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1 /* |
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2 * xfm.c |
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3 * |
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4 * Crypto transform implementation |
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5 * |
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6 * David A. McGrew |
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7 * Cisco Systems, Inc. |
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8 */ |
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9 /* |
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10 * |
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11 * Copyright (c) 2001-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. |
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12 * All rights reserved. |
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13 * |
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14 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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15 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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16 * are met: |
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17 * |
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18 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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19 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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20 * |
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21 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above |
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22 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following |
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23 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided |
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24 * with the distribution. |
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25 * |
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26 * Neither the name of the Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its |
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27 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived |
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28 * from this software without specific prior written permission. |
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29 * |
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30 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS |
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31 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT |
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32 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS |
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33 * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE |
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34 * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, |
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35 * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES |
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36 * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR |
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37 * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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38 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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39 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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40 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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41 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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42 * |
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43 */ |
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44 |
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45 #include "cryptoalg.h" |
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46 #include "aes_cbc.h" |
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47 #include "hmac.h" |
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48 #include "crypto_kernel.h" /* for crypto_get_random() */ |
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49 |
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50 #define KEY_LEN 16 |
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51 #define ENC_KEY_LEN 16 |
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52 #define MAC_KEY_LEN 16 |
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53 #define IV_LEN 16 |
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54 #define TAG_LEN 12 |
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55 #define MAX_EXPAND 27 |
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56 |
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57 err_status_t |
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58 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_func(void *key, |
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59 void *clear, |
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60 unsigned clear_len, |
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61 void *iv, |
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62 void *opaque, |
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63 unsigned *opaque_len, |
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64 void *auth_tag) { |
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65 aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
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66 hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
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67 unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
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68 unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
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69 err_status_t status; |
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70 |
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71 /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
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72 if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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73 |
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74 /* perform authentication only */ |
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75 |
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76 } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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77 |
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78 /* |
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79 * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
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80 * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
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81 */ |
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82 return err_status_fail; |
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83 |
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84 } else { |
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85 |
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86 /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
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87 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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88 if (status) return status; |
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89 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
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90 if (status) return status; |
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91 |
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92 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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93 if (status) return status; |
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94 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
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95 if (status) return status; |
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96 |
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97 |
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98 /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
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99 |
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100 /* set aes key */ |
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101 status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_encrypt); |
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102 if (status) return status; |
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103 |
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104 /* set iv */ |
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105 status = crypto_get_random(iv, IV_LEN); |
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106 if (status) return status; |
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107 status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
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108 |
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109 /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
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110 status = aes_cbc_nist_encrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
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111 if (status) return status; |
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112 |
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113 /* authenticate clear and opaque data */ |
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114 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
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115 if (status) return status; |
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116 |
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117 status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
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118 if (status) return status; |
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119 |
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120 status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
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121 if (status) return status; |
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122 |
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123 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, auth_tag); |
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124 if (status) return status; |
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125 |
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126 } |
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127 |
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128 return err_status_ok; |
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129 } |
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130 |
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131 err_status_t |
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132 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_inv(void *key, |
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133 void *clear, |
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134 unsigned clear_len, |
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135 void *iv, |
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136 void *opaque, |
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137 unsigned *opaque_len, |
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138 void *auth_tag) { |
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139 aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
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140 hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
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141 unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
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142 unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
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143 unsigned char tmp_tag[TAG_LEN]; |
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144 unsigned char *tag = auth_tag; |
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145 err_status_t status; |
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146 int i; |
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147 |
