
     SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL;
     SSL3KEAType certIndex;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->sec.isServer);
     if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn))
 	return SECSuccess;
     /* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */
     if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
 	(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) {
 	certIndex = kt_rsa;
     } else {
 	certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
     }
     if (ss->certStatusArray[certIndex] && ss->certStatusArray[certIndex]->len) {
 	statusToSend = ss->certStatusArray[certIndex];
     }
     if (!statusToSend)
 	return SECSuccess;
     /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */
     len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3;
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_status, len);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
 				      statusToSend->items[0].data,
 				      statusToSend->items[0].len,
 );
     if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	return rv; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain
  * from the cert database after they've been validated.
  */
 static void
 ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     PLArenaPool * arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena;
     ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain;
     for (; certs; certs = certs->next) {
 	CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert);
     }
     if (arena) PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
     ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL;
     ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 CertificateStatus message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  * This is always called before ssl3_HandleCertificate, even if the Certificate
  * message is sent first.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     PRInt32 status, len;
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) {
         (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
         PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
     /* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */
     status = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length);
     if (status != 1 /* ocsp */) {
        goto format_loser;
     }
     len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
     if (len != length) {
        goto format_loser;
     }
 #define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff   /* 128k - 1 */
     if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN)
        goto format_loser;
 #undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN
     /* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */
     SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1);
     if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items)
        return SECFailure;
     ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length);
     if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) {
         SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE);
         return SECFailure;
     }
     PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length);
     ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length;
     ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer;
     return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss);
 format_loser:
     return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 Certificate message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     ssl3CertNode *   c;
     ssl3CertNode *   lastCert 	= NULL;
     PRInt32          remaining  = 0;
     PRInt32          size;
     SECStatus        rv;
     PRBool           isServer	= (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer);
     PRBool           isTLS;
     SSL3AlertDescription desc;
     int              errCode    = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE;
     SECItem          certItem;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake",
 		SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert) &&
 	(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert)) {
 	desc    = unexpected_message;
 	errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE;
 	goto alert_loser;
     }
     if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) {
 	if (ss->sec.peerKey) {
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey);
 	    ss->sec.peerKey = NULL;
 	}
 	CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
 	ss->sec.peerCert = NULL;
     }
     ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message
     ** with a zero-length message body.  We'll treat that case like a
     ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability.
     */
     if (length) {
 	remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
 	if (remaining < 0)
 	    goto loser;	/* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
 	if ((PRUint32)remaining > length)
 	    goto decode_loser;
     }
     if (!remaining) {
 	if (!(isTLS && isServer)) {
 	    desc = bad_certificate;
 	    goto alert_loser;
 	}
     	/* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */
     	/* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
 	rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	    goto loser;
 	}
        ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
        return SECSuccess;
     }
     ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
     if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) {
 	goto loser;	/* don't send alerts on memory errors */
     }
     /* First get the peer cert. */
     remaining -= 3;
     if (remaining < 0)
 	goto decode_loser;
     size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
     if (size <= 0)
 	goto loser;	/* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
     if (remaining < size)
 	goto decode_loser;
     certItem.data = b;
     certItem.len = size;
     b      += size;
     length -= size;
     remaining -= size;
     ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
                                             PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
     if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
 	/* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the
 	 * problem was just some local problem, like memory error.
 	 */
 	goto ambiguous_err;
     }
     /* Now get all of the CA certs. */
     while (remaining > 0) {
 	remaining -= 3;
 	if (remaining < 0)
 	    goto decode_loser;
 	size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length);
 	if (size <= 0)
 	    goto loser;	/* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
 	if (remaining < size)
 	    goto decode_loser;
 	certItem.data = b;
 	certItem.len = size;
 	b      += size;
 	length -= size;
 	remaining -= size;
 	c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode);
 	if (c == NULL) {
 	    goto loser;	/* don't send alerts on memory errors */
 	}
 	c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
 	                                  PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
 	if (c->cert == NULL) {
 	    goto ambiguous_err;
 	}
 	c->next = NULL;
 	if (lastCert) {
 	    lastCert->next = c;
 	} else {
 	    ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c;
 	}
 	lastCert = c;
     }
     if (remaining != 0)
         goto decode_loser;
     SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert);
     if (!isServer && ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) {
        ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status;
        rv = SECSuccess;
     } else {
        rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
     }
     return rv;
 ambiguous_err:
     errCode = PORT_GetError();
     switch (errCode) {
     case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR:
     case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE:
     case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
        if (isTLS) {
            desc = internal_error;
            goto alert_loser;
        }
        goto loser;
     }
     ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
     goto loser;
 decode_loser:
     desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate;
 alert_loser:
     (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
 loser:
     (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus        rv;
     PRBool           isServer   = (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer);
     int              errCode;
     ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
     /*
      * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain.
      */
     rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd,
 					   PR_TRUE, isServer);
     if (rv) {
 	errCode = PORT_GetError();
 	if (rv != SECWouldBlock) {
 	    if (ss->handleBadCert) {
 		rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd);
 	    }
 	}
 	if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
 	    if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 		errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS;
 		rv = SECFailure;
 		goto loser;
 	    }
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
 	    rv = SECSuccess;
 	}
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
 	    goto loser;
 	}
     }
     ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
     if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
         CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert;
 	/* set the server authentication and key exchange types and sizes
 	** from the value in the cert.  If the key exchange key is different,
 	** it will get fixed when we handle the server key exchange message.
 	*/
 	SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey  = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
 	ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->signKeyType;
 	ss->sec.keaType       = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
 	if (pubKey) {
 	    ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits =
 		SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 	    if (ss->sec.keaType == kt_ecdh) {
 		/* Get authKeyBits from signing key.
