Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.
michael@0 | 1 | // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
michael@0 | 2 | // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
michael@0 | 3 | // found in the LICENSE file. |
michael@0 | 4 | |
michael@0 | 5 | /* This file has been initially imported from |
michael@0 | 6 | * http://git.chromium.org/gitweb/?p=chromium.git;a=blob;f=sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/linux_seccomp.h;h=0de0259da39ecdb745e5923b9a6ff3961c13be00;hb=2362c9abea79cae475921bdeee58f9e3910d211c |
michael@0 | 7 | * |
michael@0 | 8 | * Contains code for macro for common filters from: |
michael@0 | 9 | * http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/step-5/seccomp-bpf.h |
michael@0 | 10 | * |
michael@0 | 11 | * Contains code for arch_seccomp_data and arch_sigsys from: |
michael@0 | 12 | * http://git.chromium.org/gitweb/?p=chromium.git;a=blob;f=sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h;h=3d269916070c97b8be8938503b9b799f12d79ca6;hb=2362c9abea79cae475921bdeee58f9e3910d211c |
michael@0 | 13 | * |
michael@0 | 14 | * For more information about Seccomp, see also: |
michael@0 | 15 | * Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt and |
michael@0 | 16 | * samples/seccomp in the Linux kernel directory, for any kernel >= 3.5.0. |
michael@0 | 17 | */ |
michael@0 | 18 | |
michael@0 | 19 | #ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_LINUX_SECCOMP_H__ |
michael@0 | 20 | #define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_LINUX_SECCOMP_H__ |
michael@0 | 21 | |
michael@0 | 22 | struct arch_seccomp_data { |
michael@0 | 23 | int nr; |
michael@0 | 24 | uint32_t arch; |
michael@0 | 25 | uint64_t instruction_pointer; |
michael@0 | 26 | uint64_t args[6]; |
michael@0 | 27 | }; |
michael@0 | 28 | |
michael@0 | 29 | struct arch_sigsys { |
michael@0 | 30 | void *ip; |
michael@0 | 31 | int nr; |
michael@0 | 32 | unsigned int arch; |
michael@0 | 33 | }; |
michael@0 | 34 | |
michael@0 | 35 | // The Seccomp2 kernel ABI is not part of older versions of glibc. |
michael@0 | 36 | // As we can't break compilation with these versions of the library, |
michael@0 | 37 | // we explicitly define all missing symbols. |
michael@0 | 38 | // If we ever decide that we can now rely on system headers, the following |
michael@0 | 39 | // include files should be enabled: |
michael@0 | 40 | // #include <linux/audit.h> |
michael@0 | 41 | // #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
michael@0 | 42 | |
michael@0 | 43 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
michael@0 | 44 | #include <linux/filter.h> |
michael@0 | 45 | |
michael@0 | 46 | // From <linux/elf.h> and <linux/audit.h> |
michael@0 | 47 | // This is necessary as we can't expect recent audit headers. |
michael@0 | 48 | #ifndef EM_ARM |
michael@0 | 49 | #define EM_ARM 40 |
michael@0 | 50 | #endif |
michael@0 | 51 | #ifndef EM_386 |
michael@0 | 52 | #define EM_386 3 |
michael@0 | 53 | #endif |
michael@0 | 54 | #ifndef EM_X86_64 |
michael@0 | 55 | #define EM_X86_64 62 |
michael@0 | 56 | #endif |
michael@0 | 57 | |
michael@0 | 58 | #ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT |
michael@0 | 59 | #define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000 |
michael@0 | 60 | #endif |
michael@0 | 61 | #ifndef __AUDIT_ARCH_LE |
michael@0 | 62 | #define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE 0x40000000 |
michael@0 | 63 | #endif |
michael@0 | 64 | #ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_ARM |
michael@0 | 65 | #define AUDIT_ARCH_ARM (EM_ARM|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) |
michael@0 | 66 | #endif |
michael@0 | 67 | #ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_I386 |
michael@0 | 68 | #define AUDIT_ARCH_I386 (EM_386|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) |
michael@0 | 69 | #endif |
michael@0 | 70 | #ifndef AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 |
michael@0 | 71 | #define AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 (EM_X86_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE) |
michael@0 | 72 | #endif |
michael@0 | 73 | |
michael@0 | 74 | // From <linux/prctl.h> |
michael@0 | 75 | // This is necessary as we can't expect recent prctl headers. |
michael@0 | 76 | #ifndef PR_SET_SECCOMP |
