Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.
michael@0 | 1 | /* |
michael@0 | 2 | * xfm.c |
michael@0 | 3 | * |
michael@0 | 4 | * Crypto transform implementation |
michael@0 | 5 | * |
michael@0 | 6 | * David A. McGrew |
michael@0 | 7 | * Cisco Systems, Inc. |
michael@0 | 8 | */ |
michael@0 | 9 | /* |
michael@0 | 10 | * |
michael@0 | 11 | * Copyright (c) 2001-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. |
michael@0 | 12 | * All rights reserved. |
michael@0 | 13 | * |
michael@0 | 14 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
michael@0 | 15 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
michael@0 | 16 | * are met: |
michael@0 | 17 | * |
michael@0 | 18 | * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
michael@0 | 19 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
michael@0 | 20 | * |
michael@0 | 21 | * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above |
michael@0 | 22 | * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following |
michael@0 | 23 | * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided |
michael@0 | 24 | * with the distribution. |
michael@0 | 25 | * |
michael@0 | 26 | * Neither the name of the Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its |
michael@0 | 27 | * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived |
michael@0 | 28 | * from this software without specific prior written permission. |
michael@0 | 29 | * |
michael@0 | 30 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS |
michael@0 | 31 | * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT |
michael@0 | 32 | * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS |
michael@0 | 33 | * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE |
michael@0 | 34 | * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, |
michael@0 | 35 | * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES |
michael@0 | 36 | * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR |
michael@0 | 37 | * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
michael@0 | 38 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
michael@0 | 39 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
michael@0 | 40 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
michael@0 | 41 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
michael@0 | 42 | * |
michael@0 | 43 | */ |
michael@0 | 44 | |
michael@0 | 45 | #include "cryptoalg.h" |
michael@0 | 46 | #include "aes_cbc.h" |
michael@0 | 47 | #include "hmac.h" |
michael@0 | 48 | #include "crypto_kernel.h" /* for crypto_get_random() */ |
michael@0 | 49 | |
michael@0 | 50 | #define KEY_LEN 16 |
michael@0 | 51 | #define ENC_KEY_LEN 16 |
michael@0 | 52 | #define MAC_KEY_LEN 16 |
michael@0 | 53 | #define IV_LEN 16 |
michael@0 | 54 | #define TAG_LEN 12 |
michael@0 | 55 | #define MAX_EXPAND 27 |
michael@0 | 56 | |
michael@0 | 57 | err_status_t |
michael@0 | 58 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_func(void *key, |
michael@0 | 59 | void *clear, |
michael@0 | 60 | unsigned clear_len, |
michael@0 | 61 | void *iv, |
michael@0 | 62 | void *opaque, |
michael@0 | 63 | unsigned *opaque_len, |
michael@0 | 64 | void *auth_tag) { |
michael@0 | 65 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
michael@0 | 66 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
michael@0 | 67 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 68 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 69 | err_status_t status; |
michael@0 | 70 | |
michael@0 | 71 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 72 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 73 | |
michael@0 | 74 | /* perform authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 75 | |
michael@0 | 76 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 77 | |
michael@0 | 78 | /* |
michael@0 | 79 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
michael@0 | 80 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
michael@0 | 81 | */ |
michael@0 | 82 | return err_status_fail; |
michael@0 | 83 | |
michael@0 | 84 | } else { |
michael@0 | 85 | |
michael@0 | 86 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
michael@0 | 87 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 88 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 89 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
michael@0 | 90 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 91 | |
michael@0 | 92 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 93 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 94 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
michael@0 | 95 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 96 | |
michael@0 | 97 | |
michael@0 | 98 | /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
michael@0 | 99 | |
michael@0 | 100 | /* set aes key */ |
michael@0 | 101 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_encrypt); |
michael@0 | 102 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 103 | |
michael@0 | 104 | /* set iv */ |
michael@0 | 105 | status = crypto_get_random(iv, IV_LEN); |
michael@0 | 106 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 107 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
michael@0 | 108 | |
michael@0 | 109 | /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
michael@0 | 110 | status = aes_cbc_nist_encrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 111 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 112 | |
michael@0 | 113 | /* authenticate clear and opaque data */ |
michael@0 | 114 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 115 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 116 | |
michael@0 | 117 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