 		 * XXX The code below uses a quick approximation of
 		 * key size based on cert->signatureWrap.signature.data
 		 * (which contains the DER encoded signature). The field
 		 * cert->signatureWrap.signature.len contains the
 		 * length of the encoded signature in bits.
 		 */
 		if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdh_ecdsa) {
 		    ss->sec.authKeyBits =
 			cert->signatureWrap.signature.data[3]*8;
 		    if (cert->signatureWrap.signature.data[4] == 0x00)
 			    ss->sec.authKeyBits -= 8;
 		    /*
 		     * XXX: if cert is not signed by ecdsa we should
 		     * destroy pubKey and goto bad_cert
 		     */
 		} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdh_rsa) {
 		    ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->signatureWrap.signature.len;
 		    /*
 		     * XXX: if cert is not signed by rsa we should
 		     * destroy pubKey and goto bad_cert
 		     */
 		}
 	    }
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
 	    pubKey = NULL;
     	}
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; /* disallow server_key_exchange */
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->is_limited ||
 	    /* XXX OR server cert is signing only. */
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa ||
 #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) {
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; /* allow server_key_exchange */
 	}
     } else {
 	ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
     }
     PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto loser;
     }
     return rv;
 loser:
     (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket * ss)
 {
     PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
     return SECFailure;
 }
 /* Caller must hold 1stHandshakeLock.
 */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
     if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
 	PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	goto done;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
     if (error != 0) {
 	ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail;
 	ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error);
 	rv = SECSuccess;
     } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) {
 	sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
 	if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) {
 	    SSL_TRC(3,("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race"
 		       " with peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	}
 	rv = target(ss);
 	/* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim
 	 * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent
 	 * calls to SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Send/PR_Read/etc.
 	 */
 	if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
 	    rv = SECSuccess;
 	}
     } else {
 	SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with"
         	    " peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming);
 	PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake);
 	if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
 	    !ss->firstHsDone &&
 	    !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
 	    ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
 	    /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because
 	     * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still
 	     * haven't received any of the server's second round yet.
 	     */
 	    rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
 	} else {
 	    rv = SECSuccess;
 	}
     }
 done:
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
     return rv;
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
 			PRBool          isServer,
                 const   SSL3Hashes   *  hashes,
                         TLSFinished  *  tlsFinished)
 {
     const char * label;
     unsigned int len;
     SECStatus    rv;
     label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished";
     len   = 15;
     rv = ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(spec, label, len, hashes->u.raw,
 	hashes->len, tlsFinished->verify_data,
 	sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data);
     return rv;
 }
 /* The calling function must acquire and release the appropriate
  * lock (e.g., ssl_GetSpecReadLock / ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock for
  * ss->ssl3.crSpec).
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const char *label,
     unsigned int labelLen, const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen,
     unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
     if (spec->master_secret && !spec->bypassCiphers) {
 	SECItem param = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
 	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL;
 	PK11Context *prf_context;
 	unsigned int retLen;
 	if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
 	    mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256;
 	}
 	prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN,
 						 spec->master_secret, &param);
 	if (!prf_context)
 	    return SECFailure;
 	rv  = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context);
 	rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *) label, labelLen);
 	rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen);
 	rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen);
 	PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen);
 	PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE);
     } else {
 	/* bypass PKCS11 */
 #ifdef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
 	PORT_Assert(spec->master_secret);
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	rv = SECFailure;
 #else
 	SECItem inData  = { siBuffer, };
 	SECItem outData = { siBuffer, };
 	PRBool isFIPS   = PR_FALSE;
 	inData.data  = (unsigned char *) val;
 	inData.len   = valLen;
 	outData.data = out;
 	outData.len  = outLen;
 	if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
 	    rv = TLS_P_hash(HASH_AlgSHA256, &spec->msItem, label, &inData,
 			    &outData, isFIPS);
 	} else {
 	    rv = TLS_PRF(&spec->msItem, label, &inData, &outData, isFIPS);
 	}
 	PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outData.len == outLen);
 #endif
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
  *             ssl3_HandleFinished
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     int padding_len;
     static const unsigned char padding[32] = {0};
     if (ss->ssl3.nextProto.len == 0 ||
 	ss->ssl3.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     padding_len = 32 - ((ss->ssl3.nextProto.len + 2) % 32);
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, next_proto, ss->ssl3.nextProto.len +
 + padding_len);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->ssl3.nextProto.data,
 				      ss->ssl3.nextProto.len, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake */
     }
     rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code set by AppendHandshake */
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* called from ssl3_SendFinished
  *
  * This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a
  * SECStatus. */
 static void
 ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus rv;
     SECItem *keyData;
     char buf[14 /* "CLIENT_RANDOM " */ +
 	     SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH*2 /* client_random */ +
 /* " " */ +
 *2 /* master secret */ +
 /* new line */];
     unsigned int j;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     if (!ssl_keylog_iob)
 	return;
     rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret);
     if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	return;
     ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
     /* keyData does not need to be freed. */
     keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret);
     if (!keyData || !keyData->data || keyData->len != 48) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	return;
     }
     /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */
     /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the
      * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to
      * fwrite. */
     memcpy(buf, "CLIENT_RANDOM ", 14);
     j = 14;
     hexEncode(buf + j, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random.rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
     j += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH*2;
     buf[j++] = ' ';
     hexEncode(buf + j, keyData->data, 48);
     j += 48*2;
     buf[j++] = '\n';
     PORT_Assert(j == sizeof(buf));
     ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
     if (fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, ssl_keylog_iob) != 1)
         return;
     fflush(ssl_keylog_iob);
     return;
 }
 /* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
  *             ssl3_HandleClientHello
  *             ssl3_HandleFinished
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
 {
     ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
     PRBool          isTLS;
     PRBool          isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
     SECStatus       rv;
     SSL3Sender      sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client;
     SSL3Hashes      hashes;
     TLSFinished     tlsFinished;
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
     cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
     isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender);
     if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) {
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished);
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto fail;	/* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */
     }
     if (isTLS) {
 	if (isServer)
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
 	else
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished;
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    goto fail; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    goto fail; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     } else {
 	if (isServer)
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s;
 	else
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s;
 	PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s;
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes.u.s);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    goto fail; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
 	rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess)
 	    goto fail; 		/* err set by AppendHandshake. */
     }
     rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	goto fail;	/* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
     }
     ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss);
     return SECSuccess;
 fail:
     return rv;
 }
 /* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID.