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148 /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
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149 if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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150 |
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151 /* perform authentication only */ |
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152 |
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153 } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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154 |
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155 /* |
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156 * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
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157 * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
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158 */ |
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159 return err_status_fail; |
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160 |
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161 } else { |
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162 |
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163 /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
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164 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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165 if (status) return status; |
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166 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
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167 if (status) return status; |
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168 |
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169 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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170 if (status) return status; |
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171 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
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172 if (status) return status; |
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173 |
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174 /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
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175 |
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176 /* set aes key */ |
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177 status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_decrypt); |
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178 if (status) return status; |
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179 |
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180 /* set iv */ |
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181 status = rand_source_get_octet_string(iv, IV_LEN); |
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182 if (status) return status; |
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183 status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
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184 |
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185 /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
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186 status = aes_cbc_nist_decrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
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187 if (status) return status; |
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188 |
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189 /* authenticate clear and opaque data */ |
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190 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
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191 if (status) return status; |
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192 |
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193 status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
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194 if (status) return status; |
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195 |
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196 status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
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197 if (status) return status; |
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198 |
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199 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, tmp_tag); |
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200 if (status) return status; |
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201 |
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202 /* compare the computed tag with the one provided as input */ |
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203 for (i=0; i < TAG_LEN; i++) |
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204 if (tmp_tag[i] != tag[i]) |
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205 return err_status_auth_fail; |
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206 |
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207 } |
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208 |
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209 return err_status_ok; |
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210 } |
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211 |
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212 |
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213 #define ENC 1 |
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214 |
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215 #define DEBUG 0 |
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216 |
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217 err_status_t |
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218 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_enc(void *key, |
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219 const void *clear, |
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220 unsigned clear_len, |
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221 void *iv, |
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222 void *opaque, |
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223 unsigned *opaque_len) { |
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224 aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
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225 hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
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226 unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
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227 unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
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228 unsigned char *auth_tag; |
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229 err_status_t status; |
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230 |
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231 /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
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232 if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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233 |
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234 /* perform authentication only */ |
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235 |
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236 } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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237 |
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238 /* |
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239 * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
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240 * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
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241 */ |
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242 return err_status_fail; |
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243 |
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244 } else { |
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245 |
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246 #if DEBUG |
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247 printf("ENC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
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248 #endif |
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249 |
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250 /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
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251 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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252 if (status) return status; |
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253 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
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254 if (status) return status; |
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255 |
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256 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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257 if (status) return status; |
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258 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
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259 if (status) return status; |
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260 |
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261 |
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262 /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
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263 |
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264 /* set aes key */ |
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265 status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_encrypt); |
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266 if (status) return status; |
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267 |
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268 /* set iv */ |
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269 status = rand_source_get_octet_string(iv, IV_LEN); |
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270 if (status) return status; |
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271 status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
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272 if (status) return status; |
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273 |
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274 #if DEBUG |
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275 printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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276 printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
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277 printf("plaintext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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278 #endif |
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279 |
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280 #if ENC |
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281 /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
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282 status = aes_cbc_nist_encrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
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283 if (status) return status; |
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284 #endif |
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285 |
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286 #if DEBUG |
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287 printf("ciphertext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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288 printf("ciphertext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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289 #endif |
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290 |
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291 /* |
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292 * authenticate clear and opaque data, then write the |
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293 * authentication tag to the location immediately following the |
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294 * ciphertext |
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295 */ |
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296 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
