The Tor Browser: security/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h

Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100

author: Michael Schloh von Bennewitz <michael@schloh.com>
date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 06:09:35 +0100
changeset 0: 6474c204b198
permissions: -rw-r--r--

Cloned upstream origin tor-browser at tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1-build1
revision ID fc1c9ff7c1b2defdbc039f12214767608f46423f for hacking purpose.

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 #ifndef SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_
 #define SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_
 #include <string>
 #include "base/basictypes.h"
 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_types.h"
 #include "sandbox/win/src/security_level.h"
 namespace sandbox {
 class TargetPolicy {
  public:
   // Windows subsystems that can have specific rules.
   // Note: The process subsystem(SUBSY_PROCESS) does not evaluate the request
   // exactly like the CreateProcess API does. See the comment at the top of
   // process_thread_dispatcher.cc for more details.
   enum SubSystem {
     SUBSYS_FILES,             // Creation and opening of files and pipes.
     SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,       // Creation of named pipes.
     SUBSYS_PROCESS,           // Creation of child processes.
     SUBSYS_REGISTRY,          // Creation and opening of registry keys.
     SUBSYS_SYNC,              // Creation of named sync objects.
     SUBSYS_HANDLES            // Duplication of handles to other processes.
   };
   // Allowable semantics when a rule is matched.
   enum Semantics {
     FILES_ALLOW_ANY,       // Allows open or create for any kind of access that
                            // the file system supports.
     FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,  // Allows open or create with read access only.
     FILES_ALLOW_QUERY,     // Allows access to query the attributes of a file.
     FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY,   // Allows open or create with directory semantics
                            // only.
     HANDLES_DUP_ANY,       // Allows duplicating handles opened with any
                            // access permissions.
     HANDLES_DUP_BROKER,    // Allows duplicating handles to the broker process.
     NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,  // Allows creation of a named pipe.
     PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,      // Allows to create a process with minimal rights
                            // over the resulting process and thread handles.
                            // No other parameters besides the command line are
                            // passed to the child process.
     PROCESS_ALL_EXEC,      // Allows the creation of a process and return fill
                            // access on the returned handles.
                            // This flag can be used only when the main token of
                            // the sandboxed application is at least INTERACTIVE.
     EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY,      // Allows the creation of an event with full access.
     EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows opening an even with synchronize access.
     REG_ALLOW_READONLY,    // Allows readonly access to a registry key.
     REG_ALLOW_ANY          // Allows read and write access to a registry key.
   };
   // Increments the reference count of this object. The reference count must
   // be incremented if this interface is given to another component.
   virtual void AddRef() = 0;
   // Decrements the reference count of this object. When the reference count
   // is zero the object is automatically destroyed.
   // Indicates that the caller is done with this interface. After calling
   // release no other method should be called.
   virtual void Release() = 0;
   // Sets the security level for the target process' two tokens.
   // This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target process is
   // spawned.
   // initial: the security level for the initial token. This is the token that
   //   is used by the process from the creation of the process until the moment
   //   the process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls
   //   win32's ReverToSelf(). Once this happens the initial token is no longer
   //   available and the lockdown token is in effect. Using an initial token is
   //   not compatible with AppContainer, see SetAppContainer.
   // lockdown: the security level for the token that comes into force after the
   //   process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls
   //   ReverToSelf(). See the explanation of each level in the TokenLevel
   //   definition.
   // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise.
   //   Returns false if the lockdown value is more permissive than the initial
   //   value.
   //
   // Important: most of the sandbox-provided security relies on this single
   // setting. The caller should strive to set the lockdown level as restricted
   // as possible.
   virtual ResultCode SetTokenLevel(TokenLevel initial, TokenLevel lockdown) = 0;
   // Sets the security level of the Job Object to which the target process will
   // belong. This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target
   // process is spawned. The job controls the global security settings which
   // can not be specified in the token security profile.
   // job_level: the security level for the job. See the explanation of each
   //   level in the JobLevel definition.
   // ui_exceptions: specify what specific rights that are disabled in the
   //   chosen job_level that need to be granted. Use this parameter to avoid
   //   selecting the next permissive job level unless you need all the rights
   //   that are granted in such level.
   //   The exceptions can be specified as a combination of the following
   //   constants:
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES : grant access to all user-mode handles. These
   //   include windows, icons, menus and various GDI objects. In addition the
   //   target process can set hooks, and broadcast messages to other processes
   //   that belong to the same desktop.
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD : grant read-only access to the clipboard.
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_WRITECLIPBOARD : grant write access to the clipboard.
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS : allow changes to the system-wide