  * Caller holds the Spec read lock.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid,
     ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType)
 {
     PK11SymKey *      wrappingKey  = NULL;
     PK11SlotInfo *    symKeySlot;
     void *            pwArg        = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
     SECStatus         rv           = SECFailure;
     PRBool            isServer     = ss->sec.isServer;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism    = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
     symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(spec->master_secret);
     if (!isServer) {
 	int  wrapKeyIndex;
 	int  incarnation;
 	/* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */
 	sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex  = wrapKeyIndex =
 				       PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot);
 	PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0);	/* array has only one entry! */
 	sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation =
 				       PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot);
 	sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID   = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot);
 	sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot);
 	sid->u.ssl3.masterValid    = PR_TRUE;
 	/* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before
 	 * placing it in the SID cache entry. */
 	wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex,
 				      CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation,
 				      pwArg);
 	if (wrappingKey) {
 	    mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
 	} else {
 	    int keyLength;
 	    /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it.
 	     * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here.  If we cannot
 	     * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection,
 	     * but we will not be able to restart this session.
 	     */
 	    mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
 	    keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism);
 	    /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
 	     * It's ambiguous.
 	     */
 	    wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL,
 				      keyLength, pwArg);
 	    if (wrappingKey) {
 		PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey);
 	    }
 	}
     } else {
 	/* server socket using session cache. */
 	mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
 	if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
 	    wrappingKey =
 		getWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, effectiveExchKeyType,
 			       mechanism, pwArg);
 	    if (wrappingKey) {
 		mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
 	    }
 	}
     }
     sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism;
     PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot);
     if (wrappingKey) {
 	SECItem wmsItem;
 	wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	wmsItem.len  = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
 	rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey,
 			     spec->master_secret, &wmsItem);
 	/* rv is examined below. */
 	sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len;
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey);
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
  * ssl3 Finished message from the peer.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
 		    const SSL3Hashes *hashes)
 {
     sslSessionID *    sid	   = ss->sec.ci.sid;
     SECStatus         rv           = SECSuccess;
     PRBool            isServer     = ss->sec.isServer;
     PRBool            isTLS;
     SSL3KEAType       effectiveExchKeyType;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake",
     	SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) {
 	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
     	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     if (isTLS) {
 	TLSFinished tlsFinished;
 	if (length != sizeof tlsFinished) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer,
 	                             hashes, &tlsFinished);
 	if (!isServer)
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
 	else
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished;
 	if (rv != SECSuccess ||
 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, length)) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     } else {
 	if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) {
 	    (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	if (!isServer)
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes->u.s;
 	else
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes->u.s;
 	PORT_Assert(hashes->len == sizeof hashes->u.s);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes->u.s;
 	if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes->u.s, b, length)) {
 	    (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);	/*************************************/
     if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) ||
 	(!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) {
 	PRInt32 flags = 0;
 	/* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us
 	 * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify.
 	 * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the
 	 * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the
 	 * ServerHello message.)
 	 */
 	if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
 	    ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) {
 	    /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the
 	     * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending
 	     * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's
 	     * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too.
 	     */
 	    rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto xmit_loser;
 	    }
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto xmit_loser;	/* err is set. */
 	}
 	/* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data)
 	** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the
 	** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished)
 	** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data.
 	*/
 	if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) {
 	    flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
 	}
 	if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) {
 	    rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */
 	    }
 	}
 	if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	    flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto xmit_loser;	/* err is set. */
 	}
     }
 xmit_loser:
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);	/*************************************/
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         return rv;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) {
 	effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa;
     } else {
 	effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
     }
     if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache && ss->sec.cache) {
 	/* fill in the sid */
 	sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
 	sid->u.ssl3.compression = ss->ssl3.hs.compression;
 	sid->u.ssl3.policy      = ss->ssl3.policy;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
 	sid->u.ssl3.negotiatedECCurves = ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves;
 #endif
 	sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = effectiveExchKeyType;
 	sid->version            = ss->version;
 	sid->authAlgorithm      = ss->sec.authAlgorithm;
 	sid->authKeyBits        = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
 	sid->keaType            = ss->sec.keaType;
 	sid->keaKeyBits         = ss->sec.keaKeyBits;
 	sid->lastAccessTime     = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time();
 	sid->expirationTime     = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout;
 	sid->localCert          = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
 	ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);	/*************************************/
 	/* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */
 	if (ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data) {
 	    sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len =
 			    ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len;
 	    memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
 		   ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.data, ss->ssl3.crSpec->msItem.len);
 	    sid->u.ssl3.masterValid    = PR_TRUE;
 	    sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_FALSE;
 	    rv = SECSuccess;
 	} else {
 	    rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid,
 					       ss->ssl3.crSpec,
 					       effectiveExchKeyType);
 	    sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = PR_TRUE;
 	}
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);  /*************************************/
 	/* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid.