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297 if (status) return status; |
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298 |
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299 status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
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300 if (status) return status; |
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301 |
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302 status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
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303 if (status) return status; |
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304 #if DEBUG |
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305 printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
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306 octet_string_hex_string(clear, clear_len)); |
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307 #endif |
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308 auth_tag = (unsigned char *)opaque; |
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309 auth_tag += *opaque_len; |
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310 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, auth_tag); |
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311 if (status) return status; |
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312 #if DEBUG |
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313 printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
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314 octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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315 #endif |
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316 /* bump up the opaque_len to reflect the authentication tag */ |
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317 *opaque_len += TAG_LEN; |
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318 |
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319 #if DEBUG |
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320 printf("prot data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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321 printf("prot data: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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322 #endif |
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323 } |
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324 |
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325 return err_status_ok; |
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326 } |
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327 |
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328 err_status_t |
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329 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_dec(void *key, |
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330 const void *clear, |
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331 unsigned clear_len, |
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332 void *iv, |
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333 void *opaque, |
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334 unsigned *opaque_len) { |
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335 aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
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336 hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
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337 unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
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338 unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
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339 unsigned char tmp_tag[TAG_LEN]; |
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340 unsigned char *auth_tag; |
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341 unsigned ciphertext_len; |
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342 err_status_t status; |
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343 int i; |
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344 |
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345 /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
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346 if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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347 |
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348 /* perform authentication only */ |
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349 |
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350 } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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351 |
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352 /* |
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353 * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
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354 * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
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355 */ |
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356 return err_status_fail; |
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357 |
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358 } else { |
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359 #if DEBUG |
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360 printf("DEC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
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361 #endif |
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362 |
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363 /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
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364 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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365 if (status) return status; |
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366 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
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367 if (status) return status; |
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368 |
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369 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
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370 if (status) return status; |
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371 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
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372 if (status) return status; |
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373 |
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374 #if DEBUG |
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375 printf("prot data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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376 printf("prot data: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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377 #endif |
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378 |
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379 /* |
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380 * set the protected data length to that of the ciphertext, by |
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381 * subtracting out the length of the authentication tag |
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382 */ |
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383 ciphertext_len = *opaque_len - TAG_LEN; |
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384 |
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385 #if DEBUG |
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386 printf("ciphertext len: %d\n", ciphertext_len); |
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387 #endif |
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388 /* verify the authentication tag */ |
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389 |
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390 /* |
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391 * compute the authentication tag for the clear and opaque data, |
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392 * and write it to a temporary location |
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393 */ |
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394 status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
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395 if (status) return status; |
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396 |
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397 status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
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398 if (status) return status; |
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399 |
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400 status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
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401 if (status) return status; |
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402 |
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403 #if DEBUG |
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404 printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
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405 octet_string_hex_string(clear, clear_len)); |
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406 #endif |
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407 |
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408 status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, ciphertext_len, TAG_LEN, tmp_tag); |
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409 if (status) return status; |
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410 |
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411 #if DEBUG |
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412 printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
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413 octet_string_hex_string(opaque, ciphertext_len)); |
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414 #endif |
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415 |
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416 /* |
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417 * compare the computed tag with the one provided as input (which |
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418 * immediately follows the ciphertext) |
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419 */ |
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420 auth_tag = (unsigned char *)opaque; |
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421 auth_tag += ciphertext_len; |
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422 #if DEBUG |
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423 printf("auth_tag: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, TAG_LEN)); |
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424 printf("tmp_tag: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(tmp_tag, TAG_LEN)); |
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425 #endif |
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426 for (i=0; i < TAG_LEN; i++) { |
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427 if (tmp_tag[i] != auth_tag[i]) |
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428 return err_status_auth_fail; |
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429 } |
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430 |
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431 /* bump down the opaque_len to reflect the authentication tag */ |
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432 *opaque_len -= TAG_LEN; |
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433 |
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434 /* decrypt the confidential data */ |
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435 status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_decrypt); |
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436 if (status) return status; |
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437 status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
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438 if (status) return status; |
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439 |
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440 #if DEBUG |
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441 printf("ciphertext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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442 printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