michael@0 | 118 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 119 | |
michael@0 | 120 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
michael@0 | 121 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 122 | |
michael@0 | 123 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, auth_tag); |
michael@0 | 124 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 125 | |
michael@0 | 126 | } |
michael@0 | 127 | |
michael@0 | 128 | return err_status_ok; |
michael@0 | 129 | } |
michael@0 | 130 | |
michael@0 | 131 | err_status_t |
michael@0 | 132 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_inv(void *key, |
michael@0 | 133 | void *clear, |
michael@0 | 134 | unsigned clear_len, |
michael@0 | 135 | void *iv, |
michael@0 | 136 | void *opaque, |
michael@0 | 137 | unsigned *opaque_len, |
michael@0 | 138 | void *auth_tag) { |
michael@0 | 139 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
michael@0 | 140 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
michael@0 | 141 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 142 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 143 | unsigned char tmp_tag[TAG_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 144 | unsigned char *tag = auth_tag; |
michael@0 | 145 | err_status_t status; |
michael@0 | 146 | int i; |
michael@0 | 147 | |
michael@0 | 148 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 149 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 150 | |
michael@0 | 151 | /* perform authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 152 | |
michael@0 | 153 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 154 | |
michael@0 | 155 | /* |
michael@0 | 156 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
michael@0 | 157 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
michael@0 | 158 | */ |
michael@0 | 159 | return err_status_fail; |
michael@0 | 160 | |
michael@0 | 161 | } else { |
michael@0 | 162 | |
michael@0 | 163 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
michael@0 | 164 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 165 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 166 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
michael@0 | 167 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 168 | |
michael@0 | 169 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 170 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 171 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
michael@0 | 172 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 173 | |
michael@0 | 174 | /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
michael@0 | 175 | |
michael@0 | 176 | /* set aes key */ |
michael@0 | 177 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_decrypt); |
michael@0 | 178 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 179 | |
michael@0 | 180 | /* set iv */ |
michael@0 | 181 | status = rand_source_get_octet_string(iv, IV_LEN); |
michael@0 | 182 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 183 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
michael@0 | 184 | |
michael@0 | 185 | /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
michael@0 | 186 | status = aes_cbc_nist_decrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 187 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 188 | |
michael@0 | 189 | /* authenticate clear and opaque data */ |
michael@0 | 190 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 191 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 192 | |
michael@0 | 193 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
michael@0 | 194 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 195 | |
michael@0 | 196 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
michael@0 | 197 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 198 | |
michael@0 | 199 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, tmp_tag); |
michael@0 | 200 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 201 | |
michael@0 | 202 | /* compare the computed tag with the one provided as input */ |
michael@0 | 203 | for (i=0; i < TAG_LEN; i++) |
michael@0 | 204 | if (tmp_tag[i] != tag[i]) |
michael@0 | 205 | return err_status_auth_fail; |
michael@0 | 206 | |
michael@0 | 207 | } |
michael@0 | 208 | |
michael@0 | 209 | return err_status_ok; |
michael@0 | 210 | } |
michael@0 | 211 | |
michael@0 | 212 | |
michael@0 | 213 | #define ENC 1 |
michael@0 | 214 | |
michael@0 | 215 | #define DEBUG 0 |
michael@0 | 216 | |
michael@0 | 217 | err_status_t |
michael@0 | 218 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_enc(void *key, |
michael@0 | 219 | const void *clear, |
michael@0 | 220 | unsigned clear_len, |
michael@0 | 221 | void *iv, |
michael@0 | 222 | void *opaque, |
michael@0 | 223 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
michael@0 | 224 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
michael@0 | 225 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
michael@0 | 226 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 227 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 228 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
michael@0 | 229 | err_status_t status; |
michael@0 | 230 | |
michael@0 | 231 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 232 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 233 | |
michael@0 | 234 | /* perform authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 235 | |
michael@0 | 236 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 237 | |
michael@0 | 238 | /* |
michael@0 | 239 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
michael@0 | 240 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
michael@0 | 241 | */ |