 	 * The connection continues normally however.
 	 */
 	ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = rv == SECSuccess;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
 	    PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget");
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake;
 	return SECWouldBlock;
     }
     rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss);
     return rv;
 }
 /* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs
  * to have type sslRestartTarget.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
 {
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL );
     /* The first handshake is now completed. */
     ss->handshake           = NULL;
     /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
      * until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server
      * sends a NewSessionTicket in a resumption handshake, we must wait until
      * the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished
      * AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid.
      *
      * This must be done before we call (*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid)
      * because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also
      * because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and
      * ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket.
      */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) {
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
 	ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket);
 	/* The sid took over the ticket data */
 	PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
         ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID) {
 	PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached);
 	(*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE;
     }
     ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake;
     ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3
  * hanshake message.
  * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
 {
     SECStatus         rv 	= SECSuccess;
     SSL3HandshakeType type 	= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type;
     SSL3Hashes        hashes;	/* computed hashes are put here. */
     PRUint8           hdr[4];
     PRUint8           dtlsData[8];
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     /*
      * We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the
      * current message.
      */
     ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);	/************************************/
     if((type == finished) || (type == certificate_verify)) {
 	SSL3Sender      sender = (SSL3Sender)0;
 	ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec  = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
 	if (type == finished) {
 	    sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server;
 	    rSpec  = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender);
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	return rv;	/* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/
     }
     SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(),
 		ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type)));
     hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type;
     hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
     hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >>  8);
     hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length      );
     /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == client_hello) {
 	rv = ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;
 	}
     }
     /* We should not include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages
      * in the handshake hashes */
     if ((ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_request) &&
 	(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != hello_verify_request)) {
 	rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) hdr, 4);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv;	/* err code already set. */
 	/* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */
 	if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	    /* Sequence number */
 	    dtlsData[0] = MSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq);
 	    dtlsData[1] = LSB(ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq);
 	    /* Fragment offset */
 	    dtlsData[2] = 0;
 	    dtlsData[3] = 0;
 	    dtlsData[4] = 0;
 	    /* Fragment length */
 	    dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
 	    dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >>  8);
 	    dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length      );
 	    rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) dtlsData,
 					    sizeof(dtlsData));
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv;	/* err code already set. */
 	}
 	/* The message body */
 	rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv;	/* err code already set. */
     }
     PORT_SetError(0);	/* each message starts with no error. */
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status &&
         ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != certificate_status) {
         /* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred
          * certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage.
          * But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did
          * not send it then we need to validate the certificate now. If the
          * server does send the CertificateStatus message then we will
          * authenticate the certificate in ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus.
          */
         rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
         PORT_Assert(rv != SECWouldBlock);
         if (rv != SECSuccess) {
             return rv;
         }
     }
     switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
     case hello_request:
 	if (length != 0) {
 	    (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss);
 	break;
     case client_hello:
 	if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case server_hello:
 	if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case hello_verify_request:
 	if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case certificate:
 	rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case certificate_status:
 	rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case server_key_exchange:
 	if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case certificate_request:
 	if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case server_hello_done:
 	if (length != 0) {
 	    (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss);
 	break;
     case certificate_verify:
 	if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, &hashes);
 	break;
     case client_key_exchange:
 	if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case new_session_ticket:
 	if (ss->sec.isServer) {
 	    (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length);
 	break;
     case finished:
         rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, &hashes);
 	break;
     default:
 	(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE);
 	rv = SECFailure;
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv != SECFailure)) {
 	/* Increment the expected sequence number */
 	ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++;
     }
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record.
  * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content.
  * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks.
  */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
 {
     /*
      * There may be a partial handshake message already in the handshake
      * state. The incoming buffer may contain another portion, or a
      * complete message or several messages followed by another portion.
      *
      * Each message is made contiguous before being passed to the actual
      * message parser.
      */
     sslBuffer *buf = &ss->ssl3.hs.msgState; /* do not lose the original buffer pointer */
     SECStatus rv;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (buf->buf == NULL) {
 	*buf = *origBuf;
     }
     while (buf->len > 0) {
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) {
 	    PRUint8 t;
 	    t = *(buf->buf++);
 	    buf->len--;
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0)
 		ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t;
 	    else
 		ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t;
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4)
 	    	continue;
 #define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff	/* 128k - 1 */
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) {
 		(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
 		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 #undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN
 	    /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through,
 	    ** even if buf->len is zero.
 	    */
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0)
 	    	continue;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new
 	 * data available for this message. If it can be done right out
 	 * of the original buffer, then use it from there.