michael@0 | 77 | #define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22 |
michael@0 | 78 | #define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21 |
michael@0 | 79 | #endif |
michael@0 | 80 | #ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS |
michael@0 | 81 | #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38 |
michael@0 | 82 | #define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39 |
michael@0 | 83 | #endif |
michael@0 | 84 | #ifndef IPC_64 |
michael@0 | 85 | #define IPC_64 0x0100 |
michael@0 | 86 | #endif |
michael@0 | 87 | |
michael@0 | 88 | #ifndef BPF_MOD |
michael@0 | 89 | #define BPF_MOD 0x90 |
michael@0 | 90 | #endif |
michael@0 | 91 | #ifndef BPF_XOR |
michael@0 | 92 | #define BPF_XOR 0xA0 |
michael@0 | 93 | #endif |
michael@0 | 94 | |
michael@0 | 95 | // From <linux/seccomp.h> |
michael@0 | 96 | // This is necessary as we can't expect recent seccomp headers. |
michael@0 | 97 | #ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER |
michael@0 | 98 | #define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED 0 |
michael@0 | 99 | #define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 |
michael@0 | 100 | #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 // User user-supplied filter (seccomp-bpf) |
michael@0 | 101 | #endif |
michael@0 | 102 | |
michael@0 | 103 | #ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL |
michael@0 | 104 | // Return values supported for BPF filter programs. Please note that the |
michael@0 | 105 | // "illegal" SECCOMP_RET_INVALID is not supported by the kernel, should only |
michael@0 | 106 | // ever be used internally, and would result in the kernel killing our process. |
michael@0 | 107 | #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL 0x00000000U // Kill the task immediately |
michael@0 | 108 | #define SECCOMP_RET_INVALID 0x00010000U // Illegal return value |
michael@0 | 109 | #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U // Disallow and force a SIGSYS |
michael@0 | 110 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U // Returns an errno |
michael@0 | 111 | #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U // Pass to a tracer or disallow |
michael@0 | 112 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U // Allow |
michael@0 | 113 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION 0xffff0000U // Masks for the return value |
michael@0 | 114 | #define SECCOMP_RET_DATA 0x0000ffffU // sections |
michael@0 | 115 | #else |
michael@0 | 116 | #define SECCOMP_RET_INVALID 0x00010000U // Illegal return value |
michael@0 | 117 | #endif |
michael@0 | 118 | |
michael@0 | 119 | #ifndef SYS_SECCOMP |
michael@0 | 120 | #define SYS_SECCOMP 1 |
michael@0 | 121 | #endif |
michael@0 | 122 | |
michael@0 | 123 | // Impose some reasonable maximum BPF program size. Realistically, the |
michael@0 | 124 | // kernel probably has much lower limits. But by limiting to less than |
michael@0 | 125 | // 30 bits, we can ease requirements on some of our data types. |
michael@0 | 126 | #define SECCOMP_MAX_PROGRAM_SIZE (1<<30) |
michael@0 | 127 | |
michael@0 | 128 | #if defined(__i386__) |
michael@0 | 129 | #define MIN_SYSCALL 0u |
michael@0 | 130 | #define MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL 1024u |
michael@0 | 131 | #define MAX_SYSCALL MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL |
michael@0 | 132 | #define SECCOMP_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_I386 |
michael@0 | 133 | |
michael@0 | 134 | #define SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, _reg) ((_ctx)->uc_mcontext.gregs[(_reg)]) |
michael@0 | 135 | #define SECCOMP_RESULT(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EAX) |
michael@0 | 136 | #define SECCOMP_SYSCALL(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EAX) |
michael@0 | 137 | #define SECCOMP_IP(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EIP) |
michael@0 | 138 | #define SECCOMP_PARM1(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EBX) |
michael@0 | 139 | #define SECCOMP_PARM2(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_ECX) |
michael@0 | 140 | #define SECCOMP_PARM3(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EDX) |
michael@0 | 141 | #define SECCOMP_PARM4(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_ESI) |