   //   parameters as defined by the Win32 call SystemParametersInfo().
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS : allow programmatic changes to the
   //  display settings.
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_GLOBALATOMS : allow access to the global atoms table.
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP : allow the creation of new desktops.
   // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS : allow the call to ExitWindows().
   //
   // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise.
   //
   // Note: JOB_OBJECT_XXXX constants are defined in winnt.h and documented at
   // length in:
   //   http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684152.aspx
   //
   // Note: the recommended level is JOB_RESTRICTED or JOB_LOCKDOWN.
   virtual ResultCode SetJobLevel(JobLevel job_level, uint32 ui_exceptions) = 0;
   // Specifies the desktop on which the application is going to run. If the
   // desktop does not exist, it will be created. If alternate_winstation is
   // set to true, the desktop will be created on an alternate window station.
   virtual ResultCode SetAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0;
   // Returns the name of the alternate desktop used. If an alternate window
   // station is specified, the name is prepended by the window station name,
   // followed by a backslash.
   virtual std::wstring GetAlternateDesktop() const = 0;
   // Precreates the desktop and window station, if any.
   virtual ResultCode CreateAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0;
   // Destroys the desktop and windows station.
   virtual void DestroyAlternateDesktop() = 0;
   // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. Both the initial
   // token and the main token will be affected by this. If the integrity level
   // is set to a level higher than the current level, the sandbox will fail
   // to start.
   virtual ResultCode SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0;
   // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. The integrity level
   // will not take effect before you call LowerToken. User Interface Privilege
   // Isolation is not affected by this setting and will remain off for the
   // process in the sandbox. If the integrity level is set to a level higher
   // than the current level, the sandbox will fail to start.
   virtual ResultCode SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0;
   // Sets the AppContainer to be used for the sandboxed process. Any capability
   // to be enabled for the process should be added before this method is invoked
   // (by calling SetCapability() as many times as needed).
   // The desired AppContainer must be already installed on the system, otherwise
   // launching the sandboxed process will fail. See BrokerServices for details
   // about installing an AppContainer.
   // Note that currently Windows restricts the use of impersonation within
   // AppContainers, so this function is incompatible with the use of an initial
   // token.
   virtual ResultCode SetAppContainer(const wchar_t* sid) = 0;
   // Sets a capability to be enabled for the sandboxed process' AppContainer.
   virtual ResultCode SetCapability(const wchar_t* sid) = 0;
   // Sets the mitigations enabled when the process is created. Most of these
   // are implemented as attributes passed via STARTUPINFOEX. So they take
   // effect before any thread in the target executes. The declaration of
   // MitigationFlags is followed by a detailed description of each flag.
   virtual ResultCode SetProcessMitigations(MitigationFlags flags) = 0;
   // Returns the currently set mitigation flags.
   virtual MitigationFlags GetProcessMitigations() = 0;
   // Sets process mitigation flags that don't take effect before the call to
   // LowerToken().
   virtual ResultCode SetDelayedProcessMitigations(MitigationFlags flags) = 0;
   // Returns the currently set delayed mitigation flags.
   virtual MitigationFlags GetDelayedProcessMitigations() = 0;
   // Sets the interceptions to operate in strict mode. By default, interceptions
   // are performed in "relaxed" mode, where if something inside NTDLL.DLL is
   // already patched we attempt to intercept it anyway. Setting interceptions
   // to strict mode means that when we detect that the function is patched we'll
   // refuse to perform the interception.
   virtual void SetStrictInterceptions() = 0;
   // Set the handles the target process should inherit for stdout and
   // stderr.  The handles the caller passes must remain valid for the
   // lifetime of the policy object.  This only has an effect on
   // Windows Vista and later versions.  These methods accept pipe and
   // file handles, but not console handles.
   virtual ResultCode SetStdoutHandle(HANDLE handle) = 0;
   virtual ResultCode SetStderrHandle(HANDLE handle) = 0;
   // Adds a policy rule effective for processes spawned using this policy.
   // subsystem: One of the above enumerated windows subsystems.
   // semantics: One of the above enumerated FileSemantics.
   // pattern: A specific full path or a full path with wildcard patterns.
   //   The valid wildcards are:
   //   '*' : Matches zero or more character. Only one in series allowed.
   //   '?' : Matches a single character. One or more in series are allowed.
   // Examples:
   //   "c:\\documents and settings\\vince\\*.dmp"
   //   "c:\\documents and settings\\*\\crashdumps\\*.dmp"
   //   "c:\\temp\\app_log_?????_chrome.txt"
   virtual ResultCode AddRule(SubSystem subsystem, Semantics semantics,
                              const wchar_t* pattern) = 0;
   // Adds a dll that will be unloaded in the target process before it gets
   // a chance to initialize itself. Typically, dlls that cause the target
   // to crash go here.
   virtual ResultCode AddDllToUnload(const wchar_t* dll_name) = 0;
   // Adds a handle that will be closed in the target process after lockdown.
   // A NULL value for handle_name indicates all handles of the specified type.
   // An empty string for handle_name indicates the handle is unnamed.
   virtual ResultCode AddKernelObjectToClose(const wchar_t* handle_type,
                                             const wchar_t* handle_name) = 0;
 };
 }  // namespace sandbox
 #endif  // SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_

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security/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h@6474c204b198 (annotated)

security/sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h