 	 */
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
 	    /* handle it from input buffer */
 	    rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
 	    if (rv == SECFailure) {
 		/* This test wants to fall through on either
 		 * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
 		 * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code.
 		 */
 		return rv;
 	    }
 	    buf->buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
 	    buf->len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */
 		return rv;
 	    }
 	} else {
 	    /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */
 	    unsigned int bytes;
 	    PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
 	    bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len);
 	    /* Grow the buffer if needed */
 	    rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		/* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	    PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len,
 		        buf->buf, bytes);
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes;
 	    buf->buf += bytes;
 	    buf->len -= bytes;
 	    PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
 	    /* if we have a whole message, do it */
 	    if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
 		rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(
 		    ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
 		if (rv == SECFailure) {
 		    /* This test wants to fall through on either
 		     * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock.
 		     * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code.
 		     */
 		    return rv;
 		}
 		ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0;
 		ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
 		ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
 		if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */
 		    return rv;
 		}
 	    } else {
 		PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0);
 		break;
 	    }
 	}
     }	/* end loop */
     origBuf->len = 0;	/* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */
     buf->buf = NULL;	/* not a leak. */
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
  * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
  * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
  * them with something else for odd compilers. */
 #define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
 #define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
 /* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if
  * rv == SECSuccess.  Otherwise it returns zero. */
 static unsigned int
 SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv)
 {
     unsigned int good;
     /* rv ^ SECSuccess is zero iff rv == SECSuccess. Subtracting one results
      * in the MSB being set to one iff it was zero before. */
     good = rv ^ SECSuccess;
     good--;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
 }
 /* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
 static unsigned char
 ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
 {
     a -= b;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
 }
 /* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
 static unsigned char
 ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
 {
     unsigned int c = a ^ b;
     c--;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
 			  unsigned int blockSize,
 			  unsigned int macSize)
 {
     unsigned int paddingLength, good, t;
     const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
     /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
      * time. */
     if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1];
     /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
     t = plaintext->len;
     t -= paddingLength+overhead;
     /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
     good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
     /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
     t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1);
     good &= DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
     plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1);
     return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
 }
 static SECStatus
 ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize)
 {
     unsigned int paddingLength, good, t, toCheck, i;
     const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
     /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
      * time. */
     if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1];
     t = plaintext->len;
     t -= paddingLength+overhead;
     /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
     good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
     /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then
      * that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte.
      * Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of
      * padding.
      *
      * We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks
      * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
      * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
      * public information so we can use it.) */
     toCheck = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
     if (toCheck > plaintext->len-1) {
 	toCheck = plaintext->len-1;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) {
 	unsigned int t = paddingLength - i;
 	/* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is
 	 * 0xff.  Otherwise, mask is 0. */
 	unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
 	unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1-i];
 	/* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value
 	 * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
 	good &= ~(mask&(paddingLength ^ b));
     }
     /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value,
      * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
      * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
      * bits. */
     good &= good >> 4;
     good &= good >> 2;
     good &= good >> 1;
     good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
     good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
     plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1);
     return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
 }
 /* On entry:
  *   originalLength >= macSize
  *   macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH
  *   plaintext->len >= macSize
  */
 static void
 ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
 		  unsigned int originalLength,
 		  SSL3Opaque* out,
 		  unsigned int macSize)
 {
     unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
     /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the
      * MAC. */
     unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len;
     unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize;
     /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
      * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
     unsigned scanStart = 0;
     unsigned i, j, divSpoiler;
     unsigned char rotateOffset;
     if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1)
 	scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1);
     /* divSpoiler contains a multiple of macSize that is used to cause the
      * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
      * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
      *
      * The aim of right-shifting macSize is so that the compiler doesn't
      * figure out that it can remove divSpoiler as that would require it
      * to prove that macSize is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
     divSpoiler = macSize >> 1;
     divSpoiler <<= (sizeof(divSpoiler)-1)*8;
     rotateOffset = (divSpoiler + macStart - scanStart) % macSize;
     memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize);
     for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) {
 	for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) {
 	    unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart);
 	    unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd);
 	    unsigned char b = 0;
 	    b = plaintext->buf[i];
 	    rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded;
 	}
     }
     /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line
      * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */
     memset(out, 0, macSize);
     for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) {
 	unsigned char offset =
 	    (divSpoiler + macSize - rotateOffset + i) % macSize;
 	for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) {
 	    out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, offset);
 	}
     }
 }
 /* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the
  * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf)
  * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf
  * is lost.  Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type,
  * unless it's an application record.
  *
  * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and
  * checked, and is already sitting in databuf.  It is processed as an SSL
  * Handshake message.
  *
  * DOES NOT process the decrypted/decompressed application data.
  * On return, databuf contains the decrypted/decompressed record.
  *
  * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake
  *             ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq
  *
  * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock.
  *
  * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the
  * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than
  * Application Data records.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
 {
     const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def;
     ssl3CipherSpec *     crSpec;
     SECStatus            rv;
     unsigned int         hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1;
     PRBool               isTLS;
     SSL3ContentType      rType;
     SSL3Opaque           hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
     SSL3Opaque           givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
     SSL3Opaque          *givenHash;
     sslBuffer           *plaintext;
     sslBuffer            temp_buf;
     PRUint64             dtls_seq_num;
     unsigned int         ivLen = 0;
     unsigned int         originalLen = 0;
     unsigned int         good;
     unsigned int         minLength;
     unsigned char        header[13];
     unsigned int         headerLen;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
     if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) {
 	ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
 	rv = ssl3_InitState(ss);
 	ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    return rv;		/* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */
     	}
     }
     /* check for Token Presence */
     if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX().