michael@0 | 142 | #define SECCOMP_PARM5(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EDI) |
michael@0 | 143 | #define SECCOMP_PARM6(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_EBP) |
michael@0 | 144 | #define SECCOMP_NR_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, nr)) |
michael@0 | 145 | #define SECCOMP_ARCH_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, arch)) |
michael@0 | 146 | #define SECCOMP_IP_MSB_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, \ |
michael@0 | 147 | instruction_pointer) + 4) |
michael@0 | 148 | #define SECCOMP_IP_LSB_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, \ |
michael@0 | 149 | instruction_pointer) + 0) |
michael@0 | 150 | #define SECCOMP_ARG_MSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) + \ |
michael@0 | 151 | 8*(nr) + 4) |
michael@0 | 152 | #define SECCOMP_ARG_LSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) + \ |
michael@0 | 153 | 8*(nr) + 0) |
michael@0 | 154 | |
michael@0 | 155 | #elif defined(__x86_64__) |
michael@0 | 156 | #define MIN_SYSCALL 0u |
michael@0 | 157 | #define MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL 1024u |
michael@0 | 158 | #define MAX_SYSCALL MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL |
michael@0 | 159 | #define SECCOMP_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 |
michael@0 | 160 | |
michael@0 | 161 | #define SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, _reg) ((_ctx)->uc_mcontext.gregs[(_reg)]) |
michael@0 | 162 | #define SECCOMP_RESULT(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RAX) |
michael@0 | 163 | #define SECCOMP_SYSCALL(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RAX) |
michael@0 | 164 | #define SECCOMP_IP(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RIP) |
michael@0 | 165 | #define SECCOMP_PARM1(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RDI) |
michael@0 | 166 | #define SECCOMP_PARM2(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RSI) |
michael@0 | 167 | #define SECCOMP_PARM3(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_RDX) |
michael@0 | 168 | #define SECCOMP_PARM4(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_R10) |
michael@0 | 169 | #define SECCOMP_PARM5(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_R8) |
michael@0 | 170 | #define SECCOMP_PARM6(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, REG_R9) |
michael@0 | 171 | #define SECCOMP_NR_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, nr)) |
michael@0 | 172 | #define SECCOMP_ARCH_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, arch)) |
michael@0 | 173 | #define SECCOMP_IP_MSB_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, \ |
michael@0 | 174 | instruction_pointer) + 4) |
michael@0 | 175 | #define SECCOMP_IP_LSB_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, \ |
michael@0 | 176 | instruction_pointer) + 0) |
michael@0 | 177 | #define SECCOMP_ARG_MSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) + \ |
michael@0 | 178 | 8*(nr) + 4) |
michael@0 | 179 | #define SECCOMP_ARG_LSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) + \ |
michael@0 | 180 | 8*(nr) + 0) |
michael@0 | 181 | |
michael@0 | 182 | #elif defined(__arm__) && (defined(__thumb__) || defined(__ARM_EABI__)) |
michael@0 | 183 | // ARM EABI includes "ARM private" system calls starting at |__ARM_NR_BASE|, |
michael@0 | 184 | // and a "ghost syscall private to the kernel", cmpxchg, |
michael@0 | 185 | // at |__ARM_NR_BASE+0x00fff0|. |
michael@0 | 186 | // See </arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h> in the Linux kernel. |
michael@0 | 187 | #define MIN_SYSCALL ((unsigned int)__NR_SYSCALL_BASE) |
michael@0 | 188 | #define MAX_PUBLIC_SYSCALL (MIN_SYSCALL + 1024u) |
michael@0 | 189 | #define MIN_PRIVATE_SYSCALL ((unsigned int)__ARM_NR_BASE) |
michael@0 | 190 | #define MAX_PRIVATE_SYSCALL (MIN_PRIVATE_SYSCALL + 16u) |
michael@0 | 191 | #define MIN_GHOST_SYSCALL ((unsigned int)__ARM_NR_BASE + 0xfff0u) |
michael@0 | 192 | #define MAX_SYSCALL (MIN_GHOST_SYSCALL + 4u) |
michael@0 | 193 | |
michael@0 | 194 | #define SECCOMP_ARCH AUDIT_ARCH_ARM |
michael@0 | 195 | |
michael@0 | 196 | // ARM sigcontext_t is different from i386/x86_64. |
michael@0 | 197 | // See </arch/arm/include/asm/sigcontext.h> in the Linux kernel. |