michael@0 | 242 | return err_status_fail; |
michael@0 | 243 | |
michael@0 | 244 | } else { |
michael@0 | 245 | |
michael@0 | 246 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 247 | printf("ENC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 248 | #endif |
michael@0 | 249 | |
michael@0 | 250 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
michael@0 | 251 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 252 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 253 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
michael@0 | 254 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 255 | |
michael@0 | 256 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 257 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 258 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
michael@0 | 259 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 260 | |
michael@0 | 261 | |
michael@0 | 262 | /* perform encryption and authentication */ |
michael@0 | 263 | |
michael@0 | 264 | /* set aes key */ |
michael@0 | 265 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_encrypt); |
michael@0 | 266 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 267 | |
michael@0 | 268 | /* set iv */ |
michael@0 | 269 | status = rand_source_get_octet_string(iv, IV_LEN); |
michael@0 | 270 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 271 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
michael@0 | 272 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 273 | |
michael@0 | 274 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 275 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 276 | printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 277 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 278 | #endif |
michael@0 | 279 | |
michael@0 | 280 | #if ENC |
michael@0 | 281 | /* encrypt the opaque data */ |
michael@0 | 282 | status = aes_cbc_nist_encrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 283 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 284 | #endif |
michael@0 | 285 | |
michael@0 | 286 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 287 | printf("ciphertext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 288 | printf("ciphertext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 289 | #endif |
michael@0 | 290 | |
michael@0 | 291 | /* |
michael@0 | 292 | * authenticate clear and opaque data, then write the |
michael@0 | 293 | * authentication tag to the location immediately following the |
michael@0 | 294 | * ciphertext |
michael@0 | 295 | */ |
michael@0 | 296 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 297 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 298 | |
michael@0 | 299 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
michael@0 | 300 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 301 | |
michael@0 | 302 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
michael@0 | 303 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 304 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 305 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 306 | octet_string_hex_string(clear, clear_len)); |
michael@0 | 307 | #endif |
michael@0 | 308 | auth_tag = (unsigned char *)opaque; |
michael@0 | 309 | auth_tag += *opaque_len; |
michael@0 | 310 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, *opaque_len, TAG_LEN, auth_tag); |
michael@0 | 311 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 312 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 313 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 314 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 315 | #endif |
michael@0 | 316 | /* bump up the opaque_len to reflect the authentication tag */ |
michael@0 | 317 | *opaque_len += TAG_LEN; |
michael@0 | 318 | |
michael@0 | 319 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 320 | printf("prot data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 321 | printf("prot data: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 322 | #endif |
michael@0 | 323 | } |
michael@0 | 324 | |
michael@0 | 325 | return err_status_ok; |
michael@0 | 326 | } |
michael@0 | 327 | |
michael@0 | 328 | err_status_t |
michael@0 | 329 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_dec(void *key, |
michael@0 | 330 | const void *clear, |
michael@0 | 331 | unsigned clear_len, |
michael@0 | 332 | void *iv, |
michael@0 | 333 | void *opaque, |
michael@0 | 334 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
michael@0 | 335 | aes_cbc_ctx_t aes_ctx; |
michael@0 | 336 | hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; |
michael@0 | 337 | unsigned char enc_key[ENC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 338 | unsigned char mac_key[MAC_KEY_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 339 | unsigned char tmp_tag[TAG_LEN]; |
michael@0 | 340 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
michael@0 | 341 | unsigned ciphertext_len; |
michael@0 | 342 | err_status_t status; |
michael@0 | 343 | int i; |
michael@0 | 344 | |
michael@0 | 345 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 346 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 347 | |
michael@0 | 348 | /* perform authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 349 | |
michael@0 | 350 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 351 | |
michael@0 | 352 | /* |
michael@0 | 353 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
michael@0 | 354 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
michael@0 | 355 | */ |
michael@0 | 356 | return err_status_fail; |
michael@0 | 357 | |
michael@0 | 358 | } else { |
michael@0 | 359 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 360 | printf("DEC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 361 | #endif |