      * This implies that databuf holds a previously deciphered SSL Handshake
      * message.
      */
     if (cText == NULL) {
 	SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake",
 		 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	rType = content_handshake;
 	goto process_it;
     }
     ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/
     crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
     cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def;
     /*
      * DTLS relevance checks:
      * Note that this code currently ignores all out-of-epoch packets,
      * which means we lose some in the case of rehandshake +
      * loss/reordering. Since DTLS is explicitly unreliable, this
      * seems like a good tradeoff for implementation effort and is
      * consistent with the guidance of RFC 6347 Sections 4.1 and 4.2.4.1
      */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	DTLSEpoch epoch = (cText->seq_num.high >> 16) & 0xffff;
 	if (crSpec->epoch != epoch) {
 	    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, received packet "
 		     "from irrelevant epoch %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, epoch));
 	    /* Silently drop the packet */
             databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
 	    return SECSuccess;
 	}
 	dtls_seq_num = (((PRUint64)(cText->seq_num.high & 0xffff)) << 32) |
 			((PRUint64)cText->seq_num.low);
 	if (dtls_RecordGetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, dtls_seq_num) != 0) {
 	    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, rejecting "
 		     "potentially replayed packet", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	    /* Silently drop the packet */
             databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
 	    return SECSuccess;
 	}
     }
     good = ~0U;
     minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
     if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
 	/* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
 	minLength++;
 	if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
 	    /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */
 	    minLength += cipher_def->iv_size;
 	}
     } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
 	minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size;
     }
     /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
      * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
     if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
 	goto decrypt_loser;
     }
     if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
 	crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
 	/* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states
 	 * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and
 	 * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV
 	 * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then
 	 * discard it before decrypting the rest.
 	 */
 	SSL3Opaque iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH];
 	int decoded;
 	ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
 	if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) {
 	    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen));
 	/* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away
 	 * the block it doesn't matter.  The decryption of the next block
 	 * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block.
 	 */
 	rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded,
 			    sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen);
 	good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
     }
     /* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere
      * other than into databuf */
     if (crSpec->decompressor) {
 	temp_buf.buf = NULL;
 	temp_buf.space = 0;
 	plaintext = &temp_buf;
     } else {
 	plaintext = databuf;
     }
     plaintext->len = 0; /* filled in by decode call below. */
     if (plaintext->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) {
 	rv = sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
 		     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048));
 	    /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
 	    /* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
     }
     PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen,
 				      cText->buf->len - ivLen));
     isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
     if (isTLS && cText->buf->len - ivLen > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) {
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     rType = cText->type;
     if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
 	/* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the
 	 * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general.
 	 * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the
 	 * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */
 	unsigned int decryptedLen =
 	    cText->buf->len - cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size -
 	    cipher_def->tag_size;
 	headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
 	    header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
 	    rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen);
 	PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header));
 	rv = crSpec->aead(
 		ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server,
 		PR_TRUE,                          /* do decrypt */
 		plaintext->buf,                   /* out */
 		(int*) &plaintext->len,           /* outlen */
 		plaintext->space,                 /* maxout */
 		cText->buf->buf,                  /* in */
 		cText->buf->len,                  /* inlen */
 		header, headerLen);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    good = 0;
 	}
     } else {
 	if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
 	    ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
 	    goto decrypt_loser;
 	}
 	/* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
 	rv = crSpec->decode(
 	    crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
 	    plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    goto decrypt_loser;
 	}
 	PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
 	originalLen = plaintext->len;
 	/* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
 	if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
 	    const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
 	    const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
 	    if (!isTLS) {
 		good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(
 			    plaintext, blockSize, macSize));
 	    } else {
 		good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(
 			    plaintext, macSize));
 	    }
 	}
 	/* compute the MAC */
 	headerLen = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
 	    header, IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
 	    rType, isTLS, cText->version, IS_DTLS(ss),
 	    plaintext->len - crSpec->mac_size);
 	PORT_Assert(headerLen <= sizeof(header));
 	if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
 	    rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
 		crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen,
 		plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen,
 		hash, &hashBytes);
 	    ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf,
 			      crSpec->mac_size);
 	    givenHash = givenHashBuf;
 	    /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC
 	     * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust
 	     * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we
 	     * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */
 	    plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
 	} else {
 	    /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */
 	    plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
 	    rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
 		crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer), header, headerLen,
 		plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes);
 	    /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location
 	     * is public when a stream cipher is used. */
 	    givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len;
 	}
 	good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
 	if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size ||
 	    NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) {
 	    /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */
 	    good = 0;
 	}
     }
     if (good == 0) {
 decrypt_loser:
 	/* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
 	ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
 	SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
 	if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	    SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
 	    /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
 	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	} else {
 	    /* Silently drop the packet */
             databuf->len = 0; /* Needed to ensure data not left around */
 	    return SECSuccess;
 	}
     }
     if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&crSpec->read_seq_num);
     } else {
 	dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&crSpec->recvdRecords, dtls_seq_num);
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/
     /*
      * The decrypted data is now in plaintext.