michael@0 | 198 | #define SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, _reg) ((_ctx)->uc_mcontext.arm_##_reg) |
michael@0 | 199 | // ARM EABI syscall convention. |
michael@0 | 200 | #define SECCOMP_RESULT(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r0) |
michael@0 | 201 | #define SECCOMP_SYSCALL(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r7) |
michael@0 | 202 | #define SECCOMP_IP(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, pc) |
michael@0 | 203 | #define SECCOMP_PARM1(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r0) |
michael@0 | 204 | #define SECCOMP_PARM2(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r1) |
michael@0 | 205 | #define SECCOMP_PARM3(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r2) |
michael@0 | 206 | #define SECCOMP_PARM4(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r3) |
michael@0 | 207 | #define SECCOMP_PARM5(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r4) |
michael@0 | 208 | #define SECCOMP_PARM6(_ctx) SECCOMP_REG(_ctx, r5) |
michael@0 | 209 | #define SECCOMP_NR_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, nr)) |
michael@0 | 210 | #define SECCOMP_ARCH_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, arch)) |
michael@0 | 211 | #define SECCOMP_IP_MSB_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, \ |
michael@0 | 212 | instruction_pointer) + 4) |
michael@0 | 213 | #define SECCOMP_IP_LSB_IDX (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, \ |
michael@0 | 214 | instruction_pointer) + 0) |
michael@0 | 215 | #define SECCOMP_ARG_MSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) + \ |
michael@0 | 216 | 8*(nr) + 4) |
michael@0 | 217 | #define SECCOMP_ARG_LSB_IDX(nr) (offsetof(struct arch_seccomp_data, args) + \ |
michael@0 | 218 | 8*(nr) + 0) |
michael@0 | 219 | |
michael@0 | 220 | #else |
michael@0 | 221 | #error Unsupported target platform |
michael@0 | 222 | |
michael@0 | 223 | #endif |
michael@0 | 224 | |
michael@0 | 225 | /* Macros to common filters */ |
michael@0 | 226 | #define VALIDATE_ARCHITECTURE \ |
michael@0 | 227 | BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, SECCOMP_ARCH_IDX), \ |
michael@0 | 228 | BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_ARCH, 1, 0), \ |
michael@0 | 229 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL) |
michael@0 | 230 | |
michael@0 | 231 | #define EXAMINE_SYSCALL \ |
michael@0 | 232 | BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, SECCOMP_NR_IDX) |
michael@0 | 233 | |
michael@0 | 234 | #define ALLOW_SYSCALL(name) \ |
michael@0 | 235 | BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_##name, 0, 1), \ |
michael@0 | 236 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) |
michael@0 | 237 | |
michael@0 | 238 | #if defined(__arm__) && (defined(__thumb__) || defined(__ARM_EABI__)) |
michael@0 | 239 | #define ALLOW_ARM_SYSCALL(name) \ |
michael@0 | 240 | BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __ARM_NR_##name, 0, 1), \ |
michael@0 | 241 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) |
michael@0 | 242 | #endif |
michael@0 | 243 | |
michael@0 | 244 | #define DENY_KILL_SYSCALL(name) \ |
michael@0 | 245 | BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_##name, 0, 1), \ |
michael@0 | 246 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL) |
michael@0 | 247 | |
michael@0 | 248 | #define DENY_SYSCALL(name, err) \ |
michael@0 | 249 | BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_##name, 0, 1), \ |
michael@0 | 250 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO + err) |
michael@0 | 251 | |
michael@0 | 252 | #define KILL_PROCESS \ |
michael@0 | 253 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL) |
michael@0 | 254 | |
michael@0 | 255 | #define TRAP_PROCESS \ |
michael@0 | 256 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP) |
michael@0 | 257 | |
michael@0 | 258 | #define ALLOW_PROCESS \ |
michael@0 | 259 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) |
michael@0 | 260 | |
michael@0 | 261 | #define TRACE_PROCESS \ |
michael@0 | 262 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) |
michael@0 | 263 | |
michael@0 | 264 | #define ERRNO_PROCESS \ |
michael@0 | 265 | BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO) |
michael@0 | 266 | |
michael@0 | 267 | #endif // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_LINUX_SECCOMP_H__ |