michael@0 | 362 | |
michael@0 | 363 | /* derive encryption and authentication keys from the input key */ |
michael@0 | 364 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 365 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 366 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "ENC", 3, ENC_KEY_LEN, enc_key); |
michael@0 | 367 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 368 | |
michael@0 | 369 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, key, KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 370 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 371 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, "MAC", 3, MAC_KEY_LEN, mac_key); |
michael@0 | 372 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 373 | |
michael@0 | 374 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 375 | printf("prot data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 376 | printf("prot data: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 377 | #endif |
michael@0 | 378 | |
michael@0 | 379 | /* |
michael@0 | 380 | * set the protected data length to that of the ciphertext, by |
michael@0 | 381 | * subtracting out the length of the authentication tag |
michael@0 | 382 | */ |
michael@0 | 383 | ciphertext_len = *opaque_len - TAG_LEN; |
michael@0 | 384 | |
michael@0 | 385 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 386 | printf("ciphertext len: %d\n", ciphertext_len); |
michael@0 | 387 | #endif |
michael@0 | 388 | /* verify the authentication tag */ |
michael@0 | 389 | |
michael@0 | 390 | /* |
michael@0 | 391 | * compute the authentication tag for the clear and opaque data, |
michael@0 | 392 | * and write it to a temporary location |
michael@0 | 393 | */ |
michael@0 | 394 | status = hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, mac_key, MAC_KEY_LEN); |
michael@0 | 395 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 396 | |
michael@0 | 397 | status = hmac_start(&hmac_ctx); |
michael@0 | 398 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 399 | |
michael@0 | 400 | status = hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, clear, clear_len); |
michael@0 | 401 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 402 | |
michael@0 | 403 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 404 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 405 | octet_string_hex_string(clear, clear_len)); |
michael@0 | 406 | #endif |
michael@0 | 407 | |
michael@0 | 408 | status = hmac_compute(&hmac_ctx, opaque, ciphertext_len, TAG_LEN, tmp_tag); |
michael@0 | 409 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 410 | |
michael@0 | 411 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 412 | printf("hmac input: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 413 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, ciphertext_len)); |
michael@0 | 414 | #endif |
michael@0 | 415 | |
michael@0 | 416 | /* |
michael@0 | 417 | * compare the computed tag with the one provided as input (which |
michael@0 | 418 | * immediately follows the ciphertext) |
michael@0 | 419 | */ |
michael@0 | 420 | auth_tag = (unsigned char *)opaque; |
michael@0 | 421 | auth_tag += ciphertext_len; |
michael@0 | 422 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 423 | printf("auth_tag: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, TAG_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 424 | printf("tmp_tag: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(tmp_tag, TAG_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 425 | #endif |
michael@0 | 426 | for (i=0; i < TAG_LEN; i++) { |
michael@0 | 427 | if (tmp_tag[i] != auth_tag[i]) |
michael@0 | 428 | return err_status_auth_fail; |
michael@0 | 429 | } |
michael@0 | 430 | |
michael@0 | 431 | /* bump down the opaque_len to reflect the authentication tag */ |
michael@0 | 432 | *opaque_len -= TAG_LEN; |
michael@0 | 433 | |
michael@0 | 434 | /* decrypt the confidential data */ |
michael@0 | 435 | status = aes_cbc_context_init(&aes_ctx, key, ENC_KEY_LEN, direction_decrypt); |
michael@0 | 436 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 437 | status = aes_cbc_set_iv(&aes_ctx, iv); |
michael@0 | 438 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 439 | |
michael@0 | 440 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 441 | printf("ciphertext: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 442 | printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 443 | #endif |
michael@0 | 444 | |
michael@0 | 445 | #if ENC |
michael@0 | 446 | status = aes_cbc_nist_decrypt(&aes_ctx, opaque, &ciphertext_len); |
michael@0 | 447 | if (status) return status; |
michael@0 | 448 | #endif |
michael@0 | 449 | |
michael@0 | 450 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 451 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", ciphertext_len); |
michael@0 | 452 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 453 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, ciphertext_len)); |
michael@0 | 454 | #endif |
michael@0 | 455 | |
michael@0 | 456 | /* indicate the length of the plaintext */ |
michael@0 | 457 | *opaque_len = ciphertext_len; |
michael@0 | 458 | } |
michael@0 | 459 | |
michael@0 | 460 | return err_status_ok; |
michael@0 | 461 | } |
michael@0 | 462 | |
michael@0 | 463 | cryptoalg_ctx_t cryptoalg_ctx = { |
michael@0 | 464 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_enc, |
michael@0 | 465 | aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1_96_dec, |
michael@0 | 466 | KEY_LEN, |
michael@0 | 467 | IV_LEN, |
michael@0 | 468 | TAG_LEN, |
michael@0 | 469 | MAX_EXPAND, |
michael@0 | 470 | }; |