      */
     /* possibly decompress the record. If we aren't using compression then
      * plaintext == databuf and so the uncompressed data is already in
      * databuf. */
     if (crSpec->decompressor) {
 	if (databuf->space < plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION) {
 	    rv = sslBuffer_Grow(
 	        databuf, plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION);
 	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 		SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes",
 			 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
 			 plaintext->len + SSL3_COMPRESSION_MAX_EXPANSION));
 		/* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
 		/* Perhaps we should send an alert. (but we have no memory!) */
 		PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
 		return SECFailure;
 	    }
 	}
 	rv = crSpec->decompressor(crSpec->decompressContext,
 				  databuf->buf,
 				  (int*) &databuf->len,
 				  databuf->space,
 				  plaintext->buf,
 				  plaintext->len);
 	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	    int err = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
 	    SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
 			   isTLS ? decompression_failure : bad_record_mac);
 	    /* There appears to be a bug with (at least) Apache + OpenSSL where
 	     * resumed SSLv3 connections don't actually use compression. See
 	     * comments 93-95 of
 	     * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=275744
 	     *
 	     * So, if we get a decompression error, and the record appears to
 	     * be already uncompressed, then we return a more specific error
 	     * code to hopefully save somebody some debugging time in the
 	     * future.
 	     */
 	    if (plaintext->len >= 4) {
 		unsigned int len = ((unsigned int) plaintext->buf[1] << 16) |
 		                   ((unsigned int) plaintext->buf[2] << 8) |
 		                   (unsigned int) plaintext->buf[3];
 		if (len == plaintext->len - 4) {
 		    /* This appears to be uncompressed already */
 		    err = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD;
 		}
 	    }
 	    PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
 	    PORT_SetError(err);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 	PORT_Free(plaintext->buf);
     }
     /*
     ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again.
     */
     if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) {
 	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this
     ** function, not by this function.
     */
     if (rType == content_application_data) {
 	if (ss->firstHsDone)
 	    return SECSuccess;
 	(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     /* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application.
     */
 process_it:
     /* XXX  Get the xmit lock here.  Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting
      * data ang getting the xmit lock here prevents deadlocks.
      */
     ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if
     ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock.
     */
     switch (rType) {
     case content_change_cipher_spec:
 	rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf);
 	break;
     case content_alert:
 	rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf);
 	break;
     case content_handshake:
 	if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	    rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf);
 	} else {
 	    rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf);
 	}
 	break;
     /*
     case content_application_data is handled before this switch
     */
     default:
 	SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d",
 		 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type));
 	/* XXX Send an alert ???  */
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	break;
     }
     ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
     return rv;
 }
 /*
  * Initialization functions
  */
 /* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */
 /* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */
 static void
 ssl3_InitCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
 {
     spec->cipher_def               = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null];
     PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null);
     spec->mac_def                  = &mac_defs[mac_null];
     PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null);
     spec->encode                   = Null_Cipher;
     spec->decode                   = Null_Cipher;
     spec->destroy                  = NULL;
     spec->compressor               = NULL;
     spec->decompressor             = NULL;
     spec->destroyCompressContext   = NULL;
     spec->destroyDecompressContext = NULL;
     spec->mac_size                 = 0;
     spec->master_secret            = NULL;
     spec->bypassCiphers            = PR_FALSE;
     spec->msItem.data              = NULL;
     spec->msItem.len               = 0;
     spec->client.write_key         = NULL;
     spec->client.write_mac_key     = NULL;
     spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL;
     spec->server.write_key         = NULL;
     spec->server.write_mac_key     = NULL;
     spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL;
     spec->write_seq_num.high       = 0;
     spec->write_seq_num.low        = 0;
     spec->read_seq_num.high        = 0;
     spec->read_seq_num.low         = 0;
     spec->epoch                    = 0;
     dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords);
     spec->version                  = ss->vrange.max;
 }
 /* Called from:	ssl3_SendRecord
 **		ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() <- ssl2_BeginClientHandshake()
 **		ssl3_SendClientHello()
 **		ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
 **		ssl3_HandleRecord()
 **
 ** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock.
 **
 **
 */
 static SECStatus
 ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
     if (ss->ssl3.initialized)
     	return SECSuccess;	/* Function should be idempotent */
     ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED;
     ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
     ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[0];
     ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec = &ss->ssl3.specs[1];
     ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE;
     ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec);
     ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec);
     ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello;
 #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
     ss->ssl3.hs.negotiatedECCurves = ssl3_GetSupportedECCurveMask(ss);
 #endif
     ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
     PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData, 0, sizeof(TLSExtensionData));
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimeoutMs = INITIAL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_MS;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1;
 	PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
 	dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */
     }
     PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space);
     ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
     ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
     ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
     PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0,
 		sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket));
     ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_TRUE;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* Returns a reference counted object that contains a key pair.
  * Or NULL on failure.  Initial ref count is 1.
  * Uses the keys in the pair as input.
  */
 ssl3KeyPair *
 ssl3_NewKeyPair( SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey, SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey)
 {
     ssl3KeyPair * pair;
     if (!privKey || !pubKey) {
 	PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
     	return NULL;
     }
     pair = PORT_ZNew(ssl3KeyPair);
     if (!pair)
     	return NULL;			/* error code is set. */
     pair->refCount = 1;
     pair->privKey  = privKey;
     pair->pubKey   = pubKey;
     return pair;			/* success */
 }
 ssl3KeyPair *
 ssl3_GetKeyPairRef(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair)
 {
     PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&keyPair->refCount);
     return keyPair;
 }
 void
 ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair)
 {
     PRInt32 newCount =  PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&keyPair->refCount);
     if (!newCount) {
 	if (keyPair->privKey)
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keyPair->privKey);
 	if (keyPair->pubKey)
 	    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey( keyPair->pubKey);
     	PORT_Free(keyPair);
     }
 }
 /*
  * Creates the public and private RSA keys for SSL Step down.