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443 #endif |
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444 |
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445 #if ENC |
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446 status = aes_cbc_nist_decrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, &ciphertext_len); |
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447 if (status) return status; |
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448 #endif |
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449 |
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450 #if DEBUG |
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451 printf("plaintext len: %d\n", ciphertext_len); |
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452 printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
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453 octet_string_hex_string(opaque, ciphertext_len)); |
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454 #endif |
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455 |
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456 /* indicate the length of the plaintext */ |
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457 *opaque_len = ciphertext_len; |
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458 } |
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459 |
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460 return err_status_ok; |
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461 } |
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462 |
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463 cryptoalg_ctx_t cryptoalg_ctx = { |
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464 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_enc, |
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465 aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_dec, |
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466 KEY_LEN, |
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467 IV_LEN, |
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468 TAG_LEN, |
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469 MAX_EXPAND, |
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470 }; |
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471 |
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472 cryptoalg_t cryptoalg = &cryptoalg_ctx; |
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473 |
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474 #define NULL_TAG_LEN 12 |
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475 |
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476 err_status_t |
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477 null_enc(void *key, |
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478 const void *clear, |
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479 unsigned clear_len, |
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480 void *iv, |
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481 void *opaque, |
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482 unsigned *opaque_len) { |
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483 int i; |
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484 unsigned char *auth_tag; |
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485 unsigned char *init_vec = iv; |
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486 |
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487 /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
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488 if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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489 |
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490 /* perform authentication only */ |
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491 |
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492 } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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493 |
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494 /* |
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495 * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
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496 * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
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497 */ |
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498 return err_status_fail; |
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499 |
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500 } else { |
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501 |
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502 #if DEBUG |
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503 printf("NULL ENC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
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504 printf("NULL_TAG_LEN: %d\n", NULL_TAG_LEN); |
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505 printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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506 #endif |
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507 for (i=0; i < IV_LEN; i++) |
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508 init_vec[i] = i + (i * 16); |
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509 #if DEBUG |
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510 printf("iv: %s\n", |
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511 octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
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512 printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
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513 octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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514 #endif |
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515 auth_tag = opaque; |
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516 auth_tag += *opaque_len; |
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517 for (i=0; i < NULL_TAG_LEN; i++) |
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518 auth_tag[i] = i + (i * 16); |
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519 *opaque_len += NULL_TAG_LEN; |
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520 #if DEBUG |
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521 printf("protected data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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522 printf("protected data: %s\n", |
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523 octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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524 #endif |
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525 |
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526 } |
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527 |
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528 return err_status_ok; |
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529 } |
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530 |
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531 err_status_t |
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532 null_dec(void *key, |
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533 const void *clear, |
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534 unsigned clear_len, |
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535 void *iv, |
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536 void *opaque, |
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537 unsigned *opaque_len) { |
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538 unsigned char *auth_tag; |
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539 |
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540 /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
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541 if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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542 |
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543 /* perform authentication only */ |
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544 |
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545 } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
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546 |
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547 /* |
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548 * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
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549 * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
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550 */ |
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551 return err_status_fail; |
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552 |
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553 } else { |
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554 |
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555 #if DEBUG |
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556 printf("NULL DEC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
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557 |
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558 printf("protected data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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559 printf("protected data: %s\n", |
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560 octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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561 #endif |
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562 auth_tag = opaque; |
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563 auth_tag += (*opaque_len - NULL_TAG_LEN); |
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564 #if DEBUG |
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565 printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
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566 #endif |
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567 *opaque_len -= NULL_TAG_LEN; |
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568 #if DEBUG |
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569 printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
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570 printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
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571 octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
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572 #endif |
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573 } |
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574 |
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575 return err_status_ok; |
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576 } |
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577 |
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578 cryptoalg_ctx_t null_cryptoalg_ctx = { |
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579 null_enc, |
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580 null_dec, |
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581 KEY_LEN, |
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582 IV_LEN, |
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583 NULL_TAG_LEN, |
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584 MAX_EXPAND, |
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585 }; |
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586 |
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587 cryptoalg_t null_cryptoalg = &null_cryptoalg_ctx; |
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588 |
|
589 int |
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590 cryptoalg_get_id(cryptoalg_t c) { |
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591 if (c == cryptoalg) |
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592 return 1; |
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593 return 0; |
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594 } |
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595 |
|
596 cryptoalg_t |
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597 cryptoalg_find_by_id(int id) { |
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598 switch(id) { |
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599 case 1: |
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600 return cryptoalg; |
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601 default: |
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602 break; |
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603 } |
|
604 return 0; |
|
605 } |