michael@0 | 471 | |
michael@0 | 472 | cryptoalg_t cryptoalg = &cryptoalg_ctx; |
michael@0 | 473 | |
michael@0 | 474 | #define NULL_TAG_LEN 12 |
michael@0 | 475 | |
michael@0 | 476 | err_status_t |
michael@0 | 477 | null_enc(void *key, |
michael@0 | 478 | const void *clear, |
michael@0 | 479 | unsigned clear_len, |
michael@0 | 480 | void *iv, |
michael@0 | 481 | void *opaque, |
michael@0 | 482 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
michael@0 | 483 | int i; |
michael@0 | 484 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
michael@0 | 485 | unsigned char *init_vec = iv; |
michael@0 | 486 | |
michael@0 | 487 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 488 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 489 | |
michael@0 | 490 | /* perform authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 491 | |
michael@0 | 492 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 493 | |
michael@0 | 494 | /* |
michael@0 | 495 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
michael@0 | 496 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
michael@0 | 497 | */ |
michael@0 | 498 | return err_status_fail; |
michael@0 | 499 | |
michael@0 | 500 | } else { |
michael@0 | 501 | |
michael@0 | 502 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 503 | printf("NULL ENC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 504 | printf("NULL_TAG_LEN: %d\n", NULL_TAG_LEN); |
michael@0 | 505 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 506 | #endif |
michael@0 | 507 | for (i=0; i < IV_LEN; i++) |
michael@0 | 508 | init_vec[i] = i + (i * 16); |
michael@0 | 509 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 510 | printf("iv: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 511 | octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 512 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 513 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 514 | #endif |
michael@0 | 515 | auth_tag = opaque; |
michael@0 | 516 | auth_tag += *opaque_len; |
michael@0 | 517 | for (i=0; i < NULL_TAG_LEN; i++) |
michael@0 | 518 | auth_tag[i] = i + (i * 16); |
michael@0 | 519 | *opaque_len += NULL_TAG_LEN; |
michael@0 | 520 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 521 | printf("protected data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 522 | printf("protected data: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 523 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 524 | #endif |
michael@0 | 525 | |
michael@0 | 526 | } |
michael@0 | 527 | |
michael@0 | 528 | return err_status_ok; |
michael@0 | 529 | } |
michael@0 | 530 | |
michael@0 | 531 | err_status_t |
michael@0 | 532 | null_dec(void *key, |
michael@0 | 533 | const void *clear, |
michael@0 | 534 | unsigned clear_len, |
michael@0 | 535 | void *iv, |
michael@0 | 536 | void *opaque, |
michael@0 | 537 | unsigned *opaque_len) { |
michael@0 | 538 | unsigned char *auth_tag; |
michael@0 | 539 | |
michael@0 | 540 | /* check if we're doing authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 541 | if ((iv == NULL) && (opaque == NULL) && (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 542 | |
michael@0 | 543 | /* perform authentication only */ |
michael@0 | 544 | |
michael@0 | 545 | } else if ((iv == NULL) || (opaque == NULL) || (opaque_len == NULL)) { |
michael@0 | 546 | |
michael@0 | 547 | /* |
michael@0 | 548 | * bad parameter - we expect either all three pointers to be NULL, |
michael@0 | 549 | * or none of those pointers to be NULL |
michael@0 | 550 | */ |
michael@0 | 551 | return err_status_fail; |
michael@0 | 552 | |
michael@0 | 553 | } else { |
michael@0 | 554 | |
michael@0 | 555 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 556 | printf("NULL DEC using key %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(key, KEY_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 557 | |
michael@0 | 558 | printf("protected data len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 559 | printf("protected data: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 560 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 561 | #endif |
michael@0 | 562 | auth_tag = opaque; |
michael@0 | 563 | auth_tag += (*opaque_len - NULL_TAG_LEN); |
michael@0 | 564 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 565 | printf("iv: %s\n", octet_string_hex_string(iv, IV_LEN)); |
michael@0 | 566 | #endif |
michael@0 | 567 | *opaque_len -= NULL_TAG_LEN; |
michael@0 | 568 | #if DEBUG |
michael@0 | 569 | printf("plaintext len: %d\n", *opaque_len); |
michael@0 | 570 | printf("plaintext: %s\n", |
michael@0 | 571 | octet_string_hex_string(opaque, *opaque_len)); |
michael@0 | 572 | #endif |
michael@0 | 573 | } |
michael@0 | 574 | |
michael@0 | 575 | return err_status_ok; |
michael@0 | 576 | } |
michael@0 | 577 | |
michael@0 | 578 | cryptoalg_ctx_t null_cryptoalg_ctx = { |
michael@0 | 579 | null_enc, |
michael@0 | 580 | null_dec, |
michael@0 | 581 | KEY_LEN, |
michael@0 | 582 | IV_LEN, |
michael@0 | 583 | NULL_TAG_LEN, |
michael@0 | 584 | MAX_EXPAND, |
michael@0 | 585 | }; |
michael@0 | 586 | |
michael@0 | 587 | cryptoalg_t null_cryptoalg = &null_cryptoalg_ctx; |
michael@0 | 588 | |
michael@0 | 589 | int |
michael@0 | 590 | cryptoalg_get_id(cryptoalg_t c) { |
michael@0 | 591 | if (c == cryptoalg) |
michael@0 | 592 | return 1; |
michael@0 | 593 | return 0; |
michael@0 | 594 | } |
michael@0 | 595 | |
michael@0 | 596 | cryptoalg_t |
michael@0 | 597 | cryptoalg_find_by_id(int id) { |
michael@0 | 598 | switch(id) { |
michael@0 | 599 | case 1: |
michael@0 | 600 | return cryptoalg; |
michael@0 | 601 | default: |
michael@0 | 602 | break; |
michael@0 | 603 | } |
michael@0 | 604 | return 0; |
michael@0 | 605 | } |