  * Called from SSL_ConfigSecureServer in sslsecur.c
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CreateRSAStepDownKeys(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     SECStatus             rv  	 = SECSuccess;
     SECKEYPrivateKey *    privKey;		/* RSA step down key */
     SECKEYPublicKey *     pubKey;		/* RSA step down key */
     if (ss->stepDownKeyPair)
 	ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ss->stepDownKeyPair);
     ss->stepDownKeyPair = NULL;
 #ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER
     /* Sigh, should have a get key strength call for private keys */
     if (PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY) >
                                                      EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH) {
 	/* need to ask for the key size in bits */
 	privKey = SECKEY_CreateRSAPrivateKey(EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB,
 					     &pubKey, NULL);
     	if (!privKey || !pubKey ||
 	    !(ss->stepDownKeyPair = ssl3_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey))) {
 	    ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
 	    rv = SECFailure;
 	}
     }
 #endif
     return rv;
 }
 /* record the export policy for this cipher suite */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy)
 {
     ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
     suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
     if (suite == NULL) {
 	return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
     }
     suite->policy = policy;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy)
 {
     ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
     PRInt32             policy;
     SECStatus           rv;
     suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
     if (suite) {
     	policy = suite->policy;
 	rv     = SECSuccess;
     } else {
     	policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
 	rv     = SECFailure;	/* err code was set by Lookup. */
     }
     *oPolicy = policy;
     return rv;
 }
 /* record the user preference for this suite */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
 {
     ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
     suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
     if (suite == NULL) {
 	return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
     }
     suite->enabled = enabled;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /* return the user preference for this suite */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
 {
     ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
     PRBool              pref;
     SECStatus           rv;
     suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
     if (suite) {
     	pref   = suite->enabled;
 	rv     = SECSuccess;
     } else {
     	pref   = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
 	rv     = SECFailure;	/* err code was set by Lookup. */
     }
     *enabled = pref;
     return rv;
 }
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
 {
     ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
     suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites);
     if (suite == NULL) {
 	return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
     }
     suite->enabled = enabled;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 SECStatus
 ssl3_CipherPrefGet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
 {
     ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
     PRBool              pref;
     SECStatus           rv;
     suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites);
     if (suite) {
     	pref   = suite->enabled;
 	rv     = SECSuccess;
     } else {
     	pref   = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
 	rv     = SECFailure;	/* err code was set by Lookup. */
     }
     *enabled = pref;
     return rv;
 }
 /* copy global default policy into socket. */
 void
 ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof cipherSuites);
 }
 /* ssl3_config_match_init must have already been called by
  * the caller of this function.
  */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *cs, int *size)
 {
     int i, count = 0;
     PORT_Assert(ss != 0);
     if (!ss) {
 	PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
     	*size = 0;
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     if (cs == NULL) {
 	*size = count_cipher_suites(ss, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE);
 	return SECSuccess;
     }
     /* ssl3_config_match_init was called by the caller of this function. */
     for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
 	ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
 	if (config_match(suite, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, &ss->vrange)) {
 	    if (cs != NULL) {
 		*cs++ = 0x00;
 		*cs++ = (suite->cipher_suite >> 8) & 0xFF;
 		*cs++ =  suite->cipher_suite       & 0xFF;
 	    }
 	    count++;
 	}
     }
     *size = count;
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 /*
 ** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state,
 ** then start a new handshake.
 ** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a
 ** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done.
 **
 ** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks.
 */
 SECStatus
 ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache)
 {
     sslSessionID *   sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
     SECStatus        rv;
     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
     if (!ss->firstHsDone ||
         ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) &&
 	 ss->ssl3.initialized &&
 	 (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake))) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
     }
     if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
 	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     if (sid && flushCache) {
         if (ss->sec.uncache)
             ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */
 	ssl_FreeSID(sid);	/* dec ref count and free if zero. */
 	ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
     }
     ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);	/**************************************/
     /* start off a new handshake. */
     rv = (ss->sec.isServer) ? ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss)
                             : ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, PR_FALSE);
     ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);	/**************************************/
     return rv;
 }
 /* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */
 void
 ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss)
 {
     if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL)
 	CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
     if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL)
 	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
     if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL)
 	ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
     if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
        CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
        ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
     }
     /* clean up handshake */
 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
     if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) {
 	    SHA1_DestroyContext((SHA1Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, PR_FALSE);
 	    MD5_DestroyContext((MD5Context *)ss->ssl3.hs.md5_cx, PR_FALSE);
 	} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
 	    ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->destroy(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx, PR_FALSE);
 	}
     }
 #endif
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5,PR_TRUE);
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha,PR_TRUE);
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash) {
 	PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash);
     }
     if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) {
     	PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf);
 	ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
 	ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
     }
     /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */
     PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf);
     SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
     /* free up the CipherSpecs */
     ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[0], PR_TRUE/*freeSrvName*/);
     ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ss->ssl3.specs[1], PR_TRUE/*freeSrvName*/);
     /* Destroy the DTLS data */
     if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
 	dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
 	if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) {
 	    PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf);
 	}
     }
     ss->ssl3.initialized = PR_FALSE;
     SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE);
 }
 /* End of ssl3con.c */

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security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c